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Abstract 
Since Vladimir Putin first became Russia’s President in 2000, the state has played an 
increasingly active and interventionist role in the economy, including through its involvement 
in a large number of coercive takeovers of privately-owned businesses. The best known case 
is the Yukos affair, but there have been many other, less prominent takeovers. These have 
largely been explained as predatory acts by state officials seeking to enrich themselves or 
increase their power. This has contributed to the perception that Putin’s Russia is a 
kleptocracy, with the state given free rein to engage in economically-destructive attacks on 
property rights.  
This thesis studies a number of state-led coercive takeovers in Putin’s Russia, including the 
Yukos affair, and argues that they cannot be explained as predatory acts initiated by rent-
seeking state officials. Instead, they were the work of state officials attempting to pursue 
economic development while countering perceived threats to state sovereignty.  
The Yukos affair resulted in the company’s de facto nationalisation and heralded a broader 
trend of expanding state ownership in the economy. But two other coercive takeovers studied 
here instead resulted in the companies being transferred to new private owners. In other cases 
where nationalisation was the clear goal, the state-owned companies who emerged as buyers 
chose indirect forms of ownership over their new assets. The varying ownership outcomes are 
found to have been determined by institutional factors which constrained the behaviour of the 
state, contributing to its preference for takeovers that were negotiated rather than entirely 
coercive, and turning each case into a bargaining game between state and targeted business 
owner. Thus Russia is some way from kleptocracy, not only because of the developmental 
aspirations of its political leadership, but also thanks to partial progress towards institutional 
checks on arbitrary state coercion. 
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“Today I am absolutely sure that the main reason for the Yukos affair was the wish of four or 
five individuals to gain control of a large and successful oil company. Politics in general and 
state policy in particular were used as a pretext in order to convince the country’s leadership 
to use the whole might of the state to redistribute the assets” 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky (2005) 
 
 
“The crux is that in Russia, there is a kleptocracy run by Putin, and all the guys around him. 
They’re not in their job for the execution of public service; their job is to steal money” 
Bill Browder, quoted in Bohlen (2013) 
 
 
“States can sometimes act on behalf of developmental goals, but they are always imperfect 
instruments” 
Peter Evans (1995) 
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Chapter 1: State-led coercive takeovers in 
Putin’s Russia 
 
On 25 October 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Chairman, CEO and largest single 
shareholder of the flourishing privately-owned Russian oil company Yukos, was arrested on 
board his chartered plane at Novosibirsk airport. In the months and years that followed, he and 
his associates either fled the country or were imprisoned on charges of questionable validity, 
and the company was broken up and sold off to pay inflated demands for back taxes. The 
majority of these assets were sold to the state-owned oil company Rosneft’, often for sums of 
money that did not approach their market value.  
The “Yukos affair” has been analysed from many different perspectives, including as a 
demonstrative act aimed at warning Russia’s “oligarchs” to stay out of politics, or as an attack 
on autonomous social forces by an increasingly authoritarian and corporatist state. But one of 
the most common themes has been to highlight the predatory nature of the attack. In other 
words, as the quotation from Khodorkovsky indicates above, the company is seen as having 
been singled out as a lucrative target by a group of state officials intent on self-enrichment 
and/or self-aggrandisement. There is widespread consensus that the attack on Yukos and 
individuals associated with it involved abuses such as the arbitrary and selective application of 
the law, fabricated criminal charges and manipulation of the courts. It is therefore taken to be 
evidence that contemporary Russia is essentially a kleptocracy, and this impression is only 
reinforced by high-profile cases such as the death in prison of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky1. The 
                                                     
1 Magnitsky worked for a law firm named Firestone Duncan, and was tasked by hedge fund manager 
Bill Browder with investigating the theft of subsidiaries of his company Hermitage Capital by 
individuals linked to the Russian Interior Ministry. In response to criminal complaints lodged by 
Magnitsky and Hermitage, police arrested Magnitsky on charges that he was director of two Hermitage 
companies that had failed to pay taxes in 2001. He died in prison of severe pancreatitis in November 
2009, having been singled out for inhumane treatment by the prison authorities. See Weiss (2012). 
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above quotation from Bill Browder echoes a widespread perception of contemporary Russia 
as a country that is both rife with corruption extending to the highest levels of government, 
and lacking the institutions that might provide an effective constraint on state predation2. The 
fact that Russia’s economy has nevertheless enjoyed strong rates of growth since Putin 
assumed the presidency in 2000 has been explained by reference to benign external 
conditions, particularly high world prices for oil, gas and other basic commodities that Russia 
can offer to the world market (Gaddy & Ickes, 2010, p. 284).  
The Yukos affair has also come to symbolise two prominent trends of business-state relations 
in Russia since Vladimir Putin became President in 2000: expanding state ownership in the 
economy and an assault on property rights through takeovers of privately-owned businesses 
using state coercion. Not all of the increase in state ownership has arisen from coercive 
takeovers such as the Yukos affair: much of it has arisen from the voluntary sale of private 
business to state-owned companies. But this trend is nevertheless often associated with the 
notion that Russia’s state officials are mainly interested in enriching themselves and their 
associates. There is some justification for this: not only is state ownership typically seen as 
having negative implications for economic performance (Boardman & Vining, 1995)3, but 
there are also allegations that state-owned companies have overpaid substantially when 
buying companies from “favoured” private businessmen (Belkovsky, 2010)4, while using state 
coercion and other forms of administrative pressure to drive down the price of other purchases 
(Heinrich, 2008). In weak institutional environments, state-owned companies create 
opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking by insiders (Tompson, 2008, p. 8). It is also 
assumed that state officials are able to use directorships of state-owned companies to enrich 
                                                     
2 The pioneering investigative work of another lawyer, Aleksei Naval’ny, has helped to bring to light 
some of the worst examples of high-level corruption and misuse of public money. The English-
language version of his blog is available at http://navalny-en.livejournal.com.  
3  Though see Hertog (2010) for an examination of the circumstances under which state-owned 
companies have enjoyed successful performance even in “rentier” states. 
4 The best-known example is Gazprom’s purchase of oil company Sibneft’ in September 2005 for 
$13bn.  
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themselves; this is no doubt true to a significant extent, although the precise mechanism by 
which they do this is rarely explained5.  
The two trends of expanding state ownership and state-led coercive takeover have tended to 
be conflated in the minds of analysts, but they are in fact analytically quite distinct. Not only 
has some nationalisation arisen from voluntary purchases, but some state-led coercive 
takeovers have not led to nationalisation. For example, the owners of the oil companies 
Russneft’ and Bashneft’ came under substantial pressure from the state to give up their 
businesses, but the situation was resolved when they sold instead to a different private 
business actor who was apparently more acceptable to the Kremlin6.  
Why, having taken the trouble to force a change of ownership, do state officials not always 
claim the spoils for themselves? This question is not necessarily a genuine puzzle: it may be 
that the private business actor who stepped in as buyer to resolve the situation was colluding 
with the state officials responsible for the coercion, and that afterwards they intended to share 
the spoils. Alternatively, these cases may represent attempts at nationalisation that failed for 
one reason or another. But if the evidence does not bear out either of these explanations, then 
the cases may present a serious challenge to the view that such takeovers were the actions of 
predatory, kleptocratic state actors. 
Accordingly, the thesis examines closely these and numerous other cases of state-led coercive 
takeover. It does so with two related central research questions in mind. Firstly, what was 
motivating the Russian state (or a particular group of state actors) to instigate such takeovers? 
                                                     
5 “The innocent westerner may ask how being on the board of a state company can bring the sort of 
wealth acquired by the Yeltsin-era ‘oligarchs’. The question will be greeted with a pitying smile” 
(Hanson, 2007a, p. 881). The answer does not lie in dividends and official salaries, the details of which 
are publicly disclosed; it may instead lie in the relationships between a state-owned company and the 
suppliers and trading companies it favours. 
6 Granted, in the Russneft’ case, the original buyer, Oleg Deripaska, was not welcomed by some 
elements within the Kremlin. But, as will be explained in Chapter Two, the subsequent sale of 
Russneft’ to another private businessman, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, brought an end to Russneft’s 
problems with the authorities. 
13 
 
Secondly, what causal factors were determining whether such takeovers end with the target 
company being nationalised, or alternatively end with its transfer to a new private owner?  
With respect to the first question, the task is to consider whether the evidence from these 
particular cases supports the view that state actors (in line with the “kleptocracy” hypothesis) 
were prompted by predatory and venal motives to instigate the takeovers, or whether an 
alternative hypothesis, which is elaborated below and is based on state actors having broadly 
“developmental” motives, fits better with the evidence. 
Specifying and naming the domain of cases  
Because the project asks the question of what the state was trying to achieve by forcing a 
change of ownership at particular privately-owned businesses, it requires a term to describe 
such takeovers that does not imply any preconceived ideas regarding the state’s motivations. 
One term that is commonly used to describe coercive takeovers is “expropriation”. This term 
can be misleading, however, in that expropriation by the state implies taking an asset into state 
ownership or otherwise confiscating it for the material benefit of the public7. Moreover, its use 
in the political economy literature extends to cases where the property rights of a private 
business owner are attacked without the business itself changing hands, such as through 
arbitrary or excessive taxation8. 
When coercion is used to deprive a private business owner of his assets without any 
suggestion that this has been done in favour of the state, and without even a pretence that this 
was done for the public good, then in the Russian context this is often labelled reiderstvo. 
                                                     
7 In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the first of three definitions given for “expropriate” is “take out of 
the owner’s hands, esp. for one’s own use; spec. (of a public authority) take away (land) for public use 
or benefit.” 
8 e.g. Markus (2008, p. 75 fn. 3) defines expropriation as “the transfer of corporate value among 
stakeholders, which is (a) not consensual and (b) not transparent or generally applicable. Hence, 
contractual deals, or a universal application of a standard tax rate, do not count as ‘expropriation’; 
arbitrary applications of criminal law or ‘company-specific’ taxation do”. 
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Firestone (2008) defines  reiderstvo in terms of three criteria: 1) it is illegal (and linked to 
organised crime), 2) it uses ostensibly legal means, and 3) unlike less “ambitious” protection 
racketeering, it seeks to take over an entire business rather than just a share of the profits9. By 
all accounts, reiderstvo is a widespread phenomenon which contributes to citizens’ insecurity 
regarding property rights. It commonly includes actual or threatened physical force, which 
during the 1990s typically provided by private (i.e. criminal) actors, but has since then 
increasingly been provided by state actors (Gans-Morse, 2011, 2012; Volkov, 2004). But such 
force is not always employed, and Firestone rightly excludes it as a defining characteristic of 
reiderstvo.  
Both “expropriation” and reiderstvo are terms that imply actions intended to be for the 
material benefit of the state on the one hand, or of corrupt individuals on the other. Because 
the present thesis argues that other considerations are behind some of the state’s coercive 
takeovers, it requires a more neutral term to describe the phenomenon of interest. 
Furthermore, neither of the more commonly used terms have a scope that matches the present 
project’s specific focus on coercive takeovers in which the state plays a leading role. Hence 
the decision to use the more unwieldy but more exact term “state-led coercive takeover”. For 
ease of use, this term will henceforth be abbreviated to “SLCT”. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the set of cases that can be correctly termed SLCTs relate to cases of 
“expropriation” and reiderstvo. The areas shaded blue are not the focus of this project (either 
they did not involve a change of controlling owner, or they did not involve the state). As the 
areas of intersection indicate, some SLCTs are simultaneously cases of reiderstvo (involving 
state agencies for the material benefit of certain predatory individuals) or expropriation (intent 
on boosting state revenues or otherwise citing the public good as justification). The domain of 
                                                     
9 While this definition is undoubtedly correct, its application in the Russian context is problematic. 
Deciding whether a specific takeover was “illegal” despite using “ostensibly legal means” is 
particularly difficult in a country whose legal system is subject to corrupt influence and influence from 
the executive. It is natural for the victims of takeovers to cry reiderstvo and for the media to use the 
term to sensationalise takeovers. 
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takeovers that qualify as SLCTs, and therefore as valid cases for study, is everything inside 
the orange circle. Depending on the answer to the first research question, cases will either fall 
inside the clear orange space (i.e. not explained by reference to the material gain of the state 
or individual state actors), or in one of the intersecting areas (which would indicate that they 
are both SLCTs and cases of expropriation or reiderstvo).  
 
Figure 1. State-led coercive takeovers, expropriation and reiderstvo 
Research question 1: what motivates state actors to instigate 
state-led coercive takeovers? 
Although reinforced in the Russian case by considerable evidence of high-level corruption, 
the notion that state actors are inherently venal and predatory by nature, and that states make 
predatory interventions in the economy unless constrained or incentivised not to do so, is one 
that in any case has a strong tradition in the comparative political economy literature. The 
neoliberal strand of economics that rose to prominence in the late 1970s views interventions 
by the state as creating distortions in what would otherwise be a purely efficient, self-
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regulating free market. Such distortions in turn are believed to generate rents10. As Evans 
(1995, p. 25) observes, the state is viewed in this literature as merely “an aggregation of 
individual maximizers”, and economic interventions are seen as deliberate attempts to distort 
the economy on the part of state actors keen to capture the ensuing rents, either for their own 
financial benefit or to buy support from constituents. The key to development, in this view, 
lies in reducing to a minimum the scope and scale of the state, and its ability to engage in 
inherently destructive economic intervention.  
North (1990) sought to correct this reductive view of the state’s role by emphasizing the 
importance of institutions as “the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of 
economies”. He also noted that the state is needed as a third-party enforcer of contracts in the 
modern world’s increasingly impersonal markets. The starting-point for his theory of 
institutions is an attack on some of the assumptions of rational choice theory that are strongly 
associated with neoliberal economics: he says that individuals may be utility-maximisers, but 
they respond to their environment based on limited information, and consequently ideology 
and institutions are vitally important factors when modelling their behaviour and that of 
societies. Nevertheless, North displayed a continuing wariness regarding the state’s role in the 
economy: “if the state has coercive force, then those who run the state will use that force in 
their interest at the expense of the rest of society” (North, 1990, pp. 58–9). This is a reference 
to the “commitment problem”, which takes as its starting point the notion that “a government 
that is strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to 
confiscate the wealth of its citizens” (Weingast, 1993, p. 287). Thus, although the “new 
institutionalist” school represented by North, Weingast and others saw a more extensive role 
for the state in the economy and society, it still saw the state as a serious threat to economic 
                                                     
10 For a thoughtful definition of the term “rent”, see Gaddy and Ickes (2010, pp. 310–311). They argue 
that, although the “textbook” definition equates rent with profit, corrections should be made in the 
Russian case because of two ways in which that country’s economy deviates from “an efficient market 
economy”: firstly, “resources are not used efficiently”, and secondly, production is for various reasons 
(including the prevalence of side-payments) more costly than in an efficient economy. Benchmarking 
Russia against an ideal-type efficient market economy is therefore central to their use of the term. 
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development. Unless the “commitment problem” was solved, the state would confiscate the 
wealth of its citizens through excessive taxation or asset seizure, either to raise state revenues 
(which are in turn required to sustain the incumbent regime), or for the greed of the ruler who 
makes no distinction between state revenues and his own wealth.  
Various suggestions have been made as to how the “commitment problem” is solved in 
practice. Olson (1993) has argued that leaders of autocratic countries who feel secure enough 
in power behave like investors who enjoy long time-horizons. These wealth-maximising 
“stationary bandits” calibrate their stealing by setting taxation and expropriation at an optimal 
rate that still allows for economic development, thus yielding a higher overall income in the 
long term. The alternative “institutionalist” explanation (e.g. North & Weingast (1989), 
Weingast (1993)) involves “limited government” through a set of “coercion-constraining 
institutions” which ensure that the state’s predatory appetites (or those of individual state 
actors) are kept in check.  
Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003) were (rightly, in this author’s view) dismissive of Olson’s 
explanation, in part because it is entirely based on what the “ruler” decides independently to 
do11 . Regarding the “limited government” explanation, they pointed out, firstly, that the 
number of countries where this can truly be said to pertain is small, and secondly, that the 
economic data do not confirm the negative correlation that is implied between political 
instability (i.e. the absence of limited government) and economic growth. They instead 
presented the model of “vertical political integration” (VPI) to explain how state predation 
might be kept in check and satisfactory rates of economic growth achieved in a country where 
property rights are fragile at best. Under VPI, authoritarian political leaders who are interested 
in economic development establish a narrow rent-seeking coalition with trusted business 
leaders so that the property rights of the latter are guaranteed, even if lawlessness and 
                                                     
11 They also pointed out that Olson’s model implies that other factors (such as approaching old age or 
illness) would reduce time-horizons and prompt rulers to engage in a last-gasp frenzy of predatory 
activity. 
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predation dominate outside of this coalition. The fortunate few who are inside the coalition 
can then think with long time-horizons and invest accordingly, providing the impetus for 
economic growth. Notably, the VPI model retains the assumption that rulers are motivated to 
a large extent by harvesting rents (which they do in collusion with their business allies). The 
model therefore offers a different form of institutional solution (besides limited government) 
to the problem of wealth-maximising, predatory rulers and states. 
What unites the literature discussed above is a narrow conception of the state’s role in 
economic development. The extreme neoliberal view is that the state should be reduced as far 
as practicably possible, while the “new institutionalist” vision of the state extends only as far 
as submitting to institutional constraints on its own predatory appetites, providing some public 
goods such as national defence, protecting individual property rights from other (non-state) 
threats, enforcing contracts between private citizens and putting in place the appropriate 
institutions of a market economy. By contrast, the “developmental state” writers (e.g. 
Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 2004; Waldner, 1999) explore what types 
of active economic intervention by the state, and under what circumstances, have historically 
been successful in playing an instrumental role in economic development. They have been 
inspired by the work of Gerschenkron (1962), who argued that “late developing” countries 
would not be able to catch up with the economic performance of developed countries unless 
the state intervened, including by assuming the role of “investment banker” when insufficient 
private investment was forthcoming. Another inspiration is Polanyi, who argued that free 
markets were (contrary to the views expounded later by the neoliberals) in fact created and 
maintained through “continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism” by the 
state (Polanyi, 2001, p. 146). At the same time, the literature reflects an awareness that even 
good developmental intentions on the part of rulers can descend into kleptocracy when they 
translate into concrete policies and implementation. Following Weber, Evans argues that one 
crucial factor in determining whether states can translate development-minded policies into 
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successful outcomes is the quality of the bureaucracy. Success requires that the bureaucracy 
be united by a sense of corporate coherence, without which bureaucrats will behave much as 
the uncoordinated group of venal interest-maximisers envisaged by neoliberals (Evans, 1995, 
p. 28). 
Rent-seeking, kleptocracy and the “sovereign development” 
hypothesis 
Given the corruption that has been discussed above, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
literature on business-state relations in Russia has mainly favoured explanations based on 
kleptocracy and rent-seeking. The Yeltsin-era state is said to have been “captured” by the 
vested interests of big business, which preferred to block further economic reforms so that 
they could maximise the rents they were enjoying under “partial reform equilibrium” 
(Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2003; Hellman, 1998)12. The Putin regime is seen as having 
been able (through demonstrative actions against big business, most notably its crackdown on 
Yukos) to put big business back into a subordinate position vis-à-vis the state. But the result 
was simply “state recapture” by a new set of rent-seekers (Podplatnik, 2005). The “oligarchs” 
are described as having been supplanted by the new siloviki 13 -oligarchs or “silovarchs” 
(Treisman, 2007), as well as some St Petersburg-based businessmen from civilian life who are 
commonly referred to as “Putin’s friends” (Partiya Narodnoi Svobody, 2011). According to 
Gaddy and Ickes (2010), Putin has put in place a management system to maintain, secure and 
distribute the rents from oil and gas, to which the economy remains addicted; this rent 
management system, also known as “Putin’s Protection Racket”, is “key to the entire political 
economy”14. If not a “protection racket”, then the new system is seen as a more-or-less exact 
                                                     
12 See also Aslund’s description of Russia as one of the “outstanding examples” of the “rent-seeking 
state” in the post-Communist region (Aslund, 2002, p. 3). 
13 The term used to describe Russians with a background in the security services, armed forces or law 
enforcement. 
14 See also Holmberg (2008), Rochlitz (2010) and Wilson (2012). 
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analogue of the aforementioned VPI model based on rent-seeking (Volkov, 2010). 
Alternatively, Putin is thought to be hostage to rival rent-seeking factions, and survives in 
office only by deftly maintaining the balance of power between them (Mehdi & Yenikeyeff, 
2013). 
Crucially, however, widespread corruption does not negate the possibility that the state 
apparatus contains within it a group of individuals who seek development and take active 
steps in pursuit of it with the approval of the head of state. As Leftwich notes, “The politics of 
transition in some developmental states have displayed extraordinary mixtures of 
patrimonialism, centralisation, technocratic economic management, coercion and corruption” 
(Leftwich, 1995, p. 407). Markus (2007, p. 290) suggests a way to reconcile the co-existence 
in Russia of predatory corruption and some genuine efforts in pursuit of economic 
development: there is a lack of coordination between individual government departments, 
each of which may be variously predatory or developmental and may change their stance over 
time. But the present author would argue that corruption and the pursuit of development are 
not mutually exclusive opposites even at the level of the individual state official. Olson’s 
“stationary bandits” and other models based on wealth-maximising state actors provide a 
crude caricature of how individuals make choices and rationalise and justify those choices. 
The same can be said of the aforementioned description by Bill Browder of Putin and his 
associates as “not in their job for the execution of public service; their job is to steal money”. 
Olivier De Sardan (1999, pp. 34–35) has observed that “the practices that come under the 
complex of corruption, while being legally culpable and widely reproved, are none the less 
considered by their perpetrators as being legitimate, and often as not being corruption at all 
[...] In one sense, ‘corruption is someone else’ [...] Whoever practices corruption auto-
legitimates his own behaviour, by presenting himself, for example, as the victim of a system 
in which he is bound to this kind of practice [...] And at any rate, doesn’t everyone do it?”. 
Thus it is possible for lofty ideals of altruism and patriotism to coexist comfortably with 
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corrupt behaviour inside the minds of those who practice such behaviour. Corrupt behaviour 
certainly undermines and at times will negate the positive effect of any action taken in pursuit 
of economic development. But this does not mean that any talk of developmental goals on the 
part of such officials is nothing more than a smoke-screen for their true, thieving nature. In 
making this point, the present author does not in any way intend to justify corruption or act as 
an apologist for the Yukos affair or other excesses of the Putin regime. But an undue focus on 
rent-seeking as the central motive of state actors risks obscuring our understanding of how and 
why states attempt to shape economic processes.  
There have without doubt been many cases in recent years where the Russian state’s coercive 
resources have been effectively “hired” by private predators in order to take over business 
assets. State officials sometimes also initiate such takeovers themselves in order to materially 
benefit from it, either by taking ownership or by some other means (Gans-Morse, 2012). 
However, it is argued in the following chapters that the case studies therein demand an 
alternative explanation.  
The literature of the “developmental state” provides a promising analytical framework for 
such an alternative approach, as it allows for the possibility that factors other than rent-
seeking can influence state policies and their outcomes. The suggestion that Russia might be a 
form of “developmental state”, rather than a kleptocracy, is a minority view, but it is one that 
has gained ground in recent years (Barnes, 2006b; Markus, 2007; Wengle, 2012). For 
instance, Barnes describes Putin as an “economic nationalist” who does not seek “the passive 
sort of integration into the global economy that too many policymakers and journalists (and 
not a few scholars) seem to expect”15. Putin is in Barnes’s view a (probably unconscious) 
                                                     
15 cf. Olcott’s view that Putin “does not believe in relying on global market forces to provide the 
economic opportunities and social supports necessary for the Russian people to make a successful 
transition from communist rule to a modern, European-style economy and political system. Instead, he 
believes that premature globalization of the Russian economy will lead to greater hardship for the 
majority of Russian people and that it will lead to the concentration of vast wealth in a relatively limited 
number of hands of people with little or no incentive to reinvest in the Russian economy” (Olcott, 2004, 
p. 16). 
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follower of Gerschenkron, Hamilton and Baldwin. He believes that “private businesses can be 
an important part of Russia’s development”, but his support for private business actors is 
conditional on their participating in his dirigiste plan to achieve economic growth and 
international influence. If they actively undermine this plan, they can expect to meet a fate 
similar to that of Khodorkovsky and Yukos.  
Analysts who argue that the Putin regime has any genuine developmental ambitions still need 
to explain away the apparently negative implications of expanding state ownership for 
economic performance, and the undoubted impact on investor sentiment of shocking and 
legally dubious state “expropriations” of private businesses. Wengle (2012) stresses that the 
Russian state under Putin began its developmental push with certain significant disadvantages 
over the Asian and Latin American countries that are held up as successful examples of state-
led development. Firstly, Russia had to tackle simultaneously the “fragmentation of state 
sovereignty” that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union approximately a decade 
earlier. Secondly, it had negligible prior experience in its role as regulator of a market 
economy, and the requisite institutions had to be created from scratch. Thirdly, while other 
“developmental states” began as largely agrarian economies and pursued de novo 
industrialisation, Russia inherited a huge Soviet industrial legacy, much of which, for 
geographical and/or technological reasons, was unable to adjust overnight to market 
conditions.  
Wengle’s point is that these initial conditions make the task of state-led development 
particularly complicated in the Russian case. Many of the same initial conditions are cited by 
Tompson (2008) as factors explaining the expansion of state ownership in the 2000s. State 
ownership, in his view, was used as a developmental tool by a state that was struggling to 
achieve its goals through indirect methods such as regulation. Acquisitions by state-owned 
companies were in part used to correct ‘market failure’, some of which was down to the 
inability of inherited Soviet enterprises to adjust to market conditions. And state ownership 
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was also a response to the perceived political threat from the ‘oligarchs’, the source of whose 
political power was the highly concentrated ownership of industrial assets, which had in turn 
arisen from the Soviet industrial legacy and the way this was privatised in the 1990s. 
Tompson notes that the state possessed both money and coercive power, and accordingly the 
expansion of state ownership had taken place both through voluntary sales and coercive 
takeovers. It is therefore all the more significant to point out that not all of the coercive 
takeovers have had nationalising outcomes: engineering the transfer of a privately-owned 
business to a new, less threatening private owner has been an alternative response to the same 
factors which Tompson sees as leading only to state ownership. Thus both nationalisation and 
coercive takeover, despite their negative direct impact on the economy, can be consistent with 
developmental motives in the specific circumstances of post-Soviet Russia. 
The rhetoric of Russia’s state actors supports the hypothesis that they perceived Russia’s 
sovereignty to be fragile, viewed this as of direct relevance to economic policymaking and 
treated powerful business interests inside the country as one of the principal threats to that 
sovereignty16. In his 2004 presidential address to parliament, Putin stated that “in the last 
decade of the last century – in conditions of a destroyed economy and lost positions on world 
markets – Russia was obliged to restore its statehood and create a market economy that was 
new to us” (Chadaev, 2006, pp. 151–152). At the same event a year later, he called the 
collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991 “the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” 
and noted that the “epidemic of collapse extended to Russia itself” in the 1990s, posing a 
threat to the country’s territorial integrity (Putin, 2005). These concerns were echoed by 
Putin’s influential deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov in a 2005 speech to the business 
association Delovaya Rossiya (Sokolov, 2005). He noted that globalisation was making the 
term “sovereignty” look old-fashioned, but that people were deluding themselves if they 
                                                     
16 cf. Krasner’s (1999, p. 4) definition of “domestic sovereignty” as “the formal organization of political 
authority within the state and the ability of the public authorities to exercise effective control within the 
borders of their own polity”. 
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thought that this meant sovereignty could be ignored. Many of the threats to sovereignty that 
he listed (including terrorism and the alleged role of the United States in Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution) were not economic in nature. But he implied that sovereignty was the principal 
reason for the Yukos affair, saying that “we will not allow a small group of companies to be 
the centre of power [vlast’] in our country”. And he argued that “concern for sovereignty 
entails certain economic restrictions […] we see that national capital must either be in control 
or dominate in certain sectors.” In an article on economic issues published in the run-up to the 
2012 presidential elections, Putin wrote that “at the very beginning of my first presidential 
term we encountered persistent attempts to sell key assets into foreign hands. The preservation 
of strategic resources in the private hands of a few individuals meant that in the next five to 
ten years control of our economy would be exercised from outside” (Putin, 2012). 
The same arguments have been made by Surkov and others in defence of what they term 
“sovereign democracy”. Ostensibly a brand of democracy intended for Russia’s specific 
conditions of fragile sovereignty, “sovereign democracy” has rightly been dismissed as little 
more than the illusion of democracy (Wilson, 2005). What the present author would call 
“sovereign development”, i.e. the Russian political leadership’s pursuit of economic 
development in the specific conditions of fragile sovereignty, is quite different in that 
development is a genuine aim, for the sole reason that it enhances the power and prestige of 
the Russian state. But when a state is less than confident of its ability to exercise effective 
control within its own borders, and sees politically powerful economic actors (“oligarchs”) as 
one of the groups undermining such control, its developmental task is considerably more 
complex and fraught with conflict. Relying on privately-owned businesses as agents of 
development would risk augmenting their power further and worsening the perceived threat to 
sovereignty. The Russian developmental state was following two vectors: the strengthening of 
state sovereignty and state capacity on the one hand, and the pursuit of economic growth on 
the other. Occasionally, as when big business began to involve itself directly in policymaking 
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areas normally reserved for the state, these two vectors pulled in opposite directions. State 
actors could then justify the seizure of Yukos (at least in their own minds), even if the impact 
on overall economic development was likely to be negative (and was certain to be negative in 
the short-term). As Tompson (2008, pp. 6–7) notes, state ownership presented an appealing 
option, despite the likelihood that it would lead to inferior economic performance, because of 
the apparent political threat posed by domestic and foreign private capital. But while 
simplistic models of interest-maximising state actors stress the importance of threats to 
incumbency, the political threat posed by private capital to the Putin regime exclusively 
related to diminished sovereignty rather than any credible danger that Putin would be 
unseated17.  
The Soviet-era industrial legacy also contributed towards making Russia’s “developmental 
state” necessarily different in nature from its more successful counterparts. The latter have 
tended to focus on a few sectors that, with the right kind of targeted state assistance, are 
believed to hold the greatest potential to provide a major developmental breakthrough (Evans, 
1995, p. 58). Because many of Russia’s inherited industrial enterprises were both vast and 
located in towns where there was no other significant source of employment, simply giving 
them up to the forces of creative destruction would have had negative social consequences 
that even an authoritarian leadership ignored at their peril. But if a concern for the welfare of 
citizens will seem to some observers an unlikely motivation for Russia’s state actors, there 
were also pressing technical reasons why allowing much of the Soviet industrial legacy to fail 
would have had dire consequences. As Wengle (2012, p. 104) notes, “While the Russian state 
promotes nanotechnology and seeks to create high-tech industrial clusters that imitate Silicon 
Valley, its development strategy cannot afford to lose track of infrastructure and other sectors 
that form the backbone of regional economies”. The preoccupation with sovereignty included 
concerns regarding technological sovereignty, i.e. an unwillingness to permit the collapse of 
                                                     
17 See Chapter Two for an elaboration of this argument. 
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strategically-important domestic industries because this would mean an unacceptable level of 
economic dependence on trade with foreign partners18. The SLCT and nationalisation of the 
giant Soviet-era car plant AvtoVAZ at the end of 2005 (Fedorinova & Stolyarov, 2006) was 
almost certainly driven by an unwillingness to see an end to Russia’s history of truly domestic 
automobile production on the one hand, and concern on the other hand that the plant’s 
collapse would have serious social consequences in the local town of Togliatti and the 
surrounding Samara region. Chapters Three and Four include additional cases where such 
considerations, if they were not the primary factor behind the decision to instigate the SLCT, 
certainly affected how the state and its allies managed the assets after they had taken control. 
Indeed, the way these assets were managed by the new owners provides powerful supporting 
evidence of the underlying developmental motives. When rent-seeking motives are central to 
coercive takeovers, one expects the new owners to engage in asset-stripping, or at best (if they 
feel secure enough to think in terms of long time-horizons) to invest in their acquisitions only 
insofar as it makes commercial sense to do so. Chapters Three and Four include cases where 
the new owners, by contrast, chose and invested in their acquisitions in ways that at times 
defied commercial logic, continuing to search for ways to keep the companies alive when they 
looked increasingly unviable19.  
Although the above structural factors go some way towards explaining why the Putin regime 
pursued “sovereign development”, it would be wrong to portray the latter as merely a 
spontaneous and unmediated reaction to objective conditions. As North (1990, p. 17) 
observed, “individuals make choices based on subjectively derived models that diverge among 
individuals and the information the actors receive is so incomplete that in most cases these 
                                                     
18 As discussed in Chapter Four, the preoccupation with “technical sovereignty” and the economic 
rationale behind it was made explicit in a 2010 government strategy document regarding the need to 
preserve the country’s heavy engineering capability. 
19 See, in particular, Gazprom’s decision to take over the entirety of Zapsibgazprom (Chapter Three) 
despite the fact that the only asset of value was the gas field licence which it no longer owned; and 
Gazprombank’s continuing to lend to OMZ (Chapter Four) after serious doubts had arisen as to its 
ability to continue as a going concern. 
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divergent subjective models show no tendency to converge.” What mattered more than the 
objective threats to sovereignty were the subjective perceptions of those threats on the part of 
state actors. These are mediated by ideology, and it is likely that the security service 
backgrounds of Putin and many of his associates gave rise to an exaggerated sensitivity to 
perceived threats to sovereignty and national security 20 . However, Putin’s speeches and 
writings also contained indications that he sympathised with more liberal conceptions of 
economic development. The increasing role of the state in the economy “was nowhere and 
never announced openly—and it could not have been announced alongside declarations made 
about moving onwards to a competitive market economy, de-bureaucratisation and 
administrative reform” (Radygin, 2008). In the aforementioned 2012 article on the economy, 
Putin did talk openly of the importance of the newly-created state corporations21, and of 
targeting certain promising sectors for state-led development (“are we prepared to put 
Russia’s future at such great risk for the sake of the purity of economic theory?”); but at the 
same time he denied that such policies amounted to “state capitalism” and pledged to reduce 
the state’s presence in numerous sectors. This is typically taken as a sign that Putin’s speeches 
(as well as his decisions on appointments relevant to economic policy) sought to maintain and 
reflect the balance of power between the “liberal” and “siloviki” factions. But it could equally 
well reflect his ambivalent attitude towards the appropriate role of the state in economic 
development: on the one hand, a belief that state intervention was a necessary corrective to the 
negative effects more liberal economic policies would have on Russia’s fragile sovereignty, 
and on the other, support for greater liberalisation as an engine of economic growth. 
                                                     
20 For anecdotal evidence of this mindset, see the remarks made by Vladimir Yakunin, a close associate 
of Putin’s, former diplomat and head of state-owned Russian Railways, to the effect that the overthrow 
of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 was the work of a “global financial 
oligarchy” aimed at destroying Russia as a geopolitical opponent (Belton, 2014). See also the 
discussion of the siloviki world-view in Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005, pp. 1071–4). 
21 For a discussion of the state corporations and their significance, see Volkov (2008b). 
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Research question 2: ownership outcome of state-led coercive 
takeovers 
As noted earlier, the fact that two of Russia’s recent SLCTs (at Russneft’ and Bashneft’) did 
not result in nationalisation does not on its own negate the possibility that rent-seeking 
motivates state actors to instigate such takeovers. It does, however, suggest the need for 
further investigation in order to understand exactly what led to these non-nationalising 
outcomes. 
An alternative explanation starts with the explanation given by Tompson (2008) for the 
expansion of state ownership in Putin’s Russia. As noted earlier, Tompson sees state 
ownership as a developmental response to the particular conditions Russia found itself in at 
the beginning of Putin’s first presidency, but also as the only option that remains when the 
state no longer trusts foreign capital or domestic private capital. He also believes that rent-
seeking forms part of the explanation, noting that the developmental motive “dovetails” neatly 
with the effect of providing patronage opportunities for the elite. 
Hanson (2009) was the first to note (with Russneft’ as his main example) that some SLCTs 
have private ownership outcomes, and to discuss the implications of such outcomes for our 
understanding of the trend towards greater state ownership. Going back to first principles, he 
breaks down the possible motivations of state actors engaging in “micro-targeted state 
interventions” into 1) the pursuit of economic growth, 2) neutralising threats to their power, 
and 3) self-enrichment. He suggests that, at least for the oil industry, Russian state actors are 
likely to be driven by a combination of the two self-interested motivations rather than 
economic development. For either of these motivations, state-owned and privately-owned 
companies are, in his view, of roughly equivalent value: the rent-seeking potential in private 
29 
 
companies is approximately the same as for state-owned companies22, and if the state actors 
are instead in the business of undermining potential political adversaries, then this can be 
achieved without the need for nationalisation.  
Hanson does not, however, offer an explanation that would help us to answer the second 
research question of the thesis, i.e. to understand what causal factors determine whether a 
particular SLCT results in nationalisation, transfer to a new private owner, or some kind of 
half-way “quasi-state” ownership. For the purposes of this second research question, the 
dependent variable “ownership outcome” is operationalised along similar lines to the 
approach taken by Pappe and Galukhina (2009, p. 162). “State ownership” of a business is 
defined as possession of a majority of voting shares in that business23. Importantly, the state 
can own these shares either directly, or indirectly via entities that it controls on the same basis. 
For example, if the state directly owns a majority of the voting shares in a company, and that 
company then buys a majority voting stake in a previously privately-owned business, that 
business is itself considered to have been transferred to state ownership24.  
Correspondingly, “private ownership” of a business is defined as a situation where no state 
ownership pertains. Thus even if no individual private actor controls a majority of shares in a 
company, it is still considered to be under “private ownership” if there is no majority state 
ownership.  
Between these two outcomes there are also situations where a company is only de facto under 
state control, i.e. where state control pertains despite the absence of a formal majority voting 
stake. For example, Chapter Three discusses the situation at Gazprom in the early 2000s, 
                                                     
22 Hanson cites the example of Leonid Reiman, who while serving as Russia’s Telecoms Minister is 
alleged to have been the hidden beneficial owner of a Bermuda-registered company which held stakes 
in two of Russia’s three main mobile operators. 
23 Also under “state ownership” are those state-owned enterprises that have not issued shares (e.g. the 
Russian legal form state unitary enterprise, or GUP). But since the companies discussed in this thesis 
are primarily joint-stock companies, the emphasis is on control through possession of voting shares. 
24  Also in common with Pappe and Galukhina, the term “nationalisation” is used to describe this 
transfer into state ownership, irrespective of how it is brought about. 
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where the state did not control a majority of voting shares in the company but was able to 
cobble one together through ad hoc agreements with other shareholders. The state was 
unhappy with this situation, and went to considerable effort to increase its stake to above 50%. 
The fact that it saw this as so important underlines the extent to which voting control is crucial 
in Russian corporate governance, and hence the appropriateness of voting control as the 
criterion for operationalising ownership outcomes.   
Towards a theory of the ownership outcomes 
Four Russian experts—Pappe and Galukhina (2009, pp. 161–5) and Radygin and Mal’ginov 
(2006)—have compiled a set of considerations that might prompt a particular company to be 
taken into state ownership. These can be synthesised as follows: 
1) a government-level decision that a certain enterprise or sector should be state-dominated, 
either 
a) in order to simplify the task of administration in that sector and the wider economy, 
or  
b) to protect the enterprise or sector (and that section of society which is particularly 
dependent on it) from global competition or market failure, or 
c) to capture for the state the “rents” from that enterprise or sector, or 
d) for reasons of national security; 
2) a decision taken at the level of the state-owned company, acting on purely commercial 
considerations. This can be at the state-owned company’s initiative (with the existing owner 
either cooperating or resisting) or at the seller’s initiative. 
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The above framework applies to any M&A activity, however. In the specific context of 
SLCTs, the likelihood is reduced that they have been undertaken for purely commercial 
considerations at the initiative of a state-owned company, though that is still possible in 
principle. All of the proposed explanations in the above framework assume that 
nationalisation was the intended outcome of the takeover. How to incorporate private 
ownership outcomes into the model, to arrive at an explanation that helps predict which 
outcome will result from a particular SLCT? 
In the cases studied in Chapter Two, it is argued that the primary concern of the state was to 
deprive the existing owners of their assets: whether those assets were transferred to state or 
private hands was a matter of secondary importance. Understanding which of these outcomes 
resulted starts with viewing the takeover process in SLCTs as a form of bargaining game.  
The Yukos affair involved the full-scale use of the state’s coercive resources to effectively 
seize the company and pursue criminal convictions against a large number of shareholders, 
managers and other associated individuals. Although there have been many “mini-Yukos” 
cases subsequently, and some similar cases came before it, the scale of the coercive operation 
against Yukos has not come close to being repeated in any other case. All of the case studies 
in the following chapters have one important element in common that promises to explain 
why the Yukos affair has not been repeated: they all (including Yukos) saw the state first 
making an offer to end the coercion if the existing owner agreed to sell.  
What prompted the state to first make such a “carrot-and-stick” offer25, instead of simply 
seizing the companies from the outset, was the fact that full-scale coercive methods are a 
substantial drain on bureaucratic resources. As the discussion of the Yukos affair in Chapter 
Two will demonstrate, they involve coordination across government departments and coercive 
agencies, and large teams of lawyers and accountants. 
                                                     
25 For the use of the term “carrot-and-stick” in bargaining in an international relations context, see 
Greffenius and Gill (1992). 
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The case studies will also highlight significant institutional constraints that mean SLCTs are 
not just a one-way trampling of private business owners’ property rights by the state. Various 
legal and institutional factors, both domestic and international in nature, provide business 
owners with important defensive tactics. These tactics may not prevent a determined state 
from pursuing full-scale asset seizure once it has resolved to do so. But they offer a way to 
increase the costs of such an approach, and to reduce the material benefits to the state; as a 
result, they contribute to the state’s preference for a negotiated solution, which gives the 
targeted business owner the opportunity to bargain for a less-bad outcome. 
One such defensive tactic, which plays a part in many of the case studies, is the 
internationalisation of the targeted business. Within Russia’s jurisdiction, corners can be cut 
by the state: judges ordered to hand down a certain verdict, defence lawyers intimidated, 
criminal charges fabricated and assets physically seized. If a company has offshore ownership 
and an international banking infrastructure, it can move to transfer a large proportion of the 
business’s value out of the reach of the Russian state (if it was ever physically located inside 
Russia’s borders in the first place). If the state wants to pursue international asset seizures 
through the courts, it can no longer rely on fabricating the charges that form the legal basis for 
such seizures. The state’s own international assets become vulnerable to legal counter-claims 
brought by the business owner.  
The existing literature indicates that Russian companies defend their property rights from 
expropriation by enlisting foreign minority shareholders who can apply pressure on the 
government at the diplomatic level (Markus, 2008), forming horizontal alliances through 
business organisations (Markus, 2007), or investing in public goods to increase the 
reputational costs to the state if it decides to “expropriate” (Frye, 2006). But the 
internationalisation and offshoring of ownership and financial flows is arguably far more 
important as a defensive tactic. The case studies will also show, however, that it is not just 
international exposure that constrains the behaviour of the state actors involved in SLCTs: 
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It should be stressed that this is intended not as a formal model to be solved by backward 
induction, but rather as an illustration of the bargaining process involved26. As discussed 
earlier, the basic payoffs given above are altered in practice by defensive tactics available to 
the existing owners, and by certain institutional constraints on the state’s ability to seize assets 
at will. The case of Bashneft’, where the bargaining process dragged on for many years, will 
highlight the fact that the state is not forced to choose immediately between full-scale asset 
seizure and abandoning the takeover when faced with a recalcitrant owner: it can choose 
instead to restart the process on the basis of a revised offer.  
Some SLCTs will undoubtedly take place with a specific ownership outcome (e.g. state 
ownership, or even ownership by a specific state-owned company) in mind. But others may 
not, and it is suggested that the cases in Chapter Two are among them. Either way, the 
argument is that the ownership outcome is affected by the outcome of the takeover as 
bargaining game, as follows: 
1) If the state pursues full-scale asset seizure following refusal of the carrot-and-stick 
offer, then nationalisation is likely to result. 
2) Acceptance of the carrot-and-stick offer can lead to either ownership outcome, 
depending on which kinds of company have the means and appetite to make the 
acquisition. However, private buyers can be favoured because they can act as 
intermediaries between state and existing owner, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
the negotiated solution that the state prefers.  
The review of the thesis structure, at the end of this introductory chapter, shows how this 
argument is developed and justified over the course of the case studies that follow. 
                                                     
26 cf. Przeworski (1991) for similar use of game trees to illustrate interactions without subscribing fully 
to formal game theory models. 
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Do institutions constrain state coercion in Russia? 
Categorising Russia as a kleptocracy implies not only that state actors are intent on stealing 
from citizens, but that there are few or no meaningful constraints on their doing so. As 
mentioned earlier, the central argument of the “commitment problem” literature is that states 
that are strong enough to protect property rights are also strong enough to attack them, unless 
there are “coercion-constraining institutions” in place to keep state predation in check. In the 
cases that follow, this central argument of the “commitment problem” still pertains, despite 
the fact that the state is shown to be attacking property rights for reasons other than self-
enrichment or self-aggrandisement. 
Frye (2004) notes that “we have little knowledge about which specific institutions are 
especially important” in ensuring the security of property rights. From his survey of Russian 
businesses aimed at addressing this problem, he concludes that the state is a major threat to 
property rights, and that the main coercion-constraining institution (or set of institutions) 
required to address this problem is a legal system and judiciary that is independent of the 
executive. 
The term “telephone law” (or “telephone justice”) is commonly used to describe how Russia’s 
political leadership can influence the outcomes of court cases, by issuing direct or indirect 
instructions to judges (e.g. Hendley, 2009; Ledeneva, 2008). “Telephone justice”, then, 
denotes the lack of independence of the legal system from the executive, i.e. the absence of 
the main set of institutions necessary to prevent attacks by the state on property rights. But 
while there is consensus among scholars that “telephone justice” is an important characteristic 
of Russia’s legal system, there is an ongoing debate regarding whether the entire system can 
be dismissed as having no independence from the executive. Ledeneva (2008, 2011) uses 
survey evidence to support her claim that “telephone justice” best characterises the 
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relationship between the executive and the legal system27. However, she also calls for further 
research to be undertaken before this can be confirmed. Hendley (2006, 2009) does not 
dispute the existence of “telephone justice” and cites the Yukos affair as the most infamous 
example; but importantly, she argues that there is a functioning legal system operating in 
parallel that is free from political influence. She notes that this was the case even in Soviet 
times, but also that there has been considerable progress in post-Soviet Russia in some areas 
of the law. She therefore describes Russia’s legal system as ‘dualistic’, arguing that it is 
“better seen as an equilibrium that somehow balances ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule of law’” 
(Hendley, 2009). Hendley has also offered the most plausible explanation for how these two 
contrasting legal domains coexist in one jurisdiction: while ‘telephone justice’ holds sway in 
cases where the Kremlin or regional leaders have taken a specific interest in the outcome, 
outside that sphere the courts operate with a reasonable degree of professionalism and largely 
free from political influence28. 
The Yukos affair is rightly cited as an example that confirms the lack of adequate constraints 
on the Russian state’s ability to attack property rights through “the selective enforcement of 
laws and the arbitrary use of state power” (Frye, 2004, p. 455 fn. 3). Indeed, in none of the 
cases that follow is the state prevented by institutions from applying arbitrary coercion in the 
first instance (if there were no state coercion involved, the takeovers would not qualify as 
cases). However, as the discussion in the previous section suggests and the case studies will 
demonstrate, legal considerations featured heavily in influencing the Russian state’s 
preference for a negotiated outcome over full-scale coercive seizure. In other words, there are 
                                                     
27 Ledeneva defines telephone justice as "the practice of making an informal command, request, or 
signal in order to influence formal procedures or decision-making". While ‘corruption’ implies that 
decision-makers are given monetary incentives to act in a particular way; 'telephone justice' uses other 
means of influence, such as threatening to damage the decision-maker's career prospects if they fail to 
act in a particular way. 
28 Hendley also portrays Russians as 'savvy consumers' who instinctively understand which kinds of 
legal dispute can be taken to court with the expectation of a fair trial, and conversely which will never 
receive a fair trial because of the powerful interests they would be up against (Hendley, 2009). Hendley 
(2012, p. 169) notes that “not only has the Kremlin used the courts to go after its enemies, but it has 
looked the other way when regional leaders have done the same.” 
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constraints on the state’s appetite for coercive seizure of assets, and this helps to improve the 
outcome for the existing owner who is targeted for SLCT. The finding that not all of these 
constraints are international in nature supports Hendley’s argument that some progress has 
been made towards “rule of law” in Russia. Chapter 5 will return to this topic and discuss how 
the case studies add to an understanding of where the dividing line runs between “rule of law” 
and “telephone justice” in Russia. 
Method 
The two research questions require a method which makes it possible to discern the 
motivations and decision-making processes that prompt state actors to instigate SLCTs, and 
the motivations and institutional constraints which determine the ownership outcomes of those 
takeovers. As a result, they do not lend themselves to quantitative methods, which tend to treat 
as a “black box” the decision-making processes of individuals and organisations that lie 
between the inputs and outputs of social phenomena (George & McKeown, 1985, p. 41). 
Furthermore, it will become clear from the case studies that attempts to determine the value of 
the dependent variable for a particular takeover can be fraught with difficulty: for example, in 
Chapter Four, extensive investigation is required in order to establish who owned the 
company OMZ after the coercive takeover, and what relationship that owner had to the state. 
The new beneficial owner went to considerable lengths to keep its identity secret. Through 
careful research it is possible to identify this buyer, but it then emerges that the entity in 
question is of a kind that has no owners according to Russian law. It becomes necessary to 
engage in what might be dismissed as “Kremlinology” in order to choose between the two 
opposing theories in Russia’s media and expert commentary concerning whether this 
mysterious entity had effectively been ‘privatised’ in favour of a business actor linked to 
Putin, or was in fact still under the management control of state-owned Gazprom. The 
difficulty in establishing the value of the dependent variable of individual cases poses an 
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insurmountable challenge to any researcher attempting to apply quantitative methods to 
answer the research question regarding the ownership outcome.   
Process-tracing offers an approach that enables the researcher to tackle complex reality at a 
granular (rather than abstracted) level, while still aspiring to scientific validity. As George and 
McKeown (1985, p. 24) point out, process-tracing is distinct from quasi-experimental 
methods in that it allows for theory formation as well as theory testing (whereas statistical 
analysis is reserved for the latter). It is therefore an appropriate choice for research questions 
that begin, as this project began, without a clear hypothesis (besides a suspicion that theories 
based on rent-seeking and kleptocracy were inadequate for the purposes of explaining the 
cases). 
Gerring (2006, p. 185) suggests that it may not be appropriate to describe process-tracing as a 
scientific method, because “it may be impossible to arrive at a set of standardized 
methodological rules”. But he argues that with sufficient documentation, process-tracing 
accounts become verifiable “by those intimately familiar with that region, policy area, or 
historical era”. Accordingly, the case studies that follow take seriously the need to cite 
evidence for every substantial assertion that is made, and to note any concerns when the 
evidence that has been found is not enough to be entirely confident of the assertion. What kind 
of data sources are used as evidence is discussed in the following section. 
Various scholars (George & McKeown, 1985; Hall, 2003; Van Evera, 1997) have made 
significant contributions towards the formation of an appropriately scientific and standardised 
approach to process-tracing. In addition to the emphasis on documentation, the present author 
has sought to heed the following guidelines aimed at making the process-tracing approach as 
robust as possible:  
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• In order to deflect criticism that process-tracing is indistinguishable from historical 
narrative, “description must be combined with some making, testing or application of 
a theory” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 53). 
• Explicitly stating a causal hypothesis, then systematically checking whether or not the 
case evidence derived from the data sources is consistent with that hypothesis. 
Thereby checking each of the several links in the chain of cause and effect that goes 
to make up the causal explanation. Seeing whether the statements public and private 
made by actors are in line with the “image of the world implied by each theory” (Hall, 
2003; Van Evera, 1997). 
• Crucially, considering also whether the case evidence fits better with alternative 
hypotheses.  
• Use of counterfactuals to gain explanatory leverage (Fearon, 1991; Gerring, 2006, p. 
182)29. 
• Ensuring that theories derived from process-tracing are simple enough to be easily 
“arrow-diagrammed”. If this cannot be done, the theory itself is likely to be too 
“muddy” (Van Evera, 1997). 
Much of the criticism of small-n, case study methods holds true only when those methods are 
used to make inferences that are widely generalizable. As Hall (2003) notes, “if we see the 
central enterprise of social science, not as one of finding correlations between an outcome and 
a few independent variables, but as the more central one of devising and testing causal 
theories, small-n comparison and single case-studies constitute viable research designs with 
important roles to play in causal inference.” 
                                                     
29 This technique proved particularly useful in developing explanations for the ownership outcomes in 
Chapter Two. 
40 
 
The task of answering the first research question (the motivations behind the takeovers) is not 
to develop a general theory explaining the causes of SLCT in Russia. Instead, the goal is to 
demonstrate that some SLCTs cannot be explained by reference to rent-seeking and 
kleptocracy (i.e. do not fall inside the intersecting areas of the venn diagram in Figure 1), and 
to test the alternative (“sovereign development”) hypothesis for these cases. It may be that 
only a handful of relatively high-profile cases are better explained in this way, while a much 
larger number of smaller-scale cases are better explained as reiderstvo 30 . It would be 
unsurprising if the finite capacities of the state limited its interest in changing ownership at 
particular businesses to those which are of special political or economic significance.  
Gans-Morse (2012, p. 264) focuses instead on a much larger domain of threats posed by state 
actors to “ordinary, non-oligarchic firms”, and argues that the focus on higher-profile cases 
offers a skewed and unrepresentative portrayal of modern-day Russian business practices. The 
aim of this thesis, however, is not to portray such business practices, but to gain insight into 
the reasons for, and methods of, the Russian state’s interventions in the economy. The high-
profile cases chosen for examination are of significant inherent interest from this perspective, 
as well as arguing against the use of rent-seeking as the primary analytical framework for 
explaining economic interventions by states. 
With regard to the second research question (the ownership outcomes of SLCTs), the project 
does seek to provide an explanatory theory that accounts for the variance in the “ownership 
outcome” dependent variable. Accordingly, the within-case approach of process-tracing is 
used here in conjunction with complementary comparative case study methods, namely the 
Mill’s “method of agreement” and “method of difference” (Mill, 1904). Accordingly, cases 
were in part chosen according to the values of the dependent variable, i.e. similar and different 
forms of ownership resulting from the takeovers. The drawbacks of Mill’s methods for small-
                                                     
30 This is the argument made by Gans-Morse (2012). It may be that further cases of “political” SLCT 
are found at the sub-national level. 
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n studies (including the problem of “omitted variable bias”) are well documented, and 
arguably they are close to useless on their own. But they can be effective when used in 
conjunction with careful process-tracing (George & McKeown, 1985, p. 153; Hall, 2003, p. 
381). Mill’s methods can suggest causal relationships between independent and dependent 
variables, while process-tracing can help to confirm or reject those relationships through 
“close inspection of causal processes”, verifying whether the proposed explanatory variables 
are really affecting the dependent variable in the way that was predicted. 
Data sources 
The project has mainly relied on the following data sources: 
• media reports, primarily from the Russian business press; 
• companies’ official announcements and disclosures. 
There is a widespread perception that the Russian media lacks professionalism and 
objectivity, in particular because of censorship and self-censorship. While this is true for 
many areas of the media (notably television), it does not hold for the business press, some 
sections of which are an island of professionalism largely untouched by censorship or self-
censorship (except, occasionally, when it ventures into sensitive political terrain). Russian 
business journalists, particularly in the leading papers Vedomosti and Kommersant, and the 
magazines Forbes and (with some qualifications) Ekspert, ask penetrating questions of the 
business owners and managers they interview. Perhaps surprisingly, they often receive 
substantive answers to those questions. It will hopefully become clear from the case studies 
that follow, and the way that articles from the business press are used as evidence, that the 
level of insight and intrusion into the affairs of the country’s companies and business actors 
places Russia’s business journalism on a level perhaps even higher than its Western 
counterparts. 
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Granted, there are also poor-quality news sources in the Russian business press, and a 
discerning approach to those sources is essential to the quality of the overall analysis. The 
author is confident that long years of familiarity with the Russian media give him an 
appropriate sense of which outlets to give a measure of implicit trust, the appropriate limits of 
that trust, and how to spot the tell-tale signs of unprofessional journalism. By surveying the 
bibliography, readers with sufficient expertise of their own can judge for themselves whether 
this confidence is well-placed. 
There are naturally some pitfalls to a reliance on media reports for evidence. For example, two 
different newspapers each citing an unnamed source (as they often do) may in fact have 
spoken to the same individual; the fact that the stories corroborate each other does not 
constitute independent verification. As another example, where a newsworthy event is about 
to happen, it goes heavily reported; but if for some reason the interesting event fails to come 
to pass, then no news outlets deem it sufficiently newsworthy to merit a mention (Pappe, 
2000, p. 20). All the more reason, as Pappe argues, to seek confirmation elsewhere before 
assuming that media reports are accurate. 
Fortunately, disclosure requirements that have been put in place in the past two decades for 
Russian companies in general (but particularly for the open joint-stock companies that make 
up the majority of Russia’s big businesses) mean that a wealth of detail is often publicly 
available that ranges from the state of company finances, biographical details of its managers 
and directors, ownership structure, credit history, through to timely disclosure of events that 
are set to have a material impact on the company’s value31. Many large companies have 
additionally begun publishing accounts to International Accounting Standards (IAS). These 
give a consolidated picture that represents the state of affairs at the group as a whole rather 
                                                     
31 Such information is typically available in the “about us” or “for investors and shareholders” sections 
of Russian company websites. Furthermore, certain specialist websites (such as Interfax news agency’s 
www.e-disclosure.ru) offer searchable databases of Russian company disclosures, including archived 
copies of disclosure documents that are no longer available from company websites. 
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than one specific entity32, and are meant to provide details of beneficial ownership. The value 
of these disclosures as evidence is that they are typically signed off by the company’s chief 
executive and chief accountant, placing a legal responsibility on them for the accuracy of the 
information disclosed. In addition, quarterly and annual reports are independently audited, 
though there are of course questions over whether auditors are truly independent in practice in 
some cases.  
Official disclosures therefore make a vital contribution to this project as a way to verify 
information that comes to light in the business press, and as a source of some detail (e.g. the 
precise date of a transaction, the precise amount paid for an asset, and often crucial 
information regarding ownership) that may not have been sufficiently newsworthy to have 
featured in media reports.  
One notable omission from the data sources listed above is that of interviews conducted by the 
author. The people best placed in principle to answer many of the questions posed by the case 
studies are those state actors, company managers and business owners who were directly 
involved in the takeovers. However, there were several serious obstacles that prevented 
interviews with such individuals becoming a significant data source for the case studies. The 
main one was access. Only a small group of individuals were party to information that was 
both crucial to the case studies and above and beyond what was already publicly available. 
Where it was possible to find and approach these individuals, persuading them to talk was a 
major challenge. Western academic researchers’ access to Russia’s business and political elite 
has become increasingly restricted since the heady days of the early 1990s. But the challenge 
was also to persuade such individuals, if they were prepared to talk at all, to provide the 
specific points of detail that were required, rather than boilerplate answers. Much of this detail 
                                                     
32 Companies continue to publish entity-specific accounts to Russian Accounting Standards (RAS), 
which are also publicly available via the statistics agency Rosstat, and additionally (for those entities 
which have issued securities) in quarterly reports whose publication is required by the securities 
regulator. 
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constituted commercially sensitive information, and there was little upside for potential 
interview subjects to give it away to a doctoral researcher who could offer little or nothing in 
return. 
The quality of coverage provided by Russian business journalists has compensated somewhat 
for the lack of interviews. Russian business journalists have a level of access to the nation’s 
elite that a foreign doctoral researcher can in most cases only dream of. They also tend to ask 
questions that this researcher would have asked, if he had the same level of access. As a result, 
the project has “piggybacked” at times on the work of journalists who interviewed the 
principal actors in the case studies, or who have cited “sources close to” a deal or a company 
that has played a role in those case studies. 
In the final analysis, however, it must be acknowledged that the data sources used in this 
project are less than ideal; this and the relatively small number of cases leaves some room for 
uncertainty regarding the findings. For example, it is possible that hidden “patrons” among 
state officials were both pulling the strings behind the scenes in some of these takeovers, and 
drawing “rents” from the businesses afterwards by methods that simply do not register in the 
data sources available for study. It would be surprising, though, if these entirely unseen 
processes were playing a more significant causal role than the ones whose evidence can be 
traced in the sources that were available. A definitive answer has not been provided as to 
whether or not a genuine “carrot-and-stick” offer was ever made by the state to resolve the 
Yukos affair peacefully. But there are certainly credible grounds for believing that there was 
such an offer. Such uncertainty is inherent in the study of politics, particularly in the 
Byzantine world of Kremlin politics. The best way to deal with it is to do what we can in as 
honest and as scientific a way as we can, rather than simply giving up and going in search of 
phenomena that are more amenable to scientific analysis. 
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Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is weighted heavily towards the case studies that form the basis of the three 
substantive chapters that follow. 
Chapter Two examines the Yukos affair and two later cases from the oil industry, involving 
the smaller companies Russneft’ and Bashneft’. In these cases, it was the “sovereign” side of 
“sovereign development” that provided the main motivation for the SLCTs. It is argued that 
the perceived threats to sovereignty posed by the existing business owners were the main 
reason for instigating the takeovers. The main goal was depriving the owners of their 
businesses, and what ownership outcome resulted was of secondary importance. In each case, 
a “carrot-and-stick” offer was made to the existing owner, and a private (potential) buyer 
played a part as intermediary who could facilitate a negotiated solution (Abramovich and 
Sibneft’ in the case of Yukos, Deripaska and later Yevtushenkov at Russneft’, and 
Yevtushenkov at Bashneft’). Once the Kremlin had concluded that Khodorkovsky was 
refusing such an offer, full-scale seizure and nationalisation were all but guaranteed. In the 
other two cases, the existing owners were more amenable to a negotiated solution. They sold 
their businesses to the private buyers for amounts approaching their market value, and, in 
stark contrast to Khodorkovsky, they remained at liberty.  
Chapter Three goes back chronologically to 2002, the year before the Yukos affair began. It 
examines how de facto state-controlled Gazprom used state coercion to take back into its 
ownership three companies that had been lost (or were at risk of being lost) under its previous 
management. Taking back one of these companies was important for the strategic objective of 
bringing state ownership of Gazprom up to a direct majority stake, thus turning its ad hoc 
control into consolidated de jure control. This was in turn driven by the importance of 
Gazprom as a tool of domestic economic policy and of foreign policy. Some of the 
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motivations behind the decision to take back the other assets (and what was done with those 
assets subsequently) involved using Gazprom as a tool of economic development.  
A state ownership outcome was pre-determined by the state’s objectives for Gazprom’s 
SLCTs. But Gazprom used an intermediary figure of its own to negotiate with the targeted 
owners, in the shape of a businessman named Alisher Usmanov who was chief executive of a 
Gazprom subsidiary named Gazprominvestholding. In addition to this role, he was a major 
private businessman in his own right, as well as someone who had worked with the former 
management of Gazprom, with which the existing owners of the targeted assets had had close 
ties. Usmanov actively played on this dual status to help persuade the existing owners to 
accept the carrot-and-stick offer. This reinforces the argument that the state prefers a 
negotiated outcome over full-scale asset seizure, and the suggestion that a “state ownership” 
outcome is problematic from this perspective. 
Examination of how the takeovers proceeded highlights further the state’s concerns about 
embarking on full-scale asset seizure. Some of the reasons for this reluctance include domestic 
considerations: Gazprom initiated bankruptcy proceedings, only to discover that it risked 
losing to rival Russian creditors much of the value of the targeted businesses. In a kleptocracy, 
it is unlikely that a state-owned company would face any such dangers when embarking on 
“expropriation” with the full support of its masters in government. 
The case studies examine why the Gazprom subsidiary Gazprominvestholding acted as buyer 
rather than ownership being taken directly by the parent company. Part of the answer lies with 
Usmanov’s role as intermediary, but it also becomes clear that domestic regulations relating to 
corporate governance prevented Gazprom from acting swiftly in response to the developing 
situation of the takeovers. It used its subsidiary to bypass these constraints. Though these 
constraints did not prevent the SLCTs, they clearly shaped Gazprom’s behaviour in ways that 
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reinforce further the argument made by Hendley (2009) that “rule of law” and “telephone 
justice” somehow coexist in Russia.   
Chapter Four examines the takeover in 2004 and 2005 of two companies involved in heavy 
engineering for the nuclear industry, namely Atomstroieksport and OMZ. These were 
strategic enterprises that were essential to Russia’s indigenous capability to build nuclear 
power stations at home and abroad, and had come under the control of private businessman 
Kakha Bendukidze. For reasons of national security, international trade relations and 
technological sovereignty, the state was determined to bring them back into state ownership.  
Although sufficient evidence of state coercion is found to include these takeovers as valid 
cases, they met with little resistance from the existing owner, who was in any case 
contemplating an exit. The focus of the case studies is therefore, firstly, on how institutional 
constraints shaped the specific ownership outcome. The way the Atomstroieksport and OMZ 
acquisitions were executed, and the precise way in which ownership was structured, were 
clearly influenced by regulations which dictated the need to gain approval for acquisitions 
above a certain size from the domestic antitrust regulator. Additionally, legal considerations 
prompted the buyer, Gazprom, to conceal its involvement in the OMZ purchase, and it did so 
using the peculiar legal status of its pension fund, Gazfond, which acted as the buying entity. 
Gazprom effectively bypassed these institutional constraints to achieve what it wanted. It did 
so primarily by finding loopholes in the law, but occasionally it also flouted it. This mixed 
picture reflects the patchy but increasing powers of the antitrust body to sanction non-
compliance with the relevant legislation.   
The story of how the buyers managed their new assets centres around their relationship with 
the government agency, Rosatom, which was prepared to spend billions of dollars on new 
equipment for its planned expansion of nuclear energy capacity. The Gazprom-linked buyers 
were under state control but were not subordinate to this government agency. Both sides 
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claimed to be committed to working together to help realise the government’s developmental 
plans for the industry, and the evidence shows that this was no empty rhetoric. But they failed 
to cooperate, thereby putting in danger the entire government programme. Part of the 
explanation for this failure lies in a lack of coordination between government agencies, 
leaving them to pursue their own institutional agendas. The account underlines the important 
role played by a coordinating “pilot agency” in successful state-led development (Johnson, 
1982), and illustrates how corruption need not be central to explaining how government 
developmental strategies can fail in the absence of such a pilot agency.   
Chapter Five concludes by pulling together the evidence in support of the “sovereign 
development” hypothesis, and returning to the theory of the ownership outcomes in order to 
incorporate the points discussed during the case studies. It summarises what these cases tell us 
about the “commitment problem” and the literature regarding coercion-constraining 
institutions, given the importance of institutional constraints in the causal explanations of the 
ownership outcomes. The evidence suggests ways in which we can improve our 
understanding of how “rule of law” and “telephone justice” coexist in contemporary Russia. 
The main conclusion is that the Russian state under Putin is better understood as a “flawed 
developmental state” than as a kleptocracy. Its political leadership has an interest in pursuing 
economic development and has sought to achieve it through dirigiste state interventions in the 
economy. But the effectiveness of such efforts has been undermined in two ways. Firstly, the 
pursuit of development has frequently been trumped by an overriding preoccupation with 
countering perceived threats to sovereignty. Secondly, the government’s commitment to 
development has not been backed up by an institutional design that would permit a single 
“pilot organisation” to devise and implement a coherent strategy of state-led economic 
development. 
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Chapter 2. Yukos, Russneft’ and Bashneft’ 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a comparative study of three companies in the Russian oil sector, 
namely Yukos, Russneft’ and Bashneft’33. In all three cases, the authorities took action against 
the existing owners and sought to bring about a takeover. The outcome of the takeover 
differed across the cases in terms of the new form of ownership (i.e. the value of the 
dependent variable for the second research question): Yukos was effectively nationalised, 
Bashneft’ was taken over by a private business group named AFK Sistema, while in the case 
of Russneft’ an attempted takeover by privately-owned company Basic Element was held in 
limbo for many months pending regulatory approval, before it was ultimately unwound and 
the company returned to its original private owner.  
The aim of the study is to shed light on why the state intervened in each case, and why the 
ownership outcomes differed. Tompson (2005, 2008) has explained the Yukos affair and the 
company’s de facto nationalisation by identifying causal factors which prompted the Russian 
government to increase the level of state ownership in strategic sectors, of which the oil 
industry is arguably the most important. As noted in the opening chapter, the ownership 
outcomes of the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases present a puzzle in this context. If there were 
good reasons for bringing the oil industry into state ownership, why was the opportunity not 
seized to ensure Russneft’ and Bashneft’ also ended up in state hands? 
                                                     
33 The name “Bashneft’” is here used to refer to a loose grouping of companies in the Russian republic 
of Bashkortostan, of which the oil producing company Bashneft’ was in fact just one. Other companies 
in the group included four oil refineries and a chain of petrol stations. A more typical Russian label for 
this grouping was “Bashkirskii TEK”, but for simplicity’s sake “Bashneft’” is used here instead. 
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In line with the “sovereign development” hypothesis that was explained in the previous 
chapter, it is argued here that the Russian government was driven by political factors to force 
the existing owners of these three businesses to part with their assets. These were cases where 
the drive for development was trumped by the need to act against perceived threats to 
sovereignty posed by the owners. In the Yukos case the threat was to sovereignty at the 
federal level: its owners were becoming involved in policymaking areas that the government 
considered to be its sole prerogative. At Russneft’ and Bashneft’, the owners were seen as 
threatening the Kremlin’s ability to project its authority in the Russian republics of Ingushetia 
and Bashkortostan respectively. 
The case studies demonstrate that the ownership outcomes of the takeovers were strikingly 
contingent in nature. There was a credible alternative scenario whereby Yukos might instead 
have been sold to a different private owner, and Russneft’ and Bashneft’ might instead have 
been nationalised. The conclusion that is drawn from this is that the state did not have a 
specific ownership outcome in mind when it initiated the takeovers. They were instead aimed 
primarily at depriving the existing owners of their assets in order to neutralise them as a threat 
to sovereignty. 
In some other cases of state-led coercive takeover (SLCT), including those undertaken by 
state-owned Gazprom in Chapter Three, the state does have a particular ownership outcome in 
mind. But when this does not pertain, the “takeover as bargaining game” model introduced in 
the opening chapter provides a particularly appropriate framework for a causal explanation of 
the varying ownership outcomes. To recap, the state begins by applying a measure of coercion 
aimed at persuading the existing owner to sell. The state’s preference is for the situation to be 
resolved through the owner’s acceptance of its “carrot-and-stick” offer. A full-scale campaign 
to seize the company’s assets is the alternative, but is a last resort that is pursued only if the 
existing owner flatly refuses to sell. 
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In the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases, the owners did accept the state’s offer, and as a result 
their fates differed greatly from that of Khodorkovsky and his allies. It so happens that both of 
these cases resulted in private ownership, whereas Yukos was nationalised. But the correlation 
between the “bargaining outcomes” (a “negotiated” settlement or full-scale asset seizure) and 
the ownership outcomes is not as straightforward as this suggests. There is no reason in 
principle why the existing owners in other SLCTs might not accept a “carrot-and-stick” offer 
to sell to a state-owned company. As Figure 3 illustrates, there is therefore equifinality in the 
“state ownership” outcome: it can arise either from full-scale coercive seizure or from 
acceptance of the “carrot-and-stick” offer. By contrast, full-scale asset seizure is very unlikely 
to result in private ownership, for reasons that will be explained in detail below.  
 
Figure 3. Equifinality in the state ownership outcome 
 
The above theoretical framework provides an alternative to the more common interpretation 
of these takeovers as essentially cases of reiderstvo, i.e. of illegal takeover for private gain. 
Such interpretations are equivalent to explanations based on “rent-seeking”, and potentially 
provide answers to both of the research questions of this project: the people who instigate the 
takeovers are motivated by private gain (question one), and (unless something goes wrong) 
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the targeted company will end up under their direct or indirect ownership (question two). In 
line with the process-tracing method, the validity of this hypothesis is given due consideration 
as a rival to the theory presented above. 
Outline case narratives 
Yukos 
The main narrative of the Yukos case has been covered by several scholars in other 
publications (e.g. Goldman, 2004; Gustafson, 2012; Kononczuk, 2006; Sakwa, 2009; 
Sixsmith, 2010; Volkov, 2008a), and need only be recapped in brief here.  
Having transformed itself in the early 2000s into a supposed model of Western-style 
transparency and corporate governance (Markus, 2008, pp. 79–80; Tompson, 2005, p. 7), the 
company was enjoying a greatly improved market capitalisation in the first half of 200334; it 
appeared to be on the verge of enacting a merger with a similar private competitor, Sibneft’ 
(Vin’kov & Sivakov, 2003)35, and was in talks with two US majors interested in buying a 
stake (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 124–6). 
The first signal of the authorities’ attack on the company came on 21 June 2003, when its head 
of security Aleksei Pichugin was arrested (Butrin, Sapozhnikov, Gerasimov, & 
Skorobogat’ko, 2003) and later charged with organising up to five contract killings (Sakwa, 
2009, p. 93). The arrest was followed on 1 July by the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) 
conducting a search of Trust Bank (part of the group of companies headed by Menatep, which 
represented Yukos’s core shareholders) in Moscow. The next day saw the arrest of Menatep’s 
Chairman Platon Lebedev, on charges relating to the privatisation of a fertiliser company back 
in 1993-1994 and alleged tax evasion in Tomsk region (home to Yukos subsidiary Tomskneft’ 
                                                     
34 This peaked at over $30bn in June 2003 (Semenenko, 2003). 
35 Management control of the merged company was to lie with Yukos. 
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VNK) (Osetinskaya, Lysova, Bushueva, & Lemeshko, 2003). This was followed by the arrest 
on 25 October 2003 of Yukos CEO, Chairman and main shareholder Mikhail Khodorkovsky 
(Bushueva, Nikol’skii, Karpov, & Ivanov, 2003). Five days later came the resignation of 
Aleksandr Voloshin, the head of the Presidential Administration who reportedly opposed 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest (Bulavinov, 2003; Silaev, 2003; Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 151–2). In 
November, the proposed Yukos-Sibneft’ merger was halted at the initiative of Sibneft’s 
management (Tutushkin, Bushueva, & Lysova, 2003). 
At the end of February 2004 Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who had defended Yukos 
both in public and privately, was dismissed and a new government was formed under Mikhail 
Fradkov (Dugin, 2004). 
In July 2004 the trial of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky began in earnest (Sakwa, 2009, p. 207)36. 
It was also announced that Yukos’s main asset, Yuganskneftegaz, was to be put up for sale in 
order to repay the company’s debts to the state budget (Sapozhnikov & Skorobogat’ko, 2004). 
These debts were increasing dramatically as a result of reviews of the company’s tax 
payments for previous years, which led to enormous new demands for back taxes and fines for 
non-payment (Sakwa, 2009, pp. 171–173). An international arrest warrant was issued against 
a key business associate of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky named Leonid Nevzlin, who had fled 
Russia in the month after Khodorkovsky’s arrest. Nevzlin was accused of ordering the 
contract killings that were allegedly organised by Pichugin (Nikol’skii, 2004). 
In October 2004, the PGO opened a new investigation into allegations that Khodorkovsky and 
Lebedev had illicitly gained and laundered $11bn (Sakwa, 2009, p. 222).  
19 December 2004 saw the promised auction of Yuganskneftegaz, which was acquired by a 
shell company for $9.35bn. State-controlled Gazprom Neft’, which also sent representatives to 
                                                     
36 To be more precise, the trial resumed on 11 July 2004 after a preliminary hearing on 16 June 2004 
(“Timeline of events,” n.d.). 
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the auction, declined to bid (Bushueva & Reznik, 2004). The shell company was sold on to 
state-owned Rosneft’ three days later (Reznik, Derbilova, & Yegorova, 2004). 
The trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on the first set of charges ended on 11 April 2005 
(Zapodinskaya, 2005), and in May they received a sentence of nine years in a general regime 
penal colony, minus the 18 months already served in pre-trial detention (Lepina, 2005). 
Lebedev’s sentence was later reduced on appeal by one year (Sakwa, 2009, p. 212 fn. 100). 
Yukos was declared bankrupt by the Moscow Arbitrazh37 Court on 1 August 2006 (Reznik & 
Kornya, 2006). This was not the end of the saga, however: new charges were brought against 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in February 2007, focussing on their alleged involvement in 
embezzlement and money-laundering between 1998 and 2003. The amount of money 
allegedly involved was now $30bn (Lokotetskaya, 2007; Sakwa, 2009, pp. 249–254). 
Following on from its purchase of Yuganskneftegaz, Rosneft’ acquired the two other main 
producing assets of Yukos at auction in May 2007. Thus state-controlled Rosneft’, of which 
Igor’ Sechin (deputy chief of the presidential administration and a major player in all three 
cases in this chapter) became Chairman in July 2004, emerged as buyer of the vast majority of 
the Yukos assets that were sold at auction (Rebrov, Grishkovets, Grib, & Paramonova, 2007; 
Surzhenko & Mazneva, 2007). 
Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and other individuals associated with Yukos and Menatep continued 
to languish in prison, long after Yukos ceased to exist as a company and its assets had been 
transferred into the hands of state-controlled Rosneft’. In December 2013, Khodorkovsky 
received a pardon from President Vladimir Putin and was released from jail. He left Russia for 
Germany soon afterwards. In January 2014, Lebedev was also released, by order from the 
Russian Supreme Court (Alpert, 2014). Although these events in many ways drew a line under 
                                                     
37 The arbitrazh courts are civil courts tasked with handling all economic disputes involving legal 
entities. For more details, see Chapter 4. 
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the “Yukos affair”, many issues remained unresolved, including tax claims against 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, and the arrest warrant for Nevzlin.  
Russneft’ 
The Russneft’ case follows on chronologically from the main developments in the Yukos 
case. Russneft’s problems with the authorities began in late 2006, three years after the arrest 
of Khodorkovsky and a few months after Yukos had been declared bankrupt.  
Unlike Yukos, Russneft’ was a relatively minor player in the oil sector. It was founded by 
Mikhail Gutseriev in September 2002. Gutseriev, who had previously been CEO of state-
owned Slavneft’ until his dismissal in May 2002 (Reznik, 2007c), had created Russneft’ from 
scratch and built it up by acquiring small assets scattered around the country (Reznik & 
Nikol’skii, 2007). By 2006 it was responsible for 3% of Russia’s overall oil production38. 
On 15 November 2006, the PGO opened criminal cases against the heads of three Russneft’ 
subsidiaries, which were accused of extracting oil in excess of the quotas granted by their 
licences (Medvedeva, Nikol’skii, & Sunkina, 2006)39. In January 2007 the Interior Ministry’s 
investigative committee opened a criminal case involving tax evasion at Russneft’ (Reznik & 
Nikol’skii, 2007). In April 2007, the same body conducted searches of Russneft’s offices and 
those of four affiliated banks in connection with the tax evasion case (Karacheva, 2007). In 
May it emerged that the Interior Ministry had charged Gutseriev, Russneft’s Vice-President 
Sergei Bakhir and the heads of two Russneft’ subsidiaries with non-payment of taxes and 
illegal entrepreneurial activity (Nikol’skii, Reznik, & Rozhkova, 2007; Sergeev, 2007). In the 
following month it was revealed that the Federal Tax Service (FTS) had applied to the 
Moscow Arbitrazh Court to annul certain transactions involving Russneft’ shares that 
                                                     
38 Russneft’ produced 14.7m tons of oil and condensate in 2006 (Reznik, 2007a). The figure for total 
Russian production in 2007 was 491m tons, and this was a fall of 2.3% on the previous year (source: 
OAO “Russneft’”, Annual Report for 2007 (Russian), p. 3). The figure for 2006 was therefore 502.5m 
tons, giving Russneft’ an overall 3% share of total Russian production. 
39  The subsidiaries were ZAO Nafta-Ul’yanovsk, OAO Ul’yanovskneft’ and OAO 
Aganneftegazgeologiya. 
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allegedly had involved tax evasion, invoking article 169 of the Civil Code in a bid to have 
these shares expropriated in favour of the state (Reznik, Simakov, & Kornya, 2007). 
Russneft’s shares were frozen by the courts pending a final ruling on the lawsuit (Rebrov & 
Pleshanova, 2007). 
In July 2007, Gutseriev fled abroad, eventually settling in London. At around the same time 
reports emerged that the Kremlin was prepared to let him sell Russneft’ to Oleg Deripaska’s 
company Basic Element (Rebrov, 2007). At the end of the month Gutseriev and Deripaska 
announced that they had agreed on this sale, and Gutseriev received approximately $3bn soon 
afterwards (Fyodorov, Kiseleva, Rebrov, & Orlov, 2007; Grib, 2007; Reznik, 2007c). The 
deal was structured in a way that would allow Deripaska gradually to take over management 
control of the company before taking ownership. The transfer of ownership was conditional 
on the deal’s receiving approval from the authorities (Rebrov, 2010) 40 . The Russian 
authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Gutseriev on 24 August 2007 (Mazneva 
& Nikol’skii, 2007). Apparently resigning himself to long-term exile, Gutseriev sold his 
stakes in other businesses inside Russia, including Binbank (formally majority-owned not by 
Gutseriev himself but by his nephew Mikhail Shishkhanov) (Kudinov, 2008), coal company 
Russkii Ugol’ (Usov & Cherkasova, 2007) and chemicals firm Russkaya Sodovaya 
Kompaniya (Ravinskii, 2007). Meanwhile, Basic Element announced on 27 July 2007 that it 
had made a formal application to the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) for approval of the 
Russneft’ acquisition (Grib & Pleshanova, 2007). However, the approval process was delayed 
repeatedly, first by the FAS and later by a government commission on strategic investments 
that was chaired by Putin (who had become Prime Minister in May 2008). In March 2009 
                                                     
40 The change of management in favour of Deripaska took place as follows. In September 2007 a 
Russneft’ EGM elected a new board of directors, headed by Aleksandr Korsik (former President of 
independent gas company Itera). The remaining four directors were all Cypriot lawyers who were 
believed to represent the investment banks acting as purchasers on Basic Element’s behalf (Grib, 2007). 
February 2008 saw the first major appointment of a Basic Element representative to Russneft’s 
executive management. 
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reports emerged that Basic Element, which had been left heavily indebted following the global 
financial crisis, was looking to back out of the deal (Mazneva, 2009a).  
The next major development in the Russneft’ case was the rehabilitation of Gutseriev: at the 
end of October 2009 the Interior Ministry dropped the international arrest warrant against him, 
and soon afterwards it was reported that he might regain his ownership of Russneft’ 
(Derbilova & Tutushkin, 2009). At around this time it became known that privately-owned 
conglomerate AFK Sistema was interested in buying a stake in the company (Tutushkin & 
Tsukanov, 2009), and the company’s head Vladimir Yevtushenkov clarified in December that 
this would be up to 49% (Mazneva, 2009b)41. It later emerged that Yevtushenkov had helped 
persuade “senior officials” at the Kremlin that Gutseriev should be allowed to return to Russia 
and resume his business activities (Malkova, Berezanskaya, & Igumenov, 2012). 
In January 2010 the Basic Element acquisition was fully unwound and Gutseriev regained his 
100% stake in Russneft’ (Rebrov, 2010). The company was now heavily in debt42 and with 
this in mind the sale of a 49% stake to AFK Sistema went ahead in April 2010. This time, 
there was no objection from the authorities (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b). In the same 
month, all remaining criminal charges against Gutseriev were dropped (Rubnikovich, Rebrov, 
& Muradov, 2010), making him only the second major Russian businessman who had 
succeeded in being rehabilitated 43 . He returned to Russia soon afterwards, becoming 
Russneft’s President at the end of June (Muradov, 2010; “Vkrattse,” 2010). In September 
                                                     
41 AFK Sistema’s rationale for limiting its acquisition to a 49% stake was that any further shares in 
Russneft’ would mean Sistema having to include Russneft’s debt in its own accounts (Mazneva, 
2009b). 
42 Before unwinding the deal, Basic Element had transferred onto Russneft’s balance-sheet the $3bn it 
had borrowed from state-owned Sberbank to make the acquisition, essentially making this acquisition a 
leveraged buyout. The unwinding of the deal did not entail Gutseriev repaying the $3bn he had been 
paid by Basic Element, but the transfer of the debt to Russneft’s balance sheet meant that Basic 
Element was no longer out of pocket. The end result was therefore that Russneft’ had borrowed $3bn 
from Sberbank and handed the money to Gutseriev. 
43 Oleg Kiselev, the former head of Renaissance Capital, was accused in 2005 of committing fraud to 
obstruct the acquisition of the Mikhailovskii GOK mineral enrichment plant by Alisher Usmanov and 
his business partner Vasily Anisimov. Kiselev left Russia for London in advance of the issuing of his 
arrest warrant. The criminal case against him was dropped in autumn 2007 (according to Kiselev), amid 
speculation that he had managed to mend fences with Usmanov (Igumenov & Kozyrev, 2009).  
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2013, Gutseriev again took sole ownership of Russneft’, having bought back AFK Sistema’s 
49% and a 2% stake that had been sold to state-owned Sberbank (Yegorov, 2013). 
Bashneft’ 
The group of companies labelled in this chapter as “Bashneft’” consisted of the largest 
petrochemical and oil refinery complex in Europe, as well as the upstream producer Bashneft’ 
and a chain of petrol stations. Unlike Yukos and Russneft’, the Bashneft’ group consisted of 
assets that had not undergone privatisation during the 1990s. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Bashkortostan republic – like its neighbour Tatarstan – had managed to leverage 
declarations of sovereignty into a power-sharing treaty that gave it ownership over the local 
oil industry (Speckhard, 2004, pp. 170–3). This remained the case until they were privatised 
under controversial circumstances in April 2003, drawing criticism from the federal Audit 
Chamber (Bushueva, Khrennikov, & Voronina, 2003). They ended up in the hands of the 
family of Murtaza Rakhimov, who had been Bashkortostan’s President since December 1993. 
Specifically, controlling stakes in all the enterprises came under beneficial ownership of 
Rakhimov’s son, Ural (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b)44. 
In the December 2003 republican presidential elections, elements within the Kremlin backed 
an opposition candidate named Sergei Veremeenko in the first round, but Rakhimov 
succeeded in retaining support from the ruling United Russia party. The Kremlin switched to 
full support of Rakhimov in the second round of the elections (Gal’perin, 2008; Yartsev & 
Vadimova, 2005). 
                                                     
44 Ownership of the petrochemicals companies had been transferred by the Bashkortostan Property 
Ministry to state-owned holding company Bashneftekhim in 1993. Then in 1999, ownership of these 
assets was transferred to a new company, Bashkirskaya Toplivnaya Kompaniya (BTK), which was also 
given a controlling stake in the oil producer Bashneft’. In 2001, Ural Rakhimov became the head of 
BTK. The April 2003 transaction that became the subject of the Audit Chamber investigation involved 
BTK selling its assets to seven limited liability companies, which then passed them on to a single 
company named Bashkirskii Kapital, which was controlled by Ural Rakhimov (Surnacheva, 2010). 
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Between late 2005 and early 2006, a subsidiary of AFK Sistema, the same company that 
would later buy a stake in Russneft’, bought blocking stakes (25% plus one share) in the 
Bashneft’ companies for $600m. The seller was Ural Rakhimov’s company Bashkirskii 
Kapital (Khannanova, 2005; A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b). 
In October 2006, Rakhimov senior secured a new presidential term under a new system of 
appointments of regional leaders. His nomination by President Vladimir Putin won approval 
from the Bashkortostan parliament (Khannanova & Gainullin, 2006b). 
In 2007, a Moscow court ruled in favour of the Federal Tax Service, which was attempting to 
use Article 169 of the Civil Code to expropriate shares in the Bashneft’ companies as well as 
in Russneft’ (see above). The Bashkortostan authorities appealed (Pleshanova & Zanina, 
2009). Rakhimov reportedly met with Putin face to face and was given an ultimatum: if he did 
not sell his stakes in Bashneft’ to an appropriate buyer, they would be expropriated (A. 
Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010a). 
In 2008, the use of Article 169 in such cases was brought to an end by a ruling of the Supreme 
Arbitrazh Court. Nevertheless, at the end of March 2009, AFK Sistema reached agreement 
with Ural Rakhimov to bring its stakes in all the Bashneft’ companies to controlling (50% or 
above) (Mordyushenko, Khannanova, & Rebrov, 2009). 
On 15 July 2010, Rakhimov tendered his resignation at a face-to-face meeting with President 
Dmitry Medvedev. The fact that he was able to do so in this fashion was seen as a concession 
from the Kremlin in exchange for his having agreed to go quietly (Kostenko & Tsvetkova, 
2010). Medvedev appointed as Rakhimov’s successor Rustem Khamitov, who as the former 
head of the Federal Agency for Water Resources was seen as aloof from the rival political 
factions of the republic (Khannanova, 2010). 
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Research question 1: causes of the state-led coercive takeovers 
Ordered from the top 
The cases in this chapter share an important feature: there is ample evidence in each that Putin 
himself either personally ordered the takeovers or took a close interest in them. While some 
have argued that Putin kept his distance from the Yukos affair until after Khodorkovsky’s 
arrest (Stanislav Belkovsky quoted in Sakwa, 2009, p. 159; Woodruff, 2003), this is contested 
by the Yukos camp (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 155, 175, 241), and few would question Putin’s 
involvement after that arrest. As noted above, the crackdown at Russneft’ reportedly came 
after a meeting at the Kremlin between Ingushetian President Murat Zyazikov and Putin, in 
which the political activities of Gutseriev and his family were blamed for the deteriorating 
security situation in the republic45. And it was Putin who reportedly met with Rakhimov in the 
Kremlin in 2007, telling him he must either agree to sell controlling stakes in the Bashneft’ 
companies or have them taken from him by court order (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010a). 
Furthermore, the same state officials were involved as the main executors of the crackdowns, 
with Igor’ Sechin having played a leading role in each case 46 . He is thought to have 
masterminded the campaign against Yukos and was from July 2004 Chairman of state-
controlled Rosneft’, which acquired most of the Yukos assets; he is also thought to have been 
behind the legal efforts of the Federal Tax Service (FTS) to have controlling stakes in 
Russneft’ and Bashneft’ expropriated by the state. The same senior lawyers represented the 
FTS in court against both Yukos and Russneft’, and went on to work for Sechin in different 
capacities afterwards (Gudkov, 2008; Pleshanova & Gritskova, 2008). 
                                                     
45 This point is discussed in greater detail below. 
46 See e.g. Yaroshevskii (2008) for Yukos, Kharat’yan (2007) for Russneft’. For Bashneft’, Gal’perin 
(2008) claims that “Rakhimov’s manoeuvring particularly angered Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Sechin’s group. Dmitry Medvedev, as Chairman of Gazprom, was more favourably inclined towards 
the Bashkir authorities.”  
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There are indications that Putin might have changed his attitude to the Yukos and Russneft’ 
cases over time, possibly under the hard-line influence of Sechin, who was deputy head of the 
presidential administration for most of the period covered 47 . At Russneft’, Gutseriev’s 
rehabilitation from late 2009 appears to have been thanks not least to the persuasive powers of 
the more liberal Putin ally Dmitry Medvedev (then Russia’s President). But Putin was making 
the ultimate decisions regarding the fates of the companies and their owners.  
This fact provides some weight for arguing that the takeovers had “political” considerations as 
their motivation, rather than being merely cases of reiderstvo with underlying rent-seeking 
motivations. Putin’s involvement is not entirely incompatible with the latter explanation, but it 
raises the stakes when making such an argument. These were not the sort of illegal takeovers 
depicted by Rochlitz (2013), in which the state tolerates predation by regional officials or their 
underlings in exchange for the latter’s ability to deliver pro-Kremlin votes; neither were they 
cases where a “principal-agent problem” prevented the Kremlin from reining in the predatory 
inclinations of the bureaucracy (Markus, 2012)48. Instead, Putin was either colluding with 
those who instigated the takeovers, or was instigating them himself. If these were cases 
motivated by rent-seeking, then either Putin was seeking to benefit from them personally, or, 
conceivably, he was enabling one particular faction to benefit as part of the “rent management 
system” on which his political survival depended (Gaddy & Ickes, 2010). These are the 
explanations that need to be considered as rivals to the “sovereign development” hypothesis. 
With this in mind, we now turn to the individual cases in search of evidence regarding their 
causes. 
                                                     
47 Sechin was appointed deputy head of Putin’s presidential administration on 31 December 1999, when 
Putin was still only acting President. In May 2008 he was instead made Deputy Prime Minister with 
responsibility for the oil and energy sectors (“Sechin, Igor’,” n.d.). 
48 To be clear, Markus suggests that this mechanism might explain some cases of “expropriation” in 
Russia, but he does not claim that it explains the Yukos affair or the other cases in this chapter. 
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Yukos 
As noted above, there is no serious doubt among analysts regarding Putin’s personal 
involvement in the Yukos affair. However, there is some debate as to whether he became 
involved at the outset or only some time after the crackdown on Yukos had begun.  
 
The events prior to October 2003 (including the arrest of Pichugin and Lebedev) are seen by 
some analysts as qualitatively of a different order from what followed (including the arrest of 
Khodorkovsky). Woodruff (2003) has argued that Yukos’s early problems prior to October 
2003 were the manifestation of a business dispute between the company and state-owned 
Rosneft’, which prompted the latter to lobby the PGO to apply pressure on Yukos. There are 
plenty of other cases of law-enforcement being recruited by one or both sides in a business 
dispute, as Barnes (2006a) has ably documented. According to Woodruff, only in October 
2003 did Putin “[throw] his full weight behind the anti-Yukos campaign”, and 
Khodorkovsky’s determination to escalate the business dispute into a political conflict was the 
likely cause. Similarly, Belkovsky has claimed that Putin was kept in the dark about the 
Khodorkovsky arrest until after the fact: it was deliberately timed for the middle of the night 
so that Putin could be presented with a fait accompli. As his interviewer puts it, “If [Putin] had 
ordered Khodorkovsky’s release he would look weak and an instrument in the hands of others, 
but to accept the arrest and all that it entailed brought him into the silovik camp on this issue, 
and set Russia and his presidency on a new path” (Sakwa, 2009, p. 158). Khodorkovsky’s 
statements, which were “careful to explicitly absolve Putin of involvement”49, might lend 
credence to this view, as might the fact that Putin’s chief of staff Aleksandr Voloshin told 
Western journalists in July 2003 that Putin did not know about the Yukos campaign until it 
was already underway. 
 
                                                     
49 Woodruff (2003, p. 5). Khodorkovsky maintained this line at least as late as 2005 (“Interv’yu: 
Mikhail Khodorkovskii,” 2005). 
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If Putin was persuaded to get fully behind the Yukos affair only in October 2003, this implies 
an intriguing power-dynamic between the President and his subordinate Sechin, who had 
apparently been coordinating the Yukos affair on his own initiative prior to October. 
However, it seems at least as plausible that Putin was involved in launching the PGO’s 
crackdown against Yukos from the outset – and that it was Voloshin, not Putin, who was 
being kept in the dark about the real nature and extent of that crackdown. The fact that many 
of the best analysts believed Putin was only a late convert to the Yukos affair may simply be 
the result of the adroitness with which Putin presented himself as being above the fray (while 
tacitly supporting and overseeing Sechin’s actions), combined with the fact that 
Khodorkovsky had no choice but to appeal to the highest office in the land (the ‘good tsar’) in 
his quest for justice.  
 
In contrast to Khodorkovsky’s statements at the time (and for some years afterwards), his 
Menatep allies interviewed in Sixsmith (2010) appear to concur on the following points:  
1) they knew that the company would face serious problems from the state after a meeting of 
business leaders with Putin on 19 February 2003, at which Khodorkovsky accused Rosneft’ of 
corruption over the acquisition of oil producer Northern Oil (in Russian: Severnaya Neft’)50; 
2) very soon after this meeting the PGO was casting far and wide for evidence to build up a 
criminal case against the company and its owners51;  
3) Putin was involved in this from the very beginning52. 
                                                     
50 Viktor Gerashchenko (Chairman of Yukos between 2004 and 2007) claims that Khodorkovsky was 
told after this meeting that he should leave Russia (Yaroshevskii, 2008). Leonid Nevzlin claims that 
Putin instructed Sechin and others to begin gathering evidence against Yukos as a result of the meeting 
(Sakwa, 2009, p. 144). Mikhail Brudno claims that “none of it might have happened” if Khodorkovsky 
had not said what he said (Sixsmith, 2010, p. 64). 
51  The same message was conveyed to the present author in conversation with a public relations 
professional close to the Menatep camp, September 2012. 
52 Aleksandr Temerko claims that “Putin gave the management of the affair to Sechin and I was trying 
to negotiate with him […] Sechin was Putin’s weapon […] The Yukos affair was one of the few 
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On this last point, it is possible that the Menatep insiders changed tactics over the years, 
initially pointing the finger at Sechin and the siloviki exclusively, but then pinning the 
international blame squarely on Putin once it became clear that he could not be appealed to for 
clemency. It is also possible that the prosecutors’ search for evidence against Yukos from 
February 2003 was a relatively spontaneous phenomenon aimed at pleasing superiors, rather 
than a response to a direct instruction from above. However, the weight of evidence 
nevertheless seems to be that the Yukos intervention was initiated at the very top. This 
impression is reinforced by the fact that at Russneft’ and Bashneft’ also, the pressure on the 
existing owners began with a frenzy of investigative activity from prosecutors, with 
indications that this was triggered by an instruction from the Kremlin. The fact that these early 
stages of the SLCT did not match the full-scale coercive action that was directed at Yukos 
later should not be mistaken for a sign that the case began as a mere business dispute. Rather, 
these early activities formed the coercive basis on which the state then made its “carrot-and-
stick” offer to the existing owner. 
Sixsmith (2010, pp. 76–82) suggests that another trigger besides the February meeting was the 
fact that Yukos was in talks on the planned sale of a blocking stake (and possibly greater) in 
the company to either ExxonMobil or ChevronTexaco. It had not consulted the Kremlin on 
the issue in advance, therefore challenging the government’s right to determine its own 
strategy regarding the appropriateness of foreign capital in the oil sector. Sixsmith suggests 
that Putin might have been in favour of the sale of a minority stake to Chevron, but was aghast 
at information that Yukos was also talking to ExxonMobil about the sale of a controlling 
                                                                                                                                                        
projects that Putin supervised personally” (Sixsmith, 2010, p. 155). Bruce Misamore believes Putin was 
directing or personally approving “every major action in the destruction of Yukos” (Sixsmith, 2010, p. 
175). Mikhail Brudno insisted that “It was [Putin], from the beginning to the end. From the very 
beginning to the very end. Nothing that was done was done without his permission. Now, maybe he 
was led to making certain decisions by certain people […] But, however it may have been, he made 
those decisions” (Sixsmith, 2010, p. 241). 
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stake53. This information came to light at the beginning of October 2003. Thus it is possible to 
argue that the first phase of the Yukos affair was triggered by the February meeting, and the 
second phase (the arrest of Khodorkovsky) by the information about an imminent sale to a US 
company. However, to suggest that this news was the deciding factor in Khodorkovsky’s 
arrest (rather than altering the timing of what was going to happen in any case) would be to 
underestimate the extent to which he and his company were already in serious trouble. A more 
convincing deciding factor in the escalation of the Yukos affair was the Kremlin’s realisation 
that Khodorkovsky was not going to be cowed by the pressure that was being placed on him 
and his company into accepting the “carrot-and-stick” offer. 
Underlying causes 
“I could not have imagined that state bureaucrats with the direct connivance of the head of 
state would directly and openly act against the economic interests of Russia” – Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, in Khodorkovsky and Gevorkyan (2012) 
The above discussion has tackled the question of which state actors were responsible for 
instigating the Yukos affair, and what events might have triggered the first coercive pressure 
on the company as well as the later escalation of the crisis with Khodorkovsky’s arrest in 
October 2003. But it seems important to distinguish between triggers (which explain the 
timing of the attack) and underlying causes (the larger perceived transgressions that really 
drove the SLCT process forward). These larger transgressions cast doubt on the suggestion 
that the Yukos affair might never have happened if Khodorkovsky had not talked out of turn 
at the February 2003 meeting. 
The literature on the Yukos affair provides no shortage of suggestions regarding which of the 
actions taken by Khodorkovsky might have angered the Kremlin or elements within it. The 
                                                     
53 Sixsmith cites Bruce Misamore, former Yukos chief financial officer, as saying that ExxonMobil 
CEO Lee Raymond had bragged about this possibility in a meeting with Putin at the beginning of 
October 2003 (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 124–129). 
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literature tends to suffer, however, from an inability to discriminate between these suggestions 
or describe how they might relate to one another. The following political actions of Yukos 
and/or Khodorkovsky have been offered as explanations for the crackdown:  
• the political funding activities of Yukos, Khodorkovsky and others in the run-up to 
the December 2003 elections (e.g. Sakwa (2009, p. 67));  
• Yukos’s wider political activity, including its lobbying to block legislation on oil 
taxes (e.g. Sakwa (2009, p. 95));  
• Khodorkovsky’s advocacy of a parliamentary republic and hints that he might bid to 
be President or Prime Minister (e.g. Sakwa (2009, p. 120), Pappe and Galukhina 
(2009, pp. 217–8));  
• the company’s perceived intrusion into the realms of foreign policy, befriending 
influential American politicians and holding talks with the Chinese government on the 
construction of an oil pipeline (e.g. Sakwa (2009, p. 136), Pappe and Galukhina 
(2009, p. 207));  
• the activities of Open Russia, a philanthropic organisation founded by Khodorkovsky 
and his colleagues that was similar to George Soros’s Open Society Foundation. This 
was perceived by the Kremlin as a subversive organisation aimed at spreading anti-
government sentiment particularly among young people (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, 
p. 217). According to Sakwa (2009, p. 125), Khodorkovsky “portrayed his activities 
as representing an epochal transformation of Russia and played up the public relations 
side for all it was worth, which would have annoyed the most benign of 
governments”. 
For explanations based purely on rent-seeking, such political factors provided a mere pretext 
for a takeover that targeted Yukos because it was highly successful and lucrative. They are 
also of no causal significance to those who argue that the decision had already been taken to 
nationalise Yukos as the quickest step towards reasserting state control over the entire oil 
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industry, or reasserting state power against that of the “oligarchs”. Conceivably, all of these 
factors came into play: the steps taken by Khodorkovsky gave the state political reasons to 
instigate the SLCT, but this coincided with the rent-seeking motives of the instigators and 
strategic considerations regarding the desire to increase state control in the economy. 
However, unless some effort is made to discriminate between the many proposed causes, the 
overall explanation becomes unwieldy and over-reliant on coincidence.  
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev continued to languish in prison and were even confronted with 
new criminal charges long after Yukos’s assets were safely in the hands of Rosneft’, and this 
fact argues against the claim that politics was only a pretext for the real aim of enabling the 
takeover of Yukos by greedy officials. In order to still be valid, such an explanation relies on 
the personal animosity felt by Putin and the siloviki towards the people concerned. But it 
would be remarkable if this were all that was driving the coercive process on, given that this 
involved the state continuing to commit significant financial and bureaucratic resources. A 
more plausible explanation is that Khodorkovsky was seen as a political threat, even after he 
was deprived of most of his assets. As will become clear from the discussion later in this 
chapter regarding the precise nature of the “carrot-and-stick” offer, acceptance of that offer 
entailed renouncing political activity as well as giving up ownership of one’s business. The 
state saw the change of ownership as an important part of neutralising the political threat from 
these business owners, but was not confident that this was enough.  
What kind of political threat did Khodorkovsky pose? Pappe and Galukhina (2009, pp. 216–8) 
argue that the state felt obliged to act because Khodorkovsky posed a serious challenge to the 
Putin regime, given his intention to enter the political arena and the fact that he had billions of 
dollars in cash at his disposal. But it is in fact questionable whether Khodorkovsky’s political 
ambitions posed any genuine threat to the incumbency of Putin’s regime. His chances as a 
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presidential candidate were minimal in a country so hostile to oligarchs54. It is also far from 
clear how he could have hoped to run in an election on a level playing-field: it would have 
been easy enough for the incumbent regime to apply “administrative resources”55, either to 
eliminate him as a candidate altogether (by disqualifying him on a technicality, for example) 
or to discredit him through control over the media and law-enforcement. He would have been 
seriously hampered in his ability to use the vast financial resources at his disposal to boost his 
electoral chances: any media outlet or political organisation perceived to be financed or 
owned by Khodorkovsky and his allies could have been shut down by the state with ease. It 
could still be asserted that the Kremlin, despite holding most of the cards, was not prepared to 
take any risks and was determined to nip Khodorkovsky’s political challenge in the bud. 
However, if this is the case then the scale, scope and duration of the ensuing Yukos affair look 
like a huge over-reaction.  
In the quotation at the beginning of this section, Khodorkovsky expresses his bewilderment at 
how the state could have acted so directly against its own economic interests by going after 
one of Russia’s most successful companies. Indeed, Yukos was until 2003 a major contributor 
to Russia’s economic growth56 . But the concept of “sovereign development” provides a 
possible solution to this apparent conundrum. If the state identified a threat to sovereignty 
from Yukos’s behaviour, and prioritised such threats above the objective of economic 
development (in the narrow sense of boosting GDP), then the crackdown in fact fitted 
                                                     
54 In a VTsIOM opinion poll at the end of 2003, 61% of respondents declared Putin to be “person of the 
year”. Khodorkovsky figured only among the ‘anti-heroes’ named by respondents, behind Anatoly 
Chubais (29% of respondents), Boris Berezovsky (20%), Vladimir Zhirinovsky (18%), Gennady 
Zyuganov (13%) (“Litsa goda,” 2003). Khodorkovsky was named by 9% of respondents. While such 
opinion polls are to be treated cautiously, the numbers highlight the uphill struggle a Khodorkovsky 
presidential bid would have faced. 
55 The term “administrative resources” will occur frequently in this thesis and a definition will be 
helpful. It refers to the arbitrary and improper use of state resources by the state itself or by those with 
privileged access, in order to confer advantage over those who do not have such access. For a study of 
the use of administrative resources to influence the outcome of elections in post-Soviet countries, see 
Wilson (2005). In SLCTs, administrative resources are used by the state and state-backed companies 
against the existing owners and those with rival claims to the assets (see Chapter Three).  
56 According to Kryshtanovskaya (2003), Yukos was contributing around 5% of Russia’s GDP before 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest. 
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perfectly well with the state’s agenda. As well as explaining why state actors interested in 
development might sometimes act in ways that are economically destructive at least in the 
short term, “sovereign development” allows for the possibility that Yukos’s political activities 
were a causal factor despite their posing no threat to the incumbent regime. Of the political 
explanations offered above, the company’s undue influence on parliamentary decision-making 
and its negotiations with the Chinese government on a possible export pipeline, are in this 
light identifiable as clear threats to sovereignty and thus the most important underlying causes 
for the SLCT.  
Granted, Yukos was not the only Russian company to have been engaging in such 
sovereignty-threatening activities at the time. Yukos was not the only company that was 
seeking to influence parliamentary decision-making in ways that the Kremlin found 
objectionable (Sakwa, 2009, p. 117), and another privately-owned oil major, Lukoil, was part 
of a consortium which planned to build a privately-financed (and possibly privately-owned) 
export pipeline from Western Siberia to Murmansk (Smirnov, 2003). Gustafson (2012, p. 280) 
argues that Yukos was doing nothing different in kind from the other oil majors, but that it 
was singled out for attack because “on every point of contention [...] Yukos was more strident, 
more aggressive, and more radical than the other oil companies.” 
Russneft’ 
Determining the causes of the Russneft’ takeover is complicated by the fact that this case has 
not been subject to anything like the same scrutiny from journalists and academics as has the 
Yukos affair. While the Yukos insiders were keen to put their version of events across to the 
public in Russia and abroad, the Russneft’ camp remained largely tight-lipped – presumably 
for fear of endangering what proved to be a relatively benign outcome. 
To the extent that this specific case has been discussed in the academic literature, it has tended 
to be described as a case of reiderstvo, i.e. as an illegal takeover by predatory individuals 
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intent on self-enrichment. Hanson (2014), Rochlitz (2013) and Zhuravskaya (2008) all include 
Russneft’ as a case of reiderstvo. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the literature on 
reiderstvo has not properly addressed the question of whether takeovers where political 
motivations were paramount also count as reiderstvo. Hanson suggests that Russneft’ “may 
well have been a case with an admixture of politics, related in some way to Gutseriev’s earlier 
political activities, rather than an example of ‘pure’ asset-grabbing”. Similarly, Rochlitz 
includes Yukos as a case of reiderstvo but notes that it “is not a typical case but rather a 
personal reckoning between a leading businessman with political ambitions and President 
Putin.” The present project, by contrast, considers motivations of self-enrichment to be a 
defining characteristic of reiderstvo: if the state has played the leading role in the takeover and 
it has been enacted for some other purpose besides self-enrichment, then it should be 
categorised as an SLCT but not as reiderstvo. 
When Gutseriev sold Russneft’ to Deripaska under substantial state pressure, it was typically 
thought (as one would expect from a case of reiderstvo) that the company had been singled 
out by corrupt officials intent on enriching themselves. Deripaska was believed to be merely 
acting as a middleman on behalf of those corrupt officials who had launched the attack. It was 
expected that Russneft’ would be sold on to state-owned Rosneft’ forthwith, because 
Rosneft’s political patrons (i.e. Igor’ Sechin in particular) were thought to be responsible for 
the attack57. 
However, the subsequent fate of Russneft’ calls into question the idea that self-enrichment 
(rather than politics) was the primary motivation behind the attack. The sale to Deripaska was 
blocked by the authorities, and Sechin was at the forefront of these efforts: after this, the idea 
                                                     
57 Former State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev, a friend of Gutseriev’s, claimed that “this is not a 
fight against Gutseriev, but for his asset [i.e. Russneft’]. I would not rule out that today it ends up in the 
hands of Deripaska, but tomorrow – in Rosneft’s” (Reznik, 2007b). Similarly, Canadian lawyer Robert 
Amsterdam, who worked as counsel for Khodorkovsky, claimed that the Russneft’ attack differed 
significantly from the Yukos affair: the latter had been caused by Khodorkovsky’s political threat to the 
regime, while Russneft’ “simply controlled an asset that Rosneft’ wants to own”. Deripaska, he 
insisted, was only the middleman for this takeover by Rosneft’ (Pitts, 2007).  
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of Deripaska as a middleman for Rosneft’ was no longer credible. Furthermore, the pressure 
on Gutseriev was dropped entirely after he agreed to sell a 49% stake in the company to a 
different private owner, Vladimir Yevtushenkov. Nobody suggests that Yevtushenkov had any 
connection to the original attack on Gutseriev. So the SLCT had a relatively benign outcome 
for Gutseriev even though whoever had instigated it does not appear to have taken ownership 
or otherwise enriched themselves. Furthermore, in both the abortive sale to Deripaska and the 
subsequent sale to Yevtushenkov, Gutseriev received a price for his assets that was not far 
from their market value. Such an outcome is far from typical of cases of reiderstvo. 
As usual in such cases, the ownership outcome does not on its own invalidate the notion that 
the takeover was primarily motivated by the desire for self-enrichment on the part of those 
involved in instigating it. There are ways to explain the outcome that could still fit: perhaps it 
was a case of reiderstvo that went wrong, and the instigators were for some reason foiled in 
their attempts to claim the company for themselves. Or perhaps Yevtushenkov was acting as a 
front for the people who had instigated the takeover, so that they did in the end get the 
material reward they were after (but at a surprisingly high price). But the outcome is certainly 
sufficiently puzzling to merit a closer look at what evidence is available. Putin’s personal 
involvement in the affair may conceivably point to Russneft’ as a case of state predation at the 
very highest level. However, it also provides grounds to take seriously an alternative 
explanation that puts politics (understood as something more than venal wealth-maximising 
by state actors) at centre-stage.  
If Russneft’ was singled out for attack solely on the basis of its being an attractive target for 
rent-seeking, then Russian media reports provide a surprising variety of suggestions as to what 
Gutseriev or Russneft’ might have done to provoke the anger of the Kremlin58. One of the two 
                                                     
58 Some of the more exotic explanations that have been offered include the suspicion (reported by an 
anonymous high-ranking source in the Interior Ministry) that Gutseriev had angered state-owned 
Gazprom Neft’ by trying to prevent it buying stakes in Slavneft’-owned assets in Belarus (Sergeev, 
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explanations most consistently offered by the most reputable media sources is directly 
political in nature. This centres on Gutseriev’s connections to his home republic of Ingushetia. 
The Gutseriev family was a major player in the politics and economy of this North Caucasian 
republic, and was allied to Ruslan Aushev, who was the republic’s President from February 
1993 to April 2002. When Aushev was removed under Kremlin pressure, Gutseriev backed 
candidates who were running against Murat Zyazikov, the FSB general who ultimately won 
the election with Kremlin backing. Initially, Gutseriev’s favoured candidate was his brother 
Khamzat, a former Interior Minister of the republic. Khamzat was denied registration in the 
elections, whereupon Mikhail Gutseriev switched his support to the registered candidate 
Alikhan Amirkhanov (Kiseleva, 2006; Latynina, 2007). 
These events date back to 2002, however, and have been cited more credibly as a proximate 
cause for Gutseriev’s dismissal as CEO of state-controlled Slavneft’ in the same year. To cite 
the same events as the cause of the Russneft’ takeover four years later requires further 
explanation. Zyazikov’s presidency proved extremely unpopular locally, and he presided over 
a marked deterioration in the security situation. Latynina (2007) has suggested that the 
authorities blamed the problems on continuing opposition and obstruction from the Gutseriev 
and Aushev clans and their allies in the republic. Thus the authorities decided that something 
needed to be done to reduce Gutseriev’s political and economic power locally. According to 
Latynina, the trigger was the kidnapping in Ingushetia of one of Zyazikov’s relatives in 
Ingushetia: “It was necessary somehow to explain how the situation in Ingushetia, headed by 
an FSB General, was different from the chaos in Chechnya […] President Zyazikov arrived at 
the Kremlin and said publicly to president Putin that 80 enterprises and 500,000 square metres 
of accommodation had been built. It’s hard to say what he said in private, but the pressure on 
Gutseriev began after that […] Who is guilty of the abduction of Uruskhan Zyazikov? Of 
course, enemies. Gutseriev possesses the undoubted advantage as an enemy that it is easier to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Grib, Rebrov, & Butrin, 2007), or that he had angered Sechin by refusing to let Russneft’ sell its oil via 
Gunvor (then Rosneft’s favoured trader) instead of Glencore (Vin’kov, 2007). 
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catch him than to catch the terrorists, and he has more money.” Latynina notes as a possible 
final straw the fact Gutseriev was lobbying in 2006 for a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) for the 
neighbouring republic of Chechnya, along the lines of the Ingushetian FEZ that had been the 
focus of his early business activities in the 1990s. This reportedly threatened the business 
interests of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov (Chabanenko, 2007). Another North 
Caucasus-related factor is the fact that Gutseriev was rumoured in law-enforcement circles to 
be involved in financing illegal paramilitary groups in the region. An unnamed high-ranking 
government bureaucrat told Forbes magazine that unproven allegations of this nature made 
their way up to Putin, on whom they “acted like a red rag [to a bull]” (Malkova et al., 2012).  
This explanation based on Ingushetian politics derives additional credibility from the fact that 
the crackdown on Russneft’ was foretold in this context before there were any outward signs 
that the company was coming under pressure. It is widely accepted that the crackdown began 
in November 2006 with the opening of criminal cases against the heads of three Russneft’ 
subsidiaries regarding alleged overproduction. But a magazine had noted in passing as early as 
25 September 2006 that the Kremlin was angered by Gutseriev’s earlier support for the 
“wrong” candidate in Ingushetia’s presidential elections, and that the PGO was rumoured to 
have received a “quiet instruction to look more attentively at how Mikhail Gutseriev conducts 
his business. Are there, for example, any serious violations in their oil field licences?” 
(Kiseleva, 2006)59. 
It should be stressed that Russneft’ had no local presence in Ingushetia, and in this sense the 
case differs from that of Bashneft’, whose companies were strategic enterprises for the 
Bashkortostan republic. As noted in the case narrative above, Gutseriev sold other Russian 
businesses in the wake of the Russneft’ crackdown, most notably Binbank, which was 
                                                     
59 Thus, as in the Yukos affair, the PGO appears to have been engaged to ‘dig the dirt’ on the subject 
company once the decision to act against it was already taken. These preliminary investigations then 
formed the basis of the coercive pressure which the state applied when making its “carrot-and-stick” 
offer to Gutseriev. 
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formally majority-owned by his nephew Mikhail Shishkhanov (Chaikina, 2008). But this 
appears to have been in response to the pressure on Russneft’, with Gutseriev understandably 
concluding that it was unwise to retain any significant business interests in Russia. The state 
does not appear to have forced these other sales in the same way as at Russneft’. The fact that 
Russneft’ was the sole target lends weight to the view that Gutseriev must also have done 
something to make him no longer welcome in the Russian oil industry in particular. 
This brings us to the second cause most widely cited for the Russneft’ crackdown. This is not 
directly political and is linked to the Yukos affair. Gutseriev allegedly committed the 
transgression of buying Yukos assets that were by then effectively earmarked for sale to state-
owned companies as part of the bankruptcy process. In November 2004, Russneft’ bought six 
oil producing companies in Tomsk region that had once belonged to Tomskneftegazgeologiya, 
a company part-owned by Yukos-subsidiary VNK. There was concern that this sale had 
damaged the value of VNK, which was to be sold as part of the Yukos bankruptcy process. 
Additionally, in spring 2005 it emerged that a Cyprus company named Broadwood Trading & 
Investments, which was widely thought to be affiliated with Russneft’, had bought from a 
Yukos subsidiary a 34% stake in the small oil producer Geoilbent. In May 2005, Russneft’ 
bought a 50% stake in Yukos’s Zapadno-Malobalykskoe oil field, allegedly purchasing the 
stake directly from Yukos-affiliated investment funds. In February 2006 the company 
undertook to buy Yukos’s 49% stake in Slovakian pipeline operator Transpetrol. Another 
relevant acquisition was Yukos’s stake in Sakhaneftegaz, bought by Russneft’-affiliated 
Binbank in November 2005 (Reznik & Nikol’skii, 2007)).  
In July 2007, Russneft’ issued a press release denying that it had ever bought any assets from 
Yukos. It pointed out that the oil producing companies formerly owned by 
Tomskneftegazgeologiya were bought not from Yukos but from Cyprus-registered companies 
owned by State Duma deputy Maksim Korobov. As for Transpetrol, Russneft’s bid came two 
months before the Yukos assets were frozen as part of the bankruptcy process, and had come 
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with the approval of the Economy Ministry. Russneft’ had pulled out of the purchase after 
Aleksandr Ryazanov, former President of state-owned Gazprom-Neft’, asked them to stand 
aside in favour of that company (Gorshkova, 2007). As Reznik and Osetinskaya (2007) point 
out, it may well be that Russneft’ had done nothing wrong from a formal point of view, but 
this did not change the fact that it had bought assets formerly belonging to Yukos when the 
Kremlin had intended them to be sold to someone else60. 
The Yukos factor could perhaps be seen as sufficient on its own to explain the crackdown on 
Russneft’, and the timing of the acquisitions fits reasonably neatly with the beginning of that 
crackdown. However, the Ingushetia factor seems to have been at least as important. Not only 
was it presented as the cause of the crackdown before it happened, it appears (as explained 
below) that Zyazikov’s removal as leader of Ingushetia played an important part in 
Gutseriev’s subsequent rehabilitation. Thus it appears most likely that the crackdown at 
Russneft’ was triggered by a Kremlin meeting with Zyazikov regarding the Ingushetia 
situation, though the company’s acquisition of Yukos assets may well have been an 
underlying cause adding to the Kremlin’s negative view of the company. 
As with the Yukos case, it appears that the Russneft’ crackdown was caused by political 
factors despite the fact that the company’s political activity posed no threat whatsoever to the 
incumbency of the current regime (at least, not at the national level). Gutseriev is described as 
having been a loyal member of the elite with no interest in challenging the political status quo 
(Rubanov, 2007), but he clearly objected to the way his home republic was run after Aushev’s 
removal. Once again, the concern was that the federal government’s sovereignty (in this case, 
its ability to project its authority in a troubled region) was being frustrated by Gutseriev’s 
                                                     
60  From a Vedomosti interview with Aleksandr Temerko, Yukos’s former deputy CEO: “Yukos 
managers did discuss with Gutseriev the possibility of selling to him certain assets, and in particular of 
selling 50% of Tomskneft’, [insists Temerko]. ‘When Yukos’s problems began, we began to look at 
what assets we could sell. But at that time everyone was very afraid of doing business with us, because 
they understood that they would have trouble from the state’, Temerko recalls. But Gutseriev wasn’t 
afraid, he received the nod for these talks from certain high-ranking Kremlin officials and thought no-
one would touch him, Temerko explains. He appears to have found himself in a serious clash of 
interests among Kremlin officials” (Reznik, 2007c). 
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activities. The (unproven) allegation that Gutseriev might have been supporting illegal armed 
groups in the North Caucasus presumably exacerbated the situation, given the ruling elite’s 
preoccupation with national security. 
Explaining the rehabilitation 
Two factors appear to have been crucial to Gutseriev’s rehabilitation, which began in late 
2009: the removal of the force that had created the pressure on him in the first place, and 
support from well-connected individuals who were able to plead his case within the Kremlin.  
In October 2008, Zyazikov was replaced as the head of Ingushetia by Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. 
The latter was without doubt more positively disposed towards Gutseriev61. He is said to have 
asked President Dmitry Medvedev to allow Gutseriev to return to the country. Reportedly, this 
request won Medvedev’s backing but was opposed by Putin (Nikol’skii, Mazneva, & Rakul’, 
2009). Although Yevkurov later denied responsibility for Gutseriev’s subsequent 
rehabilitation, he did comment that “as an Ingush I publicly stated my view that this person 
should come to Russia and use his abilities, he would be of assistance to his country and his 
homeland, Ingushetia” (Muradov, 2010). 
The New Times claimed that Gutseriev’s return had been specifically requested by Medvedev 
as part of his drive for a business- and investments-focussed strategy for the Caucasus, 
replacing the previous strategy based on force (Alyakrinskaya & Vardul’, 2010)62. However, 
Gutseriev did not play any prominent political role in Ingushetia following his return (though 
he was said to be in frequent contact with Yevkurov). As of January 2013 he had not yet made 
any new investments in the republic (Muradov, 2013). It therefore appears unlikely that his 
                                                     
61 Presumably to ease his transition from power, Zyazikov was given a job as aide to President Dmitry 
Medvedev. He was dismissed from this position in January 2012, and one news site suggested that it 
was because Zyazikov had lost his remaining political authority that Gutseriev was permitted to restore 
his full ownership of Russneft’  in 2013 (Yegorov, 2013). 
62  The most obvious symbol of this change of strategy was the appointment in January 2010 of 
Aleksandr Khloponin, the former head of Norilsk Nickel, as the presidential representative for the 
North Caucasus. Medvedev’s election as President in March 2008 gave him responsibility for regional 
policy. 
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rehabilitation was conditional on his playing a role in solving Ingushetia’s problems. Instead, 
Gutseriev managed after Zyazikov’s removal to get the message across to the Kremlin (and 
specifically, to Putin) that he was not a threat.  
Gutseriev flatly denied that Ingushetia had anything to do with his rehabilitation (Reznik, 
2010), but one suspects that this was part of the general caution he exercised when discussing 
matters political after the takeover, the reasons for which will be explored below. By his 
account, the individuals who were key to his rehabilitation were Vladimir Yevtushenkov 
(head of AFK Sistema) and Sberbank CEO German Gref. He said that Yevtushenkov’s 
involvement began at the end of 2009, when they met in London to talk about Sistema’s 
purchase of Bashneft’. “The conversation turned to my return, and what would be the correct 
way to communicate to officials that I had been unjustly sentenced. Yevtushenkov decided to 
help me for unselfish reasons. He played a not insignificant role in communicating the truth to 
senior officials.” 
Bashneft’ 
As the outline case narrative showed, the sale of the Bashneft’ companies to AFK Sistema 
occurred against the wider context of the Kremlin’s efforts to remove Murtaza Rakhimov as 
President of Bashkortostan. Understanding the state’s motives for the takeover entails coming 
to some conclusions about how these two processes related to each other.  
Writing in 2004-5 about events surrounding Rakhimov’s re-election in 2003, Yenikeyeff 
(2005) focused on the role played by “Moscow-based corporate groups” in political and 
economic processes in the Russian regions and the “collateral effect” on centre-periphery 
relations. Yenikeyeff describes the rival presidential bid from Sergei Veremeenko as having 
been an attempt by Moscow-based Mezhprombank (of which Veremeenko was managing 
director) to gain access to the republic’s oil sector through regime change. He suggests that 
the first round of the election took place amid a “massive attack” waged by Mezhprombank 
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against Rakhimov, and hints that the Audit Chamber investigation into Bashneft’s 
privatisation was an example of such pressure (i.e. was ‘ordered’ by Mezhprombank) 
(Yenikeyeff, 2005, pp. 245–6) 63 . As noted earlier, the Kremlin switched support from 
Veremeenko to Rakhimov in the second round of the elections, ensuring the latter’s victory. 
Yenikeyeff explains this variously in terms of Putin’s concern regarding possible instability in 
the republic in the event of regime change, or in terms of “a temporary defeat of the […] 
siloviki […] in their political battles with the old ‘family’ group in the presidential 
administration”, or by reference to Putin’s concern that Veremeenko had become too popular 
in the republic 64 . He also suggests that the Kremlin may never have taken seriously 
Veremeenko’s bid, and was using Mezhprombank as “a battering-ram aimed at bringing the 
semi-independent region back under Moscow’s control”. 
By not discriminating between these possible explanations, Yenikeyeff omits to make clear 
who was using whom: was the Kremlin using Mezhprombank to break down regional 
autonomy, or had Mezhprombank “captured” the state’s coercive resources in order to attempt 
regime change for its own “gain-maximising” motives?65 The present case study looks at 
Rakhimov’s eventual ouster some years later, with the involvement of a different Moscow-
based corporate group, AFK Sistema. It seeks to understand the state’s motives in part by 
determining whether it was the state or Sistema that was calling the shots. 
One clear difference from the events of 2003-4 is that AFK Sistema was not behind a rival 
presidential bid in Bashkortostan. Furthermore, although it clearly had designs on Bashneft’, it 
                                                     
63  The case of Veremeenko’s bid for the Bashkortostan presidency is seen as an example of the 
following more general statement: “A federal corporate group may seek gain-maximisation through a 
direct attack on the political, economic and administrative resources of a paternalistic regional regime” 
(Yenikeyeff, 2005, p. 202). 
64 Yenikeyeff suggests that Mezhprombank, bolstered by its acquisition of Bashneft’ and with the 
popular Veremeenko at the helm, would have been seen by Putin as a political threat (Yenikeyeff, 
2005, pp. 289–290). 
65 Similarly, Speckhard (2004) finds a correlation between low levels of assertiveness in a region vis-à-
vis the federal centre and the presence of national-level businesses in that region. Although he provides 
excellent insight into the motivations driving regional leaders to monopolise their local economies and 
keep them in a state of isolation from the rest of the country, he does not specify whether it is national-
level companies or the Kremlin that are driving efforts to break down such autonomies. 
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managed to win the trust of the Rakhimov family that it could help them defend themselves 
against an attack that was coming not from Sistema but from the Kremlin. Selling Bashneft’ to 
Sistema was acceptable to the Kremlin but did not prevent Rakhimov’s subsequent removal 
from office. The political removal of Rakhimov was being sought on the Kremlin’s initiative, 
not that of Sistema. It is helpful to consider first what was behind this political campaign to 
remove Rakhimov. 
Rakhimov’s ouster 
As with Gutseriev, it is quite clear that Rakhimov presented no threat to the incumbency of 
the regime in Moscow. In fact, from that perspective Rakhimov was a positive asset: through 
his control of “administrative resources” he was able to “deliver” for the Kremlin an 
overwhelming vote in his republic in favour of the ruling United Russia party and the 
appropriate presidential candidate in nationwide elections (V. Ivanov & Voronina, 2003)66. 
However, Rakhimov had been a consistent opponent of Putin’s federal reforms - the system of 
federal super-districts, the change in composition of the Federation Council, and the new 
division of powers between the centre and the regions - all of which were aimed at imposing 
the Kremlin’s authority and breaking down the power and autonomy of regional leaders. 
Although Rakhimov was happy to ensure that his republic voted consistently strongly in 
support of Kremlin-backed candidates in national elections, he expected to rule his republic 
without interference from Moscow. The economy was also seen as largely closed to outsiders, 
which served as an irritant both to the Kremlin and to the major business interests in Moscow 
(Badovskii, 2002). 
There was real anger in Moscow at the way the Bashneft’ companies were privatised in April 
2003 (Bushueva, Khrennikov, et al., 2003). But rather than causing the Kremlin’s moves to 
                                                     
66  On the expectation that regional governors will “deliver” the vote for the Kremlin in national 
elections, see e.g. Sharafutdinova (2010, p. 675). Rochlitz (2013) suggests that regional leaders who 
deliver high pro-Kremlin votes are in exchange allowed by the Kremlin to engage in reiderstvo. If the 
Bashneft’ takeover also counts as reiderstvo, then it seems particularly odd that Rakhimov should have 
been targeted, given his strong track-record in delivering pro-Kremlin votes. 
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replace him, the privatisation happened once those moves were already underway (Butrin, 
Skorobogat’ko, & Il’khamov, 2003)67. According to some reports, when the Kremlin switched 
its support to Rakhimov in the second round, it made this conditional on Rakhimov agreeing 
to cede control of Bashneft’ (Khannanova, 2005; A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b)68.  
Rakhimov’s election meant that he could serve out a five-year term that would end in 
December 2008. However, in late 2004 the system of electing regional leaders was replaced 
with what were effectively direct appointments by the federal President, subject only to 
approval by the regional parliament (which has proved to be a mere formality) (Goode, 2007). 
Under the new system, incumbent regional leaders could opt before the expiry of their term to 
“raise the question of trust” before the President, effectively forcing the latter to either replace 
him or grant him a new five-year term. Rakhimov took advantage of this in September 2006, 
and his candidacy for reappointment was duly presented by Putin to the Bashkortostan 
parliament, who overwhelmingly voted in favour in October 2006 (Khannanova & Gainullin, 
2006b).  
Several reasons were given in the media for the Kremlin’s decision to reappoint Rakhimov in 
2006. Firstly, it was suggested that he would be more vulnerable as a presidential appointee 
than as an elected republican President, and could now be removed much more easily by the 
Kremlin at the appropriate time. Secondly, his ability to “deliver the vote” was needed for 
parliamentary elections in December 2007 and presidential elections in March 2008. Thirdly, 
it followed the Rakhimovs’ sale of blocking stakes in the Bashneft’s companies to AFK 
                                                     
67 When it was first announced in August 2002 that the republic would sell stakes in the Bashneft’ 
companies, analysts assumed that the buyers would be Moscow-based companies that could lobby 
support for Rakhimov in the 2003 elections “despite the Kremlin’s obvious dissatisfaction” with the 
republic’s president (Khannanova & Skorobogat’ko, 2002). According to Speckhard (2004, p. 139), the 
Kremlin had by 2002 labelled Bashkortostan “a problem region” because of its refusal to phase out the 
1994 power-sharing treaty. 
68 But see above for the alternative explanations proposed by Yenikeyeff. 
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Sistema, and it was thought that Rakhimov had finally agreed to hand over control 
(Khannanova, 2006; Vinogradov, 2006)69. 
Sharafutdinova (2010) poses the question of what Putin’s objectives had been in moving to 
the new system of gubernatorial appointments in 2004. She notes that the justifications offered 
by Putin and Surkov emphasized “technocratic” goals of “manageability”, control and policy 
implementation. Putin stated that the reform was “with the aim of unifying state power,” while 
Surkov claimed that this unity of power “is the necessary precondition for the unity of the 
nation”. These stated justifications are strikingly similar to the definition of “domestic 
sovereignty” offered by Krasner (1999). However, Sharafutdinova effectively argues that this 
rationale conceals political goals that were left unstated by Putin and Surkov. She names 
“Luzhkov (Moscow), Shaimiev (Tatarstan), Rakhimov (Bashkortostan), and Yakovlev (St 
Petersburg)” as being the “most powerful and oppositional” regional leaders, and describes 
them as “the archetypal regional ‘barons’, with vast autonomy and discretion from the center, 
against which the reforms were supposedly undertaken, in the first place”. Thus, she notes that 
if political consolidation were the key objective, all these regional leaders should have been 
replaced under the appointments system. At the time of her writing, only Yakovlev had been 
replaced. She argued instead, based on data on appointments available at the time, that only 
the weakest regional leaders who were unable to deliver the vote had been replaced. She 
concluded in part that delivering the vote, i.e. ensuring the survival of the existing regime in 
the Kremlin, had been Putin’s primary consideration all along; but she also suggested that the 
particular failure to replace Rakhimov had in part been down to his having been canny enough 
to “pledge loyalty” and refrain from criticising Putin, as well as the fear of regional 
destabilization in ethnic republics such as Bashkortostan (as well as Tatarstan and Chechnya).  
                                                     
69 Another suggestion was that Rakhimov had agreed to allow the sale of the local gas processing 
company Salavatnefteorgsintez to Gazprom, and that Dmitry Medvedev (then Gazprom’s Chairman) 
had in exchange lobbied for his reappointment (Latukhina, 2006). However, given that the pressure 
continued on Rakhimov to sell the Bashneft’ companies, this seems unlikely to have been the whole 
story. 
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Since Sharafutdinova’s article was published, all of the named “archetypal regional barons” 
including Rakhimov have been replaced, suggesting that the sovereignty-based rationale given 
by Putin and Surkov for the 2004 reform was perhaps the genuine reason after all. It seems 
clear from the account given above that there was a desire on the part of the Kremlin to do 
away with Rakhimov’s regime at least as early as 2003. However, in line with 
Sharafutdinova’s argument, a countervailing concern to ensure that Rakhimov continued to 
“deliver the vote” in national elections does seem to have helped to keep him in power for a 
time.  
The turning point appears to have come with the March 2008 presidential elections that were 
won by Dmitry Medvedev. It has been suggested that the Kremlin felt Rakhimov was no 
longer valuable in terms of delivering the vote: his advanced age meant that he would almost 
certainly retire before the next important elections (Gal’perin, 2008). This would seem to fit 
with the idea that Putin’s primary concern in the question of whether or not to replace 
Rakhimov was maintaining or consolidating the political power of his regime. But 
Rakhimov’s ouster was also part of a wider trend: as Blakkisrud (2011) notes, Medvedev’s 
presidency saw a substantially higher turnover of incumbent governors than had been the case 
under Putin70.  
If delivering the vote was the key objective, the Kremlin could have made life much easier for 
itself by allowing Rakhimov to appoint his own post-retirement successor, someone from the 
existing republican elite who would be equally well-placed to deliver the pro-Kremlin vote in 
future national elections. Instead, in summer 2008 the Kremlin went on the offensive. 
Negative reports about Rakhimov appeared on federal channels including TV-Centre, REN-
TV and Pervyi Kanal. The media coverage was reportedly coordinated by Surkov, who had 
previously been of the view that Rakhimov was a necessary evil for the Kremlin (Gal’perin, 
                                                     
70 Blakkisrud interprets this higher turnover as a drive to complete Putin’s project to curb regional 
autonomies, rather than as a departure from Putin’s approach. 
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2008). Also at this time, Radii Khabirov, Rakhimov’s chief of staff, was given a job in 
Medvedev’s presidential administration, amid rumours that he was being considered as the 
Kremlin’s preferred successor. Between October and December the Kremlin brought in 
people from outside the republic to head the local Interior Ministry and division of the FSB, 
replacing Rakhimov allies (Gal’perin, 2008). A criminal case was opened on suspicion that 
the Rakhimovs’ security team had illegally possessed weapons and ammunition. 
Reports appeared in the local media in December 2008 that Rakhimov had been persuaded to 
resign by the president’s special representative for the Urals Federal District, Grigory Rapota; 
but that Rakhimov had asked to wait until after his 75th birthday in February 2009 (Kostenko, 
Glikin, & Shcherbakova, 2009). However, that deadline came and went, and in March 2009 
Rakhimov launched a public attack on the Kremlin for undermining federalism, trying to 
dictate terms to the regions and encroaching on the cultural rights of ethnic groups 
(Shcherbakov & Gorodetskaya, 2009). 
In June 2009, Rakhimov gave an interview with a major newspaper that was even more 
critical, claiming that Russia was a one-party state, was more centralised than in Soviet times, 
and that the State Duma was a disgrace (Rostovskii, 2009). Soon afterwards, Surkov arrived 
in the Bashkortostan capital and secured a statement from Rakhimov that was supportive of 
the Kremlin. Some sources in Moscow claimed that Rakhimov was to keep his post, but 
others argued that this was only temporary pending a decision on who should replace him 
(Kostenko, Glikin, & Kholmogorova, 2009). Rakhimov’s resignation finally came in July 
2010. During the intervening period, the Kremlin did consult with Rakhimov on who might be 
an acceptable successor, but this was not the same as allowing him to choose: his preferred 
choice, Prime Minister Rail’ Sarbaev, was effectively vetoed by the Kremlin (Kostenko, 
Glikin, & Kholmogorova, 2009), and the eventual choice, Rustem Khamitov, was widely seen 
as having no ties to Rakhimov (Khannanova, 2010). 
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The coercive takeover 
The above section helps to clarify how the Kremlin went about removing Rakhimov from 
power, and what its underlying objectives were. The next task is to understand how the SLCT 
involving the Bashneft’ companies relates to that process. Table 1 places key events in the two 
processes side-by-side in a single chronology. 
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Date 
Developments relating to 
Rakhimov’s ouster 
Developments relating to the SLCT  
Early 2003 Veremeenko rival presidential bid  
Apr 2003  Bashneft’ privatised in favour of Rakhimov’s son, Ural 
Jul 2003  Audit Chamber investigation into privatisation 
Dec 2003 
Kremlin supports Veremeenko in 1st 
round of elections 
 
Early 2004 
Kremlin switches support to 
Rakhimov, who wins 2nd round 
 
Feb 2005  
Rakhimov accuses Ural of political “conspiracy”, begins 
campaign to renationalise Bashneft’. 
Jun 2005  
Rakhimov drops legal action vs Bashneft’ after reported 
peace deal. Legal challenge from local prosecutors. 
Late 2005  
With prosecutors’ appeal pending, Rakhimovs sell blocking 
stakes in Bashneft’ cos to AFK Sistema. 
Mar 2006  
Criminal case opened re tax evasion at Bashneft’ parent 
company, Bashkirskii Kapital 
Apr 2006  
Rakhimovs split stakes in Bashneft’ cos into smaller 
tranches and sell them onto obscure charities, LLCs 
Oct 2006 Kremlin grants Rakhimov new term  
Dec 2006  
Federal Tax Service moves to expropriate Bashneft’ in 
response to April 2006 transactions 
2007  
Putin reportedly tells Rakhimov to cede control of Bashneft’ 
or face expropriation 
Summer 
2008 
Kremlin media campaign vs 
Rakhimov; his allies removed 
 
Nov 2008  
Sistema subsidiary becomes temporary manager of 
Bashneft’ cos for 3-year period 
Mar 2009 
Rakhimov public criticism of 
Kremlin 
Rakhimov agrees to cede control of Bashneft’ to Sistema 
Jun 2009 
Surkov intervenes to stop 
Rakhimov’s attack on Kremlin 
 
May 2010  Audit Chamber closes investigation into privatisation 
Jun 2010  Audit Chamber investigation re-opened 
Jul 2010 Rakhimov resigns  
Sep 2010  
Audit Chamber head promises to establish “who bought 
what and for how much” in 2003. 
Table 1. Rakhimov's ouster and the Bashneft' takeover
71
 
                                                     
71 The table is compiled from sources cited elsewhere in this chapter. Some of the events mentioned in 
the table are described in more detail later in this report. 
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The table underlines the fact that Rakhimov’s removal was more than simply a part of the 
main objective of bringing about the Bashneft’ takeover. At the end of 2003 and in October 
2006 there was speculation that the Kremlin’s decision at the time to support Rakhimov’s 
continued reign had been part of an agreement whereby Rakhimov would agree to cede 
control of Bashneft’ to a more appropriate owner. However, it was not until 2009 that he 
finally did so. Rakhimov resigned after handing over control of Bashneft’ to AFK Sistema. 
The fact that that sale met no serious obstruction from the authorities indicates that this was an 
outcome that was acceptable to the government72. But it did not mean that Rakhimov was 
permitted to remain in office. 
A more robust argument is that the SLCT was part of the main objective of removing 
Rakhimov from power. In the words of one Kremlin source, removing Rakhimov’s control 
over Bashneft’ was a first step towards a change of leadership in the republic (Kostenko, 
Glikin, & Shcherbakova, 2009)73. But the chronology does not neatly support that argument. 
The two processes were not always co-ordinated as a single campaign of attack by the 
Kremlin. For example, the Kremlin reappointed Rakhimov in October 2006 despite the fact 
that the Rakhimovs had recently carried out dubious transactions involving Bashneft’ shares 
that threatened to put them beyond the reach of the state (and these transactions had been 
public knowledge since April). Rakhimov continued his public criticism of the Kremlin after 
he had agreed to sell controlling stakes in Bashneft’ to Sistema.  
                                                     
72 The Audit Chamber investigation into the 2003 privatisation was closed down in May 2010, after 
AFK Sistema had gained control of Bashneft’. But it was re-opened just a month later, some time 
before Rakhimov’s resignation. And after that resignation, in September 2010, Audit Chamber head 
Sergei Stepashin arrived in Bashkortostan promising to establish “who bought what and for how much” 
(Amladov, Granik, & Gorodetskaya, 2010). However, it seems reasonable to propose that the Audit 
Chamber’s investigation had something of a life of its own, independent from the political campaigns to 
remove Rakhimov and force the Bashneft’ takeover. It stemmed from real concerns regarding the 
legality of the privatisation. The attempt to close it down in May 2010 suggests an unsuccessful 
political intervention, perhaps as part of the state’s deal with Rakhimov. 
73 cf. Barnes (2006a), who argues that rival forces (including the state) compete for commercial assets 
not only as sources of profit, but also as sources of institutional power. 
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The most plausible explanation is that the Kremlin was pursuing both the ouster and the 
SLCT, and did not intend to sacrifice one on behalf of the other. The political motivations 
behind the SLCT were not limited to Rakhimov’s ouster. They also involved developmental 
concerns and economic sovereignty. Rakhimov had a strong hold over much of the republic’s 
economy, maintaining it in a high degree of isolation from the rest of the country. Peregudov, 
Lapina and Semenenko (1999, p. 196) described Bashkortostan under Rakhimov as being 
similar to neighbouring Tatarstan, where companies that did not succeed in establishing ties 
with the republican administration were obliged to quit the republic altogether. This posed a 
challenge to Putin’s efforts to create a single, nationwide economic space74. But the main 
implications were for the oil industry specifically: the Bashneft’ group’s oil refining capacities 
had an important role to play in Putin’s drive to boost oil product exports as a way of moving 
up the value chain in the world economy75. This would not happen as long as Bashneft’ was 
being run under Rakhimov’s ownership in such a way as to create “an independent market 
with its own internal price for oil and oil products” (Mordyushenko et al., 2009). Importantly 
for the second research question, nationalisation was not a requirement for solving this 
problem: it could instead be done by transferring Bashneft’s ownership to a private business 
that had a federal, rather than a parochial, reach.  
Research question 2: explaining the ownership outcomes 
Factions and rent-seeking 
Much journalistic and expert commentary regarding these takeovers has sought to predict 
and/or explain their outcome by reference to rivalry between self-interested bureaucrats. 
These bureaucrats act as patrons of the various companies who might emerge as the new 
                                                     
74 “Widespread assertive regionalism would erode the state’s ability to […] ensure a uniform legal 
framework and infrastructure for the national market” (Speckhard, 2004, p. 58). 
75 See the discussion in Gustafson (2012, pp. 369–370) of tax changes introduced in 2005 to favour the 
export of refined oil products. 
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owners. In each case, the expected owners were Rosneft’ or Gazprom. At Yukos, state-owned 
Rosneft’s political patrons are described as having instigated the takeover (and seen off a 
challenge from their rivals at state-owned Gazprom) for their own power- or wealth-
maximising motives. Rosneft’ and Gazprom are also seen as having competed to take over 
Russneft’ and Bashneft’. When private companies became involved, they were seen as acting 
on behalf of the real buyers (Rosneft’ or Gazprom) or of their political patrons. 
As noted above, however, the instigators in all three takeovers were the same, and there is 
considerable evidence of Putin’s personal involvement. In this light, the fact that the 
ownership outcomes differed can only be explained in factional terms if Putin is acting as an 
arbiter between rival factions, maintaining a balance between them in order to preserve his 
own power. On this reasoning, the siloviki must not be allowed to become so dominant that 
they pose a potential challenge to Putin himself, therefore the “liberals” are permitted the 
occasional victory (Holmberg, 2008; Mehdi & Yenikeyeff, 2013; Rochlitz, 2010). It could be 
claimed that the siloviki were not permitted to build on their victory at Yukos by taking over 
the (much smaller) Russneft’ and Bashneft’ as well. 
There are methodological problems with this type of explanation: there is little hard evidence 
against which to test it (how would we know whether or not Putin is actually “balancing” the 
interests of rival factions?), there are problems defining and delimiting factions (how do we 
know who is “in” and who is “out” of a particular faction?), and the explanation is worryingly 
flexible (it can be used to explain the fact that Rosneft’ was the main buyer of Yukos’s assets, 
but with a few tweaks could equally well have been used to explain an entirely different 
outcome). However, it still needs to be considered for the possibility that it best explains the 
outcomes of the three cases. 
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Limitations of state ownership 
The literature provides some theoretical grounding for an explanation of the dependent 
variable that is instead based on the strengths and weaknesses of state ownership versus 
private ownership. As noted in Chapter 1, Hanson (2009, 2011) has explored the possibility 
that Russian state actors use “trusted” (doverennye) private businessmen as an alternative to 
state ownership. Without coming to any firm conclusions about what motivates state actors to 
carry out SLCTs, he suggests (2009, pp. 22–23) that the Yukos affair might have been 
prompted by a decision to establish state control over the oil sector. He argues that to do this it 
was only necessary to explicitly nationalise Yukos itself: this was enough to signal to the 
remaining private actors in the sector that they had to submit to the Kremlin’s instructions on 
how to behave. In this atmosphere of greater subordination to the Kremlin, it became a viable 
option to let “trusted” businessmen become the new owners in subsequent SLCTs such as 
Russneft’. Hanson states that in the unlikely event state actors were pursuing economic 
development rather than narrow interest-maximisation, they should have learned that state-
controlled companies underperform their private counterparts. If power is instead the main 
motivation, then in the post-Yukos climate “trusted” businessmen are sufficiently subordinate 
to the Kremlin to be used to undermine the power-base of political adversaries. And if it is 
material self-interest that dominates, state actors should have realised that it is just as easy to 
extract rents from private business (e.g. through hidden ownership or kickbacks) as from 
state-owned companies. Therefore, by any of the possible motivations, control through 
“trusted businessmen” is an attractive alternative to state ownership from the point of view of 
state actors.  
This would only provide a causal explanation for the varying ownership outcomes in this 
chapter’s three cases if it were indeed the case that state actors learned since the Yukos affair 
that nationalisation was a bad idea, and accordingly preferred subsequently to allow 
companies to be sold to “trusted” private businesspeople instead. This would fit with the 
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sequencing of the Yukos, Russneft’ and Bashneft’ takeovers. But there are weaknesses in the 
argument: firstly, it does not fully explain why nationalisation was a necessary outcome for 
the expropriation of Yukos. Would the warning to other oligarchs not have been just as clear 
if Yukos had instead been expropriated in favour of a politically loyal private businessman? 
Secondly, the demonstration effect of the Yukos case has been questionable given that the 
state has felt the need to intervene in subsequent cases (including Russneft’ and Bashneft’). 
And the Russneft’ intervention, which has not resulted in nationalisation, took place when the 
Kremlin’s fondness for state ownership was apparently at its peak76. Thirdly, it would seem 
that state actors have not learned the requisite lesson either, because SLCTs after Yukos have 
had nationalising outcomes, for example the takeover of Bank Moskvy by state-owned VTB 
in April 2011 (“Chei Bank Moskvy?,” 2011). 
Contingent nature of the outcomes 
The strongest argument against explanations based on Putin’s acting as arbiter between 
factions, and those based on state actors learning about the weaknesses of state ownership, 
comes from evidence that the outcomes of the three cases were in fact highly contingent in 
nature. 
With respect to the Yukos affair, this point is expressed well by Gustafson (2012, p. 314): 
“The simplest version—that Yukos was expropriated because the leading siloviki saw an 
opportunity to take it over for themselves—is demonstrably false […] the transfer of Yukos’s 
resources to Rosneft came about as the result of a fluke, which was not foreseen by the 
ultimate beneficiaries themselves.” As will be discussed below, the nature of this “fluke” was 
that Gazprom, the state-owned company which at some point did become the Kremlin’s 
intended buyer, was prevented at the last minute from taking ownership of Yukos’s main asset 
                                                     
76 Two major new state-owned joint-stock companies, the United Aviation Company (OAK) and the 
United Shipbuilding Company (OSK), were created in November 2006 and March 2007 respectively. 
Vneshekonombank (VEB) became a state corporation in July 2007. The state corporation 
Rostekhnologii was created at the end of 2007. 
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by international legal action from Khodorkovsky’s allies. Rosneft’ stepped in because, unlike 
Gazprom, its international exposure was at the time close to nil. But it is also argued below 
that before the Kremlin settled on Gazprom as its intended buyer, it had been prepared to 
accept a private buyer for Yukos (in the form of a revised version of the Yukos-Sibneft’ 
merger which would have given the latter management control). 
It will also be shown below that at Russneft’ and Bashneft’, the new private owners are 
unlikely to have been those the Kremlin had in mind specifically when the takeovers were 
instigated. Deripaska approached Gutseriev with the offer to buy Russneft’ after receiving the 
nod from the Kremlin, only to have his acquisition blocked by the Kremlin. When this deal 
was unwound, the idea to sell instead to Yevtushenkov arose at a meeting in London with 
Gutseriev, and was apparently in exchange for Yevtushenkov’s lobbying senior Kremlin 
officials to get the criminal charges against him dropped. Rakhimov approached 
Yevtushenkov as a defensive move against Kremlin pressure, rather than being instructed by 
the Kremlin to sell to him. Furthermore, in both cases these private ownership outcomes 
followed failed attempts by state actors to expropriate controlling stakes in the companies 
through the courts. 
The takeover as bargaining game 
The contingent nature of the outcomes lends weight to the view that the primary concern of 
the state was to deprive the existing owners of their assets: whether those assets were 
transferred to state or private hands was a matter of secondary importance. In the absence of a 
strong preference for a particular new owner, the differing outcomes instead depended to a 
large degree on the way the takeover played out as a bargaining game between the state and 
the existing owner.  
The previous chapter introduced the notion of the SLCT as bargaining game, and began to 
explore how the outcome of this game affects the ownership outcome. Simply put, each 
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takeover begins with state coercion, on the basis of which the state makes a “carrot-and-stick” 
offer to the existing owner. The reason why this offer is made at all (why the state does not in 
every case opt for the full-scale asset seizure and mass arrests it eventually pursued against 
Yukos) is that such actions are a substantial drain on state resources as well as having 
reputational costs.  
Just how great an administrative burden is entailed by full-scale asset seizure depends on the 
type and nature of the business that is being expropriated. Does its value consist largely of 
physical assets that can be easily seized, or cash that can easily escape seizure, or other 
intangible assets that would not survive seizure (such as dependence on key clients who will 
take their business elsewhere)? Is it a solely domestic company in its ownership, financial 
flows and physical assets, or will the asset seizure have to be waged internationally, including 
through foreign courts which take a dim view of the Russian justice system? As these 
questions show, there are defensive tactics available to business owners to increase the costs 
of asset seizure by the state. For example, owners can build offshore affiliates and financial 
networks to save a greater portion of the business’s value from seizure and increase the 
administrative costs to the state if it chooses to pursue asset seizure. However, as the 
Rakhimov family demonstrated with its sleight-of-hand involving shares in the Bashneft’ 
companies, this can also be done using purely domestic techniques.    
If the owner rejects the “carrot-and-stick” offer and the state follows through on its threat to 
pursue full-scale coercive seizure, then the ownership outcome is almost certain to be 
nationalisation. After the state’s coercive resources have been used on such a scale to force the 
takeover, a “private” outcome would be controversial. The state would be accused of having 
been “captured” by this new owner, of having allowed its coercive resources to be used for his 
mercenary ends. It would face a loss of credibility at home, criticism abroad and (if the target 
business has an international dimension) international legal action from the victims. It would 
be unable to argue that the company had been expropriated in the national interest. Only a 
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highly authoritarian regime living in a state of international isolation would be willing to go 
down this road. It would also require the consent of the private company that was set to be the 
new owner, which might be less than keen to be associated with the expropriation because of 
the damage to its reputation and (if it has one) its share price, and the likelihood that it would 
be entangled in the ensuing international litigation brought by the victims. It might find the 
doors of Western financial institutions and foreign markets closed to it as a result77. 
Such is the state’s reluctance to pursue full-scale asset seizure that, if the owner instead agrees 
to sell and accepts certain other conditions (i.e. to refrain from activities deemed to threaten 
state sovereignty), he can expect to receive material compensation that goes at least some way 
towards the market value of the asset. The ownership outcome can, in this case, be either the 
sale to a state-owned company or to a new private owner. As noted in Chapter 1, the outcome 
at this point depends on a variety of political and commercial factors which determine who 
might be genuinely interested buyers (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, pp. 161–5; Radygin & 
Mal’ginov, 2006).  However, the case evidence to which we now turn suggests that the state’s 
reluctance to pursue full-scale asset seizure favours the private ownership outcome, because 
private buyers can help to bring about the negotiated outcome that the state prefers. 
Relating the cases to the theory 
Yukos 
The “carrot-and-stick” offer and the possibility of an alternative outcome 
As the quotation from Gustafson noted above, there was in fact nothing predetermined about 
the ownership outcome of the Yukos affair. There is credible evidence that an offer was on the 
table from the Kremlin that could have enabled Yukos to survive under private ownership. 
                                                     
77 Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 suggested that Putin was now prepared for such international 
isolation. But at the time of the Yukos affair, he was not. As will be shown below, the government both 
cited the national interest as justification and went to considerable lengths to maintain the facade that 
Yukos was bankrupted in a legal and “market-based” way. 
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Furthermore, even after that offer was withdrawn and the Kremlin resolved to pursue 
nationalisation, it was only a highly contingent and extraneous factor that led to Rosneft’s 
being chosen over Gazprom as the preferred new owner for Yukos’s assets. 
After the merger between Yukos and Sibneft’ was announced in April 2003, the government 
continued for several months to express its support. In its original form, the merger would 
have amounted to the takeover of Sibneft’ by Yukos78. The result would have been the largest 
player in the oil sector, with no state ownership (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, p. 213). Putin 
reportedly gave the nod to the Yukos-Sibneft’ merger the day after it was announced79, and it 
received approval from the FAS as late as August 2003 (Sapozhnikov, 2003). If the state was 
intending to destroy Yukos from the outset, then the government’s apparently benign attitude 
to the Yukos-Sibneft’ merger must have been some kind of trap laid for Khodorkovsky, as 
indeed some in the Yukos camp have claimed (Sixsmith, 2010, p. 76). A less conspiratorial 
and more likely explanation is that at this time, the government was genuinely in favour of the 
deal. But how to square this with the mounting pressure on Yukos in the months following 
April 2003? Pappe and Galukhina (2009, p. 215) suggest that at this time the Kremlin was 
already set on neutralising Khodorkovsky as a political threat, including by cutting him off 
from ownership of Yukos and the financial flows he derived from it – but that the intention 
was to do so without harming Yukos itself. The Kremlin’s attitude to Yukos-Sibneft’ was 
surely one of support for the creation of a national champion for the oil sector (even under 
private ownership), but on the condition that Khodorkovsky and his allies agreed to exit the 
company. In other words, it assumed their acceptance of a “carrot-and-stick” offer from the 
Kremlin. 
                                                     
78 Sibneft’s shareholders would sell 20% of the company to Yukos for $3bn, and exchange a further 
stake of just over 70% for new shares issued by Yukos. Yukos would thus own over 90% of Sibneft’. 
55% of the merged company would be owned by Yukos’s core shareholders, and 26% by those of 
Sibneft’. The merged company was to be headed by Khodorkovsky (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, p. 213). 
79  Putin’s demonstration of approval came in the form of his meeting the following day with 
Khodorkovsky and Sibneft’ president Yevgeny Shvidler (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, p. 213).  
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That such an offer was made is indicated by these words from an unnamed oil executive 
quoted in Sixsmith (2010, p. 244): “I think Putin, or the Kremlin, would have been prepared 
to pay for the company. So if Khodorkovsky had not taken such an aggressive stance against 
Putin, he might have received a good deal of money and been able to leave the country. I am 
sure a deal like that could have been concluded, but Khodorkovsky’s attitude made it 
impossible”. 
The Kremlin may not have approached Khodorkovsky and spelled out the terms of its 
ultimatum prior to his arrest, but it seems that he and his allies were aware implicitly of what 
was expected of them. Sakwa (2009, p. 156) writes that, before his arrest, Khodorkovsky 
made clear that he refused to “take the Berezovsky or Gusinsky path and go into exile,” 
despite being strongly urged by Nevzlin and others to do so. “Among other things, Nevzlin 
considered that this would be a way of saving the company.” Viktor Gerashchenko, the former 
Central Bank governor who became Chairman of Yukos in July 2004, later claimed that “with 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky they waited almost to the end of the year [i.e. 2003], they were sure 
that he would ‘understand everything’ and leave the country, and then it would be possible to 
redistribute Yukos without any fuss” (Yaroshevskii, 2008). 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest in October 2003 naturally upped the stakes, but it did not mean that the 
“carrot-and-stick” offer was yet off the table80 . In fact, an anonymous, “knowledgeable” 
source cited by Hanson (2007a, p. 880 fn. 24) claimed that Khodorkovsky, when in pre-trial 
detention, “was offered a dropping of all charges if he surrendered his assets”. 
The Yukos-Sibneft’ merger also lived on as a possibility after Khodorkovsky’s arrest, albeit in 
a changed form. In November, Sibneft’ heads Roman Abramovich and Yevgeny Shvidler met 
                                                     
80 cf. Sixsmith (2010, p. 148): “In retrospect there may well have been a window of opportunity for a 
deal to be done in the first days after Khodorkovsky’s arrest. The price of his freedom, though, may 
have been higher than the Yukos executives expected or were willing to pay at that stage. It would 
almost certainly have meant exile; the loss of all his wealth in Russia; the end of his political ambitions 
both through the Duma and through the social engineering of Open Russia. It also would probably have 
meant Khodorkovsky’s remaining in gaol until December’s parliamentary elections – or even the 
following March’s presidential elections – were safely out of the way.” 
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with Khodorkovsky’s Menatep colleagues in Tel Aviv, and proposed that Sibneft’ rather than 
Yukos take management control of the merged company, which would be chaired by Putin’s 
former chief of staff Aleksandr Voloshin81. Abramovich presented this as being the only way 
that the Kremlin would approve the merger (“Yukos rejects Sibneft demand,” 2003). The later 
accounts of various Menatep insiders indicate that Leonid Nevzlin, to whom Khodorkovsky 
had delegated decision-making authority, effectively vetoed the Abramovich proposal. He was 
convinced that the merger had even in its original form been a trap set by Abramovich in 
collusion with Putin (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 159–160). Khodorkovsky, former Yukos Vice-
President Aleksandr Temerko and former Yukos CFO Bruce Misamore all disagreed with 
Nevzlin on this point, believing that Abramovich was acting in good faith (Sixsmith, 2010, 
pp. 159–163, 290). 
Once this Sibneft’ offer had been rejected by Menatep, the Kremlin removed its offer from the 
table and resolved to pursue full-scale asset seizure at Yukos. The following months saw 
Yukos making counter-proposals in an effort to resolve the conflict. Gerashchenko claims 
that, soon after he became Yukos Chairman in July 2004, Khodorkovsky offered to place his 
stake in Yukos (and those of his Menatep allies) in trust, to be sold by the Yukos management 
to pay the company’s tax debts. This could have left the state with a controlling stake in the 
company, but the offer was declined by Putin’s aide Igor’ Shuvalov, who said that the 
Kremlin had no faith that Khodorkovsky would honour such an agreement (Yaroshevskii, 
2008).  
There is some agreement in the literature that Khodorkovsky bears personal responsibility for 
the fact that no deal was reached with the Kremlin. Although Yukos and its owners employed 
various defensive tactics, these were aimed at persuading the state to yield altogether or, 
failing that, at raising the costs to the state of full-scale asset seizure. They were not aimed at 
improving the terms of a negotiated outcome, because Yukos’s owners were (at least until the 
                                                     
81 Voloshin resigned as chief of staff on 30 October 2003. 
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beginning of 2004) unprepared to accept such an outcome. Khodorkovsky’s decision to stand 
his ground and fight for justice came at considerable cost not only to himself, but to a great 
many of Yukos’s other shareholders and employees and their families. As the game-tree 
presented in the preceding chapter suggests, the decision to take a stand against the state and 
refuse the negotiated outcome makes little sense in terms of rational, interest-maximising 
actors. It was driven not least by a sense of injustice at the arbitrary state coercion that was 
used against him, his colleagues and the company itself; it became an altruistic (if somewhat 
quixotic) campaign for justice (Khodorkovsky & Gevorkyan, 2012). 
Defensive tactics of the existing owners 
As noted in Chapter 1, Markus (2008) has singled out the enlisting of foreign minority 
shareholders as one of the most important defensive strategies businesses can adopt against 
“expropriation” by the state. Yukos too had foreign minority shareholders, and it is true that 
the holders of its depositary receipts launched legal action in the United States against the 
Russian state, Rosneft’ and other defendants (LaCroix, 2007). Furthermore, had Yukos 
succeeded in taking on Exxon or Chevron as a strategic investor, then such a shareholder 
might have been able to use its influence with the US government to help protect Yukos from 
expropriation, as Markus envisages. But other aspects of Yukos’s internationalisation proved 
more important in raising the costs to the state of pursuing full-scale asset seizure. 
In financial terms, the destruction of Yukos was in fact highly profitable for the state and for 
state-owned Rosneft’. As Sakwa (2009, p. 245) notes, “the Putin regime won hands down in 
its struggle with Yukos […] Not only had it managed to squeeze at least $32 billion out of the 
company in back taxes, it had then been able to buy its assets for roughly half their market 
valuation.” Rosneft’ had a market capitalisation of $4bn in 2003, spent $21bn buying up 
Yukos assets, and saw its market capitalisation rise to $90bn in 2007. However, the Yukos 
affair came at considerable cost in terms of the drain it placed on the state’s limited and 
flawed bureaucratic resources. It required the deployment of large numbers of police, 
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prosecutors, lawyers, accountants and tax officials, and the coordination of their activities. 
The complexity of the task was undoubtedly compounded by the fact that Yukos had not only 
foreign minority shareholders, but also foreign assets, directors, and creditors, as well as 
international cash-flows and commodity-flows, and an ownership structure spanning 
numerous offshore jurisdictions 82 . This provided the basis for further international legal 
action. Furthermore, Sixsmith’s interviews with Khodorkovsky’s associates reveal how they 
scrambled to get as much of their money safely offshore before the Russian government was 
able to seize it (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 255–257)83. Even the company’s share register was 
smuggled offshore and beyond the reach of the Russian authorities (Gurova, Rubchenko, & 
Tsunskii, 2004). Because it was intent on seizing as much as possible of Yukos’s value (albeit 
under the façade of market-based legitimacy), the Russian state was forced to respond 
internationally as well, and this meant putting its prosecutorial case to foreign judges who did 
not hold any bias in its favour. 
In order to test the proposition that expropriation requires nationalisation, it is possible to 
consider the plausibility of a counterfactual scenario whereby Yukos’s assets, having been 
seized by the state, were then acquired by private company Sibneft’. This seems unlikely for 
the reasons already stated: the Kremlin would have been widely accused of having been 
“captured” by Sibneft’, and it would not have been able to cite the national interest in its 
justification for the expropriation84. The presence of foreign minority shareholders at Sibneft’, 
that company’s international ownership structure85 and its exposure to international markets 
would certainly have made Abramovich think twice about such a deal. If Sibneft’ were buying 
                                                     
82 Including Cyprus, the Isle of Man and Gibraltar (Sakwa, 2009, p. 169; Sixsmith, 2010 ch. “The 
British Troika”).  
83 Kevin Bromley, one of three British men who became directors of Menatep (GML) in 2004, spoke 
openly to Sixsmith about their role in “selling off assets without bringing the full wrath of the Russian 
authorities down on our heads […] It was a big programme to salvage as much as possible” (Sixsmith, 
2010, p. 256). 
84 For an attempt by the government to portray the Yukos affair as having been for the public good, see 
Medetsky (2007), cited in Sakwa (2009, p. 246).  
85 Sibneft’s then-parent company, Millhouse Capital, was registered in the UK. 
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Yukos as a favour to the Kremlin, it may well have considered asking for a substantial 
financial consideration to make the risks more palatable, as Pappe has argued (Gurova et al., 
2004).  
The international dimension of the Yukos affair explains why considerable lengths were gone 
to in order to create the façade of a legal and even market-based process to what was 
essentially seizure of assets with negligible compensation. This façade was sufficient to allow 
Rosneft’ to conduct a successful IPO in July 2006, raising $10.4bn for a 13% stake, and 
enabled it to work successfully with the international financial community after the IPO. But 
it was not enough to prevent a compensation lawsuit brought by Menatep in The Hague that 
threatened to lead to the seizure of Russian government assets abroad, and those of Russia’s 
state-owned companies (Sixsmith, 2010, pp. 267–270), though it was uncertain whether 
Menatep could convert a favourable ruling into meaningful enforcement. The Russian 
government also expended a great deal of effort, largely without success, to persuade foreign 
courts to extradite former Yukos or Menatep employees for trial in Russia, or prevent Yukos 
assets abroad being sold outside the framework of the Russian bankruptcy process. If the 
authorities had been more blatantly arbitrary in their treatment of Yukos, then these problems 
would have been still more acute.  
Why this new owner? 
Rosneft’s management is seen as having been involved in the pressure on Yukos in the  
crucial months leading up to Khodorkovsky’s arrest and afterwards 86 . However, even if 
nationalisation was the Kremlin’s determined end goal for Yukos from the end of 2003, there 
was no guarantee at the time that Rosneft’ would be the state-owned company to benefit. In 
September 2004 it emerged that the government was preparing a merger deal that would 
effectively have seen Rosneft’ taken over by Gazprom. According to Gustafson (2012, pp. 
                                                     
86 e.g. Gustafson (2012, p. 336) claims that Rosneft’ CEO Sergei Bogdanchikov, “more and more 
plainly backed by the Kremlin, became one of the principal leaders of the campaign against Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Yukos.” 
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338–341), this deal was presented to Putin by Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller and Prime 
Minister Mikhail Fradkov, effectively sidelining Igor’ Sechin (Rosneft’s Chairman since July 
2004) and Rosneft’ CEO Sergei Bogdanchikov.  
At the time of the Yuganskneftegaz auction in December 2004, Gazprom’s takeover of 
Rosneft’ was still on the cards. It was Gazprom, not Rosneft’, that was originally intended to 
be the buyer of this key Yukos asset. Legal action from Yukos in a court in Houston, Texas 
led to the judge issuing a temporary injunction suspending the auction, whereupon the 
international banks that planned to lend money to Gazprom to finance its acquisition got cold 
feet. The auction went ahead nonetheless, and was won by the sole bidder, an obscure 
company named Baikal Finance Group (Skorobogat’ko, Butrin, & Kovalev, 2004). It was then 
bought by Rosneft’ a few days later (Reznik et al., 2004). Putin made clear that Baikal 
Finance Group was a transitional purchaser whose role was to shield the ultimate buyer from 
legal action87. Significantly, no Western banks were involved in providing the finance for the 
acquisition88.  
The outcome of the Yuganskneftegaz auction strengthened the hand of Rosneft’s leadership, 
who were not keen to have their company absorbed into its larger state-owned sister company. 
But it did not yet mean that a decision had already been made to let Rosneft’ acquire the 
majority of Yukos’s assets, though many observers promptly predicted that this would happen 
(Reznik et al., 2004). In fact, Gazprom still intended to buy Yuganskneftegaz as part of its 
takeover of Rosneft’. Resistance from the latter meant that it briefly looked as though 
Rosneft’ CEO Sergei Bogdanchikov would be permitted to head a standalone 
                                                     
87 Putin’s words, in an interview with Spanish media on 7 February 2006, were as follows: “The future 
owners had to think about how they would work; how it may be that they would have to defend law-
suits which might be issued against them. And when BaikfalFinanceGroup bought the corresponding 
stake, it became the owner. Everything that happened later took place on the secondary market. In this 
way the claims against those who then bought this asset were effectively reduced to nothing” (Putin, 
2006).  
88 Gustafson (2012, p. 348) writes that “the bulk of the cash came from the Chinese oil company CNPC, 
in the form of a prepayment against future oil exports by Rosneft’ to China […] The prepayment went 
through Russia’s state-owned bank for foreign trade, Vneshekonombank (VEB). In addition, Rosneft’ 
received a sizable loan from the other major Russian state-owned bank, Sberbank.” 
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Yuganskneftegaz, with the rest of Rosneft’ being taken over by Gazprom (“Rosneft’ sol’etsya 
s Gazpromom bez Yuganskneftegaza,” 2005). The Gazprom-Rosneft’ merger was abandoned 
at the last minute in May 2005, apparently thanks to lobbying by Sechin and Bogdanchikov 
(Goldman, 2008, pp. 190–191; Sakwa, 2009, pp. 326–9). But it would be wrong to see 
Rosneft’s superior lobbying power as having determined its ultimate victory: the turning-point 
had been Yukos’s legal action, which put paid to Gazprom’s bid for Yukos’s main asset. It 
was Rosneft’s largely domestic focus at this time, and its corresponding lack of exposure to 
international legal action, that proved decisive. 
Subsequently a political decision must have been taken to ensure that Rosneft’ emerged as the 
preferred buyer for all the Yukos assets89. As the problems later faced by Russneft’ illustrate, 
no private company was permitted to bid for any of the assets of bankrupted Yukos, despite 
speculation that cash-rich Surgutneftegaz would be a contender (Sakwa, 2009, p. 187).  
Thus it seems clear that the state’s intervention at Yukos was not undertaken with a 
nationalising outcome in mind, let alone with the specific outcome of transfer to state-owned 
Rosneft’. Therefore it is possible to reject the notion that the Yukos affair was from the outset 
aimed at restoring state control of the oil industry by increasing the role of state-owned oil 
companies. Since the company which ultimately benefited most from the Yukos affair could 
not have known from the outset that that would be the case, it also seems unlikely that the 
SLCT was undertaken with rent-seeking as the central motive.  
It may be that when the decision was taken (probably towards the end of 2003) to pursue the 
nationalisation of Yukos through full-scale asset seizure, the Kremlin resolved also that it was 
time to bring the bulk of the oil industry, or even of the wider economy, into state control. 
Certainly, the expansion of state ownership in Putin’s Russia is typically traced back to the 
Yukos affair, and the fact that Gazprom went on to acquire Sibneft’ in September 2005 could 
                                                     
89 One of the few exceptions was a 50% stake in Tomskneft’, which Gazprom subsequently bought 
from Rosneft’ (Sakwa, 2009, p. 244). 
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be seen as a continuation of the nationalising drive that began with Yukos. But it remains 
unclear whether the acquisition of Sibneft’ was part of what Pappe and Galukhina (2009, pp. 
161–5) call a “sectoral” decision in favour of nationalisation, or was more narrowly driven by 
the political leadership’s desire to see Gazprom become a diversified energy company along 
the lines of the Western majors. This had been the rationale behind the Gazprom-Rosneft’ 
merger, the failure of which left Gazprom still lacking any significant oil production90. 
If there was indeed a sectoral logic behind the government’s ultimate decision to nationalise 
Yukos, and behind Sibneft’s subsequent sale to state-owned Gazprom, then conceivably the 
later “private” outcomes of the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ takeovers could be explained in terms 
of the Kremlin being satisfied that sufficient state control of the industry had by that time 
already been achieved. However, as will be shown below, those outcomes were also highly 
contingent in nature. 
Russneft’ and Bashneft’ 
Before beginning to explain the ownership outcome of the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ takeovers, 
it is worth recapping just what that these outcomes were. When Russneft’s owner Gutseriev 
agreed in July 2007 to sell to a new private owner (Deripaska), both buyer and seller expected 
that this would satisfy the government and bring the case to a resolution. However, although 
considerable steps were taken towards implementing the deal (including the payment of $3bn 
to Gutseriev), governmental and regulatory approval was repeatedly delayed until apparently 
extraneous factors (a liquidity crunch due to the global financial crisis) prompted Deripaska to 
back out. In January 2010 the company was returned to its original owner, Gutseriev, who had 
by this time been “rehabilitated” and had returned to live in freedom in Russia. In April 2010 
Gutseriev sold a 49% stake in the company to a different private owner, AFK Sistema, whose 
                                                     
90 As Gustafson (2012, p. 336) notes, “From the moment he became President, Putin had encouraged 
Rosneft and Gazprom to work together. That was the trend worldwide. In contrast to oil, gas had long 
remained a regional industry; but that was rapidly changing, as technological advances, chiefly the 
growth of liquefied natural gas (LNG), made gas increasingly global. All the major international 
companies did both oil and gas.” 
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Chairman Vladimir Yevtushenkov had helped bring about the rehabilitation. This latter sale 
proceeded without any objections from the government. 
In March 2009, i.e. prior to its purchase of a stake in Russneft’, AFK Sistema reached 
agreement to become the new controlling shareholder of the Bashneft’ companies. This sale 
met no serious resistance from the Kremlin. 
The possibility of a nationalising outcome 
Since the current study primarily seeks to explain outcomes in terms of a state vs. private 
dichotomy, it is most helpful to develop a causal explanation for the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ 
outcomes in terms of a “contrast space” (Garfinkel, 1981) of nationalisation. Were the 
interventions undertaken with a state ownership outcome in mind, and if so, what went 
wrong? 
The Russneft’ intervention, which began at the end of 2006, coincided with the creation of 
Russia’s major new state-owned companies and state corporations91. Its “private” ownership 
outcome (through the sale to Deripaska in 2007) therefore happened at the very time when the 
state ownership expansion drive was at its peak. Thus it cannot be argued that the 
government’s appetite for nationalisation across the economy was waning by this point. 
However, an explanation specific to the oil industry remains possible for the private outcome 
at Russneft’. As mentioned earlier, it was responsible for only 3% of Russia’s total oil 
production, and thus a private ownership outcome may have been acceptable to the Kremlin 
because the sector was by this time already dominated by state-owned players. Only TNK-BP, 
Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz remained as big private players, and only the first of these was 
considered relatively independent of government influence. 
                                                     
91 Of the new state-owned joint-stock companies, the United Aviation Company (OAK) was created in 
November 2006; the United Shipbuilding Company (OSK) was created in March 2007. VEB became a 
state corporation in July 2007. Rostekhnologii was created at the end of 2007. 
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Applying the same logic to the Bashneft’ outcome is more problematic: the Bashneft’ group 
of companies included significant refining capabilities that the state-owned companies, 
Rosneft’ and Gazprom-Neft’, particularly lacked. This gave the government a “sectoral” 
reason for wanting a state ownership outcome for Bashneft’, and provided the state-owned 
companies themselves with a commercial reason to be interested in acquiring it (Derbilova, 
2005; Tutushkin, 2006). 
While Bashneft’s refining capacities made it a commercially interesting acquisition for both 
private and state-owned Russian companies, not all analysts agreed that Russneft’ was an 
attractive target: one investment bank analyst pointed out that production at its oil fields was a 
technologically complex task, and claimed that the company’s profitability was low. For this 
reason, he suggested that the prospect of expropriating Russneft’ was no more than a 
“pleasant accompanying bonus” to the main task of settling scores with Gutseriev (Rebrov & 
Pleshanova, 2007). The company itself was claiming before the attack that it expected to post 
a profit for 2006 of $1bn (“Oil and gas company RussNeft plans $1bln net profit for 2006 - 
Company’s President,” 2006), but it managed only RUB 9.9bn ($380m) (Grib, Akhundov, 
Rebrov, & Pleshanova, 2007). Rebrov  (2007) pointed out that if it was not an attractive target 
for state-owned companies, Russneft’ might still be of interest as a private investment for 
rent-seeking officials (possibly the same officials who acted as patrons to the state-owned oil 
companies). He suggested that such officials might be behind Deripaska’s purchase. At the 
time of his writing, it had not yet become clear that that purchase was encountering serious 
resistance. 
Of course, even a relatively unprofitable company might still be an attractive acquisition 
target (for asset-strippers if nobody else) if it is possible to force down the sale price. It has 
been suggested that a state-owned company (most likely Rosneft’) made an approach to buy 
Russneft’ in 2006 for $1bn, and that this approach was swiftly rebuffed by Gutseriev because 
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it was far below the company’s market value (Nikol’skii et al., 2007)92. If this did indeed 
happen, it is unlikely that declining this offer was the root cause of Gutseriev’s problems: the 
more compelling reasons for the attack on Russneft’ have been detailed above. The alleged 
offer to buy the company for $1bn is more likely to have been the first “carrot-and-stick” offer 
that was put to Gutseriev after the takeover had been triggered for those other reasons. 
Gutseriev has claimed that Deripaska was merely one of six potential buyers he considered 
after the problems began. The six included Gazprom, but he rejected this possibility because it 
would have taken the state-owned company too long to arrange the deal, and he needed to get 
it done quickly (Reznik, 2010)93. If his words can be taken at face value, he did not feel under 
pressure to sell to a particular buyer, state-owned or otherwise. 
As noted in the earlier section discussing the causes of the crackdown, even after Deripaska 
emerged as Russneft’s buyer, the assumption remained that he would swiftly sell it on to the 
state-owned company (either Rosneft’ or Gazprom) that was the real intended buyer. This 
assumption was fuelled by the fact that Deripaska had negligible previous involvement in the 
oil industry. But it was confounded by subsequent events: the expected onward sale to a state-
owned company never happened. Either something went wrong with the planned onward sale, 
or it was never the plan. As noted earlier, the idea of Deripaska as transitional buyer on behalf 
of Rosneft’ can be ruled out, because there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Rosneft’s 
Chairman Igor Sechin was behind the campaign to stop the Deripaska acquisition94. That 
leaves the possibility that Deripaska was acting instead for Gazprom, and that the plan was 
sabotaged by Sechin. But there is little evidence that Gazprom was seriously interested in 
                                                     
92 The article cited above stated that an unnamed senior oil company manager was its source for the 
$1bn bid from an unnamed state-owned company; separately it cited a source close to Gutseriev as 
saying the latter had been in talks with officials on selling to Rosneft’ specifically. 
93 For more on the difficulties faced by Gazprom when attempting to move quickly in time-sensitive 
situations, see the following chapter. 
94 Furthermore, there is little evidence that Rosneft’ had any significant appetite to buy Russneft’. It 
was widely noted in July-August 2007 that Rosneft’s debt burden did not allow it to consider further 
purchases at that time (Polukhin, 2007; Rubanov & Vin’kov, 2007), and that Russneft’ did not provide 
an appropriate fit with Rosneft’s assets (Tsymbalov, 2007). 
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acquiring Russneft’. Granted, it was confirmed in 2009, when Deripaska was attempting to 
restructure Basic Element’s debts, that talks had taken place on the possible onward sale of 
Russneft’ to Gazprom. However, the latter’s senior management was reportedly unconvinced, 
as it had its eyes on more prestigious international projects and was unwilling to pay the price 
demanded by Deripaska (Mazneva, 2009a). 
In his first public comment on the matter in November 2007, Deripaska insisted that his 
interest in Russneft’ was strategic (Tutushkin, 2007b). He had in 2005 formed a company 
named United Oil Group95, whose main asset was an oil refinery in Krasnodar region but 
which also included a chain of petrol stations in southern Russia. The continuing obstruction 
by the government and Basic Element’s troubled financial position after the global financial 
crisis provide sufficient explanation for his later decision to unwind the deal, and it seems 
credible that he did indeed intend to use the Russneft’ acquisition to gain a proper foothold in 
the oil industry. In other words, contrary to the assumption at the time, it was never the plan to 
sell the company on to the state. Either his plans were indeed strategic, or he hoped to profit 
from re-selling the company a few years down the line. 
The latter approach is what AFK Sistema consistently said it was taking with Bashneft’. 
Sistema’s Vice-President Levan Vasadze said in 2005 that the plan was to create a vertically-
integrated holding for resale within eighteen months to two years (Yartsev & Vadimova, 
2005). This timetable was of course delayed by the fact that Sistema did not gain control of 
Bashneft’ until 2009. The planned restructuring was completed in 2012, with the previously 
disparate group of companies becoming a vertically-integrated holding with a “single share” 
under the oil producing company Bashneft’ (“‘Bashneft’’ zavershila perekhod na edinuyu 
aktsiyu,” 2012). Clearly this was no mere speculative purchase, and at the time of writing in 
March 2014, Sistema is still the controlling shareholder. It might therefore be a stretch to 
                                                     
95 OOO Ob’’edinennaya Neft’yanaya Gruppa. 
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describe it as a transitional buyer, but the long-term plan was always to sell the company on 
after adding value through the restructuring.  
The speculation that this onward sale would be to a state-owned company began as early as 
2005 (e.g. Yartsev & Vadimova, 2005), and was understandable given the increasing 
dominance of the sector by state-owned players. In June 2013 it was reported that Rosneft’ 
was considering buying Bashneft’ (Dzyadko, Derbilova, Kezik, & Voronova, 2013). But 
before concluding from this recent news that Yevtushenkov was working all along as 
transitional buyer on behalf of Rosneft’, it should be remembered that all the bets had 
previously been on him working on behalf of Gazprom96. This was denied by Sistema sources 
who insisted that the ultimate buyer had not yet been determined (Fokina, 2005). But the 
rumours persisted, fuelled by the fact that Yevtushenkov accompanied Dmitry Medvedev 
(then First Deputy Prime Minister and Gazprom’s Chairman) on a trip to Bashkortostan’s 
capital Ufa in August 2006 (Gavshina, 2006; Khannanova & Gainullin, 2006a; A. Levinskii & 
Sokolova, 2010a). 
In summary, there is a lack of compelling evidence that either of the state-owned companies, 
Gazprom or Rosneft’, was designated as the intended new owner when the SLCTs of 
Russneft’ and Bashneft’ were instigated. Neither is there strong evidence that either company 
was determined to buy Russneft’ or Bashneft’ in the event that they were put up for sale. But 
in considering the possibility of a nationalising outcome for either case, there is one more 
important factor to be taken into account. In both cases, the Federal Tax Service (FTS) 
attempted to nationalise both companies through the courts, through a direct act of 
expropriation rather than the sale to a state-owned company. Both of these legal challenges 
were based on Article 169 of the Civil Code, a law which dated back to the 1920s and 
envisaged the confiscation of property in favour of the state as punishment for transactions 
                                                     
96  Source close to Sistema management cited in Yartsev and Vadimova (2005). Source close to 
Rakhimov cited in Fokina (2005), predicting the group would end up in Gazprom hands within two 
years. Source close to Bashkortostan leadership cited in Gainullin & Skornyakova (2005). 
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“carried out for a purpose that is contrary to the fundamentals of public order and morality” 
(White, 2008). Beginning around 2003, tax officials had begun using this article for tax cases: 
a perfect example of state actors finding innovative applications for existing laws in contexts 
that were clearly unforeseen and unintended by their original authors (Woodruff, 2013)97.  
The FTS first adopted this approach in December 2006, launching legal action based on 
Article 169 in response to transactions in April 2006 which had seen Bashkirskii Kapital (then 
the main parent company of the Bashneft’ group of companies, beneficially owned by 
Murtaza Rakhimov’s son Ural) break up its stakes in the Bashneft’ companies into smaller 
tranches and transfer them to obscure charities (Tutushkin, 2007a). Then in April 2007, the 
FTS attacked Russneft’ in the same way: it brought a series of criminal cases against eleven of 
Russneft’s past and present first-level shareholders, challenging deals involving Russneft’ 
shares that had been carried out in a way that had allegedly allowed the company to evade 
RUB 6bn ($230m) in taxes. As with the Bashneft’ case, Russneft’ stakes had been broken 
down into smaller tranches “through a long chain of transactions” (Rebrov & Zanina, 2008; 
Reznik et al., 2007).  
In the event, neither attempt was successful: the use of Article 169 in civil cases was brought 
to an end in 2008, after an April ruling from the Supreme Arbitrazh Court that it was only to 
be used in certain categories of non-economic criminal cases (Pleshanova, 2008a, 2008b; 
White, 2008)98. This was explained in the media by reference to the fact that the head of the 
court, Anton Ivanov, was an ally of Dmitry Medvedev, who was on the verge of assuming the 
presidency and was promising to introduce changes to the law and judiciary to ease the 
pressure on business.  
                                                     
97 Article 169 was additionally used in an effort to confiscate from accounting firm PwC the money it 
had received from Yukos for its auditing services prior to the crackdown (Pleshanova, Kiseleva, & 
Grib, 2007). 
98 The FTS challenged the Supreme Arbitrazh Court’s ruling at the Constitutional Court, but the latter 
ruled against the FTS in January 2009 (Pleshanova & Zanina, 2009). 
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Advocates of an explanation based on rent-seeking factions can see this as a victory for the 
‘liberal’ faction, which sought to block the further expansion of the siloviki into the oil 
business. However, there are some problems with this interpretation. Firstly, it appears that, in 
the event that the expropriation had been successful, the government would have promptly put 
the confiscated shares up for auction99. Granted, it is possible that such an auction would have 
been rigged in favour of a favoured state-owned buyer, but this can only be speculation. 
Secondly, there is no evidence in the public domain that Rosneft’ used the campaign to make 
an approach to either company to sell at a lower price.  
Furthermore, the expropriation campaign followed (and was at least formally triggered by) 
moves by the existing owners which look very much like defensive tactics aimed at raising the 
costs to the state of full-scale asset seizure, as will be discussed below. It therefore seems 
quite possible that the expropriation effort was aimed at ‘blocking’ such moves rather than 
nationalising the companies concerned.  
Overall, it appears that the state and state-owned companies were not maximising their efforts 
to bring either company into state ownership, either by acquisition or by expropriation. 
Therefore it is unlikely that the state had nationalisation in mind when it began to apply 
pressure on Gutseriev and Rakhimov to give up control of their companies. As a former 
employee in Rakhimov’s administration has claimed with respect to Bashneft’, “they just 
wanted to take it from the wrong kind of people [u neponyatnykh lyudei] and give it to decent 
guys [normal’nym patsanam] for a decent price” (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b). 
The private ownership outcomes therefore should not be seen as successfully thwarted 
attempts to nationalise the two companies. In the Bashneft’ case, transfer to Sistema’s control 
                                                     
99 In an interview with Yevtushenkov regarding his company’s acquisition of Bashneft’, the journalists 
asked: “It is said that back in 2007 Rakhimov senior met with President Putin face to face, and there 
were two options: either by force, returning [Bashneft’] to federal property through the courts, and then 
auctioning it, or simply finding a new owner and giving it to him. Why did they choose you?” (A. 
Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b). 
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was an acceptable ownership outcome from the state’s point of view; and, as will be further 
elaborated below, the state’s objections regarding Deripaska’s acquisition of Russneft’ were 
not based on its preference for that company’s nationalisation. 
Defensive tactics of the existing owners 
As in the Yukos case, the coercive takeovers in the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases were far 
from being a one-sided game where the state held all the cards. In both cases, a new buyer was 
brought in by the existing owner in the hope that they were capable of calling off the state’s 
attack on the company. In his open letter announcing his departure from the company, 
Gutseriev had written that “I am handing over control of the holding to a new owner whose 
appearance, I am sure, will mean that the problems Russneft’ has encountered will be 
resolved” (Gutseriev, 2007).  
In the Bashneft’ case, discussion of the defensive tactics of the existing “owners” is 
complicated by an apparent rift that developed between Rakhimov senior (President of the 
republic) and his son Ural (beneficial owner of Bashneft’) in late 2004. This came to a head in 
February 2005, when Rakhimov senior accused his son of being behind a “conspiracy” to 
unseat the republican parliament speaker, and began a legal campaign to return Bashneft’ to 
state (i.e. republican) property (Khannanova & Gainullin, 2005). But on 9 June 2005, this 
legal campaign was abruptly dropped, following a “peace deal” between father and son 
(Gainullin, 2005). Contemporary reporting of the rift tended towards the naive assumption 
that Ural Rakhimov was the true beneficial owner of Bashneft’, rather than merely the 
nominal owner on behalf of his father (who was prevented by law from owning the companies 
himself). Some opposition politicians argued instead that the rift, the allegations regarding 
Ural’s political “conspiracy”, and Rakhimov senior’s efforts to renationalise Bashneft’ were 
all exaggerated or invented as defensive moves against Kremlin pressure (Khannanova & 
Gainullin, 2005; “Ot redaktsii: Bash na bash,” 2005).  
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According to a former Bashkortostan official, it was Rakhimov senior who first approached 
AFK Sistema later in 2005 with the proposal to sell stakes in Bashneft’. This is significant for 
its indication of who was the real owner at Bashneft’, but also because it shows Sistema was 
not imposed on Rakhimov by the Kremlin. The official claimed that the sale of the blocking 
stakes was (like the subsequent shenanigans involving the remaining shares) a response to the 
Kremlin’s coercion: beset by criminal investigations relating to his son’s activities, Rakhimov 
had decided to bring in as a strategic investor a Moscow-based company who he hoped could 
protect Bashneft’ from whoever was behind the investigations (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 
2010b)100. This tactic is similar to the one described by Markus (2008), with the important 
difference that the new minority shareholders are Russian rather than foreign, and it is hoped 
that they can lobby the Kremlin directly through their own contacts, rather than through 
diplomatic representation. 
The defensive tactics of the existing owners did not stop at bringing in a new owner who 
might be acceptable to the Kremlin. The other tactics suggested in the literature, i.e. relying on 
support from business associations (Markus, 2007) or the provision of public goods to 
increase the reputational cost of expropriation (Frye, 2006), do not appear to have played a 
significant role. Instead, the owners focused on increasing the costs to the state if it decided on 
a path of full-scale asset seizure, and putting as much as possible of the companies’ value 
beyond the state’s reach. Some of the transactions involving Russneft’ shares that were 
challenged by the FTS under Article 169 pre-dated the beginning of the state’s crackdown and 
may have been aimed solely at avoiding tax. However, others occurred after the crackdown 
and may have been a response to it (Reznik et al., 2007). The sale of Russneft’ to Basic 
Element was also a highly complex transaction. It took place exclusively at the level of the 
offshore beneficiary companies behind Russneft’s first-level shareholders on one hand, and 
                                                     
100  In 2010, Yevtushenkov was asked why Rakhimov had chosen to work with him specifically: 
[interviewers] “Maybe people in Bashkortostan believed that you have some kind of…” 
[Yevtushenkov] “Resource? Yes, probably they did believe that, given that it all worked out as it did” 
(A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010a).  
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offshore entities controlled by Jersey-registered Basic Element on the other101. While the 
offshore nature of the transaction was no doubt aimed in part at minimising tax liabilities and 
ensuring that the agreement was governed by a more reliable non-Russian legal system, it was 
also intended to protect the sale and the money involved from intervention by the Russian 
state. Specifically, it thwarted efforts on the part of the Interior Ministry Investigative 
Committee to freeze shares in Russneft’ (Skorlygina & Rebrov, 2007). 
In March 2006 a criminal case was opened on suspicion of tax evasion that could have led to 
the bankruptcy of Bashkirskii Kapital, which held the controlling stakes in the Bashneft’ 
companies. In response, the Rakhimovs moved in April 2006 to break up their shares in those 
companies into smaller stakes of 13-16.5% each. These smaller stakes were then donated free 
of charge to four charities which had been newly founded by obscure individuals. Bashkirskii 
Kapital itself was placed into liquidation. The charities each promptly founded a limited-
liability company, to which the stakes in the Bashneft’ companies were transferred 
(Pleshanova & Gainullin, 2006).  
In response, a large team of federal law-enforcement officers arrived in Bashkortostan’s 
capital in May 2006 (Khannanova, 2006), and the FTS campaign to expropriate a controlling 
stake in the Bashneft’ companies was undertaken in December. In February 2007 the Moscow 
Arbitrazh Court placed a freezing order on the shares. In November 2008 the Rakhimovs 
settled on a way to bypass the court-imposed share freeze, by reaching agreement with a 
Sistema subsidiary to take over management of the Bashneft’ companies for a three-year 
period (Khannanova, 2008).  
There is an offshore dimension also to the Rakhimovs’ defensive tactics: there is reason to 
believe the infrastructure was put in place for the rapid exit of the Rakhimovs’ money in the 
event of expropriation. Ural had been living in Vienna for many years, and while his father 
                                                     
101 This provided formal grounds on which the FAS and the government commission later refused to 
approve the sale, as explained below. 
113 
 
was still President, his Prime Minister Rail’ Sarbaev is known to have made several trips to 
the Austrian capital, returning with money (for social projects and to pay teachers and 
doctors) in cash that was drawn from Ural’s charities (Allenova, 2012). Although the $2bn 
proceeds from the sale of Bashneft’ were said to be residing in accounts in banks in 
Bashkortostan, the previous arrangement suggested that it would be relatively easy to 
facilitate this money’s rapid exit offshore in the event that the state made renewed claims on 
it. 
Why these new owners? 
Besides the question of why these two companies were not nationalised, there is the 
supplementary question of why the assets were transferred to these particular new private 
owners. The private buyers must have felt confident that they could persuade the Kremlin to 
halt its pressure on the companies: otherwise they would not have risked their investment and 
their own political standing by getting involved in a sector that was so politically charged after 
the Yukos affair. Presumably their confidence was based on their status as what Hanson 
(2009) calls “trusted businessmen”, i.e. their immaculate personal connections in the Kremlin 
had heretofore ensured a peaceful political environment for their other business activities. But 
personal ties and trust played an important role also in the existing owners’ selection of (or 
agreement to work with) new buyers: to some extent, the owners were putting their fates in 
the buyers’ hands. Gutseriev and Deripaska had jointly held in trust shares in Slavneft’, the 
state-controlled company Gutseriev headed from 2000 to 2002. They also both had the 
commodities trader Glencore as a major business partner: it was a co-owner of Deripaska’s 
company Russian Aluminium and was Russneft’s largest creditor (Reznik & Osetinskaya, 
2007). Russneft’ had bought oil industry assets from AFK Sistema in 2003 (Nikol’skii et al., 
2007). No such long-standing ties existed between Sistema and the Rakhimovs, and 
Yevtushenkov has said that it took time to build up the latter’s trust, before they were 
prepared to contemplate giving up control of Bashneft’: “The sellers of this asset are complex 
114 
 
people from the point of their mentality and experience. Probably it was important for them to 
realise that they were not dealing with raiders, with people for whom nothing is sacred” (A. 
Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010a). 
There are some indications that Deripaska received approval from Putin personally before 
making his original bid approach102. Additional evidence of early support from the highest 
level comes from the fact that Deripaska borrowed $3bn from state-owned Sberbank to 
finance the deal (using a controlling stake in his automobile manufacturer GAZ as collateral): 
the expert commentary at the time was that approval would have been needed from the 
Presidential Administration for Sberbank to grant such a substantial loan at short notice (Grib, 
2007). 
Clearly Deripaska was mistaken in thinking that the Kremlin would wave through his 
acquisition. Technical reasons were given for the failure to approve the deal, but the evidence 
suggests that these concealed what was really a politically-motivated decision. The FAS 
initially explained its delay by claiming that the required documents had not been received 
from the applicant outlining the full details of the transaction. Later it claimed that the details 
of the transaction were not only highly complex but also frequently changing. In February 
2008, the FAS announced that it would not consider the deal until the outcome of the Article 
169 cases was known (Rebrov & Zanina, 2008). 
The prospects for Basic Element’s purchase appeared to brighten in the course of 2008 as 
Article 169 court cases were dropped by the Federal Tax Service. However, a new obstacle 
then appeared. The law was changed in April 2008 requiring an additional level of approval 
for acquisitions by foreign companies of assets included on the government’s list of strategic 
assets, which included one of Russneft’s oil fields (Rebrov, 2008). The FAS was obliged to 
refer such matters to a government commission which was headed by Prime Minister 
                                                     
102 Information from a source close to Basic Element cited in Grib (2007). See also Rebrov and Zanina 
(2008), citing “major Russian businessmen and investment bankers who were familiar with the deal”. 
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Vladimir Putin and included Deputy Prime Minister Igor’ Sechin. The fact that Basic Element 
was registered in Jersey qualified it as a foreign buyer. There is no suggestion that this policy 
decision was aimed specifically at frustrating Basic Element’s acquisition. But what happened 
next left no doubt that there was high-level opposition to the deal. Over the course of 2009, 
the Putin-led commission three times omitted to examine the case at its sessions. Incomplete 
documentation was the reason initially given (Malkova, Reznik, & Fedorinova, 2009), but 
then Sechin claimed that the problem was the offshore nature of what was an essentially 
Russian-Russian transaction (Rebrov, 2009). A source in the government claimed that Putin 
himself was against the deal’s offshore structure (“Kto zhe protiv?,” 2009). But this had not 
stopped Cyprus-registered Nafta-Moskva (representing the Russian businessman Suleiman 
Kerimov) gaining approval to buy the Russian gold mining company Polyus Zoloto at the 
commission’s June session (Mazneva & Chechel’, 2009). 
Precisely what the real political objection was to the deal is not clear, but Sechin is rumoured 
to have been particularly opposed as well as having a personal grudge against Deripaska103. It 
has been suggested that Deripaska was not welcome in a sector “where Kremlin bureaucrats 
of the highest rank, particularly Igor’ Sechin, are used to ruling unchallenged” (Kharat’ian, 
2007). It was later claimed that Sechin was angry that Deripaska had effectively gone over his 
head by approaching Putin directly for approval, despite Sechin’s formal responsibility for the 
oil sector (A. Levinskii & Sokolova, 2010b). 
But before concluding that Deripaska’s acquisition failed to gain approval because of hostility 
from rival factional/bureaucratic interests, it should be remembered that Putin did not remain 
above the fray here: he was personally involved in holding up the deal at the government 
commission level. It therefore appears that Putin, having initially been in favour of Deripaska 
                                                     
103 Confirmed in author’s interviews with two leading Moscow-based financial journalists, one English 
and one Russian. Cf. also Belkovsky’s claim in 2007 that the continuing pressure on Gutseriev was 
down to a fight between Sechin and Deripaska over who would take over Russneft’ (“Pochemu 
prodolzhaetsya pressing Gutserieva?,” 2007). 
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buying Russneft’, was subsequently persuaded against the idea by Sechin. It is possible (as an 
alternative or supplementary explanation) that what turned Putin against the Deripaska 
acquisition was the open letter that Gutseriev wrote and published in the Russneft’ corporate 
journal soon after the agreement with Deripaska had been reached. Subsequently reprinted by 
Vedomosti, the letter explained Gutseriev’s decision to sell in terms of the “unprecedented 
pressure” placed on him and his company by the authorities (Gutseriev, 2007). Conceivably, 
Putin’s objection was not to Deripaska becoming a player in the oil industry, but to Gutseriev 
being able to leave the country with his freedom and his cash, if at the same time he was going 
to complain in public about his treatment by the authorities104.  
Significantly, Gutseriev swiftly backpedalled after the letter’s publication: it promptly 
disappeared from the Russneft’ website, and two days later he told Interfax that the decision to 
sell the company had been taken by the shareholders “without any pressure […] the political 
aspect which journalists are writing about does not exist” (Tsymbalov, 2007)105. Gutseriev 
was careful in his choice of words in subsequent interviews, as illustrated by the way he 
parried a question in 2010 regarding whether Sechin had been responsible for what had 
happened to him: “I have heard this theory many times, but I have no evidence that the 
command came from him. I cannot say that it’s true [ya ne mogu etogo utverzhdat’]. I don’t 
think that he was behind Russneft’s problems or will do this in the future” (Reznik, 2010). 
As noted above, it was Rakhimov who first approached AFK Sistema in 2005, rather than 
Sistema being imposed on Rakhimov by the Kremlin. Furthermore, Sistema helped the 
Rakhimovs to bypass the court-imposed freeze on Bashneft’s shares. This reinforces the 
notion that Sistema and the Rakhimov family were allies, now united against a common 
enemy in the shape of the FTS. 
                                                     
104 Latynina suggested in August 2007 that this might be the explanation for the arrest order that had 
just been issued against Gutseriev (“Yuliya Latynina: ‘Gutseriev otdal “Russneft”’ ne tem, kto za nim 
okhotilsya,’” 2007). 
105 Cf. Kakha Bendukidze’s insistence (Chapter Four) that he sold his stakes in Atomstroieksport and 
OMZ entirely of his own volition and without government pressure. 
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AFK Sistema’s head Yevtushenkov can be assumed to have had better relations with the 
Kremlin as a whole, given that the company encountered no serious resistance to its 
acquisition of Bashneft’ and was able to help secure Gutseriev’s rehabilitation. But Deripaska 
(and Abramovich in the Yukos case) had planned to play the same role, offering to solve the 
existing owners’ problems by taking the asset off their hands and solving problems with the 
authorities. Although for Deripaska it did not work out, both Deripaska and Yevtushenkov 
expected to be both a defensive tactic by the existing owners against state coercion, and 
buyers who were acceptable to the Kremlin. How one might explain this paradox is discussed 
further in the concluding section of this chapter. 
Contrasting fates of the existing owners 
One of the arguments against considering Russneft’ and Bashneft’ to be cases of reiderstvo is 
the fact that both existing owners survived the situation relatively unscathed. Firestone (2008) 
distinguishes reiderstvo from racketeering by stating that the reider is more ambitious, 
seeking to take over an entire company rather than just a share of the profits. But the ideal-
typical reider surely seeks to take over a business without handing over much money (if any) 
to the existing owner. When the existing owner walks away with an amount of cash that 
comes close to the market value of his business, this goes against the spirit of reiderstvo. 
Gutseriev received $3bn in cash from Deripaska in a deal which valued Russneft’ at $6.5bn 
overall (the remainder of the total went on the assumption of Russneft’s debt). This must have 
softened the blow of being forced to leave the country and being subject to a Russian arrest 
warrant while living in the UK. Thanks to the later intervention of Yevtushenkov and others, 
he subsequently returned to Russia with all charges against him dropped and bought back full 
ownership of Russneft’.  
The Rakhimov family received $2bn from Sistema in exchange for ceding control of the 
Bashneft’ companies. This appears to have been part of a deal that was attractive even by the 
standards of the Russneft’ case. Rather than being cast into exile, Rakhimov was permitted to 
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continue to operate at least for a time as a parallel centre of power in the republic, 
undermining his successor Rustem Khamitov’s efforts to establish his own authority. He 
benefited from a law passed by the republican parliament granting immunity from prosecution 
(Kamyshev, 2010), worked for a time as an official adviser to Khamitov (Allenova, 2012) and 
was given a seat on the board of Bashneft’ (Derbilova, Kostenko, & Simakov, 2010)106.  
The amount of money received was particularly remarkable given the Audit Chamber’s claims 
that the family had originally taken ownership of Bashneft’ by illegal means. Back in July 
2003, one of its auditors had described the privatisation as “the most unprecedented case of 
theft of assets from state property” (Amladov, Granik, & Gorodetskaya, 2010). Restrictions 
were put in place to prevent the Rakhimovs using this money at their own discretion. It was 
paid to the charities which owned Bashneft’ and whose beneficiary was widely held to have 
been Murtaza Rakhimov's son, Ural. In November 2010 these charities were merged into a 
single body named the Ural Foundation (with Murtaza Rakhimov as Chairman). An unusual 
compromise was reached, with the Ural Foundation committing to invest the annual interest in 
social projects in the region supposedly under the supervision of the republican authorities 
(“Rustem Khamitov: v Bashkortostane preodolen krizis upravleniya den’gami ot prodazhi 
TEK,” 2010)107.  
Rakhimov’s political influence in Bashkortostan, his ability to “deliver” pro-Kremlin votes, 
and the Kremlin’s concerns about stability and separatist sentiments in the republic, no doubt 
                                                     
106 In May 2012 Bashneft’ announced that by mutual agreement, Rakhimov would not be reappointed 
to the board of directors. This followed Khamitov’s criticism of Bashneft’ for a wave of redundancies 
that he said threatened social stability in the republic (“Glava Bashkirii Rustem Khamitov predupredil 
ob ugroze sotsial’nogo vzryva,” 2012). A source close to the republican government claimed that 
Khamitov was angered by Bashneft’s close ties to Rakhimov (Dzyadko, 2012).  
107 It is clear from subsequent events that the republican authorities did not secure any meaningful 
control over the charity. In October 2011, Khamitov gave an interview in which he criticised the Ural 
fund for failing to invest the principal amount by “building factories, supporting agriculture, 
strengthening infrastructure” rather than leaving it in bank accounts (Stepovoi, 2011). He made it clear 
that the fund was under Rakhimov’s control. Rakhimov responded with sharp criticism of Khamitov 
and a threat to end the fund’s cooperation with the republican government (“Murtaza Rakhimov: ‘I ne 
takie trudnosti preodolevali,’” n.d., “Zayavlenie Soveta Blagotvoritel’nogo fonda ‘Ural’ po materialam 
interv’yu R.Z. Khamitova gazeta ‘Novye Izvestiya’ ot 5 oktyabrya 2011 g.,” 2011). 
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played a significant role in strengthening his bargaining position. But the Kremlin may also 
have been concerned that full-scale asset seizure would not have captured a large proportion 
of Bashneft’s value, because of the defensive tactics used by the Rakhimovs. 
In any case, the fates of both Gutseriev and Rakhimov were in stark contrast to that of 
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, who spent ten years in Russian prisons, and of the many other 
Yukos-affiliated individuals who were caught up in the state’s massive campaign of coercion. 
These contrasting fates serve to underline that the state’s preference for a negotiated solution 
is so great that it is prepared to “buy” this solution with a relatively attractive offer to the 
existing owner. 
Conclusion  
The above comparative case study provides a great deal of information that helps to confirm 
and illustrate the arguments made in Chapter 1. But it also suggests the need to make 
additional refinements to the theoretical framework outlined in that chapter. The task now is 
to summarise the theoretical lessons from the case studies.  
Explaining the causes of the takeovers 
All three takeovers were ordered from the very top of the Russian political system, either by 
Putin personally or at least with his knowledge and participation in how they subsequently 
progressed. This fact lends weight to the possibility that the takeovers were driven by political 
considerations rather than rent-seeking. It does not on its own negate the rent-seeking 
hypothesis, but raises the stakes considerably. Either Putin was personally engaging in the 
rent-seeking, or he was helping a group of his associates to do so. 
Another key finding from the case studies is that the outcomes were contingent rather than 
pre-determined. There was a credible prospect in each case that the outcome would have been 
quite different: Yukos could possibly been resolved through handing ownership to a new 
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private owner (i.e. Sibneft’). It was also a “fluke” that Rosneft’ ended up as the state-owned 
company which acquired most of Yukos’s assets. Both Russneft’ and Bashneft’ were the 
subject of legal campaigns aimed at bringing them into state ownership.  
The contingent nature of the outcomes provides a further argument against rent-seeking: if 
Putin was acting as an arbiter between rival rent-seeking factions, then why was it a matter of 
chance who ended up as the new owners of the assets? There are additional points from the 
cases that cast doubt on the rent-seeking explanation. Why were Khodorkovsky and Lebedev 
still in jail many years after the Yukos assets were largely safely in the hands of the alleged 
rent-seekers? Why did Gutseriev and Rakhimov receive so much money in exchange for 
handing over their assets, if these were cases of predatory reiderstvo?  
For all these reasons, political motivations should be taken seriously when explaining the 
takeovers. The contingent nature of the outcomes suggests that the goal was to deprive the 
existing owners of their assets for political reasons; precisely who would be the new owners 
was of secondary importance. But at the same time, the political threat to the regime posed by 
Khodorkovsky has been substantially exaggerated, Gutseriev posed no threat whatsoever to 
the Kremlin, and Rakhimov was a positive asset in terms of his ability to deliver pro-Kremlin 
votes at federal elections. Hence the conclusion that the political threat posed by the existing 
owners related specifically to sovereignty rather than regime incumbency. The undue 
influence Yukos had gained over the parliamentary decision-making process and its direct 
negotiations with foreign powers (bypassing the Kremlin) on matters affecting Russia’s 
international relations were seen as clear challenges to sovereignty. The Kremlin saw 
Gutseriev’s involvement in Ingushetian politics, and the political and economic autonomy 
from the Kremlin that Rakhimov enjoyed, as threats to its ability to project its authority 
throughout the country. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, “sovereign development” entails two separate vectors that 
sometimes can be pulling in opposite directions. It would appear that these were cases in 
which the objective of tackling perceived threats to sovereignty trumped developmental 
considerations. There was a possible developmental motive behind forcing the change of 
ownership at Bashneft’, and opening up its petrochemicals complex so that it played a role in 
the economy beyond Bashkortostan (perhaps in order to help realise Putin’s objective of 
boosting exports of refined products). But the economic impact of all three takeovers was 
bound to be negative in the short term (through the impact on operations at the companies, 
and on investor sentiment nationally), with little prospect of long-term upside for economic 
output in the long-term.  
Explaining the ownership outcomes 
Even if rent-seeking is rejected as an explanation for the takeovers, it may still in principle 
play a causal role in determining their outcome. If the question of who would be the new 
owner of these assets was of secondary importance to the Kremlin, then perhaps the outcome 
depended on struggles between rival rent-seeking factions who were keen to get their hands 
on the spoils. Putin’s involvement in all three cases makes such explanations problematic: 
rather than remaining aloof, he was without question involved in obstructing the acquisition of 
Russneft’ by Deripaska, and he is rumoured to have been involved in encouraging Rakhimov 
to sell to Yevtushenkov. He was almost certainly party to the struggle between Rosneft’ and 
Gazprom over their merger and the related issue of who would emerge as the main buyer of 
Yukos’s assets. On the face of it, this undermines the argument that the outcome was of 
secondary importance to the Kremlin. Putin did show a preference for one new owner over 
another, and this preference apparently changed over time in the case of Russneft’ (anti-
Gutseriev and pro-Deripaska at first, then anti-Deripaska, then pro-Gutseriev and pro-
Yevtushenkov). At times he reacted to events to shape the ownership outcomes of the 
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takeovers, but the key point is that those outcomes cannot have reflected an initial intention 
when the SLCTs were instigated. 
The other suggestion that can be found in the existing literature to explain the private 
outcomes of the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases is that the factors that had heretofore been 
driving state ownership no longer applied. The sale of Russneft’ to Deripaska happened at a 
time when the trend of expanding state ownership was at its peak. It could still be the case that 
sufficient control had been achieved over the oil industry specifically so that the Kremlin saw 
no particular imperative to nationalise a company contributing only 3% of overall oil 
production. But the contingent nature of the outcomes makes this explanation also 
problematic: why, if there was not much Kremlin interest in bringing Russneft’ and Bashneft’ 
into state ownership, was there an (albeit unsuccessful) effort to nationalise both companies 
through the courts? 
The takeover as bargaining game 
In Chapter 1, the theory was introduced that the outcomes of SLCTs might be influenced by 
how they proceed as bargaining games. If, as argued above, the SLCTs in the present chapter 
were undertaken without a specific ownership outcome in mind, then one would expect to see 
the bargaining game play a particularly strong causal role in determining their outcomes, 
assuming the proposed theory has any validity. 
A key building block in that theory is the argument that the state prefers to see a negotiated 
outcome to the takeovers rather than having to pursue the kind of full-scale asset seizure seen 
in the Yukos case. The existing owners in this chapter met sharply contrasting fates: 
Khodorkovsky imprisoned for 10 years and receiving no compensation for his assets (the 
money raised from their sale instead went to pay off Yukos’s deliberately inflated tax debts); 
Gutseriev receiving $3bn in cash for his assets and able to live in peace in London, before 
being rehabilitated, returning to Russia and reclaiming his company; Rakhimov receiving 
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$2bn and being permitted to live on in Bashkortostan, even continuing to play a political role 
to the exasperation of his successor. These contrasting fates provide a strong argument in 
favour of the state’s preference for a negotiated solution: this preference is so strong that it is 
prepared to let existing owners who opt for that solution walk away with a level of 
compensation very different to what we would expect in cases of reiderstvo. 
The cases also provide clues as to precisely what the state’s “carrot-and-stick” offer entails. It 
is clear that the existing owner is asked to do more than simply part with his asset. He must 
also refrain from the kinds of sovereignty-undermining political activities he was suspected of 
engaging in. In the case of Khodorkovsky and Gutseriev, it seems clear that emigration was 
also part of the deal108. The bitterness of this pill is, however, sweetened by the prospect of 
receiving an amount of money that approximately reflects the value of the asset. 
To say that Khodorkovsky refused his offer while the other two owners accepted would be an 
over-simplification: Gutseriev apparently refused unceremoniously an earlier offer from a 
state-owned company to sell his business for a heavily discounted price, while it took many 
years of coercion and careful bargaining before the Kremlin was able to persuade the 
Rakhimovs to cede control of Bashneft’. But there is a significant distinction to be made 
between Khodorkovsky’s refusal on principle to play the game—his willingness to take a very 
public stand against state coercion—and the way the other two owners responded to the 
situation. 
Defensive tactics and constraints on coercion 
The Yukos case drives home the point made by Markus (2012, p. 254) that “business is likely 
to lose in a head-to-head confrontation with the central executive.” But the Yukos affair 
provides clues to explain why the Kremlin prefers a negotiated outcome, rather than effecting 
                                                     
108 That Rakhimov was not required to leave the country may be thanks to the extra bargaining power 
available to him through his local electoral support and ties to the local political and business elite, as 
well as Kremlin fears over potential instability in the republic. His cooperation was required in ensuring 
a (relatively) smooth transition for his successor. 
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every SLCT through full-scale asset seizure. The crackdown on Yukos meant recruiting the 
state’s coercive resources on a massive scale, and coordinating this effort across state 
agencies. The Russian state probably lacks the administrative resources to wage such a 
campaign against several companies at once. This fact by itself amounts to a (limited) 
constraint on the state’s appetite for coercive takeover. Furthermore, the existing owners of 
companies targeted by the state have tactics at their disposal that make full-scale asset seizure 
a less attractive option. The internationalisation of the business is one such defensive tactic: it 
means that the pursuit of assets by the state must also be international in nature, and it must 
press its case in foreign courts that cannot be so easily leant on to provide a favourable ruling. 
The use of offshores can also facilitate moving assets abroad and getting them to a place 
where they cannot be found or seized by the Russian state. In the Yukos case, there is little 
evidence that any domestic institutions offered any significant constraints on the state’s 
behaviour. Although considerable effort was expended to give the bankruptcy auctions a 
semblance of market-based legitimacy, this was probably determined by the international 
factor (in terms of reputation, investor sentiment, and legal claims) rather than by domestic 
institutions. International legal risk also proved decisive in the decision to allow Rosneft’, 
rather than Gazprom, to buy Yukos’s main asset, Yuganskneftegaz. 
But as the Bashneft’ case shows in particular, there are also some domestic constraints which 
qualify as “coercion-constraining institutions” (Frye, 2004) inside Russia’s jurisdiction. The 
transactions that were aimed at protecting against expropriation, by breaking up shares in the 
individual companies and moving them on to Russian charities and limited-liability 
companies, would have been meaningless if the state were not constrained by domestic 
institutions from simply seizing the assets. In the chapters that follow, more evidence will be 
provided that domestic institutions play a significant (albeit still an inadequate) role in 
constraining coercion in Russia. 
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Relating “bargaining outcomes” to “ownership outcomes” 
In the introductory section of this chapter, a simple explanation was provided for how the 
“bargaining outcomes” of the takeovers affected their “ownership outcomes”: the negotiated 
outcome can lead to either state or private ownership, but full-scale asset seizure will 
ordinarily lead to nationalisation. Why full-scale asset seizure leads to nationalisation (except 
perhaps in countries that are particularly “kleptocratic” and already isolated internationally) is 
explained above in the context of Yukos: transfer to a new private owner would be highly 
controversial after full-scale asset seizure involving the state’s coercive resources; it would be 
difficult to find a private buyer who was prepared to play this role, because of the associated 
legal and reputational risks; there would be no “national interest” justification for the 
takeover; it would have negative consequences in terms of the legitimacy of the ruling group, 
and internationally in terms of legal risks stemming from the seizure. 
In its present form, the theory says the following about the ownership outcome that results 
from the “negotiated” bargaining outcome. The company may still be nationalised in pursuit 
of a political strategy for the sector, or as a one-off intervention to address a market failure. If 
there is no such political factor, then the ownership outcome will be determined by the 
apolitical issue of which private or public companies happen to have the greatest commercial 
appetite to acquire the company. However, as the following section explains, the evidence 
from the cases suggests a further refinement to this element of the theory.  
Private buyers as intermediaries 
How can AFK Sistema have been simultaneously a defensive play by Rakhimov against 
Kremlin coercion, and the Kremlin’s preferred buyer? The answer to this apparent puzzle lies 
in viewing private buyers as intermediaries who facilitate the negotiated outcome that the 
state prefers. An obstacle to this outcome is the level of animosity created when the state 
applies coercion and makes clear that – either through agreement or force – the existing owner 
must part with their business. The animosity makes it psychologically more difficult for the 
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existing owner to accept that he must sell to the same people who are applying the coercion. A 
third-party buyer, who has no affiliations to the state but is acceptable to the Kremlin, is 
therefore a mutually preferred solution. In the case studies, we saw some indication that 
Gutseriev may have rejected an approach from Rosneft’ to take the company off his hands for 
$1bn. Although he later denied that Rosneft’s Chairman Igor’ Sechin was involved in the 
Russneft’ takeover, we can speculate that this was privately what he believed, and that his flat 
refusal of Rosneft’s offer was prompted not only by the price but also by the offer having 
come from the same people responsible for the coercion. Similarly, there is little doubt that 
Khodorkovsky’s refusal to accept any kind of offer was driven by his sense of injustice at the 
coercion being used against him (Khodorkovsky & Gevorkyan, 2012). This almost certainly 
ruled out a voluntary sale to Rosneft’, and the alternative of a sale to Sibneft’ might have been 
possible if Yukos’s owners had been more convinced that Sibneft’s owner Roman 
Abramovich was really acting independently of the state officials responsible for the coercion. 
Both Deripaska and Yevtushenkov were favoured by the existing owners precisely because 
they were seen as third parties who could nevertheless help persuade the Kremlin to call off 
the attack. 
Thus it remains the case that the “negotiated” bargaining outcome can lead to either a private 
or state ownership outcome. But the state’s preference for a negotiated outcome makes a 
private ownership more likely. The following chapter provides additional evidence for this 
process, and in a surprising context. In all of the takeovers in the next chapter, the state has in 
mind a specific ownership outcome (state ownership through acquisition by de facto state–
controlled Gazprom). Yet once again, it makes use of an “intermediary” buyer who can 
facilitate the negotiated outcome.  
Finally, there is one small piece of evidence from the Russneft’ case that anticipates an issue 
which looms large in the next chapter. Gutseriev mentioned in passing that, when the state 
began to apply coercion on him, he considered Gazprom as one of six possible buyers for 
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Russneft’. However, he felt that Gazprom would not be able to move fast enough – and time 
was of the essence, presumably because the “carrot-and-stick” offer was conditional on him 
parting with Russneft’ within a certain time-frame. The precise obstacles which prevented 
Gazprom from moving fast, and how it sought to bypass those obstacles, will become clear in 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Gazprom’s campaign to re-take 
“lost” assets 
Introduction 
This chapter examines developments at Gazprom, arguably Russia’s most strategically-
important state-owned company, in the first years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Putin 
assumed the presidency in May 2000, and from the outset paid close attention to what was 
happening at Gazprom109. A substantial change in the company’s management soon followed. 
In June 2000, Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former USSR Gas Minister who created Gazprom, 
stood down as Chairman of its board of directors. His replacement was Dmitry Medvedev, 
then deputy head of Putin’s administration (Panyushkin & Zygar’, 2008, p. 104). On 30 May 
2001, Rem Vyakhirev, who had been Gazprom’s chief executive since 1992, was dismissed 
on Putin’s orders (Butrin, 2001)110. His replacement, Aleksei Miller, had very little experience 
of the gas industry, but shared with Putin a professional background in St Petersburg111. Miller 
moved to replace the majority of the Vyakhirev-era management team, primarily with people 
with similar backgrounds to his own (Panyushkin & Zygar’, 2008, pp. 113–115).  
One of the salient features of the new management team’s first years at Gazprom was a 
campaign to recover assets over which the company had lost control under the previous 
management, either through sales based on a suspiciously low valuation or through other 
means such as share dilutions. According to one assessment, these lost assets included gas 
                                                     
109 Panyushkin and Zygar’ (2008, p. 107) cite unconfirmed rumours that as early as the end of 1999, 
when Putin was Prime Minister, he ordered his close associates to study the company with a view to 
replacing its management and consolidating the state’s control. It was even suggested by some analysts 
that the new Gazprom CEO, Aleksei Miller, took few strategic decisions without first consulting Putin 
(Kozyrev, 2011).  
110 Vyakhirev was made Chairman of Gazprom and stayed on in that role for approximately one more 
year. The decline in his political power is said to have begun soon after Viktor Chernomyrdin was fired 
as Prime Minister in 1998 (“Rem Vyakhirev,” 2013). 
111 Between 1991 and 1996, Miller worked under Putin at the Committee for External Ties of the St 
Petersburg mayor’s office. His only professional experience of the gas industry prior to heading 
Gazprom was his time as Deputy Energy Minister between 2000 and 2001 (“Aleksei Borisovich 
Miller,” n.d.). 
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fields which amounted to nearly 10% of Gazprom’s hydrocarbon reserves, and were 
equivalent to the total reserves of US oil major ExxonMobil (Kleiner, 2008, p. 89). This 
campaign to recover lost assets is the focus of this chapter. Three companies, which were the 
subject of takeover by Gazprom in 2002, are examined as case studies. These are the 
construction contractor Stroitransgaz, petrochemicals firm Sibur, and the company 
Zapsibgazprom, which held the licence for a substantial gas field named South Russkoe. In 
each case, Gazprom had lost control of the company itself or of its most important assets, or 
was at imminent risk of doing so. The cases have been selected firstly because they were 
undertaken at approximately the same time, meaning that the circumstances surrounding the 
takeovers (including the composition of the Gazprom management) were similar across cases. 
Secondly, all three cases involved Gazprom’s use of state coercion in the takeover process 
(while in other cases Gazprom was able to take over assets without resorting to such 
methods). 
As in the previous chapter, the case studies aim to answer two research questions: firstly, what 
were the motives behind these SLCTs, and secondly, what explains their ownership outcome. 
For the present chapter, answering the first question entails understanding the motivations of 
the Gazprom management and its government patrons in undertaking to bring the ‘lost’ assets 
back under Gazprom’s control.   
Gazprom’s privatisation in the 1990s left the majority of its shares under the control of its own 
management, and thus when Putin became President in 2000, it was not a formally state-
controlled company. The state’s direct stake stood at just 38.4%, there was no ‘golden share’ 
arrangement granting it additional voting privileges besides this stake, and it had no majority 
on the board of directors. An important motivation behind these SLCTs was the political 
leadership’s desire to turn its precarious ad hoc control over this strategic company into 
formal control on the basis of majority ownership. This desire was in turn driven by the 
importance of Gazprom to the state as a tool of domestic economic policy and of foreign 
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policy. However, establishing majority ownership over Gazprom cannot explain the decision 
to take back all the lost assets in question, some of which had no involvement in Gazprom’s 
ownership. Gazprom’s management at times sought to explain the re-gathering of its lost 
assets by reference to the exclusively commercial goal of boosting market capitalisation 
(Reznik, 2002a), but some of the assets involved were both outside of Gazprom’s core 
business 112  of gas production, distribution and sales, and there was apparently no other 
commercial imperative for Gazprom to return them to its control. The principal objectives 
behind the campaign were instead political, and included wider developmental considerations. 
Turning to the second research question, because the SLCTs in this chapter were aimed at 
bringing assets back into the ownership of de facto state-controlled Gazprom, their ownership 
outcome was pre-determined as “state ownership” (but not formal state control until the state 
subsequently formalised its majority control over Gazprom itself, as will be discussed below). 
In each case, the takeover involved the existing owner’s acceptance of the state’s “carrot-and-
stick” offer, though in the Sibur case this happened only after the owner was placed under a 
high degree of coercion (his agreement to sell the company was signed while he was in pre-
trial detention). The cases therefore provide confirmation that SLCTs can result in state 
ownership not only through full-scale asset seizure (as with the Yukos case), but also when 
the existing owner accepts the state’s “carrot-and-stick” offer.  
However, Gazprom used a wholly-owned subsidiary named Gazprominvestholding in all 
three SLCTs, as buyer of some or all of the shares and/or as negotiator on behalf of Gazprom. 
Gazprominvestholding’s chief executive, Alisher Usmanov, was a major private businessman 
in his own right, as well as someone who had worked with the former management of 
Gazprom, with which the existing owners of the targeted assets had close ties. Usmanov 
                                                     
112 A company’s “non-core” assets and business lines are those deemed by the management not to be 
central to the main “value proposition” of the business. Precisely what constitutes “core” and “non-
core”, and a company’s appetite for diversifying into non-core business areas, shifts as strategy changes 
and as the profitability of certain business lines changes over time. 
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actively played on this dual status to help persuade the existing owners to accept the carrot-
and-stick offer. Thus, while a private buyer was ruled out in these cases because of the need to 
restore Gazprom’s control, Gazprom still found a way to capture some of the advantages (seen 
in the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases in the previous chapter) of using a private buyer as 
intermediary who could facilitate a negotiated outcome to the takeover. 
The use of Gazprominvestholding as a buyer did not change the overall “state ownership” 
outcome of the cases. However, in explaining the causal factors that determined the specific 
ownership outcomes, the case studies will highlight the extent to which Gazprom was forced 
to work within legal and other constraints. Some of these constraints were common to all 
Russian joint-stock companies. However, as Gutseriev’s comment at the end of the previous 
chapter suggested, Gazprom’s status as a state-owned company and one that dominated its 
market placed significant additional restrictions on its freedom of manoeuvre. The political 
motivations behind Gazprom’s takeovers highlighted its privileged position as a channel of 
government policy. But despite this privileged position and its superior access to 
‘administrative resources’, Gazprom was forced to find innovative solutions to bypass legal 
obstacles that stemmed in part from its own ‘state-ness’. These legal obstacles were largely 
domestic in nature, providing further evidence that (contrary to what one would expect in an 
ideal-type kleptocracy) some domestic institutions in Russia are working as constraints on 
coercion even by the most privileged of companies. 
Research question 1: causes of the state-led coercive takeovers  
Examining the motivations behind Gazprom’s campaign to recover lost assets highlights a 
contradiction that is common to commercialised state-owned companies in market economies, 
particularly when (as was the case at Gazprom) those companies include private minority 
shareholders. As noted above, Gazprom’s management at times attempted to present the 
campaign as being motivated by exclusively commercial considerations, namely boosting the 
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company’s market capitalisation. But there was a clear political dimension to the campaign 
which was sometimes at odds with Gazprom’s internal commercial logic.  
It has been suggested that Aleksei Miller, the Putin appointee who took Gazprom’s helm at 
the end of May 2001, was tasked from the outset with regaining Gazprom’s lost assets113. In 
reality, however, the months that followed his appointment were characterised by indecision 
and internal debate among the company’s directors, including the state’s representatives on 
the board (Denisov, 2001b). This indecision centred on how to proceed with taking back the 
lost gas producer Purgaz, and whether and how to prevent the threatened loss of 
petrochemicals company Sibur. While media reports tended to blame this indecision on the 
incompetence and inexperience of the new management team, in both cases there were real 
reasons to question whether re-taking the assets in the proposed way, or even re-taking them 
at all, was commercially desirable. 
Purgaz is not treated as a case in this chapter because it was taken over by Gazprom without 
recourse to coercion. However, the debates within Gazprom’s management regarding how to 
proceed at Purgaz highlight the doubts over the commercial rationale for the campaign to re-
take lost assets. As will be shown below, these doubts persisted until a clear political signal 
was given to proceed with a large-scale campaign of takeovers. Purgaz was a producing 
company with the licence to develop the Gubkinskoe gas field, with substantial proven 
reserves of 400bcm. This was the first case in which Gazprom had handed control of one of its 
own gas fields to a third party. It had been founded in 1998 as a joint venture between 
Gazprom (51%) and the independent producer Itera (49%)114. In the following year, Gazprom 
sold Itera a further 32% stake, leaving it with just 19%. The sale price had been just $1200 
(sic), equivalent to the nominal value of the shares. Gubkinskoe swiftly became Itera’s main 
producing asset: it was already producing 3.8bcm of gas in 1999 and 14bcm in 2000. This 
                                                     
113 e.g. Drankina & Tatevosova (2002); Henderson (2010, p. 59). 
114 Gazprom’s stake was via its subsidiary Noyabr’skgazdobycha and Itera’s via ZAO Itera-Rus’. 
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looked like an extremely generous gift to a competitor: the hedge fund Hermitage Capital 
Management, which was an activist minority shareholder in Gazprom, claimed that the market 
value of the 32% stake was $566m (Kleiner, 2002). 
At the beginning of 2001 (i.e. before Miller’s arrival at Gazprom), two separate investigations 
had been launched into Gazprom’s dealings with Itera, whose business was at the time 
primarily based on re-selling gas produced either in Turkmenistan or by Gazprom in Russia. 
One investigation was commissioned by the government and was conducted by the Audit 
Chamber (whose role is to monitor the use of federal budget money); the other was 
commissioned by Gazprom’s board of directors and was conducted by the accounting and 
auditing firm PwC. One of the findings of the PwC investigation, which reported to 
Gazprom’s board at the end of July 2001, was that Gazprom still had an option available to 
buy back its 32% stake in Purgaz at the same nominal price for which it had been sold, 
provided that it did so before 1 January 2002 (Bushueva, 2001f; Reznik, 2001b). It ought to 
have been clear how Gazprom should proceed: it had handed over an asset apparently worth 
$566m for next to nothing, and now had the option of buying it back for the same token 
amount. Nevertheless, Gazprom’s board was riven by debate for some six months before it 
finally resolved in December 2001 to exercise the option (Reznik & Khrennikov, 2001). 
What gave the Gazprom board pause were the following considerations. At a board meeting in 
August 2001, the State Property Minister (one of the state’s five representatives on the board) 
voiced the concern that, if Gazprom went ahead and deprived Itera of its main producing 
asset, Itera might have trouble paying debts for which Gazprom was acting as guarantor 
(Bushueva, 2001f). Furthermore, by regaining its controlling stake in Purgaz, Gazprom would 
be taking on responsibility for the latter’s debts to Itera: the latter had provided between 
$250m and $300m in short-term loans to Purgaz between 1998 and 2000, in order to get 
production up and running. It emerged that the terms of the option agreement meant Gazprom 
would have to pay Itera $194m in compensation for these investments (Reznik & Bushueva, 
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2001). Furthermore, the Gubkinskoe field’s location meant that its gas could only be sold 
domestically. While under Itera’s control, Purgaz could sell its gas at a price set by the 
market, though it was dependent on Gazprom’s pipeline network to find a market outside the 
immediate vicinity 115. If Gazprom regained control, the gas could only be sold at the tariff set 
by the government. It was therefore uncertain whether Gazprom could profitably exploit the 
asset. If it opted instead to retain the status quo, Gazprom could continue to collect transit 
revenues from Itera in exchange for taking the gas to market. These were substantial, 
amounting to $215m in 2001 (Bushueva, 2001b; Davydova & Reznik, 2001). Thus the reality 
was distinctly more complex than Hermitage had claimed: if their valuation was correct and 
the 32% stake in Purgaz was indeed worth $566m, then it is doubtful whether it was worth 
this amount to Gazprom, subject as it was to regulated prices.  
The case of petrochemicals company Sibur provides further evidence that Gazprom and its 
political masters did not yet have a coherent strategy for its lost assets until some time after 
Miller became chief executive. In July 2001, Gazprom found that it had failed to convert a 
newly-gained majority stake in Sibur into a board majority. It was also being asked to buy into 
a new Sibur share issue which Gazprom First Deputy CEO Petr Rodionov believed was based 
on an exaggerated share price (its stake would be drastically diluted if it did not subscribe). At 
the end of September, Rodionov demanded the resignation of Sibur’s CEO Yakov Goldovsky. 
But he found himself reprimanded by Gazprom’s then Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev, 
on the grounds that he had exceeded his authority. Rodionov submitted his resignation soon 
afterwards (Bushueva & Reznik, 2001b). But only a few months later, in January 2002, 
Goldovsky was arrested and effectively accused of trying to steal the company from Gazprom. 
By the time of Goldovsky’s arrest the Gazprom management had finally arrived at a strategy 
for its lost assets that was straightforward in its approach even if unclear in its motivations. In 
                                                     
115 Non-Gazprom producers had since 1998 been released from any obligation to sell their gas at 
regulated prices (Ahrend & Tompson, 2005, p. 804). 
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the same month, Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksandr Ananenkov said that “everything which by 
rights belongs to Gazprom must be returned”, as part of a new company strategy “aimed at 
increasing the capitalisation of the company” (Reznik, 2002a). While the reference to 
increasing capitalisation implied that this was a commercially-motivated strategy, the 
assertion that the campaign extended to all assets “which by rights belong to Gazprom” 
suggested otherwise. The commercial rationale was doubtful not just with respect to Purgaz, 
but also regarding some of the assets that are the subject of the case studies below.  
It appears that an intervention by President Vladimir Putin was the prompt for Gazprom’s new 
strategy. On 20 November 2001, he publicly reprimanded Miller for deficiencies in his work 
to date, and passed judgement on Sibur using wording that implied the same lesson was to be 
applied to other lost or threatened Gazprom assets: "You must pay close attention to the 
ownership issue. If you sit with your mouth open, you will lose not only Sibur, but other 
companies too before you have time to look around" (Gorelov, 2001; Isachenkov, 2002; 
“Tsitata nedeli,” 2001). 
Barnes (2006a, 2006b) provides a good starting-point for understanding the political 
objectives behind the decision to recover the lost assets that “by rights belong to Gazprom”. 
He states that commercial property is prized by competing interests (including the state) not 
just for its financial value but as a source of power in an economic environment characterised 
by a high degree of uncertainty. Additionally, he suggests that Putin’s views on economic 
development include a Gerschenkronian stress on the need for the state to play an active role, 
particularly in “late developing” countries, and an adoption of Baldwin’s notion that control 
over natural resources can be used to gain international influence (Baldwin, 1985; 
Gerschenkron, 1962). Gustafson (2012, pp. 247–250) notes that once Putin had moved from 
St Petersburg to the national stage in 1999, “he increasingly [stressed] the importance of state 
power and control. State power is the precondition for stability and economic growth, and 
control of natural resources is the precondition for state power”. This is the reason for the 
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close personal interest that Putin took in Gazprom, and explains why it became a major 
priority to transform the state’s somewhat precarious de facto control over Gazprom into solid 
de jure control by achieving a direct majority stake.  
Gazprom had begun its existence as the direct successor to the USSR Gas Industry Ministry. 
In August 1989, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who headed the Ministry, persuaded the USSR 
Cabinet of Ministers to transform it into a Union-wide state-owned kontsern (Panyushkin & 
Zygar’, 2008, pp. 16–19) 116 . Gazprom’s managers tried unsuccessfully to exclude the 
company from the wider privatisation programme led by Anatoly Chubais. However, they did 
succeed in winning concessions that allowed them to control the privatisation process. They 
emerged with control over a substantial Gazprom stake and considerable autonomy of 
action117.  
Pappe and Galukhina (2009, p. 170) question whether the state ever lost its de facto control 
over Gazprom: they argue that the management always obeyed clearly expressed directions 
from officials at the level of deputy prime minister and above. Furthermore, they claim that 
from the formal point of view, the state in the early 2000s enjoyed a majority vote at Gazprom 
because it could rely on the management and other shareholders whose loyalty was 
guaranteed. By contrast, journalistic accounts give the impression that this situation was more 
precarious: the state was able to cobble together a majority vote at shareholder meetings by 
reaching ad hoc agreements with other shareholders (Petrovsky, 2002; Reznik, 2001a). In any 
case, it is clear that the political leadership did not find the situation satisfactory, and felt that 
it could not rely on being able to exploit Gazprom’s resources effectively until state control 
was formalised. There was also a perceived risk, possibly exaggerated in the minds of political 
                                                     
116 Gazprom was the first kontsern and entirely replaced the USSR Gas Ministry. Although entirely 
state-owned, this and subsequent kontserny gave enterprise managers some autonomy from government 
for the first time (Gustafson, 2012, p. 72; Sim, 2008, p. 18) 
117 For details of the privatisation process and subsequent developments affecting the state’s control 
over Gazprom in the 1990s, see Ivanova (2001). 
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actors who were arguably unusually preoccupied with national security, that the lack of formal 
control might mean Gazprom falling into the hands of Russia’s ‘enemies’.  
As will be discussed below, formal state control over Gazprom was achieved in summer 2005, 
when a state-owned company named Rosneftegaz bought a 10.7% stake in Gazprom from its 
subsidiaries. But this final transaction was made possible by Gazprom’s earlier work to buy 
back Gazprom shares that had been sold to third parties under the previous management. Most 
notably, this included a 4.83% Gazprom stake that had been sold to Stroitransgaz in 1994-
1995. In Gazprom’s SLCT of Stroitransgaz, which is examined below, it was the Gazprom 
stake that was the main prize and not Stroitransgaz itself. 
Restoring state control over Gazprom cannot, however, have been the sole objective behind 
the campaign to recover its lost assets. Otherwise, the campaign could have been restricted to 
pressuring Stroitransgaz and other companies to hand over their Gazprom shares. The fact that 
it extended to many other lost Gazprom assets can largely be explained by the wish to boost 
Gazprom’s asset base as far as possible. Doubts over the commercial rationale of taking back 
some of these assets were ultimately rejected in favour of an apparently indiscriminate 
campaign, proving that this was not, as Ananenkov claimed, essentially a policy aimed at 
boosting Gazprom’s market capitalisation118. The more important motivation appears to have 
been to maximise Gazprom’s effectiveness as a tool of the state.  
Heinrich (2008) has examined Gazprom’s use by the Putin administration as a means to boost 
Russia’s influence abroad, while pointing out that it has also been used to bolster state power 
within Russia’s borders. Gazprom also serves as an example to support the claim made by 
Chaudhry (1993) that in developing countries state ownership is often “a response to the 
administrative weakness of a state” and to “the difficulties encountered by late developers in 
                                                     
118 Pappe and Galukhina (2009, p. 171) express doubts also regarding the wisdom of this ‘bloating’ 
(razbukhanie) of Gazprom, which included the acquisition of vast new assets as well as re-taking ones 
that had previously been lost. They argue that the scale and diversification of the Gazprom business 
would inevitably lead to problems of manageability.  
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constructing effective national legal and regulatory institutions”119. Gazprom fulfils official 
regulatory functions on behalf of the government as well as being a supposedly commercially-
motivated joint-stock company. Ahrend and Tompson (2005, pp. 813–4) argue that Gazprom 
needs to transfer its regulatory functions to state bodies, but the fact that this has not been 
done to date most likely points to the government’s awareness that it is unable to provide 
effective regulation. It has also been argued (though not uncontroversially) that by fixing 
Gazprom’s domestic prices at below-market rates, the government has used it to provide a 
subsidy to the wider economy (Henderson, 2011, p. 8)120. 
The evidence from the three cases, to which we now turn, shows that the state went on to try 
to use Gazprom’s restored ownership of some of these assets to solve certain micro-economic 
problems, despite indications that these efforts made no commercial sense for Gazprom itself. 
Therefore the political objectives for the campaign included (or came to include through a 
form of ‘mission creep’) wider considerations of state-led economic development.  
Sibur 
Sibur was created in 1995 through a government decree which transferred to it numerous gas 
processing plants which had previously been the property of state-owned Rosneft’. The plants 
took as inputs the associated gas which is a by-product of oil production; they separated it into 
pipeline-quality natural gas on the one hand, and natural gas liquids which could be used in 
petrochemicals production on the other. By 2001, Sibur had expanded to become Russia’s 
largest petrochemicals company, with a 47% share of the country’s production of rubber, 43% 
of its tires, 25% of its liquid gases and 23% of its synthetic fibres (Bushueva, Reznik, 
Novolodskaya, & Chertkov, 2002). As will be discussed below, this was an asset that had not 
                                                     
119 “In cases where the government becomes the primary employer and producer and assumes the role 
of setting prices, its task is simplified to monitoring the activities of corporations and agencies that it 
owns and manages” (Chaudhry, 1993, p. 252). By contrast, Evans (1995, pp. 69–71) suggests that 
excessive expansion of state ownership can undermine developmental goals by placing “an intense 
strain on state capacity.” 
120 Woodruff (1999) challenges this notion by problematizing the concept of “below-market”. 
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yet been strictly ‘lost’ by Gazprom, but was in imminent danger: Gazprom had secured 
majority ownership for the first time in summer 2001, only to find soon afterwards that its 
stake risked being diluted to the point where it had no influence over the company.  
The petrochemicals industry was beyond Gazprom’s core business of gas production and 
supply. But by controlling Sibur, Gazprom (which already had some gas processing plants) 
could establish itself as a monopsony buyer of the associated gas produced by oil companies. 
Heinrich (2008) describes this as one of the ‘administrative resources’ which Gazprom (after 
retaking Sibur) used against oil producers with ambitions to become significant gas producers, 
in order to stop them competing with Gazprom on a level playing field. In addition to 
Gazprom’s monopsony position, the oil producers had since 1998 been forced to sell their 
associated gas at a price fixed by the regulator in order to preserve Sibur’s commercial 
viability. They had responded by increasingly electing to simply ‘flare’ this gas on-site. 
When Putin made his remarks in November 2001 about the danger of losing control of Sibur, 
he commented at the same time on the need to preserve and revive Russia’s petrochemicals 
industry. Sibur’s creation had helped to bring about a partial revival of the industry, but it was 
feared that without its affiliations with Gazprom, and the stable demand this brought for the 
pipeline-quality natural gas produced at the gas processing plants, Sibur would be an unviable 
business (Drankina & Tatevosova, 2002)121.  
In an April 2002 interview, Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksandr Krasnenkov conceded that 
Sibur was strictly speaking a non-core asset for Gazprom, but noted that “the Sibur production 
cycle lengthens the chain of gas processing and allows [us] to export not just raw materials but 
processed products”. This can be seen as an exclusively commercial explanation for 
                                                     
121 For the sake of clarity, two monopsonies were involved in Gazprom’s relationship with Sibur: 1) 
with Sibur under its ownership, Gazprom stood to own all of the country’s gas processing plants, giving 
it monopsony status as buyer of associated gas from oil companies; 2) Gazprom was also the only 
company in a position to buy the pipeline-quality natural gas produced at Sibur’s plants. This 
dependence on a single buyer would have imperilled the profitability of this side of Sibur’s business, if 
Sibur were no longer under Gazprom’s ownership. 
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Gazprom’s interest in Sibur, but it is also notably similar to the developmental interest taken 
by Putin in moving oil exports up the ‘value chain’ by boosting the exports of refined 
products (Gustafson, 2012, pp. 369–370) 122 . It also recalls Wengle’s (2012, p. 101) 
description of the Russian government’s interest in promoting electricity exports from 
Russia’s Far East as part of a strategy “aimed at moving away from exporting raw materials, 
toward value-added production.”  
Stroitransgaz 
Stroitransgaz was another company that could hardly be described as a core asset for 
Gazprom: it built pipelines and provided other construction services relating to the 
development of oil and gas fields. Like Sibur, the company itself was not ‘lost’ by Gazprom 
under Vyakhirev – it had never been controlled by Gazprom. But what was deemed to have 
been lost to Stroitransgaz was a 6.2% stake in Gazprom itself. Gazprom had transferred the 
bulk of these shares (4.83%) to Stroitransgaz in 1994-5 as payment for construction services. 
The exchange was based on a substantially under-valued price for Gazprom’s shares123 . 
Stroitransgaz had bought the remaining Gazprom shares on the open market in subsequent 
years.  
If the state could gain control of the Gazprom stake that was held by Stroitransgaz, it would be 
well on the way to its ultimate goal of securing a direct majority stake in Gazprom. The 
government considered this a pre-condition for eliminating the ‘ring-fence’ bar on foreign 
shareholders owning Gazprom’s domestically-issued shares (Grivach, 2003). Removing the 
                                                     
122 Putin aimed to achieve this increase in refined oil products exports through a reduction in export tax; 
as noted in Chapter Two, such motivations may have contributed to the decision to force 
Bashkortostan’s petrochemicals industry to open itself up to the national economy. 
123 STG’s CEO Arngold Bekker claimed in a 2000 interview that Gazprom had the option of taking 
back the 4.83% stake by repaying its debt in cash within three years, but had not elected to do so 
(Bushueva, 2000c). An investigation by the Russian Federal Securities Commission in 2001 found that 
the Gazprom shares had been priced at just their nominal value for this 1994-5 transaction, i.e. the 
4.83% stake was in payment for a debt of $2.5m. The market value of the stake at the time was said to 
be at least $70m. However, this had been legal and in line with other deals that year involving Gazprom 
shares (Prezhentsev & Reznik, 2001; Yakubova, 2001). 
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ring-fence would boost Gazprom’s capitalisation, a strategic aim of Gazprom’s management 
which would also delight the company’s existing minority shareholders. No doubt a large 
number of Gazprom insiders and Russian officials who were also Gazprom shareholders also 
stood to benefit from the removal of the ring-fence124. But as noted earlier, these commercial 
motivations were less important than the government’s wish to establish full control of 
Gazprom because of its power as a political and economic tool both domestically and 
internationally. At the same time this meant removing the risk that the company might instead 
fall under the control of domestic or foreign ‘enemies’. 
Stroitransgaz presented an additional hindrance to the state’s efforts to exert de facto control 
over Gazprom. Its CEO Aleksandr Bekker had been voted onto the Gazprom board of 
directors in 1999 (Davydov, 1999). While Vyakhirev’s management had been in control of 
Gazprom, Bekker’s loyalty had not been in question. But after Vyakhirev’s removal as 
Gazprom CEO in May 2001 there was concern that Bekker would vote independently or 
against the new management’s initiatives. 
It will become clear later in this chapter that Gazprom could have confined its efforts vis-à-vis 
Stroitransgaz to taking control of the Gazprom shares on its balance sheet and pressuring 
Bekker to withdraw from the Gazprom board. But it elected additionally to purchase a 
blocking stake in Stroitransgaz itself. The rationale for this latter decision was commercial. 
The intention was to optimise Gazprom’s dealings with an important counterparty by bringing 
it under Gazprom’s ownership. Stroitransgaz had historically been its main general contractor 
for pipeline construction work125. In the absence of a meaningfully competitive market for 
these services, Stroitransgaz was close to being a monopolist provider, and there was 
                                                     
124 For reasons that cannot be dwelt on here, there were also many companies and individuals who 
benefited financially from the distortions created by the ring-fence. 
125 In 2000 Stroitransgaz had received RUB 31bn out of the total RUB 97bn which Gazprom invested in 
construction (Rybal’chenko, 2001). 
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particular concern regarding its inflated costs 126 . Furthermore, as general contractor 
Stroitransgaz only supervised projects and sub-contracted the work out to other companies, 
and these included many of Gazprom’s own construction subsidiaries; yet most of the profit 
from the work was retained by Stroitransgaz (Reznik, 2002d). Consequently, Gazprom 
considered the alternative strategy of replacing Stroitransgaz with a Gazprom subsidiary 
offering the same services. In fact, as will be seen below, Gazprom tried for a time to do both 
at once, with the project to create a new rival subsidiary acting as a useful bargaining tool 
when negotiating with Stroitransgaz’s existing owners. 
Zapsibgazprom and South Russkoe 
While it is debatable whether Sibur’s petrochemicals business or Stroitransgaz’s gas field 
construction business rightly belonged within the Gazprom group of companies, there was a 
clear case for Gazprom to recover control of the South Russkoe gas field. Located in central 
Yamal, this field had proven reserves of 600bcm (Reznik, 2001c). Given Gazprom’s total 
proven reserves of 28tcm at the end of 2001 (OAO “Gazprom,” 2002a, p. 14), this was of 
sufficient size to be significant if not momentous for Gazprom’s future. Production began in 
2007, by which time German firm BASF had become a minority shareholder in the field’s 
operating company. It was scheduled to increase from 10bcm in 2008 to 25bcm (equivalent to 
4.5% of Gazprom’s overall production) in 2009. But the field was to have additional strategic 
significance for Gazprom and the Russian state: it became the main resource base for the Nord 
Stream gas pipeline, which runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany and came 
onstream in 2011-12 (Mazneva, 2007; Paszyc, 2012). This pipeline is of considerable 
                                                     
126 As Usmanov explained in December 2002, “Gazprom needs a blocking stake [in Stroitransgaz] in 
order to have strategic influence over a company connected with [its] business. The blocking stake will 
allow Stroitransgaz to take part in tenders on equal terms with other bidders, and Gazprom will be able 
to exercise real control over the cost of work done by this company” (Reznik, 2002h). A government 
bureaucrat close to the Gazprom board of directors said in 2004 that he and others had been against the 
purchase of a blocking stake, believing that Gazprom should be using competitive tenders to buy its 
equipment. “But Gazprom persuaded us that it was important for it to be able to monitor 
[kontrolirovat’] the finances of its contractor” (Reznik, 2004a). 
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geopolitical value to Russia, as it allows Gazprom to deliver stable supplies of gas to western 
Europe without risk of disruption from transit countries (Helén, 2010).  
As will be explained below, the licence to develop South Russkoe was until 1998 held by 
Gazprom’s subsidiary Zapsibgazprom, one of the largest industrial enterprises in Tyumen’ 
region, which owned various companies involved in laying new gas infrastructure for Russian 
regions (Bushueva, 2001a). The gas field licence was then transferred to a subsidiary of 
Zapsibgazprom named Severneftegazprom, though this fact was not confirmed in public until 
2001. No-one within Gazprom’s management disputed the need to regain control of the gas 
field, but there was some debate as to whether the company needed the infrastructure business 
of Zapsibgazprom itself127. There were concerns about the commercial viability of the latter, 
and these concerns would later prove to be well-founded. Nevertheless, the decision was made 
to recover Zapsibgazprom in its entirety. It may be that this decision simply reflected an 
indiscriminate, essentially political strategy to take back everything that ‘by rights belonged to 
Gazprom’128. But if that were the case, one would expect the company’s ailing infrastructure 
business to have been quietly forgotten after the takeover129. Instead, the intention was that 
Gazprom would revive the business by sending new orders its way, especially by making it 
general contractor for development of the South Russkoe field (Mokrousova, 2003b; Morgun, 
2002a). Vladimir Zav’yalov, a former deputy of Tyumen’ region’s parliament, was made head 
of a new managing company created on 20 April 2002 that was tasked with reviving 
Zapsibgazprom’s fortunes. It appears that the region’s governor Sergei Sobyanin had a hand 
                                                     
127 In July 2001, when it was becoming clear that Zapsibgazprom no longer had the licence to the gas 
field, an unnamed Gazprom senior manager was cited as saying “I don’t understand at all why we need 
this acquisition. Zapsibgazprom is on its own a non-core enterprise, and its only value was in the 
licence” (Bushueva, 2001e). Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksandr Krasnenkov was more positive about the 
remaining Zapsibgazprom business in April 2002, saying that the company was “without exaggeration 
a second Gazprom within Gazprom, and is involved in literally everything. There are many non-core 
and core assets there” (Butrin, 2002b). 
128 A Gazprom representative said in February 2002 that the attempt to take back Zapsibgazprom was 
part of company policy to take back illegally stolen assets, “and in this we are prepared to go to the end, 
be that with Sibur or with Zapsibgazprom” (Reznik & Lysova, 2002). 
129 There was talk of using the Zapsibgazprom stake as part-payment for Gazprom’s contribution to a 
new share issue at Sibur (Bushueva, 2001g), but this did not come to pass. 
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in this appointment130. Zav’yalov said in an interview that he reported to Gazprom Deputy 
CEO Aleksandr Ryazanov, who was responsible for Zapsibgazprom within Gazprom’s senior 
management. Zav’yalov made clear his determination not to let Zapsibgazprom go the way of 
the region’s other oil and gas enterprises, which had “been liquidated before my very eyes” 
(Morgun, 2002b) 131. 
Summary 
It is clear from the case studies that Gazprom’s decision to take back these assets was not 
motivated by exclusively commercial considerations. The stated objective of boosting market 
capitalisation fits perfectly with the acquisition of the South Russkoe gas field (which 
previously belonged to Zapsibgazprom). Re-taking Stroitransgaz’s Gazprom stake also 
promised to boost Gazprom’s capitalisation through the removal of the ring-fence, but the 
political objective of consolidating state control over Gazprom was more important. The 
objective of boosting Gazprom’s power as a political and economic resource applies to the 
South Russkoe acquisition given its later strategic importance as source of gas for the Nord 
Stream pipeline. But the decision to keep Zapsibgazprom’s ailing gas infrastructure business 
alive with new orders, and some of the justifications given for including Sibur in the 
campaign, indicate that both the government and Gazprom’s managers felt that Gazprom had 
a responsibility to act as a tool of industrial policy. Gazprom was seen as having a 
responsibility to play an ‘altruistic’ role in solving problems associated with Zapsibgazprom 
and Sibur, even if this worked against Gazprom’s institutional self-interest132.  
                                                     
130 Sobyanin was governor of Tyumen’s from January 2001 to November 2005, when he was made 
Putin’s chief of staff. In October 2010 he became mayor of Moscow. 
131 Despite the good intentions, Gazprom failed to turn Zapsibgazprom around. It took another three 
years for work to begin to develop South Russkoe, during which time Zapsibgazprom’s financial 
condition had worsened. Gazprom decided instead to bring in German investors to help develop the 
field. In December 2012, the now heavily-indebted company was sold to financial firm IFK Metropol 
(“Metropol’‘ pokupaet ’Zapsibgazprom,” 2012). 
132 The fear of the social impact on Tyumen’ region in the event of Zapsibgazprom’s collapse appears 
to have prompted Gazprom’s efforts to keep it alive through new orders. Stable orders from Gazprom 
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The decision to buy at least a blocking stake in Stroitransgaz can be seen as motivated by 
Gazprom’s commercial self-interest, but not in the sense of directly boosting Gazprom’s 
market capitalisation. Instead, the aim was to use ownership to control the costs involved in 
Gazprom’s relationship with a key supplier. Ownership was also key to helping Sibur and 
Zapsibgazprom through the provision of a steady stream of orders. What stood in the way of 
achieving the same objectives without the use of ownership were the costs associated with 
transacting with the same companies across the market. As well as the uncertainty this would 
bring to prices, it would severely complicate the task of ensuring that contracts were honoured 
reliably. The work of Williamson (1981) on the use of vertical integration in response to high 
transaction costs provides valuable theoretical insight into these problems and their attempted 
solution. The prevalence of monopsony and monopoly relationships relates to his discussion 
of asset-specificity, which complicates the task of finding alternative buyers and sellers and 
thus raises the spectre of ‘hold-up problems’. Williamson sees ‘uncertainty’ as another critical 
dimension for describing transactions and determining whether they are better carried out 
across the market or within a vertically-integrated company. Adachi (2010, pp. 37–38) 
employs Williamson’s theory as part of her explanation for what prompted Russian business 
to ‘reconstruct the production chain’ through vertical integration. She argues that the lack of 
market-supporting institutions in Russia, the high costs of contract enforcement due to its 
weak legal system, and undeveloped markets for products, labour and finance all added to 
uncertainty and made vertical integration a more attractive option. However, as dissenting 
voices within the company told the media at the time, many of the assets being brought into 
the Gazprom fold were in fact unrelated to the chain of production in Gazprom’s core activity 
of gas production and transportation. This fact serves to underline that the objectives behind 
the campaign were essentially political and developmental, rather than being based on 
Gazprom’s internal commercial logic.  
                                                                                                                                                        
were important to Sibur’s viability, which in turn had been identified by Putin as being of importance to 
the petrochemicals sector as a whole. 
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Research question 2: explaining the ownership outcomes 
The remainder of this chapter seeks to explain what determined the outcomes of these 
takeovers. Although state ownership was the outcome in each case, the aim is to understand 
the specific ways in which Gazprom structured its ownership. The outcomes are once again 
explained by reference to how the SLCTs progressed as bargaining games between state and 
existing owner. In order to understand the nature of the bargaining games, we first examine 
the nature of Gazprom’s predicament on the eve of the takeover. This means understanding 
whether it had already lost control over the target company or was merely at imminent risk of 
doing so. However, Gazprom’s predicament was compounded by the fact that, thanks to 
defensive tactics employed by the existing owners, the target companies and the assets which 
Gazprom prized were not always one and the same. 
Ownership status on the eve of takeover 
Sibur 
From its creation in 1995 until 1998, Sibur was state-owned and had no affiliation with 
Gazprom. It was then privatised, and the obscure companies that emerged as the buyers also 
had no formal connection to Gazprom. But they were linked to Yakov Goldovsky, an oil 
trader whom Gazprom had hired to be head of its subsidiary Gazsibkontrakt133. Goldovsky 
maintained later that he and certain unspecified private business partners had been the real 
buyers in the Sibur privatisation (despite the fact that it was financed by a loan from 
Gazprom’s then-subsidiary Gazprombank, with Gazprom acting as guarantor), but that he had 
always encouraged Gazprom to buy in to the business at a later stage (Novolodskaya, 2003). 
This claim runs counter to the account provided by journalists from Russian Forbes, who 
                                                     
133 The two main stages of the privatisation involved the sale of a 20.22% stake to a company named 
OOO Bonus-Invest, which was owned by four obscure individuals, and the sale of a second tranche of 
50% minus 1 share to a company named Gazoneftekhimicheskaya Kompaniya (GNK). The latter was 
owned by companies which were based in Liechtenstein but had Goldovsky as their Chairman 
(Makarkin, 2002). 
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stated that Gazprom had hired Goldovsky with the specific aim of buying Sibur in 
circumvention of restrictions preventing it from participating in the privatisation auction 
directly (Lysova & Nogina, 1999). The fact that Sibur’s board was dominated by Gazprom 
representatives as early as 1999 lends some additional weight to the Forbes account (Lysova 
& Nogina, 1999; Makarkin, 2002). 
The Forbes journalists did not elaborate on why they believed Gazprom did not have the right 
to take part in the privatisation directly. The Law on Privatisation at the time only prevented 
companies in which the state had a direct stake of above 25% from participating in 
privatisation auctions (Neimysheva & Reznik, 2003). Therefore, to get around this legal 
obstacle, Gazprom could simply have used one of its own subsidiaries to buy Sibur. 
Admittedly, to have done so would have been politically controversial: at the time, the notion 
of state-owned companies acting as buyers in privatisation auctions still struck many as 
defeating the object of privatisation134. But the specific obstacle to Gazprom’s participation in 
the Sibur privatisation process may well have come instead from the antitrust regulator135. As 
mentioned above, Gazprom stood to become a monopsony buyer of associated gas as a result 
of the Sibur purchase. It would therefore have needed to gain prior approval from this 
regulator before it or any affiliated company (as defined by the extant antitrust legislation) 
                                                     
134 A few years later, state-owned Rosneft’ did attempt to participate in the privatisation of Slavneft, 
using two affiliates including a subsidiary of a Rosneft’ subsidiary. This was blocked by the State 
Property Fund, which was apparently aware that it was on shaky ground legally but insisted that 
allowing these indirectly state-owned companies to participate would have defeated the object of the 
privatisation (Neimysheva & Reznik, 2003). The State Property Fund’s head was subsequently fined by 
a Dagestan court for having incorrectly applied the Privatisation Law. In recent years, the involvement 
of state-owned companies as buyers in Russian privatisation has become almost the norm, as evidenced 
by the emergence of state-owned Gazprom and Inter RAO as major owners of electricity generating 
companies. 
135 The regulator was named the State Antimonopoly Committee from March 1997 until September 
1998, when it was renamed the Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for Entrepeneurship. 
Today it is named the Federal Antimonopoly Service. As shown in Tazhetdinov (1996), antitrust 
legislation, including the legal concepts of “affiliated entity” and “group of entities”, was already well 
developed by the time of the Sibur privatisation. 
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could bid in the privatisation auction. This may have made it impossible in practice for 
Gazprom to have made a timely privatisation bid136. 
Using various companies to which he was linked, Goldovsky bought stakes not only in Sibur 
itself but in various associated petrochemicals enterprises. He placed Sibur’s assets ‘at one 
remove’ from the company itself by making it managing company of the petrochemicals 
enterprises but not their parent company: the ownership ties between them were either highly 
complex or non-existent137. According to Goldovsky, he and Gazprom had planned all along 
that this relationship would be restructured and simplified when Gazprom bought into the 
company: the enterprises Sibur managed would become its formal subsidiaries, and Gazprom 
would acquire a controlling stake in the main Sibur entity by subscribing to a new share issue 
(Novolodskaya, 2003).  
Goldovsky had worked with members of Gazprom’s management in devising the plan for 
Sibur (Lysova & Nogina, 1999), but as early as August 1999 the Kremlin was putting pressure 
on Gazprom to think again. On the day before a Gazprom extraordinary general shareholders’ 
meeting (EGM), the offices of Sibur and Gazsibkontrakt were searched by police and 
documents were confiscated relating to their dealings with Gazprom (N. Ivanov, 1999). At the 
beginning of June 2000, Vyakhirev said he was not yet sure whether Gazprom would increase 
its stake in Sibur from the current 18% to controlling. However, in December the 
Antimonopoly Ministry approved Gazprom’s application to do just that through subscribing to 
a new share issue (Bushueva, 2000d; Novolodskaya, 2000). Before this acquisition was 
implemented, Sibur’s board in May 2001 approved another share issue, which would oblige 
Gazprom to subscribe again (at a cost of $700m) in order to retain control (Novolodskaya, 
                                                     
136 Approval from antitrust body was later required when Gazprom formalised its controlling stake in 
Sibur in summer 2001 (see below). The role of the antitrust regulator in constraining the behaviour of 
large companies including Gazprom is a major theme of the following chapter. 
137 In spring 2001, Russia’s oil companies were to discover that Sibur owned very little in the way of 
assets. This fact came to light when the companies conducted due diligence on Sibur after they were 
invited to buy a blocking stake. The invitation arose from a condition imposed by the antitrust regulator 
when it approved Gazprom’s purchase of a controlling stake in Sibur (Novolodskaya, 2001b). 
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2001a). Little attention was paid at the time to the fact that Sibur was planning to issue both 
ordinary voting shares (to which Gazprom was encouraged to subscribe) and preference 
shares to which it was not eligible to subscribe. Gazprom’s senior management realised only 
later that these preference shares posed a serious threat to their investment in Sibur. 
Perhaps because Gazprom’s new management was still getting to grips with company 
business following the change of command with Miller’s appointment as CEO at the end of 
May 2001, the company failed to convert its majority stake into a board majority at the Sibur 
AGM in July 2001138. Only five out of sixteen Sibur board seats were occupied by Gazprom 
representatives. Other seats were filled by representatives from foreign companies who were 
helping Sibur expand into Eastern Europe, but also by a representative of a foreign company 
which was thought to be planning to subscribe to one of the new share issues. Somehow this 
company had made its way onto the board before the share issue had taken place 
(“Transnatsional’nyi ‘Sibur,’” 2001). 
As noted above, one member of Gazprom’s senior management took it upon himself to act 
against Goldovsky in September 2001. Angered by the loss of Gazprom’s board majority at 
Sibur and believing its assets to be substantially over-valued for the purposes of the new share 
issue, Gazprom First Deputy CEO Petr Rodionov demanded Goldovsky’s resignation. 
Goldovsky refused and instead wrote to Miller, explaining that “I do not consider it possible 
to agree with the proposal to dismiss me, as I believe that this would lead to serious 
consequences for Sibur and to the winding up of the programme to create on its basis a 
powerful vertically-integrated company”. Reportedly the letter also contained an offer from 
certain Sibur shareholders to finance the repayment of Sibur’s debts to Gazprom, and to halt 
the controversial new share issue, on the condition that Goldovsky remain as CEO (Lysova & 
Novolodskaya, 2001).  
                                                     
138 Similarly, management disarray at Gazprom is likely to explain why Gazprom suffered two serious 
setbacks in May 2001 that put control of the South Russkoe gas field beyond its reach; this will be 
explained below.  
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A few days prior to this board meeting it had come to light that the preference shares which 
Sibur was planning to issue, and to which Gazprom was not eligible to subscribe, would be 
convertible into ordinary shares within three years. This meant that, even if it paid the 
required $700m investment to buy enough voting shares to retain control, Gazprom might still 
find itself a mere minority shareholder in Sibur (Fedorin & Denisov, 2001)139. 
On 5 November 2001, Aleksei Miller announced the appointment of Aleksandr Ryazanov as 
Gazprom Deputy CEO. Ryazanov was made responsible for Gazprom’s relations with Sibur 
and Itera140. This was an ill omen for Goldovsky given Ryazanov’s past: he had in 1998 been 
director of the state-owned Surgut gas processing plant when Goldovsky, as head of the 
Gazprom subsidiary Gazsibkontrakt, was working to bring such plants under Gazprom’s 
control. Ryazanov had refused to accept a share-swap proposed by Goldovsky, and had been 
arrested at Surgut’s airport, accused of attempting to leave town with stolen money. He claims 
that Goldovsky visited him in person in his detention cell and made clear he would be released 
if he agreed to the share-swap (Bushueva, Osetinskaya, & Shcherbakova, 2001; Drankina & 
Tatevosova, 2002; Malkova, 2011)141.  
Gazprom would go on to use very similar tactics against Goldovsky. But despite Ryazanov’s 
appointment and Putin’s warning to Miller in the same month to stop further assets being lost, 
the decision to recruit the state’s coercive resources to establish secure control over Sibur had 
not yet been taken. This was apparently due in part to a concern that, if it went on the 
offensive against Goldovsky, this would trigger a bankruptcy process at Sibur, which was in 
debt to numerous creditors including Gazprom itself. It was feared that the bankruptcy process 
                                                     
139 Reportedly, it had been clear throughout to anyone who read the Sibur company charter that its 
preference shares were convertible in this way into voting shares, suggesting that Gazprom’s lawyers 
had been somewhat negligent in not realising this earlier (Bushueva & Reznik, 2001a). 
140 At the time the Gazprom press office stated merely that Ryazanov would be responsible for “the 
whole range of production issues” (Bushueva, Osetinskaya, & Shcherbakova, 2001), but his more 
specific responsibilities soon became clear. 
141  Reportedly Ryazanov held out and was in any case released. He resigned from his post soon 
afterwards, however. 
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would lead to Sibur being broken off, with some of the assets going to Gazprom’s rival 
creditors. In order to prevent this scenario developing, Gazprom stepped in at the beginning of 
December 2001 to lend Sibur RUB 2.2bn (then worth around $73m) so that it could avoid 
defaulting on bonds it had issued in the summer (Epshtein & Reznik, 2001).  
In December 2001, Gazprom reached a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with Sibur’s managers that 
the new share issue would be delayed. In the meantime, certain gas processing plants that 
were to be transferred to Sibur’s ownership through that share issue would instead be sold to 
oil companies, and the money used to help repay Sibur’s debt to Gazprom (Drankina & 
Tatevosova, 2002; Novolodskaya, 2001b) 142. One sale went ahead as planned: the Surgut gas 
processing plant was bought by the privately-owned oil major Surgutneftegaz in late 
December (Novolodskaya & Tutushkin, 2001). 
On 29 December 2001 Gazprom received an extract from Sibur’s share register which showed 
that Goldovsky’s company Gazoneftekhimicheskaya Kompaniya had bought newly-issued 
shares and left Gazprom’s stake reduced to 32%. The money from the sale of the Surgut gas 
processing plant had reportedly financed this acquisition, rather than going to Gazprom 
(Drankina & Tatevosova, 2002). Reportedly, Gazprom went straight to the Prosecutor 
General’s Office when it received this information, and from this point on Gazprom’s 
campaign to re-take Sibur became explicitly coercive (Reznik, 2009). 
Figure 4 shows the ownership situation at Sibur at the point when Gazprom launched its 
coercive takeover. The assets of value and interest to Gazprom - the gas processing plants - 
were controlled not by Sibur but by its management, which had also just won back control of 
Sibur itself through the latest share issue. Gazprom had only a non-controlling stake in Sibur. 
                                                     
142 As noted above, Goldovsky had reportedly offered in his September letter to Miller to have Sibur 
shareholders help repay Sibur’s debts to Gazprom. Since the same management-linked offshore 
companies which owned Sibur also owned the gas processing plants (see Figure 4), this enabled the 
money raised from selling the plants to be used to repay Sibur’s debt to Gazprom. 
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As a major creditor, it also had a claim over the company and its assets, but other creditors 
also had rival claims. 
 
Figure 4. Sibur ownership before takeover 
 
Stroitransgaz 
Stroitransgaz was founded as a joint-stock company in 1990 and brought together enterprises 
that previously belonged to the Soviet Oil and Gas Construction Ministry. Its founder and 
president, Arngold Bekker, had worked in the Ministry for the previous twenty years and was 
closely acquainted with Viktor Chernomyrdin, then general director of Gazprom143. Details of 
the company’s initial ownership structure are scarce, but reportedly there was cross-ownership 
from the outset, with its construction enterprise subsidiaries acting also as its shareholders. As 
the company grew in the mid-1990s, its share structure changed: its managers bought shares 
and Bekker and his family achieved control. Also appearing among its shareholders were the 
children of Chernomyrdin and of his successor as head of Gazprom, Vyakhirev144. In the 
                                                     
143 As noted above, Gazprom was founded as a kontsern in 1989. 
144 Reportedly Chernomyrdin’s sons Andrei and Vitaly each gained 14%, while Vyakhirev’s daughter 
Tatyana Dedikova gained 6%. 
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meantime, Gazprom-affiliated companies reportedly only held shares equivalent to a few 
percentage points (Govorun, 2008). 
In November 2001, i.e. a few months after Miller’s arrival at Gazprom, Stroitransgaz 
disclosed some details of its ownership as part of an apparent strategy to deflect criticism 
regarding its non-transparent nature. Bekker, who was both President and Chairman, was the 
largest single shareholder with 19.6%. The management collectively controlled 51%. Bekker 
admitted that his children held shares in the company, as did Vyakhirev’s daughter. 
Gazprom’s stake was less than 1% (Chelnok, 2001). 
Of the three cases, this was the most straightforward from Gazprom’s perspective, as 
illustrated in Figure 5 below. The primary objective was retaking control of the Gazprom 
shares on the Stroitransgaz balance sheet. Through purchases on the secondary market, the 
company had increased its stake in Gazprom from the original 4.83% to 6.2% (Chelnok, 2001; 
Sapozhnikov, 2002). While Stroitransgaz  remained under the control of its managers, there 
was a risk that the company’s Gazprom shares might be sold on to third parties; but the 
managers’ preference was instead to hold on to them as valuable collateral enabling the 
company to borrow on financial markets (Bushueva, 2000c). 
 
Figure 5. Stroitransgaz ownership before takeover 
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Zapsibgazprom and South Russkoe 
The licence to develop South Russkoe was awarded to Zapsibgazprom as far back as 1993. 
Zapsibgazprom was at the time a newly-created company, having previously been a Soviet-
era production unit named Zapsibgazpromstroi (Rybal’chenko & Mokrousova, 2002; 
“Zapsibgazprom,” n.d.). It was made a subsidiary of Gazprom but was also privatised in 1993-
4 (Analiticheskii otdel RIA “Rosbizneskonsalting,” n.d.). This explains why, by the late 
1990s, Gazprom only owned 51%; the other shareholders were linked to the company’s 
management (Yambaeva, 2002). 
The key moment when Gazprom lost control of the company came in summer 2000, when it 
failed to subscribe to a new share issue and was left with only 37% (Bushueva, 2000b). It 
would have cost Gazprom just RUB 51.3m (then worth $1.85m) to subscribe to the share 
issue and retain its 51% controlling stake. It is not clear whether Gazprom’s management 
made a conscious decision to cede control, or simply let slip the opportunity to subscribe to 
the share issue. Either way, the management came under severe criticism from the state’s 
representatives on the Gazprom board of directors (Bushueva, 2001a).  
Once Zapsibgazprom’s managers had achieved majority ownership over the company, they 
completed their project to move the South Russkoe licence beyond Gazprom’s reach. This had 
begun as far back as 1998, when Zapsibgazprom created a wholly-owned subsidiary named 
Severneftegazprom and transferred the licence to it (Bushueva, 2001e)145. In February 1999, 
Severneftegazprom issued new shares and thereby reduced Zapsibgazprom’s stake to 51%. 
                                                     
145  At the time, such licence transfers were perfectly legal, with the only restriction being that a 
company could transfer a licence only to another company in which it has a controlling stake. Nothing 
was said in the legislation regarding what happened subsequently to the ownership of that receiving 
company. Information from an employee of the Natural Resources Ministry licensing department cited 
in Reznik (2001c). 
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The buyers of the new shares were companies linked to Itera, though Itera did not rush to 
acknowledge this fact146. 
Gazprom’s first efforts to regain control of Zapsibgazprom began while Vyakhirev was still at 
the helm: in October 2000 he announced that Gazprom would increase its stake to 86.8% by 
buying an additional 49.8% through another new share issue (Bushueva, 2001a). This 
initiative was blocked by Zapsibgazprom’s other shareholders at an EGM in May 2001 
(Bushueva, 2001c). In the same month, Gazprom’s control over the South Russkoe licence 
was truly severed: Severneftegazprom conducted a new share issue which left Zapsibgazprom 
(now only 37%-owned by Gazprom) with just an 11% stake.  
It emerged only later that companies linked to Itera had by this time gained a controlling stake 
(51%) in Severneftegazprom, and hence controlled the South Russkoe licence (“Kak 
prodavalsya ‘Severneftegazprom,’” 2001). In the meantime, if Gazprom’s management was 
aware of Zapsibgazprom’s loss of control of the licence, it was not telling even some of its 
own board members. After a Gazprom board meeting on 31 July 2001, independent board 
member and minority shareholder Boris Fyodorov told the press that he had repeatedly asked 
Gazprom’s managers whether Zapsibgazprom still owned the licence; he had not received an 
answer. The board had nevertheless approved the proposal to buy a 49.8% stake in 
Zapsibgazprom (this time in a direct purchase from its management-linked shareholders, 
rather than through the new share issue earlier proposed by Vyakhirev). Two of the state’s 
representatives had abstained from the vote, as had Fyodorov and one other minority 
shareholder representative (Bushueva, 2001f; Reznik, 2001b). On 7 August 2001, 
Zapsibgazprom’s CEO admitted that the company no longer held the licence. He said that 
Gazprom must have known about the licence transfer that took place in 1998, “and there 
                                                     
146 A year later, Itera’s CEO Igor Makarov said in an interview “we do not plan to buy Zapsibgazprom, 
but we have created a joint venture, OOO Severneftegazprom, which is 10% owned by Itera-Rus’ and 
90% by Zapsibgazprom. As we invest in the South Russkoe field, Itera’s stake in the joint venture will 
increase” (Bushueva, 2000a). 
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should be no sensation made of this” (Denisov, 2001a). At the end of August, it was 
confirmed that Zapsibgazprom only held an 11% stake in the licence-holding company, 
Severneftegazprom (Bushueva, 2001g). 
Figure 6 summarises the ownership situation on the eve of Gazprom’s takeover. As at Sibur, 
Gazprom’s claim to the main asset which it prized (in this case, the South Russkoe licence) 
had become decidedly tenuous. 
 
Figure 6. Zapsibgazprom and South Russkoe ownership before takeover 
 
Summary 
The above discussion highlights the fact that each case differed in terms of the nature and 
scale of the challenge Gazprom faced in trying to secure control of its assets. Gazprom’s 
control at each of the targeted companies was either precarious or already lost when the 
company began its SLCT. But this problem was compounded by the fact that the existing 
owners had managed to place many of Gazprom’s prized assets at one remove from the 
companies themselves. 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the state was concerned that full-scale asset seizure 
might not capture all of the value of the assets, because of various defensive tactics available 
Controlling stake 
Non-controlling stake 
Creditor claim 
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to their existing owners. Further examples of such defensive tactics are the share dilutions and 
other methods used by the existing owners to separate Gazprom from its prized assets. The 
situation was relatively straightforward at Stroitransgaz, where the Gazprom shares (the main 
asset of interest to Gazprom) were held on the company’s balance sheet. But at Sibur the 
management had taken direct control of the prized assets (the petrochemicals companies), 
while at Zapsibgazprom it had gone further by selling the South Russkoe gas field on to a 
third party147.  
This made the SLCTs fraught with risk: if the existing owners were to sever the remaining ties 
between the target company and the prized assets, Gazprom might find itself the new 
controlling owner of a company that no longer possessed the assets it actually wanted, and 
might lose those assets permanently. As will be discussed in detail below, this played a 
substantial role in strengthening the bargaining position of the existing owners, because it 
increased the state’s incentives to seek a negotiated solution to the takeovers. 
The coercive takeovers 
The three cases studied in this chapter have been chosen from the wider sample of Gazprom 
takeovers partly because of their timing, but also on the basis that they involved state coercion 
while others did not. This choice needs to be justified by explaining precisely what is meant 
by ‘state coercion’.  
Table 2 below shows the various tactics used by Gazprom in the three core cases examined 
here (shaded cells), and in its takeovers of other lost assets that have not been selected for 
detailed case study. The columns show the tactics used by Gazprom, and are arranged left to 
right in ascending order in terms of their coercive nature. 
  
                                                     
147  Sibur’s management had done the same with the sale of one of the gas processing plants to 
Surgutneftegaz. 
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SLCT Date of 
completion 
Negotiate 
and/or 
purchase 
controlling 
stake 
Economic 
embargo  
Non-law 
enforcement 
investigation 
(tax, 
regulatory) 
Civil court 
cases e.g. 
bankruptcy, 
revoking 
licence 
Searches by 
law 
enforce-
ment 
Criminal 
cases, 
arrests 
Purgaz Dec 2001  X X X X X 
Sibur Feb & 
July 2002 
 X X    
Stroitransgaz May-Sep 
2002 
    X X 
South Russkoe  May 2002  X X    
Nortgaz Sep 2005   X  X X 
Tambeineftegaz 
& 
Yamal SPG 
Nov 2006  X X  X  
Sibneftegaz Dec 2006   X X X X 
The tactics shown in italics are those that are taken to involve state coercion for the purposes 
of this project. Least problematic is the inclusion of tactics involving the state’s coercive 
apparatus (e.g. searches by prosecutors, arrests). But two other columns are also accepted as 
forms of state coercion, namely civil court cases and investigations by organisations that are 
not part of the state’s coercive apparatus (e.g. the tax authorities and regulatory bodies).  
                                                     
148 For the first four cases, the table is compiled from the evidence presented elsewhere in this chapter. 
For Nortgaz, see: Heinrich & Kusznir (2005, pp. 25–6); Stern (2005, p. 27); Levinskii (2005); Reznik 
& Mazneva (2005); Grib & Butrin (2005). For Tambeineftegaz and Yamal SPG, see: Batishchev & 
Voronin (2006); Tutushkin & Reznik (2006); Grib (2006). For Sibneftegaz, see: Grib (2005); 
Medvedeva (2007a); Heinrich (2008, pp. 1549–50). 
Table 2. Gazprom takeover tactics
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In his examination of the tactics used by companies to protect against expropriation, Gans-
Morse (2011, p. 7) notes that all reliance on law is backed up by the implicit threat of coercion 
“legitimized by formal rules and regulated by the state”. But for the purposes of the present 
project, a takeover is deemed to involve state coercion only if state institutions appear to have 
been used in a selective and arbitrary way to apply pressure on the existing owner. The case of 
Purgaz, which was mentioned earlier, clearly involved no state coercion: Gazprom regained 
control merely by exercising an option that was available to it contractually. Elsewhere 
Gazprom’s use of the law bore the hallmarks of what Gans-Morse labels “corrupt force”: 
rather than playing by formal rules, it was recruiting the help of state bodies which are 
assumed to have held some bias in its favour149.  
Such acts are also examples of what Heinrich terms Gazprom’s use of ‘administrative 
resources’ (2008, pp. 1549–1553). But Heinrich breaks down ‘administrative resources’ into 
Gazprom’s innate resources and its recruitment of the state’s resources. The present project 
would only include the latter as state coercion. The case of Sibneftegaz is accordingly 
included by Heinrich (2008, pp. 1549–1550) as a case of Gazprom’s use of ‘administrative 
resources’, but it does not meet the present project’s definition of ‘state coercion’. Sibneftegaz 
was the licence-holder to the Beregovoe gas field, located next to South Russkoe. After losing 
control of the field to Itera, Gazprom refused the project access to its pipeline network, 
thereby rendering it commercially unviable (Grib, 2005). There is a case for arguing that this 
was in breach of Gazprom’s legal obligation to provide such access, and that it could not have 
happened without at least tacit support from the government. Granted, it was the state that had 
given Gazprom the power to accept or deny gas from third parties into its pipeline 
                                                     
149 It should be acknowledged that the definition of “coercion” used here (and indeed the definition of 
“corrupt force” used by Gans-Morse and “administrative resources” by Heinrich) is fraught with the 
same difficulty noted in the previous chapter with respect to reiderstvo. In a country whose legal 
system is characterised to a significant extent by “telephone justice” and corruption, there is no clear 
way to discern whether institutions including the law have been used in an inappropriate way in a 
particular case. But there are some telltale signs: for example, if an investigation is launched into a 
company and then promptly dropped once the desired takeover has been achieved. 
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infrastructure (subject to controls that oblige it, at least in theory, to grant access fairly). But 
essentially this was an example of Gazprom making use of its own resources and inherent 
advantages to bring about a takeover, and no state bodies were actively involved.  
In Heinrich’s depiction of Gazprom’s relationship to independent producers, including some 
of the targets for its campaign to re-gather assets, Gazprom would appear to hold all the cards 
because of its access to ‘administrative resources’. Yet the takeovers in the three cases below 
reveal that Gazprom was acting under significant constraints that limited its ability and 
willingness to launch a full-scale seizure of the assets concerned. These included, but were not 
restricted to, the aforementioned fear that it might lose forever its claim to the assets it 
actually wanted, which had been placed at some distance from the companies it had to first 
target for takeover. 
Sibur 
On 8 January 2002, Sibur’s President Yakov Goldovsky was arrested while waiting in the 
reception of Aleksei Miller’s office at Gazprom’s headquarters. He had a meeting scheduled 
with Miller to discuss a Sibur shareholder meeting that was scheduled for the following day. 
His deputy Yevgeny Koshits was also arrested, as was Vyacheslav Sheremet, a Gazprom 
Deputy CEO who was also Sibur’s Chairman. The three individuals were the subject of a 
criminal case that was based on a civil compensation claim from Gazprom stemming from 
Sibur’s most recent share issue. Prosecutors accused the three individuals of stealing Sibur 
assets that rightfully belonged to Gazprom (Novolodskaya & Chertkov, 2002). Sheremet was 
released three days later, having signed a pledge to remain in the country. Vyakhirev (who 
was at the time still Gazprom Chairman) was rumoured to have intervened on his behalf 
(“Chelovek nedeli: odin za vsekh,” 2002)150. On 18 January 2002, Goldovsky and Koshits 
were charged with abuse of office, and on 31 January they were additionally charged with 
                                                     
150 Sheremet had been Gazprom Deputy CEO under Vyakhirev and had, until this point, survived the 
change of management at the company. Although he avoided prosecution, he was dismissed in July 
2002. 
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theft of assets worth RUB 2.6bn ($83m) and forgery of documents (Berres, 2002; Bushueva & 
Osetinskaya, 2002). 
The Sibur takeover was to resemble an earlier case in which Gazprom had taken ownership of 
the media business of Vladimir Gusinsky. In June 2000, Gusinsky was arrested on charges of 
embezzlement during the acquisition of a St Petersburg television company. He was 
subsequently released after agreeing to sell to Gazprom a controlling his stake in his company 
Media-Most. Gusinsky then left the country and reneged on the agreement, claiming it had 
been signed “under the barrel of a gun”. The state then set about seizing control of Media-
Most through bankruptcy proceedings, based on its substantial debts to Gazprom (Belin, 
2002). Goldovsky was similarly ‘persuaded’ to sign away his rights to Sibur in exchange for 
his release from pre-trial detention. As noted in the previous chapter, there are indications that 
the same choice was later offered to, but declined by, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Such heavy-
handed tactics could easily be mistaken for the full-scale seizure of Sibur’s assets, and this 
perception is reinforced by the paltry sum of $96m which Goldovsky received from Gazprom 
in exchange for his interest in Sibur and the assets it managed (Terent’eva, 2011). This 
amount was clearly well below market value151 and in stark contrast to the amounts received 
by Gutseriev and Rakhimov in the previous chapter. However, unlike the coercive asset 
seizures that took place in the Yukos case, Gazprom obtained Sibur and its petrochemicals 
enterprises through an agreement with Goldovsky. Both Goldovsky and Khodorkovsky were 
given the stark choice of signing over their assets or remaining in detention to face criminal 
charges, but only Goldovsky opted for liberty.  
Goldovsky had had considerable defensive measures in place to protect his business from 
asset seizure: he reportedly felt that he was in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Gazprom 
                                                     
151  In 2008, Gazprombank valued the Sibur business at $5.5bn, and this was considered an 
underestimate by analysts (Malkova, 2011). See below for an explanation of the apparent discrepancy 
between the $96m and the much larger amount that Gazprom claimed in an official disclosure to have 
paid for Sibur and its petrochemicals assets. 
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because only he understood the network of offshore companies through which he controlled 
Sibur and its major assets (Drankina & Tatevosova, 2002). A senior Gazprom manager told 
one newspaper that the company preferred to reach an agreement with Goldovsky so it did not 
have to go to court to return the assets (Chertkov, Osetinskaya, & Bushueva, 2002). The main 
deterrent was that, because of the offshore nature of the ownership ties, some of this legal 
action would be outside Russia, where a favourable ruling was far from guaranteed. 
Goldovsky’s other main advantage was that, as mentioned above, he had arranged for Sibur 
only to manage, rather than own, many of its key assets, in which he himself owned 
significant stakes. Without Goldovsky’s co-operation, Gazprom’s task of restoring control 
over both Sibur and these key assets would have entailed much more complexity and risk. 
If Goldovsky had evaded arrest through a timely departure from Russia, the bargaining would 
almost certainly have gone very differently. But as it was, he agreed while in pre-trial 
detention that in exchange for his liberty he would transfer to Gazprom the right to vote his 
14.6% Sibur stake at a Sibur extraordinary shareholder meeting (EGM) that had been called 
by Gazprom for 25 March 2002152. This enabled Gazprom to win Sibur shareholder approval 
to cancel the share issue that had deprived it of its controlling stake, to gain a majority on the 
board, and to appoint its Deputy CEO Aleksandr Ryazanov as Sibur’s new President 
(Bushueva & Novolodskaya, 2002; Butrin, 2002a). On 1 July 2002 it emerged that Goldovsky 
(who was still in pre-trial detention) had additionally agreed to sell to Gazprom his stakes in 
Sibur-managed assets, including at least 10 petrochemicals companies (Chertkov et al., 2002). 
Gazprom disclosed in 2003 that it had in exchange agreed to pay Goldovsky RUB 19.49bn 
(then worth $615m), using promissory notes that would mature in 2005153. But in the event, 
Goldovsky only received $96m (Terent’eva, 2011). His undoing was the fact that he had been 
compelled to hand over control of the petrochemicals assets (thereby losing his main 
                                                     
152 This stake was held by the Goldovsky-controlled company Gazoneftekhimicheskaya Kompaniya. 
153 The disclosure came in Gazprom’s consolidated financial report for 2002 (Gazprom, 2003, p. 63). 
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bargaining chip) before he was released from detention154. In exchange, he was meant to 
receive the promissory notes by November 2002, but this did not happen. Gazprom claimed 
that the promissory notes were ready to be handed over as soon as Goldovsky’s company 
GNK sent a representative to receive them (Reznik, Lemeshko, & Golubovich, 2003), but it 
appears to have taken advantage of the fact that Goldovsky had no way of compelling it to 
hold up its side of the deal. GNK’s CEO hinted in August 2003 that the company might take 
legal action, though it had been warned against this by people who pointed out that “there is a 
state interest in this matter and administrative resources will be activated in order to protect 
[that interest]” (Lemeshko, 2003a). In January 2004, it emerged that Goldovsky had decided 
against legal action (although he had left Russia, he reportedly “had not forgotten his time in a 
Russian prison”, and this had persuaded him against another confrontation with Gazprom). He 
had, however, finally received payment: he had agreed on the much lower amount of $96m, 
but had at least received the money in cash (Bushueva, Reznik, & Lemeshko, 2004).  
However, all did not go entirely smoothly for Gazprom either. Because it could not be sure 
from the outset of Goldovsky’s cooperation, it had put in place a ‘plan B’. Accordingly, it had 
initiated bankruptcy proceedings against Sibur on 11 February, based on the fact that Sibur 
owed Gazprom $1bn (out of a total Sibur debt of $1.6bn) (Reznik, Osetinskaya, & 
Novolodskaya, 2002). In the event that it failed to restore majority control, it hoped to use its 
status as Sibur’s main creditor to force the takeover. The bankruptcy proceedings would allow 
Gazprom to challenge deals done in the previous year by the former Sibur management155. No 
doubt they served also as an additional argument to persuade Goldovsky that resistance was 
futile.  
                                                     
154 As discussed in the section below dedicated to the ownership outcome, Gazprom was in a hurry to 
gain control of these assets before it dropped its civil case against Goldovsky (the first step in dropping 
the related criminal charges). 
155 For example, Gazprom believed that when Sibur increased its stake in the Kemerovo-based firm 
Azot from 7.8% to 73.94%, it had done so based on a drastic over-valuation of the latter company 
(Reznik, Osetinskaya, & Novolodskaya, 2002). For the ability to challenge deals done by the 
management up to a year previously under bankruptcy, see Mikhailov (2002). 
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Once Gazprom had restored majority control over Sibur and was on its way to purchasing the 
Sibur-managed assets from Goldovsky, the bankruptcy proceedings became a liability: they 
put Sibur and the assets under threat from claims by Sibur’s other creditors. Gazprom’s 
management had previously said that bankruptcy was the only way to regain control of all of 
Sibur’s assets156, but Sibur’s new President now said that they were not in possession of all the 
facts when they came to that view (Gubenko, 2002). They were now set on pursuing an out-
of-court settlement with Sibur’s creditors that would bring the company out of bankruptcy  
(Reznik & Novolodskaya, 2002).  
Sibur’s other debts included $190m owing to various banks157. Although this was a small 
portion of its total debt, it was the most dangerous. A specialist from one of the banks in 
question was quoted as saying Gazprom risked losing the Sibur-managed assets forever, 
because the banks would go to court to get their money back and would seize those assets 
which had been pledged as collateral for the bank loans: Gazprom would end up with “a 
company which was being torn to pieces” (Reznik & Novolodskaya, 2002). Privately-owned 
Alfa Bank in particular was to pose a threat out of all proportion to the amount of money it 
was owed ($78m): it had adopted a tough position from the beginning of the bankruptcy 
process, had seized Sibur assets and was the only bank to vote against an agreement that was 
signed with Sibur’s creditors in September 2002. Although it failed in its efforts to challenge 
that agreement in court, it did manage to persuade Gazprom to restructure its debt on 
exclusive terms, despite Gazprom’s pledge that all creditors would be treated equally 
(Bushueva, 2002; Novolodskaya & Bushueva, 2002; Novolodskaya, 2002; “Ot redaktsii: 
Miller i den’gi,” 2002). 
                                                     
156 Both CEO Aleksei Miller and deputy CEO Aleksandr Ryazanov had made this claim (Reznik & 
Novolodskaya, 2002; Reznik, Osetinskaya, & Novolodskaya, 2002). 
157  These included state-owned VTB, privately-owned Alfa-Bank and Austria’s Raiffeisenbank 
(Reznik, Osetinskaya, & Novolodskaya, 2002). 
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Stroitransgaz 
Of the three core cases examined here, that of Stroitransgaz involved the least use of the 
state’s coercive resources. To recap, Gazprom’s primary objective was to obtain on behalf of 
the state the Gazprom shares that were on the balance sheet of Stroitransgaz. But it also 
sought to buy at least a blocking stake in the company itself. The takeover therefore proceeded 
on these two fronts.  
The coercive tactics related to the original sale of the Gazprom shares to Stroitransgaz back in 
1994-1995. This was subject to an investigation by the Federal Security Commission which 
was initiated in October 2000 (Butrin, 2000). The investigation was still on-going in June 
2001, and it was suggested that it was in part aimed at pressuring Bekker to give up his seat on 
the Gazprom board of directors (Prezhentsev & Reznik, 2001). At the Gazprom AGM on 29 
June Bekker duly withdrew his candidacy for re-election to the board, and was replaced by a 
state representative158. This helped the state secure a majority of six out of eleven seats on the 
Gazprom board (Reznik, 2001a)159.  
The Federal Security Commission published its findings at the end of August, stating that it 
had found nothing illegal (Bushueva, 2001h). Bekker made another concession to Gazprom in 
September, stating that he was planning to sign over to Miller the right to vote Stroitransgaz’s 
6.2% Gazprom stake at the next Gazprom AGM (Bushueva, 2001h). But he was not prepared 
to sell the stake, because it provided excellent collateral that enabled his company to borrow 
from financial markets. Stroitransgaz even said at a November 2001 press-conference that it 
intended to increase its Gazprom stake (Aglamish’yan, 2001).  
                                                     
158  Aleksandra Levitskaya, first deputy head of the government’s administration (“apparat 
pravitel’stva”). 
159  Bekker claimed later that he had done this simply because his excessive workload from 
Stroitransgaz prevented him fulfilling his duties to the Gazprom board (Bushueva, 2001h); however, 
one newspaper claimed Vyakhirev had warned him not to stand for re-election even though he had a 
good chance of gaining the necessary votes (Shiryaev, 2001). 
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At around this time, Gazprom was negotiating with Bekker and other Stroitransgaz managers, 
and separately with the families of Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev, to buy shares in 
Stroitransgaz. At an early stage in these negotiations, Gazprom was reportedly seeking to buy 
from the Stroitransgaz management a controlling stake in the company; in exchange, 
Gazprom would pledge to retain it as its preferred general contractor. But Bekker had been 
prepared to sell only 10% and the talks foundered 160 . Gazprom had more success in 
negotiating with the Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev families. They had reportedly been keen to 
sell for some time, but had first offered their shares to Bekker, who was a personal friend. He 
had rejected their offer, believing it to be over-priced. They then offered their shares to 
Gazprom (though not directly, as will be explained below). In November 2001 Stroitransgaz 
announced that it would be issuing new shares, and journalists established that this would 
dilute the stakes belonging to the Vyakhirev and Chernomyrdin families (Aglamish’yan, 
2001). It later emerged that this was Bekker’s retaliatory response on learning that they were 
in talks with Gazprom161. 
Aside from successfully driving a wedge between Bekker and the families, Gazprom’s other 
main tactic was an economic embargo through an implicit threat to withdraw business from 
Stroitransgaz. With this in mind, Gazprom proposed at the beginning of March 2002 to create 
a new rival general contractor called Gazpromstroiinzhiniring. While this initiative was 
pending approval, Gazprom was using another subsidiary, named Spetszagotovtrans, to deal 
with the same subcontractors that were used by Stroitransgaz (Reznik, 2002c). The new 
initiative did not receive board approval in April 2002 and was described by a Gazprom 
employee as a still-born idea (“Ot redaktsii: otsy i dochki,” 2002; Reznik, 2002d). 
Nevertheless, the effect was to focus the minds of Stroitransgaz’s existing shareholders on the 
                                                     
160 Source close to Gazprom’s management cited in Reznik (2002c). 
161 Information from a source close to the deal, cited in Reznik (2002g). Vyakhirev said many years 
later: “Tat’yana had Stroitransgaz shares. But Bekker carried out several share issues and fleeced us” 
(Malkova & Igumenov, 2012). 
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fact that the value of their shares depended significantly on Gazprom’s future business, which 
no longer looked guaranteed.  
Bekker stood down as company president on 12 April 2002. There are indications that he left 
Russia for Germany soon afterwards: although no physically coercive measures were taken 
against him or Stroitransgaz, he was presumably keen to avoid Goldovsky’s fate162. It was 
revealed later that Bekker sold his personal 20% stake in Stroitransgaz at around this time. But 
Gazprom was not the buyer: instead, he had sold the shares to companies close to his 
successor and former deputy, Viktor Lorents (Reznik, 2004b). As will be shown below, 
however, Gazprom continued after this sale to negotiate with Bekker on returning 
Stroitransgaz’s Gazprom shares. This suggests that Bekker remained in de facto control of 
those Gazprom shares, and possibly also of Stroitransgaz itself. 
In May 2002, Gazprom secured a legal victory in its campaign to take control of the Gazprom 
stake held by Stroitransgaz. The Moscow Arbitrazh Court ruled that Stroitransgaz must hand 
back the 4.83% it had received from Gazprom in 1995 (Butrin, 2002c). Stroitransgaz appealed 
this decision on 5 June (“Sudebnaya praktika,” 2002). But on 27 June the two sides reached an 
out-of-court settlement which saw Stroitransgaz selling the 4.83% stake back to Gazprom 
(Igumenov & Malkova, 2012; Reznik, 2002g, 2002h). It later emerged that the agreed price 
for the stake was RUB 4.6bn ($148m), as opposed to its market value of RUB 29bn ($935m) 
on the day of the agreement (Grivach, 2003). As will be discussed below, the buyer was in 
fact Gazprominvestholding, which went on to buy the remaining Gazprom shares that were 
held by Stroitransgaz. 
                                                     
162 Goldovsky was at this time still in detention after his arrest in January 2002. As will be discussed 
below, Usmanov subsequently claimed that he flew to Germany to negotiate with Bekker at around this 
time. 
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By August 2002 Gazprom had also achieved its blocking stake in Stroitransgaz itself. It had 
bought shares primarily from the Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev families, with a significant 
number of additional shares purchased on the secondary market (Reznik, 2002g, 2002h).  
Zapsibgazprom and South Russkoe 
The SLCT involving Zapsibgazprom was arguably the most complex from Gazprom’s 
perspective: as discussed earlier, the main asset of interest had been separated from 
Zapsibgazprom but then additionally sold on to third parties.  
To recall, it was confirmed in August 2001 that Zapsibgazprom no longer controlled the 
licence to the South Russkoe field. But Gazprom’s management nevertheless resolved to take 
back control of Zapsibgazprom itself in addition to the new licence-holding entity, 
Severneftegazprom. Here Gazprom’s takeover was coercive to a significant extent, if less so 
than at Sibur. At the beginning of January 2002, prosecutors paid a visit to Zapsibgazprom’s 
offices. This was apparently in connection with other cases, and no criminal case was opened 
with respect to the company or its management as part of the takeover process (Reznik, 
Osetinskaya, & Nikol’skii, 2002). But after the takeover, in January 2003, some of its 
managers (with the exception of its CEO Vladimir Nikiforov) became the subject of criminal 
cases in relation to illegal attempts to bankrupt Zapsibgazprom subsidiaries. It also emerged at 
this time that the authorities had tried on several occasions to open a criminal case against 
Nikiforov (Mokrousova, 2003a). He checked himself into hospital in December 2001 before 
being dismissed in March 2002, quite possibly because he feared arrest (Reznik, 2002b). 
As with Sibur, Gazprom employed bankruptcy against Zapsibgazprom as a strategy to regain 
control of its assets, based on Zapsibgazprom’s RUB 2.9bn debt to Gazprom (then worth 
$93m) (Reznik, Osetinskaya, & Nikol’skii, 2002)163. In February 2002 it secured a court order 
placing Zapsibgazprom in bankruptcy administration, with a former employee of the FSB’s 
                                                     
163 Zapsibgazprom’s total debt was in excess of RUB 6bn, or $192m. 
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economic security department appointed as temporary bankruptcy manager (Reznik & 
Lysova, 2002; Reznik, Osetinskaya, & Nikol’skii, 2002). Gazprom hoped to use the 
bankruptcy process to annul the share dilution that had seen Zapsibgazprom lose control of its 
subsidiary Severneftegazprom164.  If successful, this would return the South Russkoe licence 
to Zapsibgazprom. 
However, Gazprom was again concerned that it might not be able to control the bankruptcy 
proceedings it had initiated. Firstly, as noted above, it appears that Zapsibgazprom’s managers 
took advantage of the company’s bankruptcy to initiate additional bankruptcy proceedings 
against its subsidiaries - presumably in order to remove some of Zapsibgazprom’s assets from 
the reach of its largest creditor. Secondly, another significant Zapsibgazprom creditor was 
Yukos, which was seeking also to establish a controlling ownership stake and was a potential 
threat to Gazprom’s claim on South Russkoe (Reznik & Lysova, 2002).  
Gazprom accordingly sought to achieve its objectives by other means. In April 2002, it 
obtained a court ruling which annulled the August 2000 share issue that had seen the dilution 
of its controlling stake in Zapsibgazprom (Reznik, 2002e) 165 . Having regained majority 
ownership, it began the process of bringing the company’s bankruptcy to a close by seeking 
agreement with the other creditors. It also called a Zapsibgazprom extraordinary shareholder 
meeting for 25 May 2002, at which it secured a board majority and effectively gained 
management control of the company. 
Instead of pursuing bankruptcy to achieve the return of the South Russkoe licence to 
Zapsibgazprom, Gazprom chose to negotiate with the new owners of the licencing-holding 
entity, Severneftegazprom. As noted earlier, Itera had gained majority ownership of the latter 
company in May 2001 through a share issue that had seen Zapsibgazprom’s stake reduced to 
                                                     
164 As noted above, creditors were able to challenge deals concluded by the bankrupt company within 
the previous 12 months. 
165 The court case was initiated not by Gazprom, but by another minority shareholder in Zapsibgazprom 
which was (formally) unaffiliated with Gazprom. 
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11%. But Gazprom began with the minority shareholders: on 29 April 2002 it announced that 
it had been able to acquire a 49% stake in Severneftegazprom “through quite difficult talks” 
(Butrin, 2002b). It had reportedly done this by buying Zapsibgazprom’s 11% stake and an 
additional 38% held by companies linked to Zapsibgazprom’s management; according to a 
source linked to Itera, Gazprom had paid only the nominal value of the shares, a total of 
$3200 (Reznik, 2002f). A Gazprom senior manager166 also said that “now talks are underway 
– and I mean talks, without any court proceedings – to buy all the remaining shares. At the 
very least, we intend to increase our stake in Severneftegazprom to controlling”. However, 
Itera was at this time already in the process of attempting a defensive share dilution aimed at 
cutting Gazprom’s newly-acquired 49% stake in Severneftegazprom back down to 20% 
(Reznik, 2002f). Gazprom was forced to resort to legal action after all: at some point in the 
following two months, it succeeded in getting this share issue cancelled by the securities 
regulator (OAO “Gazprom,” 2002b, p. 31). 
Gazprom’s CEO Aleksei Miller must have been holding talks with his Itera counterpart Igor 
Makarov either strikingly soon after this attempt at share dilution, or even before it, because 
agreement was reached between them as early as late June 2002 on resolving the conflict 
through an asset-swap. This saw Itera handing over its 51% stake in Severneftegazprom in 
exchange for Gazprom’s minority stakes in other Itera-dominated projects, Sibneftegaz (10%) 
and Tarkosaleneftegaz (7.78%) (Lysova & Reznik, 2002)167.  
Meanwhile Gazprom had been working to increase further its newly-gained controlling stake 
at Zapsibgazprom. It was reported in late March 2002 that it had persuaded Zapsibgazprom’s 
three other shareholder companies (all of which were suspected of being linked to the 
                                                     
166 Deputy CEO Aleksandr Krasnenkov. 
167 Prior to this, Gazprom had reportedly suggested to Itera that it sell just 2% of Severneftegazprom 
(thus staying on as a minority shareholder with 49% and receiving a proportionate share of the gas 
produced). But according to an Itera source, “without a controlling stake we are no longer so interested 
in South Russkoe” (Lysova & Reznik, 2002). As noted earlier, the shares in Sibneftegaz proved to be of 
little value to Itera, because of Gazprom’s refusal to allow into its pipeline network the gas produced at 
the Beregovoe field. 
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management) to halt the sale of their 39% stake to companies affiliated with Yukos (Reznik, 
2002b). But evidently this was only partially successful, because Yukos did succeed in 
acquiring a 25.2% stake. In July, Gazprom recovered these shares by means of another asset-
swap agreement, handing Yukos a 12% stake in gas producer Artikgaz in exchange168. As 
Yukos had also been a major creditor of Zapsibgazprom, this helped to pave the way for the 
agreement to end the bankruptcy process, which was reached in October 2002. Thus both 
Yukos and Itera had caused Gazprom considerable difficulty at Zapsibgazprom and 
Severneftegazprom respectively, and yet Gazprom reached an amicable share-swap agreement 
with both within a relatively short space of time. 
Summary 
Some of the methods used by the existing owners in the case studies above (in particular, 
share dilutions, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and the use of offshore companies) 
have been described by Adachi (2010) as “informal corporate governance practices” (ICGPs). 
Her central argument is that such practices are not always destructive: they were used in the 
1990s to build viable businesses out of collections of atomised enterprises. However, she 
notes that similar tactics were used at Norilsk Nickel in order to protect the owners from 
“deprivatisation”. The case studies above highlight the fact that these are versatile methods 
that serve a range of purposes, including attacks on property rights as well as defensive 
measures against such attacks. Bankruptcy was used as a defensive tactic by Zapsibgazprom’s 
managers, but also as an (aborted) offensive tactic by Gazprom against Sibur and 
Zapsibgazprom169.  
                                                     
168 Artikgaz was sold in 2007 as part of the Yukos bankruptcy process. Unusually for Yukos’s assets, it 
was bought not by Rosneft’ or Gazprom but by Italian company ENI. The latter had been permitted to 
buy as part of an agreement which allowed Gazprom access to Italy’s retail market for gas (Sakwa, 
2009, p. 243).  
169 Indeed, precisely who is “attacking” and who “defending” in such cases depends on where one’s 
sympathies lie. If one accepts Gazprom’s argument that many of these assets rightly belonged to it, then 
one might see its moves to regain them as a defence of its own property rights. 
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As noted in the cases of Yukos and Russneft’ in the previous chapter, offshore ownership 
brings an international dimension which hinders attempts by the state to seize assets. But the 
share dilutions and other tactics used in the cases above are primarily domestic in nature, as 
was the case with many of the tactics used by Bashneft’s owners in the previous chapter. It 
bears repeating that these domestic tactics only work against attacks on property rights by the 
state because they make use of domestic institutional constraints on coercion. In other words, 
in an ideal-typical kleptocratic state they would be meaningless in the face of the state’s 
limitless ability to seize assets within its own borders. 
The cases all ended relatively well for Gazprom, despite the defensive tactics used against it. 
But it was forced to think carefully about the real risk of assets being lost to new buyers or 
rival creditors. This reinforced the company’s preference for a negotiated outcome over full-
scale asset seizure. In the Sibur case this outcome was obtained in exchange for the existing 
owner’s liberty, somewhat stretching the definition of ‘negotiated’. But in the other cases, 
Gazprom used more subtle methods to make the existing owners more amenable to sell. These 
methods provide part of the explanation for the ownership outcomes, as the following section 
explains. 
The ownership outcome: the role of Gazprominvestholding 
In this chapter, explaining the ownership outcome goes further than simply confirming that 
state ownership is a possible outcome when the state reaches agreement with the existing 
owner. Although each outcome was “state ownership” in the sense that indirect state control 
was asserted via Gazprom, in each case a wholly-owned subsidiary named 
Gazprominvestholding played a role either as buyer, or negotiator, or both. This company had 
been headed since 1998 by Alisher Usmanov, who was better known as a successful private 
businessman with diverse business interests including in metallurgy, internet and media 
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companies 170 . The task is to understand what Gazprom sought to achieve by using this 
subsidiary rather than buying and negotiating directly.  
In fact, each takeover saw Gazprom and its subsidiary divide roles according to Table 3, 
below. Thus, when trying to pinpoint why Gazprominvestholding was used in certain 
situations, it is possible to compare these situations with those where Gazprom chose instead 
to play a direct role. 
  
                                                     
170 Russian Forbes in April 2013 estimated Usmanov’s personal wealth at $17.6bn, and ranked him as 
Russia’s richest individual (“Usmanov vozglavil reiting samykh bogatykh rossiyan po versii Forbes,” 
2013). 
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Target Negotiator Buyer 
Gazprom Gazprominvestholding 
Sibur Gazprom management Controlling stake 
restored by court 
order 
Became a beneficiary through 
its purchase of shares in Sibur-
managed enterprises that were 
also Sibur shareholders. 
Sibur-managed 
enterprises 
Gazprom management n/a Shares purchased through 
agreement with existing owner 
(Goldovsky) 
Stroitransgaz Usmanov n/a Blocking stake purchased 
through agreement with 
existing owners plus on 
secondary market 
Stroitransgaz’s 
Gazprom stake 
Usmanov n/a Purchased from Stroitransgaz 
Zapsibgazprom Gazprom management 
and 
Gazprominvestholding 
Controlling stake 
restored by court 
order; increased 
by subsequent 
share-swaps 
Controlling stake transferred to 
its trust management on eve of 
EGM 
Severneftegazprom 
(South Russkoe 
licence) 
Gazprominvestholding 51% obtained by 
share-swap 
49% accumulated by 
agreements with minority 
shareholders 
Table 3. Division of takeover roles between Gazprom and Gazprominvestholding
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171 Data compiled from the case evidence that is discussed below. 
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The following sections shed light on precisely why Gazprominvestholding came to play such 
a significant role in the takeovers.  
Official explanations 
One of Gazprominvestholding’s official responsibilities within the Gazprom group was to 
handle the buying and selling of its non-core assets (Novolodskaya, 2003; Reznik, 2003). But 
this is not enough to explain away its role in the cases. For example, it was involved as buyer 
when Gazprom regained control of South Russkoe, which was unequivocally a core Gazprom 
asset. When this point was raised by a journalist, Gazprominvestholding Deputy CEO Oleg 
Skorik said that “we carry out Gazprom’s instructions in undertaking a whole series of core 
projects, including trust management and direct ownership of assets” (“Interv’yu s Olegom 
Skorikom,” 2002).  
In a 2003 interview, Usmanov explained the company’s role as primarily carrying out 
securities transactions and portfolio investments to provide financial support for Gazprom’s 
core activity. These official explanations leave open a role for the company in almost any 
Gazprom takeover, and are therefore largely unhelpful in establishing precisely why Gazprom 
used it in particular situations.  
Technical obstacles to Gazprom’s direct ownership 
Panyushkin and Zygar’ (2008, p. 120) write that Usmanov “carried out deals for Gazprom in 
which the monopoly for various reasons did not want or was not able to be directly involved”. 
This downplays the fact that, in most such deals, Usmanov was acting through the Gazprom 
subsidiary Gazprominvestholding rather than in a personal capacity 172 . However, a 
satisfactory explanation for the company’s involvement in these cases is indeed found by 
identifying reasons why the main Gazprom entity (i.e. OAO “Gazprom”) could not or would 
not play a direct role. 
                                                     
172 Though, as will be discussed below, there was at least one occasion where Usmanov did act as buyer 
in his personal capacity in the first instance, before selling on to Gazprominvestholding. 
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Securities trading licence 
Gazprominvestholding held the relevant licences which authorised it to carry out transactions 
on the securities market, while Gazprom did not173. Gazprom was nevertheless able to make 
direct purchases of shares in other organisations, but unlike its subsidiary it could not buy or 
sell shares traded through exchanges. This gets us closer to a satisfactory explanation, but the 
cases show Gazprominvestholding acting as buyer both on the securities market174 and in 
direct transactions. 
Deal confidentiality 
Usmanov has said that Gazprominvestholding was able to preserve the confidentiality of a 
deal until the moment of its completion, something which gave it an advantage over banks 
(Reznik, 2003). Russian banks are obliged to make detailed disclosures regarding their 
finances to the Central Bank, and these disclosures are publicly available. The main bank that 
could have acted instead of Gazprominvestholding at the time was Gazprom’s subsidiary 
Gazprombank, which as an issuer of securities was further obliged to issue detailed quarterly 
reports containing more qualitative disclosures regarding its operations 175 . As a limited-
liability company, Gazprominvestholding was not obliged to make such disclosures. In that 
regard it also had an advantage over parent company Gazprom, which in addition to its 
various disclosure requirements was less able to maintain confidentiality due to the presence 
on its board of independent directors.  
As will be discussed below, the Gazprom management needed prior approval from the board 
before making acquisitions. Independent director Boris Fyodorov in particular gave frequent 
commentary to the press, which meant that Gazprom board decisions (and even some details 
of how they were arrived at) came under particular public scrutiny. However, Gazprom’s need 
                                                     
173 http://www.gazprominvestholding.ru/licenses. On the subject of whether Gazprom’s lack of such 
licences prevented it from buying shares, see Petrova and Reznik (2002). 
174 Usmanov has said that some of the shares Gazprominvestholding accumulated in Stroitransgaz were 
acquired “on the secondary market” (Reznik, 2002h). 
175 This obligation stems from the Federal Law “On the Securities Market”, chapter 7, article 30. 
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to secure prior board approval for acquisitions presented other problems besides 
confidentiality, and these are likely to have been more important in determining its decision to 
use Gazprominvestholding as buyer on its behalf. 
Bypassing board approval and the government directive 
Gazprom’s management was obliged to work within three different types of institutional 
constraint, which had the combined effect of substantially reducing its freedom of movement 
and (most importantly) its ability to respond quickly to developing situations. Firstly, in 
common with all Russian joint-stock companies, it was obliged to gain approval for deals over 
a certain size from the board of directors or (for particularly large deals) by a shareholder 
vote. The second constraint came from additional restrictions which were imposed by the 
board of directors on the company specifically in May 2001, and which were aimed at 
preventing further assets going astray. But the third and most important constraint stemmed 
from its status as a state-owned company. This meant that voting by the board of directors was 
subject to the ‘directive’ system: before state representatives on the board could vote, they had 
to obtain written instructions on how to vote that were duly signed off by various interested 
government departments. As Tompson (2008, p. 12) notes, the ‘directive’ system is a serious 
obstacle to the efficiency of state-owned companies in Russia. The system “is cumbersome 
and frequently ensures that decisions simply have to be put off.” Although this problem was 
common to all state-owned joint-stock companies, it was particularly acute for Gazprom after 
the extra restrictions imposed in May 2001, which meant that even relatively small deals had 
to go through board approval and the ‘directive’ system. 
The use of Gazprominvestholding was the Gazprom managers’ response to these constraints. 
Rather than simply ignore them or override them as a state-owned company might be 
expected to do in a truly ‘kleptocratic’ state, they instead found innovative ways to work 
within them. Realising that they did not apply to subsidiaries (or subsidiaries of subsidiaries) 
of state-owned joint-stock companies, they were able to free themselves from legal constraints 
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in a way that was entirely compliant with the letter of the law. In the process, however, they 
also circumvented the government’s own efforts to keep tighter control over the company’s 
assets. 
The relevant constraints on joint-stock companies stemmed from articles 79 and 83 of the 
Federal Law “On Joint-stock Companies”. These dictated that companies needed to gain 
approval from the board of directors before carrying out major deals or deals involving 
interested parties. Major deals were defined as those involving assets equivalent to 25% of the 
balance-sheet value of the acquiring company; if the assets involved were equivalent to over 
50% of the balance-sheet value of the acquiring company, the deals required approval instead 
by a shareholder vote176. 
The additional controls that were specific to Gazprom were first announced in October 2000 
(Butrin, 2000; Manvelov, 2000; “Sovet direktorov Gazproma,” 2000) and were originally 
aimed at making all deals involving Gazprom assets subject to board approval. However, it 
was clear that this would mean an excessive addition to the workload of the Gazprom board of 
directors, and some kind of practicable solution needed to be found (Pravosudov, 2001). The 
new rules, which came into force in May 2001, were laid out in an internal company 
document named the “Statute [reglament] for the approval of transactions involving Gazprom 
assets”. This was not made publicly available, and thus the precise rules that were put in place 
can only be divined using circumstantial evidence. The best such evidence comes from a 2004 
Audit Chamber report on Gazprom, one section of which is dedicated to an audit of 
Gazprom’s management of its subsidiaries and affiliates (Schetnaya Palata RF, 2004, pp. 55–
71). This report states that the Statute was in force between 17 May 2001 and 27 September 
2002, and therefore covers most of the period when Gazprominvestholding was making share 
purchases in the three cases. The Statute was then replaced by the Procedure for Completing 
                                                     
176  The text of the two articles can be found at http://www.zakonrf.info/zakon-ob-ao/79/ and 
http://www.zakonrf.info/zakon-ob-ao/83/. Accessed on 3 July 2013.  
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Transactions (Poryadok soversheniya sdelok). The Audit Chamber report cites some examples 
of Gazprom board approvals given while the Statute was in force, for acquisitions and 
disposals made by Gazprom subsidiaries of shares in other companies (Schetnaya Palata RF, 
2004, p. 63). All four of the examples of acquisitions show that they would result in Gazprom 
group gaining a majority stake in the target organisation177. It therefore seems likely that, 
while the Statute was in force, approval from the Gazprom board of directors was required 
when Gazprom subsidiaries bought shares in other companies only when this resulted in 
Gazprom group gaining a controlling stake178. Such was the solution that was found so that 
Gazprom’s board did not have to approve every acquisition made by a Gazprom subsidiary of 
shares in other companies. Crucially, it left room for Gazprominvestholding to proceed 
without approval from the Gazprom board of directors when making share acquisitions that 
did not bring Gazprom group’s overall stake in the target company up to controlling, or when 
buying additional shares in companies already controlled by Gazprom.  
On its own, the need for prior approval from the board of directors was a restriction on 
Gazprom’s ability to move quickly in situations that were often time-sensitive, because the 
board typically met just once a month (Pravosudov, 2001). In most cases, the Gazprom board 
would not be prepared to vote on a particular transaction without first receiving 
documentation prepared by the company which outlined the business case for the transaction. 
But as Tompson notes, it was the ‘directive’ system which acted as a particular encumbrance. 
For most of the period covered by these case studies, the directive was issued by the State 
Property Ministry. Reportedly, officials from that Ministry consulted with the Prime 
Minister’s office before giving approval for major deals. Additionally, in July 2001 the 
                                                     
177 For three out of the four examples, this is made explicit in the text of the report. In the fourth, the 
purchase of a 32% stake in Purgaz by Gazprom subsidiary Noyabr’skgazdobycha, the result was to 
increase Gazprom’s stake back to controlling by adding to its existing 19% stake (Davydova & Reznik, 
2001). 
178 Further circumstantial evidence in support of this view is provided by the fact that no contemporary 
reports have been found where Gazprom’s board gave approval for a subsidiary’s purchase that did not 
result in a controlling Gazprom stake. 
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Property Ministry agreed to consult with the Energy Ministry and reach a consensus before it 
issued directives for board and shareholder votes at state-owned energy companies including 
Gazprom. If consensus could not be reached, the decision would be postponed until a future 
board or shareholder meeting (Bushueva, 2001d). Then in January 2003 Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kas’yanov introduced tighter rules for Gazprom and 17 other “strategic” state-owned 
companies: thereafter, the directive needed to be personally signed off by the Prime Minister 
or one of his deputies (Nikol’skii & Bekker, 2003). Kas’yanov’s new regulations applied only 
to purchases by the state-controlled companies, not by their subsidiaries. Such companies 
accordingly began using subsidiaries to bypass the new regulations, because it was taking too 
long to get the appropriate sign-off; the government moved to close the loophole only in 2013 
(Tovkailo, 2013). Given that Gazprom’s management was obliged to submit a particularly 
high proportion of deals for board approval via the directive system, it is unsurprising that it 
was enthusiastic in embracing the use of subsidiaries. 
As the sections dedicated to the specific cases will show below, much of 
Gazprominvestholding’s involvement as buyer can be explained by this need to bypass the 
requirement for Gazprom board approval in time-sensitive situations. 
Importance as intermediary  
The technical factors described above which dictated the role of Gazprominvestholding as 
buyer leave unexplained why (as Table 3 indicates) the company and its chief executive 
Alisher Usmanov additionally played a significant role as negotiator with the existing owners 
in the cases of Stroitransgaz and South Russkoe179. There was no obvious reason why the 
buyer also needed to be the one to negotiate with the seller: indeed, at Sibur, it was Gazprom’s 
management that negotiated with Goldovsky, but Gazprominvestholding that acted as buyer.  
                                                     
179 Usmanov claimed that he was not personally involved in the negotiations over Sibur (see below). 
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At least one account has hinted that Usmanov’s value as negotiator lay in his ability to get the 
agreement of the existing owners not through compromise but through coercion180. However, 
this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that both Usmanov and Vyakhirev (whose family was 
among the selling shareholders in the Stroitransgaz case) have subsequently spoken about 
each other in only respectful terms181. Besides, it is unclear why Gazprom would need such 
assistance in providing coercion when it has been shown to have had good access to the 
coercive resources of the state. 
There is significant evidence to indicate that Usmanov was valuable to Gazprom as a 
negotiator in a similar way to the private buyers in the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases in 
Chapter Two. To recap, Deripaska was a trusted associate of Gutseriev and Yevtushenkov had 
gained the trust of the Rakhimovs, but at the same time both were believed (wrongly, as it 
turned out for Deripaska) to have the Kremlin’s backing as new owners. It was suggested in 
the previous chapter that they were valuable to the state as intermediaries who could facilitate 
a negotiated outcome to the bargaining process. The existing owners would have been more 
recalcitrant if they had been presented instead with the sole option of selling to the same 
people who were responsible for the coercion being used against them. 
Usmanov was first and foremost acting in his capacity as a hired manager of a Gazprom 
subsidiary. In that sense, he could hardly be considered a “private buyer”. But the blurred line 
between his role at Gazprominvestholding and his private business, and the fact that he had 
worked under Vyakhirev182, helped to make him more of an independent intermediary, and 
                                                     
180 e.g. Panyushkin and Zygar (2008, p. 121) wrote “It is not known what Usmanov said to Bekker, 
what arguments he used or what he used to blackmail [him], but Bekker received 190 million dollars 
for the 4.83% stake in Gazprom, which today is worth around 13 billion dollars”. 
181 e.g. in one of his last interviews, Vyakhirev described Usmanov as “A good guy, he calls some 
times, always sends a present on birthdays”. Vyakhirev also spoke bitterly about his family having been 
“fleeced” by Aleksandr Bekker in the Stroitransgaz share dilution, after which they decided to sell their 
stake to “Alisher” (Igumenov & Malkova, 2012). In his 2003 interview Usmanov described himself as 
“a Vyakhirev person”, referring positively to Vyakhirev’s qualities as an individual as well as a 
Gazprom manager (Reznik, 2003).   
182 Usmanov joined Gazprominvestholding as First Deputy CEO in 1997, becoming CEO in 2000. Thus 
he was ultimately subordinate to Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev for up to four years, from 1997 until 
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less of a Gazprom representative, when it came to the negotiations for Stroitransgaz and South 
Russkoe.  
A former Gazprom employee said in a 2012 press article that when the new management took 
over at Gazprom in 2001, they had their doubts about whether to keep Usmanov on at 
Gazprominvestholding. They had ultimately been persuaded to do so not least by the fact that 
Vyakhirev and his allies refused to talk to anyone else about selling their assets back to 
Gazprom. Usmanov confirmed this impression by claiming that “the old team needed a new 
person who could guarantee to them all the payments. I said to them ‘Don’t worry, I am 
buying from you, I will buy’” (Igumenov & Malkova, 2012). As will be explained below, he 
revealed that this was literally true in one case: he bought the shares in a private capacity 
before selling them on to Gazprominvestholding. But in the other cases also, his link to the 
old Gazprom regime seems to have been crucial in winning the existing owners’ confidence 
that Gazprom’s new management would not renege on their side of any deal.  
Thus the explanation for Gazprominvestholding’s role in the ownership outcomes centres on 
the legal advantages which made it a better buyer in certain situations from Gazprom’s point 
of view, and on Usmanov’s value as an intermediary who could bargain most effectively with 
the existing owners. The next task is to establish how far these two factors fit with the specific 
evidence from the cases. 
Sibur 
As noted above, Gazprom restored its controlling stake in Sibur in February 2002, when that 
company’s shareholders (with Goldovsky’s support) agreed to cancel the most recent share 
issue. This newly-restored controlling stake was directly owned by Gazprom. But 
Gazprominvestholding then purchased Goldovsky’s shares in the Sibur-managed enterprises. 
Some of these enterprises were also shareholders in Sibur itself, and thus 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vyakhirev’s dismissal in May 2001. Additionally, Usmanov was a consultant to Vyakhirev between 
2000 and 2001 (“Usmanov Alisher,” n.d.). 
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Gazprominvestholding became a beneficial owner of Sibur through these acquisitions. To 
complicate matters further, the purchases were in fact carried out not by 
Gazprominvestholding itself but by five of its subsidiaries (Bushueva et al., 2002). By January 
2003, Gazprom’s combined direct and indirect stake in Sibur had reached approximately 75% 
(Reznik, 2003).  
In a January 2003 interview, Usmanov said that he was not personally involved in the talks 
with Goldovsky, but that Gazprominvestholding had been given the technical task of 
assessing the value of his stakes in the Sibur-managed enterprises (Reznik, 2003). An 
interview given by Goldovsky in March 2003 would appear to confirm that 
Gazprominvestholding did not act as negotiator in the Sibur takeover: he said that the relevant 
agreements were prepared by Gazprom’s lawyers and he first saw them when he was released 
from detention (Novolodskaya, 2003)183. In that interview, Goldovsky was also asked why 
Gazprominvestholding, rather than Gazprom, had bought his stakes in the Sibur-managed 
enterprises. He answered only that it was the job of Gazprominvestholding to handle 
Gazprom’s non-core assets (Novolodskaya, 2003).  
As noted earlier, Gazprom had promised Goldovsky his liberty provided that he agreed to sell 
his stakes in the Sibur-managed enterprises. In order to fulfil its side of the bargain, Gazprom 
would drop its civil compensation claim against Goldovsky and his deputy; this would signal 
to the Prosecutor General’s Office that it should no longer pursue the criminal case against 
them. The first hearing of the criminal case was scheduled for 31 July 2002 (Bushueva et al., 
2002; Novolodskaya & Chertkov, 2002). Perhaps mindful of how the media baron Vladimir 
Gusinsky had earlier reneged on a similar agreement, Gazprom was reportedly determined to 
                                                     
183 Similarly, when Gazprom sold its stake in National Reserve Bank in exchange for the bank’s 0.2% 
stake in Gazprom, the bank’s President Aleksandr Lebedev claimed he was not consulted on the fact 
that the buyer of the Gazprom shares was Gazprominvestholding; the sale agreement had been a 
Memorandum signed by Lebedev and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller. “I signed the documents, but I 
respect the right of Gazprom to structure the deal [as they see fit]. If they change something I will re-
sign the documents, as long as this is legal and doesn’t create tax-related or reputational problems for 
us” (Petrova & Reznik, 2002).  
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ensure that it had successfully taken ownership of all of Goldovsky’s shares before the 
criminal case against him was dropped. Using Gazprominvestholding subsidiaries as the 
buyers almost certainly bypassed the need for Gazprom board approval, and hence for any 
government directives. It thus expedited the many transactions required, which involved 
shares in more than 10 petrochemicals companies184.  
Stroitransgaz  
It was Gazprominvestholding that bought back all of Stroitransgaz’s Gazprom shares (Reznik, 
2002h). After reaching agreement with Bekker, it bought the 4.83% stake which Stroitransgaz 
had acquired from Gazprom back in 1995. This left the additional 1.1-1.2% stake which 
Stroitransgaz had since purchased on the secondary market. It emerged in March 2003 that 
these were also bought by Gazprominvestholding, though once again it had used various 
subsidiaries. They had borrowed money from Gazprombank (another Gazprom subsidiary) to 
make the purchases. The bank then took ownership of this entire 1.1-1.2% Gazprom stake as 
repayment of the loan. It was thought that the deal had been structured this way because the 
bank’s reserve requirements prevented it buying directly (Bushueva & Berezanskaya, 
2003)185.  
Gazprominvestholding was also the buyer for the blocking stake in Stroitransgaz itself. By 
August 2003, it had accumulated 26.1% of the company’s ordinary shares and a further 
15.54% of its non-voting preference shares (Reznik & Yegorova, 2004). 
Legal considerations dictated the use of Gazprominvestholding as buyer of the Gazprom 
stake, but these considerations differed from those in the Sibur case. If the shares had been 
                                                     
184 Whatever the precise regulations regarding the need for Gazprom board approval for purchases by 
Gazprom subsidiaries, they almost certainly did not extend to purchases by subsidiaries of Gazprom 
subsidiaries. 
185  Usmanov said in January 2003 that Gazprominvestholding now held a 6% stake in Gazprom 
(Reznik, 2003), confirming that it had bought the remaining shares held by Stroitransgaz. It was 
originally thought that only half of the 1.1% stake had then been passed on to Gazprombank (Bushueva 
& Berezanskaya, 2003). But in June 2005, when Gazprominvestholding and other Gazprom 
subsidiaries sold their combined 10.4% Gazprom stake, Gazprominvestholding’s contribution was only 
4.83%. Gazprombank contributed 1.25% (Butrin, 2005).  
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bought by Gazprom itself, they would have been treated legally as treasury shares which 
could not be voted by any party at Gazprom shareholder meetings. Company shares that were 
on the balance-sheets of company subsidiaries were not treated as treasury shares and could be 
voted according to the wishes of the company management. For the same reason, 
Gazprominvestholding in June 2002 bought a 0.2% Gazprom stake from National Reserve 
Bank (Petrova & Reznik, 2002).  
These acquisitions were part of a wider campaign by the state to gain control of wayward 
Gazprom shares by placing them on the balance-sheets of Gazprominvestholding and other 
subsidiaries including Gazprombank. In June 2005, these subsidiaries sold a combined 10.4% 
stake to state-owned Rosneftegaz (which at the time owned 100% of the Rosneft’ oil 
company), thereby enabling the state to formalise its direct majority control over Gazprom. 
By using subsidiaries, Gazprom was able to buy back its own shares and retain the ability to 
vote those shares. But this explanation requires some clarification: if the state wanted these 
Gazprom shares for itself, why did it not buy them directly rather than through Gazprom 
subsidiaries? Pappe and Galukhina (2009, pp. 166–7, 170) pose precisely this question, while 
at the same time noting that the Russian state had expanded its ownership role in the economy 
without making a single direct purchase (preferring instead to use existing state-owned 
companies as the acquisition vehicles). Regarding Gazprom, they suggest that the state could 
have bought the required shares directly, or achieved its controlling stake by having Gazprom 
transfer the shares held by its subsidiaries on to its own balance sheet, and then cancelling 
those shares. This latter method would not have been sufficient on its own: the state would 
have needed to buy some additional shares on the open market in order to achieve its 
controlling stake. The authors offer two explanations for the government’s decision not to 
choose one of these options, and more generally for its tendency to avoid direct purchases to 
achieve expanded state ownership. Firstly, direct purchases of shares by the state need 
parliament to give prior approval for the required money to be allocated from the state budget: 
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even given Russia’s parliament, which was by this time almost entirely subordinate to the 
executive, such budgetary approval was difficult to secure. Secondly (and in their view more 
importantly), “in our view the political leadership does not have too much trust in bureaucrats 
and is very cautious in its approach to broadening the functions of state bodies.” 
In the present author’s view, the first explanation was in fact more important. Buying up 
shares on the open market implies a process that is both time-sensitive and fraught with 
uncertainty over price. Even if the state’s vehicle for direct ownership (the Federal Agency for 
State Property Management, or Rosimushchestvo) were licensed to buy exchange-traded 
shares (which is doubtful), it would have been difficult to achieve this with a fixed amount of 
money set aside long in advance by the state budget. The amount of money allocated would 
have been public knowledge, which would have played into the hands of the selling 
shareholders. In other words, the institutional barriers to direct state purchases were similar to 
those preventing Gazprom itself buying up shares in price- and time-sensitive situations. But 
even outside such situations, the process of allocating money from the state budget was 
eschewed in favour of more market-based solutions. Tellingly, when Gazprom’s subsidiaries 
sold their shares on to state-owned Rosneftegaz in June 2005, this too was done in a way that 
bypassed the need for budget money. Instead, Rosneftegaz took a bridging loan (probably 
from state-owned Vneshekonombank) while it waited to secure a syndicated loan from 
Western banks (Skorobogat’ko, Kiseleva, & Skornyakova, 2005). The Western bank loan was 
eventually repaid from money raised through Rosneft’s IPO in July 2006. While state-owned 
joint-stock companies were legally authorised to borrow from banks, Rosimushchestvo was 
(as Pappe and Galukhina note) obliged to seek financing from the state budget186.   
                                                     
186 Once Rosneftegaz had repaid its loan from Western banks, it was meant to be liquidated and its 
Gazprom stake transferred to Rosimushchestvo. This did not happen, and Rosneftegaz instead went on 
to acquire further important assets on behalf of the state (and to withhold from the state budget 
dividends it earned on its shares in those assets). This is typically explained by reference to the self-
enriching or self-aggrandising motivations of Igor’ Sechin, who effectively controlled Rosneftegaz. 
However, Vernon (1984, p. 48) provides an alternative explanation: “there are major advantages in 
distinguishing the income and expenditures of […] state-owned enterprises from those of the 
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So far, the explanation for the ownership outcome of Stroitransgaz’s Gazprom shares applies 
to any Gazprom subsidiary. The best available explanation why Gazprominvestholding was 
chosen specifically over other Gazprom subsidiaries in this case probably lies in Usmanov’s 
value as negotiator. He said in 2012 that, while Gazprom was fighting through the courts to 
obtain Stroitransgaz’s Gazprom stake, he met with Bekker (who was now living in Germany) 
to persuade him to sell. Most significantly, Usmanov claimed that Bekker was so mistrustful 
of Gazprom’s new management that he only agreed to sell the Gazprom stake when Usmanov 
volunteered to buy it in his personal capacity. Usmanov then sold the Gazprom shares on to 
Gazprominvestholding, supposedly at zero mark-up (Igumenov & Malkova, 2012)187. 
In the same 2012 article, a separate source claimed that the Vyakhirev and Chernomyrdin 
families had refused to talk to any of the new Gazprom senior managers on the subject of 
selling their shares in Stroitransgaz. As noted above, their first choice had been to sell their 
shares to Bekker, but when they failed to reach agreement with him they agreed to talk to 
Usmanov. Usmanov claimed that he told “the old team” that he would be the buyer of the 
Stroitransgaz shares. Although there are no indications that he bought these shares also in a 
private capacity, his remarks do suggest that his personal guarantees helped to make the deal 
possible (Igumenov & Malkova, 2012). 
Usmanov’s role as negotiator would not necessarily have ruled out a different Gazprom 
subsidiary acting as the buyer of these shares. But that would have made less credible his 
claim to be an intermediary for the new Gazprom management rather than their direct 
                                                                                                                                                        
government proper […] [this] helps make managers of such enterprises accountable for their 
performance and helps protect ministers from charges of profligacy; it creates a separate cache of 
resources in some instance, unavailable or unknown to public and parliament, that the government can 
draw on at strategic junctures”. 
187 No independent confirmation has been found in the public domain that Usmanov first bought this 
Gazprom stake in a personal capacity. It is hard to imagine why Usmanov would have invented such a 
detail, however, and it seems unlikely that Forbes would have opened itself up to legal difficulties by 
misquoting Usmanov. 
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representative (that “he” was buying rather than Gazprom). It would also have reduced his 
freedom to negotiate terms.  
Zapsibgazprom and South Russkoe 
Gazprominvestholding’s involvement in the takeovers of Zapsibgazprom and the South 
Russkoe gas field was as follows. Gazprom’s controlling stake at Zapsibgazprom was restored 
by a court order in mid-April 2002, and this stake was directly owned by Gazprom. But on the 
eve of a crucial Zapsibgazprom shareholder meeting on 25 May that was called by Gazprom, 
Gazprominvestholding was handed temporary control of the stake (“Sostoyalos’ sobranie 
aktsionerov OAO ‘Zapsibgazprom,’” 2002; Yambaeva, 2002). It was also involved as buyer 
in Gazprom’s takeover of Severneftegazprom, the licence-holder for the gas field. Usmanov 
and his deputy at Gazprominvestholding were involved as negotiators both in the 
Severneftegazprom takeover, and in Gazprom’s buying out Zapsibgazprom’s minority 
shareholders after its majority stake had been restored by court order.  
The transfer of the Zapsibgazprom stake to Gazprominvestholding was not a sale (which 
would have required approval from the Gazprom board of directors) but was almost certainly 
trust management, which in Russian law approximates to granting power of attorney188. The 
Zapsibgazprom shareholder meeting elected a new board of directors which was now 
dominated by Gazprom representatives, and appointed Oleg Skorik, Usmanov’s deputy at 
Gazprominvestholding, as the new chief executive189. The company was still in bankruptcy 
administration at the time, and thus Skorik was subordinate to the court-appointed 
                                                     
188 This explanation of trust management (doveritel’noe upravlenie) was provided by a partner in the 
Moscow office of a major law firm. In a brief newspaper interview soon after the EGM, 
Zapsibgazprom’s new CEO and Gazprominvestholding First Deputy CEO Oleg Skorik mentioned 
“trust management and direct ownership of assets” as one of the functions Gazprominvestholding 
fulfilled on behalf of Gazprom, and then cited as an example its leadership of the project to return 
Severneftegazprom to Gazprom’s control (“Interv’yu s Olegom Skorikom,” 2002). 
189  Skorik had joined Gazprominvestholding from Usmanov’s private business Interfin; he left 
Gazprom group in 2004 to work for the Swiss division of Coalco (another privately-owned business 
linked to Usmanov) (OAO “Regiongazkholding,” 2003, pp. 12–13). This provides another indication 
that the boundaries between Usmanov’s private business and his role as a Gazprom employee were 
somewhat blurred. 
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administrator, who continued to be the highest-ranking executive at the company. Precisely 
how long Skorik remained as CEO is not clear, but a new CEO was appointed soon after 
agreement was reached with Zapsibgazprom’s creditors in October 2002 to bring it out of 
bankruptcy. 
A disclosure document published by Severneftegazprom in early 2003 (OAO 
“Severneftegazprom,” 2003) provides all the evidence necessary to divine how ownership 
roles were divided in Gazprom’s takeover of that company. Gazprominvestholding bought 
Zapsibgazprom’s remaining 11% stake in the company and the other 38% that was held by 
Zapsibgazprom’s managers. When Gazprom subsequently acquired an additional 49% stake 
in Severneftegazprom via a share-swap with Itera, it took ownership of this latter stake 
directly190. There is no sign that the Gazprominvestholding purchases received prior approval 
from the Gazprom board; by contrast, the share-swap that gave Gazprom its additional 49% 
stake did receive such approval on 20 August 2002 (“Vchera,” 2002). This is consistent with 
the interpretation given above of the rules that applied at the time: namely, that Gazprom’s 
board needed to pre-approve purchases of shares in other companies (even those made by its 
subsidiaries) if they resulted in Gazprom group gaining a controlling interest191.   
Gazprominvestholding was involved in the negotiations with Itera that led to the agreement 
between Miller and Makarov to bring Gazprom’s stake in Severneftegazprom up to 100% 
(Lysova & Reznik, 2002). Indeed, as noted above, Gazprominvestholding claimed to be in 
charge of the whole project of returning South Russkoe to Gazprom’s control (“Interv’yu s 
Olegom Skorikom,” 2002). Usmanov said in 2012 that he had gone to court to get control of 
                                                     
190 The disclosure document shows that at the end of 2002, Gazprominvestholding held 49% and 
Gazprom 49%. Gazprominvestholding acquired its stake on 8 April 2002, and Gazprom on 9 December 
2002. 
191 The wording of the press-release from the relevant board meeting was that approval had been given 
for Gazprom to become the sole owner of Severneftegazprom by increasing its stake from 49% to 
100%. Thus the approval actually covered two transactions: the share-swap and Gazprom’s 
subsequently taking ownership of the remaining shares in the company. This it did on 31 January 2003 
(OAO “Severneftegazprom,” 2007, p. 11). 
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the gas field from Itera (Igumenov & Malkova, 2012). Presumably he was referring to the 
legal action which blocked Itera’s attempt to dilute the Gazprominvestholding stake in 
Severneftegazprom from 49% back down to 20%. In a 2003 interview, Usmanov had referred 
to this case as an example where his company had been used to maintain confidentiality 
pending completion of the deal. Regarding Zapsibgazprom, he added that “we learned that 
there were attempts to initiate the bankruptcy of this company, but we were able to reverse the 
process and return the company to Gazprom’s control” (Reznik, 2003)192.  
It is not apparent why, as Usmanov claimed, there was a particular need for confidentiality in 
the acquisition of shares in Severneftegazprom. The precise reason for Gazprom transferring 
its Zapsibgazprom stake to trust management by Gazprominvestholding also remains 
something of a mystery. Because this took place on the eve of the shareholder meeting, it 
seems highly likely that the transfer was needed for the purposes of that meeting, which was 
aimed at consolidating Gazprom’s newly-regained control over the company. There is nothing 
in the list of decisions that were made at the meeting that would have prevented Gazprom 
voting its own stake 193 . The meeting was held under controversial circumstances, amid 
tensions with the remaining Zapsibgazprom shareholders. It took place on a Saturday and 
inside Gazprom’s Moscow headquarters (rather than at the Zapsibgazprom headquarters in 
Tyumen’), in a transparent effort to exclude those remaining shareholders. Gazprom claimed 
to have duly notified all shareholders in advance of the meeting, but this claim was contested. 
The meeting was only just quorate (with only the owners of 51.6% taking part), which 
effectively means that few or no other shareholders were present (Yambaeva, 2002). 
Gazprominvestholding was most likely brought in as part of Gazprom’s efforts to exclude 
                                                     
192 Given that it was Gazprom itself that initiated Zapsibgazprom’s bankruptcy, this seems to first 
glance to be an odd comment to have made. However, in December 2001, i.e. prior to Gazprom’s 14 
January 2002 application to bankrupt Zapsibgazprom, a different creditor (namely the bankruptcy 
administrator of Inkombank) had made its own application (OAO “Zapsibgazprom,” 2002; Reznik, 
Osetinskaya, & Nikol’skii, 2002). Usmanov may well have been referring to his company’s role in 
ensuring that this earlier application was disregarded. 
193 The list of decisions was published in a Gazprom press-release (“Sostoyalos’ sobranie aktsionerov 
OAO ‘Zapsibgazprom,’” 2002). 
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minority shareholders from the meeting, though it is not clear precisely how it contributed to 
those efforts.  
Conclusion   
The first section of this chapter looked at what prompted Gazprom to undertake its campaign 
to take back assets. It took some time for this campaign to take shape after Putin’s appointee 
Aleksei Miller had taken over as Gazprom’s new CEO: his first months at the company saw 
considerable debate over whether it was commercially prudent to take over some of the assets 
lost to Gazprom under the previous management. It seems clear that an intervention by Putin 
put an end to these debates, and set Gazprom’s managers on an essentially indiscriminate 
campaign to take back all of the assets that “rightfully belonged” to the company. Although 
the commercial objective of boosting market capitalisation was cited in justification, it is clear 
that other considerations influenced what was essentially a political decision.  
The conclusion from the case studies was that the twin political objectives of consolidating 
state control over Gazprom and boosting its power as a political and economic resource 
played an important role in the campaign. Consolidating state control over Gazprom was the 
reason for taking back the Gazprom stake held by Stroitransgaz. Taking back the South 
Russkoe gas field was strategically important given its future role as supplier to the Nord 
Stream pipeline. Gazprom was intended to be used as a tool of economic development 
through its ownership of Sibur and Zapsibgazprom: ownership would allow Gazprom to 
provide a steady stream of orders to these companies. Sibur’s fortunes were important to the 
petrochemicals industry (prioritised as part of a developmental drive to move exports ‘up the 
value chain’ from primary natural resources), while Zapsibgazprom was an ailing company 
which the government was apparently unwilling to allow to fail. Gazprom also sought to take 
an ownership stake in Stroitransgaz in order to solve the strictly commercial problem of its 
relationship with a key supplier. In the decisions to take ownership of Sibur, Zapsibgazprom 
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and Stroitransgaz, the aim was to bring under common ownership transactions that had 
previously taken place ‘across the market’. Williamson (1981) provides the key to 
understanding why such ‘vertical integration’ can under certain circumstances be preferable to 
relying on the market to provide the best outcomes194. 
Thus there is in fact a wide range of explanations required to account for all the decisions 
involved in Gazprom’s campaign, and for how the newly-acquired assets were subsequently 
managed. This suggests that a form of ‘mission creep’ was at work. Vernon (1984, p. 51) 
argues that state-owned companies around the world are often vulnerable to this problem, 
because they are accountable not to one but to several state agencies: “the enterprise operates 
according to multiple objectives, some originating from inside the firm, some from without; 
the influence of the various objectives on the behaviour of the state-owned enterprise varies 
with time; and the environment in which the enterprise operates usually contains substantial 
elements of instability.” 
As a final observation before turning to the ownership outcomes, one of Gazprom’s 
justifications for undertaking these SLCTs, and its wider campaign of re-taking lost assets, 
was simply that these assets “rightfully belonged” to it. They had been lost due to the 
inadequate controls exercised by the state over the former Gazprom management. In the 
literature on the “commitment problem”, the state is seen both as having a responsibility to 
protect the property rights of private economic actors, and as a major potential threat to those 
property rights. But in the cases in this chapter, it is far from clear which side was attacking 
property rights and which was defending. Gazprom’s private minority shareholders agreed 
with the new management that the company’s campaign was justified as an effort to remedy 
past attacks on its own property rights. 
                                                     
194 A further example of the state attempting to foster the development of industry through vertical 
integration is provided in the following chapter focussing on engineering company OMZ. 
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The cases studied in this chapter provide further evidence that SLCTs can be a two-way 
bargaining game rather than straightforward “expropriation” by the state. There was 
considerable acrimony between Gazprom and existing owner in all three cases. The fact that 
the assets Gazprom particularly wanted were not the same as the companies that were the 
takeover targets, and in two out of three cases had been placed at one remove from those 
target companies, made the situation particularly precarious for Gazprom. Care needed to be 
taken to ensure that the prized assets were not sold on to third parties, or claimed by rival 
creditors. Attempting to pursue full-scale asset seizure against a hostile existing owner would 
have heightened the risk that the prized assets would be lost forever, and this made securing a 
negotiated outcome particularly preferable.  
The defensive tactics employed by the existing owners go a long way towards explaining why 
the prized assets were in such danger of being lost. Sibur’s owner (as in the Yukos and 
Russneft’ cases) had had the foresight to structure his ownership through offshore companies, 
and Gazprom showed a reluctance to take action against them in international courts. But his 
fate shows that such tactics are of little value if the owner is then arrested and not (as with 
Khodorkovsky) prepared to face a lengthy prison sentence. At Stroitransgaz, the owner had 
the foresight to evade arrest by leaving the country (as had Gutseriev in the Russneft’ case). 
But these case studies add to the impression gained from the Bashneft’ case that constraints on 
the executive do not simply begin where Russia’s jurisdiction ends. The existing owners also 
used a variety of defensive tactics, such as share dilutions and bankruptcy, that had no 
international dimension. These tactics were only effective because Gazprom was obliged by 
domestic institutional constraints to accept their results, despite its privileged access to the 
state’s coercive resources and other “administrative resources”. 
Gazprom’s preference for a negotiated outcome helps to explain why it made considerable use 
of its subsidiary Gazprominvestholding in these takeovers. The case studies show that 
Usmanov’s ambiguous status (as a private businessman as well as a hired manager of state-
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controlled Gazprom, and as a ‘Vyakhirev man’ as well as a loyal subordinate to the new 
Gazprom management) enabled him to facilitate agreement with the existing owners. 
Similarly, in the cases of Russneft’ and Bashneft’, the private buyers had played an important 
role in facilitating agreement between the existing owners and the state. Thus, Gazprom found 
in Gazprominvestholding a way to finesse the issue of its own ‘state-ness’ in order to improve 
its ability to negotiate with the same people against whom it was employing the state’s 
coercive resources. 
Gazprominvestholding’s other role was technical and legal in nature. By going deeper into the 
“state ownership” outcome of these cases to understand why it was used as owner on behalf of 
Gazprom, it has been possible to identify significant domestic legal constraints within which 
Gazprom was forced to operate. Some of these constraints were common to all joint-stock 
companies. But Gazprom was under additional controls stemming from its status as a state-
owned company, which had been tightened further in response to the loss of assets under the 
former management. The ‘directive’ system at Russia’s state-owned companies made 
governance of these companies a cumbersome process. The involvement of various state 
agencies in the sign-off of directives heightened the problem noted by Vernon of state-owned 
companies being subject to state interference in multiple and sometimes opposing directions, 
which may explain why Gazprom’s takeover campaign served a multitude of potentially 
contradictory political and commercial purposes. But the assets ‘lost’ by the previous 
management show that the directive was not a meaningless piece of red-tape: this and the 
additional controls placed on Gazprom were aimed at ensuring the company would no longer 
be asset-stripped by a management that was not subject to sufficient shareholder control. 
Gazprom’s management felt the need to bypass the institutional controls on its actions not so 
much because it resented meddling from multiple interested state agencies, but because the 
controls substantially reduced its ability to respond in an agile and flexible manner in tense 
and time-sensitive situations. The more acrimonious the takeovers of the lost assets, the more 
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tense and time-sensitive they were likely to be. With the existing owners strategizing to place 
assets offshore or otherwise hamper Gazprom’s ability to seize them, the Gazprom 
management could not afford to wait for months for appropriate sign-off for particular 
acquisitions. 
By using Gazprominvestholding (and subsidiaries thereof) as buyers, the Gazprom 
management was able to bypass these constraints while remaining compliant. Compliant, that 
is, with the letter of the relevant laws and regulations, but hardly with their spirit. Woodruff 
(2013) points out that “rule of law” requires not just a well-defined, open and stable legal 
framework and its adequate enforcement, but also a sensitivity to how the law is manipulated 
by those to whom the law allocates authority, and a preparedness to re-calibrate the law in 
response. The ownership structures used by Gazprom in these takeovers were examples of 
such manipulation: without breaking any rules, they largely undermined the effectiveness of 
the controls that the state had placed on the company for apparently good reasons195. 
It is perhaps surprising that the loyal management of a state-owned company found ways to 
bypass controls that were imposed by the state, but less surprising that they did so in a way 
that was legally compliant. Presumably the state’s representatives on the Gazprom board were 
aware of how Gazprominvestholding was being used, but did not object because they 
understood the more pressing imperative of making sure the takeovers proceeded as planned. 
It would have been less easy for them to look the other way if the company was directly 
infringing (rather than bypassing) the controls put in place by the state. 
More significant is the fact that Gazprom was subject to other types of “coercion-constraining 
institutions”. Gazprom was a state-owned company which had full state backing for its project 
to take back lost assets, and was able to employ “administrative resources” to help bring it 
about. But it was not above the law: its concern about losing control of bankruptcy was real, 
                                                     
195 Similarly, in the OMZ case studied in the next chapter, Gazfond was used as buyer in a way that 
undermined the antitrust regulator’s efforts to maintain a competitive market. 
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and when tactics such as share dilution were used in order to undermine Gazprom’s control of 
a company, those tactics had a tangible effect (even if Gazprom was in some cases able to 
reverse them later through the courts). These considerations contributed to Gazprom’s 
preference for a negotiated solution to the takeovers, and this was particularly theoretically 
significant where the constraints on coercion were exclusively domestic, rather than 
international, in nature. That such things mattered at all shows that Russia was some way from 
being an ideal-type kleptocracy. 
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Chapter 4: OMZ and Atomstroieksport 
Introduction 
This study centres on a state-led coercive takeover (SLCT) in Russia’s heavy engineering 
industry, which took place in November 2005 and involved a company named OMZ196. The 
company specialises in manufacturing heavy equipment for the mining, metallurgy, oil and 
gas, and nuclear energy industries. The main focus of this case study is its work for the 
nuclear energy industry, which is based at the Izhorskie Zavody plant in St Petersburg. 
However, it will occasionally touch on OMZ’s other main asset, the giant Yekaterinburg-
based factory complex Uralmashzavod, which was in Soviet times called the “factory of 
factories” because most of the metallurgical and mining plants in the country were built with 
equipment made there (Colton, 2008, p. 54).  
OMZ was founded in 1998 by Kakha Bendukidze. An ethnic Georgian who had moved to 
Moscow in 1977 at the age of 21, he had trained and worked as a biologist until 1987, when 
he first went into business (European Stability Initiative, 2010). In 1993, companies he 
controlled participated in the privatisation of Uralmashzavod, acquiring sufficient shares to 
gain control over what was a highly dispersed set of other shareholders. Bendukidze boasted 
that he had bought Uralmashzavod for “one thousandth of its real worth” (Freeland, 1995). By 
his account, he and his partners had been the only serious contenders to appear at the 
privatisation auction. 
In 1998, Uralmashzavod acquired Izhorskie Zavody through a share-swap (Thornhill, 1998). 
Bendukidze noted that Izhorskie Zavody’s technology was more advanced, but that its market 
capitalisation was only half that of Uralmashzavod because it had been less open to investors.  
                                                     
196  Ob’’edinennye Mashinostroitel’nye Zavody, which the company renders in English as “United 
Heavy Machinery”. 
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OMZ was created in the same year as parent company to these two major enterprises. It was 
an early convert to the idea of attracting Western finance. By late 2001 it had listed American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange, had become the first 
engineering company in Russia to publish GAAP accounts, and was described by one 
investment bank analyst as “one of the most open companies on the Russian market” (Clark, 
2001). 
In November 2003, OMZ gained control over Atomstroieksport, Russia’s general contractor 
for the construction of nuclear power stations abroad, which had until that point been state-
owned since its creation in 1998. This event, which is the starting-point for the present case 
study, triggered the coercive campaign to bring Atomstroieksport back into state ownership. 
However, as will be shown below, some analysts believe it was additionally what persuaded 
the state to go further and bring OMZ itself under state control. In both of these state-led 
takeovers, the buyers were closely related, if not the same. Furthermore, the way they 
designed the particular ownership outcome of the Atomstroieksport takeover holds the key to 
explaining the outcome in their later acquisition of OMZ. For all of these reasons, the 
takeover of Atomstroieksport is included as a complementary case study in this chapter.  
As in chapters 2 and 3, the case studies here have two objectives: firstly, to provide causal 
explanations for the takeovers which assess the motivations of the buyers and of the state, and 
secondly, to explain the outcome of those takeovers in terms of their new ownership status. 
Before explaining the motivations of the buyers, it is necessary to understand precisely who 
these buyers were and to what extent their actions reflected the will of the state (or of a 
particular group within the political leadership). The research outlined below established the 
identity of the buyers and found that they were effectively the same in both cases. But arriving 
at this conclusion was not a straightforward task for either case. Both acquisitions were 
carried out in a non-transparent way, with the buyers admitting to their involvement only 
some time after the transaction had taken place. Gazprombank, which was at the time a direct 
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subsidiary of de facto state-controlled Gazprom, declared itself to be the new controlling 
shareholder of Atomstroieksport in November 2004, but there are indications that it did not 
make the purchase directly. In this regard, the OMZ takeover is more extreme: precisely who 
was behind the entities which bought the controlling stake in November 2005 was never 
disclosed197. But there is sufficient evidence in the public domain to come to a confident 
conclusion about who the new beneficial owners were, to glean a significant amount about 
how they structured the acquisition, and to understand why it was done in this way.  
Because the identity of the buyers is not self-evident, the present chapter departs from the 
structure of its two predecessors by tackling this question before examining the motivations 
behind the takeovers. The ownership outcome at OMZ is particularly difficult to categorise on 
a scale ranging from “state ownership” to “private ownership”. It involved a “non-state” 
pension fund that was (despite this potentially misleading term) affiliated to state-controlled 
Gazprom. Managing OMZ on behalf of the pension fund was a group of senior managers of 
Gazprombank, which was at the time still a subsidiary of Gazprom. But both the pension fund 
and the bank would soon cease to be part of Gazprom group and hence to be subject to any 
formal (but indirect) state control. Furthermore, there are indications that this process was 
already underway at the time of the OMZ acquisition. As will be explained below, some 
analysts see the pension fund and its assets as having been ‘privatised’ in favour of a group of 
businessmen who have strong informal ties to President Vladimir Putin. However, in the 
present chapter it is argued that the pension fund and its assets (including OMZ) remained 
under the control of the Gazprom group. Hence, both Atomstroieksport and OMZ had been 
placed under a form of state control following the takeover, albeit this control was tenuous 
from a formal perspective in the case of OMZ. 
The next section seeks to understand the motivations of the buyers in the two takeovers, and 
how this related to the government’s own plans for the sector. In Chapter 2, it was argued that 
                                                     
197 Correct as of this writing. 
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the state instigated the three coercive takeovers in the oil industry without a specific 
ownership outcome in mind: either state ownership or transfer to a new private owner was 
acceptable, provided that the existing owners were deprived of their assets, thereby removing 
the political threat that they posed. In Chapter 3, however, the state’s goal was clearly to 
restore Gazprom’s control over its ‘lost’ assets. Similarly in the cases of Atomstroieksport and 
OMZ, there is evidence that the state actors who instigated the takeovers intended the 
Gazprom group to be the new controlling beneficiary, at least for an interim period. 
Consequently, understanding the motivations of the buyers (and their backers in government) 
plays an important role in answering both why the takeovers happened and their particular 
ownership outcome. The objective is to understand whether the buyers were seeking to profit 
from an opportunity created by the state’s intervention, whether they had arranged that 
intervention to increase company profits (or the personal wealth of company insiders), or 
whether they were instructed by the state to take ownership of the asset for primarily political 
(rather than commercial) reasons.  
The takeover of OMZ came just before the announcement of a massive programme to boost 
Russia’s nuclear energy production. OMZ stood to benefit substantially from government 
orders from this programme because Izhorskie Zavody was the only Russian plant capable of 
producing nuclear reactors.  Thus at first glance it seems that the OMZ acquisition was 
motivated primarily by profit: the buyers may well have been acting on insider information 
regarding the nuclear expansion and the role OMZ was set to play in it. However, decisions 
were taken subsequently by the new owners that suggest their pursuit of profit was sometimes 
at odds with the expectation that they play a role as tools of government policy. Most notably, 
when the promised turnaround in OMZ’s fortunes did not happen and doubts set in regarding 
its ability to continue as a going concern, OMZ’s buyers continued to provide financial 
support. It appears that the government, intent on retaining this important part of Russia’s 
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remaining heavy engineering capability, put pressure on OMZ’s owners (who were also its 
main creditors) not to pull the plug on its operations. 
At the same time, however, OMZ failed to cooperate productively with the Federal Agency 
for Nuclear Energy (Rosatom), the government body responsible for the nuclear expansion 
programme and the gatekeeper for all government orders stemming from that programme. Not 
only was this failure a significant contributor to OMZ’s financial problems, it also undermined 
the implementation of the government’s nuclear energy strategy. Thus we see the same 
business actors on the one hand keeping ailing industrial enterprises alive on behalf of the 
government and at the expense of their own profits, yet on the other hand letting their 
corporate self-interest undermine an important facet of government industrial policy. This 
puzzle demands an explanation both from the perspective of the motivations of OMZ’s 
buyers, and from that of the state, which failed to use its influence to ensure OMZ and 
Rosatom cooperated effectively. 
As in the previous chapter, questions also arise from the precise way in which the acquisitions 
were structured, and (in the case of OMZ in particular) why this was done in an atmosphere of 
secrecy. Once again, legal considerations prove to have played the main role in determining 
these specific ownership structures and the secrecy surrounding them. In the previous chapter 
the buyers found innovative ways around the need for prior approval from the Gazprom board 
of directors (and hence also for the government ‘directive’) before the takeover could proceed. 
But in the takeovers of the present chapter, which took place slightly later, the main obstacle 
was the need to gain prior approval from a newly-empowered and somewhat hostile antitrust 
regulator. Thus once again, evidence is provided that powerful state-backed corporate players, 
who are able to benefit from various types of ‘administrative resource’ including state 
coercion in support of takeovers and influence over the outcomes of court cases, are at the 
same time paying attention to mundane laws relating to the establishment of a market 
economy. At the same time, however, there were occasions where Gazprom simply ignored 
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the same institutions that were supposed to be constraining their behaviour. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of whether the sanctions that were available to the antitrust body, and its 
willingness to use them against Gazprom group, are sufficient to explain Gazprom’s partial 
compliance with the relevant law. 
Government strategy and nuclear engineering 
As noted above, the focus of this case study is on OMZ’s engineering operations for the 
nuclear energy industry, based at Izhorskie Zavody in St Petersburg. As Russia’s general 
contractor in the construction of nuclear power stations abroad, Atomstroieksport was the 
gateway for all OMZ’s export orders in this area. Before turning to what triggered the 
coercive takeovers at Atomstroieksport and OMZ, it is necessary to understand the Russian 
government’s strategic thinking at the time regarding heavy engineering and nuclear energy. 
Government strategy for heavy engineering was not given published documentary form until 
2010, when the Ministry for Industry and Trade approved the “Strategy for the Development 
of Heavy Engineering for the period to 2020” (Minpromtorga Rossii, 2010)198. Izhorskie 
Zavody was discussed in the document, but its main focus was on the non-nuclear side of 
Russia’s heavy engineering industry, which was the main focus of OMZ’s other main 
enterprise, Uralmashzavod. The document noted that although this industry provided just 
1.2% of GDP in 2009, its clients (the oil and gas, mining and metals industries) provided over 
80% of budget revenues, and were responsible for 81% of exports. Around two-thirds of the 
costs in these industries were from the purchase, servicing and use of heavy equipment. There 
were very few heavy engineering companies on the world market, as well as on the Russian 
market, and the government feared that “the complete degradation of Russian heavy 
                                                     
198 This document was approved several years after the main events discussed in this chapter, and 
government strategy may have changed somewhat in the intervening period. However, it retains some 
value in providing an indication of the government’s preoccupations at the time of the takeovers. 
203 
 
engineering would lead to an increase of tens of percentage points in the costs of acquiring 
and servicing fixed assets for the raw materials industries” (Minpromtorga Rossii, 2010, p. 3). 
These remarks highlight the government’s preoccupation with “technological sovereignty” 
and industrial self-sufficiency, and provide some rationale for it. They illustrate the 
government’s particular interest in preventing the total collapse of the heavy engineering 
industry, which helps to explain why it was not prepared to maintain a laissez faire attitude 
when it came to the fate of OMZ.  
Of more direct relevance to the coercive takeover at OMZ was a government strategy that was 
announced in January 2006 by Rosatom head Sergei Kirienko. This was a dramatic scaling up 
of existing plans to increase the country’s nuclear energy production, so that 40 new 
generating units would be built over the next 25 years at an estimated cost of $60bn. 
Additionally, and of direct relevance to Atomstroieksport, Kirienko said that he anticipated 
Russia building another 40-60 generating units abroad (Nikol’skii, 2006) 199 . Kirienko’s 
announcement was followed by the approval in October 2006 of the Federal Target Plan 
(FTP) named “Development of the nuclear energy industrial complex of Russia for 2007-2010 
and towards 2015” (“Federal’naya tselevaya programma ‘Razvitie atomnogo 
energopromyshlennogo kompleksa Rossii na 2007-2010 gody i na perspektivu do 2015 
goda,’” 2006). This plan envisaged beginning the construction of two new nuclear generating 
units per year (with construction taking five years). Ten new units would be completed by 
2015, and by 2020 32 units would either be completed or under construction (“Kto investiruet, 
tot i vyigryvaet,” 2009)200. 
                                                     
199 Each generating unit was based around a nuclear reactor, and there was typically more than one unit 
at a given nuclear power station. At the time of Kirienko’s announcement there were 31 generating 
units operating at Russia’s 10 nuclear power stations.  On average, each generating unit had capacity of 
0.75 GW (Alekseev, 2006). 
200 The scale of the expansion under the FTP was reduced in June 2010 owing to the financial crisis 
(“Pravitel’stvo RF utverdilo korrektirovku General’noi skhemy razmeshcheniya ob’’ektov 
elektroenergetiki do 2020 goda s perspektivoi do 2030 goda,” 2010). However, it remained the case (as 
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A key reason given by the FTP document for the nuclear expansion was to bolster the 
country’s energy security by improving the diversity of fuel sources. The document cited 
years of underinvestment in nuclear energy and rising energy demand in Russia and globally, 
thus raising concerns regarding the possibility of “a large-scale energy crisis, which would be 
systemic in nature.” High world oil prices threatened to inflate domestic gas prices and 
undermine plans to meet Russia’s energy demand through the construction of new gas-fired 
power stations. Furthermore, increasing the share of nuclear energy in Russia’s energy 
balance would help it meet its carbon emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. But in 
addition to increasing the share of nuclear energy production inside Russia, the FTP’s goals 
included promoting exports of Russian companies involved in the nuclear energy cycle, and 
the construction of nuclear power stations abroad. 
The FTP made no mention of the need to use Russian equipment as far as possible in the 
construction of the new generating capacity, but it is clear from what followed that there was a 
determination to source the equipment for the new nuclear reactors domestically, rather than 
from abroad201. The government’s preoccupation with saving Russia’s heavy engineering 
from collapse helps to explain why, on the contrary, it was hoped that the state-funded nuclear 
expansion would provide a stable flow of orders to Russia’s heavy engineering enterprises, 
which could borrow against these future orders to finance their own modernisation 
(Pushkarskaya & Kornysheva, 2006; Yemel’yanenkov, 2006). Another consideration was 
energy security: as OMZ’s CEO Igor Sorochan put it in 2010, “How could the state plan a 
large-scale programme for development of nuclear energy if the creation of new reactors 
didn’t depend on domestic production but instead depended on foreign supplies? What kind of 
energy security could we talk about then?” (Osin, 2010). There were also technical problems 
                                                                                                                                                        
of this writing) that there would be considerable new nuclear generating capacity built in the next two 
decades, and the determination remained to use domestic engineering capacities as far as possible. 
201 As will be discussed later, when Rosatom encountered problems in its dealings with Izhorskie 
Zavody, it went to great lengths to find an alternative supplier of reactors inside the country. The 
possibility of overcoming Izhorskie Zavody’s monopoly by sourcing reactors abroad was apparently 
never seriously considered. 
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involved in trying to introduce imported components in the construction of new reactors, 
according to Izhorskie Zavody’s CEO (Imamutdinov, 2006).   
This determination to rely on Russia’s domestic industry in the nuclear expansion programme 
placed OMZ’s St Petersburg plant Izhorskie Zavody at centre stage, because (as noted above) 
it was the only Russian factory capable at the time of producing nuclear reactors and certain 
other equipment for the new generating units. It was therefore essential to the fulfilment of the 
FTP, giving the government a key reason to be interested in its fate. 
Triggers for the takeovers 
OMZ’s takeover of Atomstroieksport 
In November 2003, OMZ gained sufficient shares to wield control over Atomstroieksport, and 
Bendukidze took over as its CEO (Lemeshko, 2003b)202. As noted above, this event served as 
the first main trigger of the state-led coercive takeovers which followed. The company had 
until that point been majority-owned by state-owned companies subordinate to what was then 
the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom)203. As Russia’s sole general contractor for the 
construction of nuclear power stations abroad, it was the exclusive gateway to international 
orders not just for Izhorskie Zavody but for other Russian companies involved in nuclear 
engineering -  in particular Silovye Mashiny, a heavy engineering company owned by the 
Interros group. The economist Yakov Pappe later commented that “When Kakha bought 
Atomstroieksport, I said: that’s the end. No-one is going to allow Bendukidze to manage the 
                                                     
202 Atomstroieksport had had been founded in 1998 by two state-controlled entities, one a joint-stock 
company named Atomenergoeksport (49%) and the other a state unitary enterprise named 
Zarubezhatomenergostroi (51%). OMZ acquired a 19.9% stake in Atomenergoeksport, whose 
remaining shares were widely dispersed among its managers and employees. Thus OMZ’s small stake 
was sufficient for control over Atomenergoeksport, and hence gave it control of the 49% stake in 
Atomstroieksport. Subsequently Atomenergoeksport gained a small number of additional shares in 
Atomstroieksport, making it the controlling shareholder (Lemeshko, 2003b). 
203 In March 2004, Minatom was deprived of its ministerial status and supervision of the nuclear 
industry was handed to the Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy (Rosatom). The Minister in charge at 
Minatom, Aleksandr Rumyantsev, continued as head of Rosatom until his replacement in November 
2005 (see below).  
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nuclear industry” (Kozyrev, 2008). There was understandable concern that Atomstroieksport 
would now favour OMZ’s bids for its contracts over those from its competitors (Lemeshko, 
2003a). But Minatom was also concerned that Atomstroieksport’s export contracts, which 
involved Russian state guarantees, would be threatened by the company’s new privately-
owned status (Rybal’chenko & Kornysheva, 2003). It later emerged that the Chinese 
government had demanded an explanation as to why the Russian state was acting as guarantor 
for the construction of a nuclear power station at Tianwan, when the general contractor for the 
work was now privately-owned. This question was raised “at the highest diplomatic level” 
(Kozyrev, 2008)204.  
OMZ claimed that it was prepared to sell shares in Atomstroieksport back to state-owned 
companies and to Atomstroieksport’s other key partners. Bendukidze agreed that some kind of 
state involvement in the company’s management was necessary in order to simplify its work 
on international markets. But at the same time he criticised what he saw as Minatom’s two 
diametrically opposing attitudes to ownership in the sector: “one allows private capital to take 
part in the management of nuclear energy, and the other opposes it” (Rybal’chenko & 
Kornysheva, 2003).  
By November 2003 Minatom was reported to be in talks with OMZ on regaining state control 
of Atomstroieksport, but so far without success (Rybal’chenko & Kornysheva, 2003). In 
December, it emerged that agreement had been reached in principle on OMZ selling shares in 
Atomstroieksport to one or more unspecified state-owned companies as well as to Silovye 
Mashiny and privately-owned Alfa Bank. The state would be the largest single shareholder, 
but control was expected to be exercised by an alliance of Silovye Mashiny and OMZ. 
Minatom was now sounding conciliatory, saying that “our position is not so strict, there is no 
                                                     
204 In an April 2004 interview Yevgeny Yakovlev, then CEO of OMZ, made reference to China’s 
concerns over the loss of state control over Atomstroieksport (Lemeshko, 2004a). 
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serious conflict with OMZ. Ultimately, we both have the same goal: developing the business” 
(Lemeshko, 2003c; Yambaeva, 2003).  
On 18 December 2003 it became clear that the sale of Atomstroieksport shares to Silovye 
Mashiny was part of a wider plan: OMZ and Silovye Mashiny had agreed on a merger (Jack, 
2003). This entailed the takeover of Silovye Mashiny by OMZ, with Silovye Mashiny’s main 
owner Interros taking a 50% stake in OMZ. But executive management of OMZ was to be 
transferred to Interros, with Bendukidze moving from CEO to Chairman. The merger began to 
be implemented long before its completion, with Silovye Mashiny’s CEO Yevgeny Yakovlev 
taking the helm at OMZ in March 2004 (Dobrov, 2004). 
It appears that Minatom’s fears for Atomstroieksport were allayed by the prospect of this 
merger. In an April 2004 interview, OMZ’s new CEO revealed that his company and Silovye 
Mashiny had reached agreement with the government on the issue of restoring state control 
over Atomstroieksport. The change of government in March 2004 (with Prime Minister 
Mikhail Kas’yanov dismissed in part over his stance on the Yukos affair) meant that the 
companies needed to secure fresh agreement on this plan from the incoming government led 
by Mikhail Fradkov. Yakovlev said OMZ was planning to resume the dialogue once the 
situation regarding the composition of the new government had stabilised (Lemeshko, 2004a). 
Bendukidze joins the Georgian government 
On 1 June 2004 it emerged that Bendukidze was resigning his post as Chairman of OMZ and 
joining the government of Mikheil Saakashvili, who had recently been elected President of 
Bendukidze’s native Georgia (“Russian tycoon to reform Georgia,” 2004). 
From a formal point of view, Bendukidze could not influence affairs at OMZ or 
Atomstroieksport while he held his new post: Georgian legislation meant he had to place his 
OMZ shares in trust and give up any management role (Lemeshko, 2004c). This technicality 
might not have done much to allay the Russian government’s concerns. However, 
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Bendukidze’s government appointment cannot have been the trigger for the state-led takeover 
of Atomstroieksport, because efforts to regain state control of that company pre-date the 
appointment. Furthermore, the appointment was a relatively spur-of-the-moment decision 
both on the Georgian government’s part and on Bendukidze’s, thus ruling out the possibility 
that the Kremlin knew about it when it began taking steps to restore state control of 
Atomstroieksport205.  
The offer to join the Georgian government came while Bendukidze was already contemplating 
an exit from most or all of his Russian business activities. It was being suggested that he 
might return to academia (Dobrov, 2004), and it was later claimed that he had been planning 
to retire to the south of France at this time (Peel, 2007). Therefore it would also be wrong to 
suggest that Bendukidze’s decision to quit ownership of Atomstroieksport and OMZ was 
entirely in response to pressure from the Russian political leadership after it learned of his 
appointment to the Georgian government. 
Nevertheless, the Russian government was undoubtedly concerned about the appointment, and 
this was compounded when the OMZ-Silovye Mashiny merger hit the rocks a few weeks 
later: in July 2004 it became clear that it would not proceed (Lemeshko, 2004b)206. The 
merger’s unwinding meant that Atomstroieksport was back under the control of Bendukidze 
rather than Interros, even if he was formally prevented from exercising that control. There was 
no longer a plan in place to bring Atomstroieksport back under state control, and these efforts 
                                                     
205 The offer from the Georgian side came from Prime Minster Zurab Zhvania on 29 May 2004 at a 
Russian-Georgian business forum in Tbilisi. Bendukidze took only the weekend to make up his mind. 
Putin was informed after the fact, in a telephone call from Saakashvili which was apparently made at 
Bendukidze’s insistence. According to Saakashvili, Putin was somewhat caught off guard by the news 
but did not raise any objections (Bekker, Nikol’skii, & Ivanov, 2004; Bekker, 2004; Borozdina, 
Sharipova, Biyanova, & Davydova, 2004; Korop & Ratiani, 2004). 
206 The most credible explanation for the failure of the merger is that Bendukidze was not happy with 
the fact Silovye Mashiny’s owners Interros had been holding separate talks on selling the merged 
company to German firm Siemens. The specific bone of contention was Interros’s insistence that the 
OMZ company charter be changed to allow it to sell a stake to Siemens without offering it first to 
OMZ’s other shareholders (Ponomarev, 2004). The Siemens deal later also foundered, because of 
Russian government concerns over a foreign company gaining control of enterprises that formed part of 
the country’s military-industrial complex (Borisov, 2005; “Siemens zavershil prodazhu blokpaketa 
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needed to begin again from scratch. According to one of the participants in the talks which led 
to the sale of Atomstroieksport to Gazprombank, these talks began immediately following the 
collapse of the OMZ-Silovye Mashiny merger (Lemeshko & Petrova, 2004). Within less than 
four months, state control had been restored: in October 2004, OMZ sold its stake in 
Atomstroieksport to de facto state-controlled Gazprombank (Lemeshko & Petrova, 2004).  
If the state’s only goal had been to restore state control over Atomstroieksport, there would 
have been no need for the subsequent takeover of OMZ. Pappe and Galukhina claim, 
however, that Bendukidze’s takeover of Atomstroieksport made up the minds of the 
government to bring “not only the core, but also the periphery of the nuclear energy complex” 
back under state control (Pappe & Galukhina, 2009, p. 174). Whether or not that is correct, the 
failure of the OMZ-Silovye Mashiny merger and Bendukidze’s joining the Georgian 
government no doubt provided additional reasons for the Russian state to pursue the takeover 
of OMZ, given its importance to the heavy engineering industry. Not only was it now in 
‘foreign’ hands, it was in poor shape as a stand-alone business after the failure of the merger 
with Silovye Mashiny. It had narrowly avoided defaulting on its debts in 2004 (Vin’kov, 
2006), and in advance of the merger Bendukidze had sold off many of its non-nuclear assets 
including its most profitable shipbuilding enterprises (Kudryashov, 2005). 
Takeover tactics: the use of state coercion 
Bendukidze has claimed that both companies were sold on his own initiative, in response to 
what he perceived to be a generally negative business climate in Russia rather than any 
specific actions that the state might have taken against him or his business. He was also 
claiming to be quite content with the amount of money he received for OMZ207. If this were 
                                                     
207 Written communication from Bendukidze to the author, May 2012. See also Kotin (2005), in which 
Bendukidze claims that he decided to sell OMZ because he was tired of being engaged in the same line 
of business for ten years, and had always intended to sell the business on at a profit; and Yegorova et al 
(2005), in which the political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky claims that Bendukidze had been wanting for 
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the whole story, then neither Atomstroieksport nor OMZ would constitute bona fide cases for 
the current project because they would not constitute coercive takeovers. However, there is 
sufficient evidence that the state used various coercive tactics in order to encourage the 
takeovers to happen. These tactics continued after Atomstroieksport was safely returned to 
state control; the last form of pressure was dropped only after Bendukidze had sold OMZ. 
In chapter 3, the concept of the state-led coercive takeover was broken down into various 
tactics used by the state that are more or less clearly coercive in nature. These are (in 
ascending order in terms of their coercive nature): negotiations and/or purchase of stake to 
regain control; economic embargo; non-law enforcement investigations; civil court cases 
(including bankruptcy); searches by prosecutors; and criminal cases. Using these categories as 
a framework, the coercive tactics used by the state around the Atomstroieksport and OMZ 
takeovers were as follows: 
• Economic embargo: soon after OMZ’s takeover of Atomstroieksport in November 
2003, sources at Minatom were discussing the possibility of an economic embargo of 
the company. The company operated under contracts signed by Ministerial decrees, 
and in principle Minatom could have issued new decrees handing these contracts to 
other parties. This was unlikely in practice because it would have entailed altering 
inter-governmental agreements – a lengthy process which would have damaged 
Russia’s international reputation (Silin, 2003). 
• Non-law enforcement investigations: in May 2004 (i.e. while the OMZ-Silovye 
Mashiny merger was still thought to be in process but while OMZ was still seeking to 
reach agreement with the new government on returning state control of 
Atomstroieksport) the Control and Intelligence Agency of Russia’s Presidential 
Administration reportedly carried out an investigation of Atomstroieksport and found 
                                                                                                                                                        
a long time to quit his business interests in Russia to concentrate on his business activities in Georgia, 
where he intended to become Prime Minister. 
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numerous violations. These formed the basis for investigations by the Audit Chamber 
which continued after the restoration of state control. The Audit Chamber 
investigation was based on allegations that the company’s managers were responsible 
for financial violations worth RUB 665m (around $22m) in relation to its fulfilment 
of the programme to build Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power station (Latynina, 2005; 
Perekrest & Spirin, 2005). In January 2006, i.e. two months after Bendukidze had sold 
OMZ, the Audit Chamber announced that this matter was closed (Granik, 2006). 
• Searches by prosecutors: According to Kozyrev (2008), OMZ’s head office was 
searched by unspecified law-enforcement officers after the inspection of 
Atomstroieksport by the Control and Intelligence Agency208. 
• Criminal cases: in December 2003, the Sverdlovsk regional division of the FSB 
opened a criminal case relating to suspicions that commercial secrets were being sold 
by an employee at Uralmashzavod. This was announced on the same day as the news 
that OMZ was to merge with Silovye Mashiny. A spokesman said that normally the 
FSB would not get involved in such matters, “but we have found indications of 
espionage activity at the factory” (“FSB nashla shpionov na ‘Uralmashe,’” 2003). 
According to Kozyrev (2008), there was also a criminal case opened on the basis of 
the alleged financial violations at Atomstroieksport209.  
Bendukidze’s claim to have sold the two companies voluntarily is in fact contradicted by 
some other statements he has made. In a 2008 interview, he denied that he had been forced to 
sell OMZ at a below-market price, but he also commented on his decision to sell that “there is 
no point spitting against the wind”. Apparently in the context of the state’s negative reaction 
                                                     
208  This claim could not be corroborated elsewhere. In a written communication with the author, 
Bendukidze said that he was unable to confirm or deny the search of OMZ’s offices, explaining that by 
this time he had no involvement in the company’s management so would not necessarily have known 
about such an event. Although he no longer had any formal role, it seems unlikely that the company’s 
largest beneficial owner would not have been informed by the management of a police search of the 
head office. 
209 Again, Kozyrev’s claim has not been corroborated elsewhere. 
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to OMZ’s gaining control of Atomstroieksport, he commented “I didn’t think about that – it 
was my mistake210” (Kozyrev, 2008). 
Reportedly, Bendukidze received a “harsh offer” [zhestkoe predlozhenie] of just $10m for 
OMZ (as against its market value at the time of $77m) several months prior to the November 
2005 sale. Such a low amount would suggest that the bidder believed Bendukidze had no 
choice but to sell. Granted, in the intervening period Bendukidze had been able to negotiate 
this upwards, and the final sale price was thought to be somewhere between $50m and $70m, 
which a source in a rival heavy engineering company commented was “definitely below 
market price” (Kudryashov, 2005; Yambaeva, Grib, & Belikov, 2005)211. The investment 
bank UFG, which acted as organiser and settlement agent for the transaction, said it had been 
organised in a hurry, while stressing that it had been a “market transaction” (Yambaeva et al., 
2005). There are several possible reasons for this hurry: for example, Bendukidze might have 
needed to raise the cash from the sale for other purposes. But it is quite likely that whoever 
was responsible for the coercive tactics had imposed a deadline on his exit from OMZ.  
Thus there would seem to be sufficient evidence to categorise both Atomstroieksport and 
OMZ as SLCTs. As with all of the cases discussed in the previous chapters save that of the 
Yukos affair, this was a negotiated takeover where the existing owner accepted the “carrot-
and-stick” offer provided by the state and the buyers. This was a more ‘voluntary’ takeover 
than those other cases, because here the existing owner was already contemplating an exit. But 
the state was anxious to separate the assets from their existing owner and used a range of 
coercive tactics to ensure that this happened. Presumably because Bendukidze was in any case 
interested in selling, there are fewer indications than in the previous chapters that the existing 
                                                     
210 In Russian, “moi nedochet”. 
211 OMZ’s buyers were not the only ones to make an offer. Rival bids came from ex-UES manager 
Mikhail Abyzov and Oleg Deripaska. In a written communication with the author, Bendukidze 
commented that the rival bids were far too low. It therefore seems likely that the negotiations swiftly 
focussed on the possible sale to the buyers represented by UFG. 
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owner took steps to improve his negotiating position and prevent this becoming a case of full-
scale asset seizure by the state212. 
Assessing the ownership outcome 
Before explaining the outcome of the two takeovers, it is necessary to understand precisely 
who the new buyers were, what their relationship was to the state (i.e. whether the SLCTs 
resulted in state ownership), and how they structured ownership of their new assets. 
Atomstroieksport 
Figures 7 and 8 show the ownership of Atomstroieksport before and after the SLCT. As 
Figure 8 indicates, the October 2004 sale of OMZ’s 54% stake in Atomstroieksport 
represented the restoration of state control that the government sought: the buyer, 
Gazprombank, was at this time a subsidiary of Gazprom, which was comfortably under the 
state’s de facto (but not yet de jure) control213. 
                                                     
212 It has been argued that the OMZ merger with Silovye Mashiny was precisely such a step, based on 
the calculation that the superior political standing of the Interros group would protect OMZ from the 
Kremlin’s anger (Dobrov, 2004; Gotova, 2004; Moroz, 2003); however, this interpretation would 
appear to underestimate the importance of the commercial considerations behind the merger. 
213 As discussed in Chapter 3, direct majority ownership of Gazprom was not achieved by the state until 
June 2005. 
 Figure 7. Atomstroieksport ownership before SLCT
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 Figure 8. Atomstroieksport ownership after SLCT
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owned companies, namely TVEL or Tekhsnabeksport. Tellingly, in February 2006, Rosatom 
head Sergei Kirienko spoke of the need to return Atomstroieksport to “state control”, despite 
the fact that it was already controlled by the state via Gazprombank (Naumov, 2006). 
Like the subsequent takeover of OMZ, Gazprombank’s acquisition of Atomstroieksport was a 
complex transaction that was carried out in an atmosphere of some secrecy. When it was 
completed on 7 October 2004, Gazprombank would not confirm this fact or its involvement: it 
merely acknowledged that it was interested in the asset (Lemeshko & Petrova, 2004). 
Atomstroieksport held an extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting (EGM) the following 
day so that the new shareholders could vote in a set of new directors (Yambaeva, 2004). The 
sale was confirmed on 15 October 2004 by a government official214, but still no comment was 
forthcoming from either Gazprombank, Gazprom, Atomstroieksport or Rosatom 
(“Gazprombank poluchil kontrol’ nad ZAO ‘Atomstroieksport,’” 2004). Gazprom group’s 
first official acknowledgement came in November 2004, when it disclosed in a financial 
report that the group now held a 54% stake in Atomstroieksport (Makeev & Siluyanova, 
2004)215. 
The object of the sale was a 54% stake in Atomstroieksport. The seller was OMZ-controlled 
Atomenergoeksport. Because of its legal form as a closed joint-stock company, 
Atomstroieksport was not obliged to disclose the precise identity of its new shareholders216. 
The buyers were in fact not solely Gazprombank, but also a number of its subsidiaries 
(Grivach, 2005; Yambaeva, 2004). The reasons for Gazprombank’s use of multiple buying 
entities, and for its refusal to acknowledge the transaction until later, will be explained below. 
                                                     
214 The head of the Federal Service for Environmental, Technical and Nuclear Monitoring, Andrei 
Malyshev. 
215 OAO Gazprom, IFRS Consolidated Interim Condensed Financial Information (unaudited), 30 June 
2004, p. 20. Available at http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/20/985450/4-
21ifrs_eng_6m04_151104_last.pdf, accessed 3 February 2014.  
216  The Law on Joint-Stock Companies and the Law on the Securities Market place substantial 
disclosure requirements on open joint-stock companies and on those closed joint-stock companies 
which have carried out a public issue of securities (Atomstroieksport has not issued securities). For a 
good overview see Fatikhova (2012). 
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OMZ 
Identity of the buyer 
Significantly greater secrecy surrounded the identity of the buyers in the November 2005 
takeover of OMZ. Presumably bound by a confidentiality agreement, Bendukidze 
subsequently maintained that he had no idea who the buyers were (Kozyrev, 2008)217.  
OMZ was an open joint-stock company, which in theory obliged it to disclose details of any 
shareholders with a stake of 5% or greater. However, in its first quarterly report following the 
acquisition, OMZ stated that over 85% of its shares were in the hands of nominal shareholder 
companies. No other single entity held a stake of 5% or greater218 . In separate Russian 
regulatory disclosures known as “material events” (sushchestvennye sobytiya), OMZ reported 
that three companies which jointly held 42.16% had exited as shareholders on 2 November 
2005219. These were almost certainly the entities through which the sellers (Bendukidze and 
his partners) had held their 42.16% stake (Yambaeva et al., 2005)220. No disclosure was made 
of the identity of any new shareholders.  
While Atomstroieksport’s new owners had held an EGM the day after their acquisition so that 
they could replace the existing directors and take other steps to impose control, OMZ’s buyers 
omitted to do so, waiting instead for the routine AGM scheduled for June 2006 (Kir’yan, 
2006; Vin’kov, 2006). This delay was presented in some press articles as an indication that 
OMZ’s buyers were incompetent and/or unable to make coordinated decisions regarding what 
to do with their new asset. While (as discussed below) there is some corroborating evidence 
that the buyers did not have the required expertise to manage these industrial assets, it is 
almost certain that they chose not to call an EGM specifically because that would have risked 
                                                     
217 Confirmed as still being the case in Bendukidze’s written communication with the author, May 
2012. 
218 OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q4 2005, p. 100-1. 
219 The names of these entities were Lernon Investments Limited (11.32%), Lotterby Limited (10.91%) 
and HKPI Promyshlennye Investory (19.93%). 
220 Bendukidze’s personal stake in OMZ was 25.93% (Yambaeva, Grib, & Belikov, 2005). 
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revealing their identity221. Additionally, the company refused to disclose to its auditors the 
identity of its ‘ultimate controlling party’ for the purposes of its annual consolidated financial 
statements, despite a requirement to do so for accounts conforming to International 
Accounting Standards (IAS)222.  
A source close to the deal claimed soon after its announcement that it had been preceded by 
several months of talks “in a close circle. Four people had taken part. Among them were 
senior managers of Gazprombank” (Yambaeva et al., 2005). The press office of the 
Sverdlovsk regional administration (home to the Uralmashzavod factory) declared OMZ’s 
buyer to be Gazprombank  (“Sverdlovskie vlasti vydali pokupatelya OMZ,” 2005). This was 
the information that was conveyed to the region’s Governor, Eduard Rossel’, by the CEO of 
Uralmashzavod. The CEO was then promptly sacked by the new controlling shareholders 
because of the leak (Samedova, Tikhomirova, & Terletsky, 2005; V. Stepanova & Yambaeva, 
2005). Gazprombank insisted that it was not the buyer but was merely representing 
unspecified third-party investors (Vin’kov, 2006; Yambaeva et al., 2005; Yegorova & 
Malkova, 2005). Only in February 2006 did it acknowledge that it was working with those 
investors, who had by this time consolidated a 75% stake (“Gazprombank khochet sdelat’ 
OMZ nepublichnoi kompaniei,” 2006). OMZ’s Chairman Aleksei Matveev reiterated in 
October 2006 that Gazprombank was not a shareholder in OMZ, but was a “strategic financial 
partner”, implying that it was providing long-term credit (Vin’kov, 2006). 
                                                     
221 At the very least, the institutional affiliations of any new directors voted on to the board would have 
given a hint as to the identity of the new controlling beneficiaries. 
222 IAS 24 Related party disclosures, which first came into force in 1986, states that the reporting entity 
“shall disclose the name of its parent and, if different, the ultimate controlling party.” See 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias24. In OMZ’s consolidated financial statements for the 
years 2006 through 2008, the auditors PwC noted this requirement, adding that it had not been able to 
establish whether there was an ultimate controlling party. For example, for the 2008 report PwC’s 
wording was: “The Company has not disclosed the name of its ultimate controlling party, if any […] It 
was impracticable to satisfy ourselves as to whether there was an ultimate controlling party […]”. The 
statements are available from www.omz.ru/eng/investors/statements/, accessed on 18 November 2013. 
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The above naturally presents some difficulty when attempting to understand the ownership 
outcome and the relationship of the buyers to the state. However, with further investigation it 
is possible to determine with some confidence the true identity of the buyer. 
In April 2006, OMZ disclosed that an entity named Forpost-Management now held a 19.93% 
stake. Then in June 2006 Forpost applied to the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) to 
increase its stake to 95%. This did not, however, end the secrecy as to who ultimately 
controlled OMZ. The FAS turned Forpost’s application down in May 2007 on the grounds 
that the information provided as to the size of its stake in OMZ was inaccurate, and no 
information had been supplied regarding the identity of its ultimate beneficiaries (Aliev, 2007; 
Malkova & Mazneva, 2007; Malkova, 2007a).  
A source close to OMZ’s shareholders later said that Forpost had informed the FAS in autumn 
2006 that its beneficial owner was an equities fund named Citadel, which had been founded 
by UFG and Gazprombank. The FAS objected to the fact that the identity of Citadel’s 
investors had not been disclosed; additionally, it had discovered that by December 2006, 
Forpost-Management already controlled a 44% stake in OMZ, which was sufficient to wield 
voting control at the company223 . Therefore the information Forpost had provided in its 
application was no longer accurate, and it had proceeded to take control of OMZ without 
waiting for approval from the FAS (Belikov, 2007a). 
The ownership of OMZ as of December 2006 (just over one year after the acquisition from 
Bendukidze et al) is represented in Figure 9. 
                                                     
223 This was because a 12% stake in the company was held by its own subsidiaries. 
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Figure 9. OMZ ownership as of December 2006 
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The mystery surrounding the identity of the buyers led to different theories being put forward 
in the media. It was suggested that they were individuals whose origins were deep inside the 
security services224; or that Gazprombank was indeed the buyer (despite its denials)225; or that 
the buyers were Gazprombank senior managers acting in an individual capacity226. It was later 
claimed that the purchase might have been made in the interests of the shareholders of St 
Petersburg-based Bank Rossiya, which (as will be discussed below) became the manager of a 
controlling stake in Gazprombank in 2007 (Kozyrev, 2008). 
Forpost-Management’s board of directors was dominated by Gazprombank senior 
managers227. Its Chairman from 2007 was Farid Kantserov, a deputy CEO at Gazprombank 
and adviser to its CEO Andrei Akimov228. Another director was Sergei Ivanov, who had 
joined Gazprombank in 2004 initially as an aide to Akimov, and who joined Forpost’s board 
in 2008229 . Ivanov was the son of the politician Sergei Ivanov, who was Deputy Prime 
Minister between 2005 and 2011, during some of which time (as will be explained in detail 
below) he had specific oversight of the heavy engineering and nuclear energy industries230. On 
the executive management side was Aleksandr Stepanov, who became an official aide to 
Akimov at Gazprombank in 2004, and retained this post when he also became deputy CEO at 
Forpost in 2006231. Forpost’s CEO in 2007, Vladimir Yurkov, was the former head of a 
subsidiary of Sibur (Malkova & Mazneva, 2007)232.  
                                                     
224  e.g. Vin’kov (2006). A similar claim had been made in Yambaeva (2004) regarding 
Atomstroieksport’s buyers. 
225 e.g. Kir’yan (2006); Mitrova & Pappe (2006, p. 83); Yegorova, Simakov & Malkova (2005). 
226 e.g. Kornysheva, Yambaeva & Grib (2006); Yegorova & Malkova (2005). 
227 Note that in February 2009, Gazprombank took formal ownership of Forpost-Management. If the 
presence of Gazprombank managers on Forpost’s board had only begun after this date, it would be 
entirely expected. But there is documentary evidence in OMZ’s disclosures that Gazprombank 
managers were already on Forpost’s board at least as early as 2007. 
228 Source: OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q1 2012, pp. 98-99. 
229 Source: OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q3 2009, p. 100. 
230  At the time of writing, Sergei Ivanov senior is (since May 2012) head of Vladimir Putin’s 
presidential administration. 
231 Source: OAO “Kriogenmash”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q2 2008. 
232 For Sibur’s relationship to Gazprom, see Chapter 3. 
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Despite this evidence and the fact that OMZ’s sale had been preceded by talks between 
Bendukidze’s representatives and those of Gazprombank, the bank and its parent company 
Gazprom were at pains to stress that they were not affiliated with OMZ’s buyers (Yegorova & 
Malkova, 2005).  
Prior to the takeover, there was already a Gazprom-affiliated shareholder at OMZ, namely the 
pension fund Gazfond. It had begun buying OMZ shares on the open market at the end of 
2002, and had built up a 15% stake by 2004. This was originally thought to be a short-term 
portfolio investment, but the opinions of investment bank analysts began to diverge on this 
issue as the Gazfond stake increased (Seregin, 2004).  
By examining some later transactions, it is possible to establish with some confidence that 
Gazfond was the beneficial owner behind the OMZ takeover. The first such transaction came 
in April 2007, when Gazfond acquired a controlling stake in Gazprombank (Grib & Chaikina, 
2006; Moiseev, Grib, Chaikina, & Gosteva, 2007). Then in April 2009, Gazprombank became 
the direct owner of Forpost-Management, thereby becoming OMZ’s controlling beneficiary. 
Gazprombank was still majority-controlled by Gazfond at this time, making Gazfond the 
ultimate controlling owner of OMZ. Crucially, the OMZ board of directors did not change in 
the weeks and months following Gazprombank’s purchase of Forpost233. As noted above, new 
owners will normally seek to exert control as soon as possible over their purchase, including 
by electing their own representatives to the board (typically at an EGM called for that 
purpose). That this was not done at OMZ provides a strong indication that beneficial 
ownership of OMZ had not changed in any significant way despite Gazprombank’s purchase 
of OMZ’s controlling shareholder. It follows that Gazfond was already Forpost’s beneficial 
owner prior to the February 2009 transaction. 
                                                     
233 Source: OMZ’s quarterly reports (in Russian) for Q4 2008, Q1 2009, Q2 2009 and Q3 2009. 
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Similarly, when the OMZ shares which were bought from Bendukidze and his associates were 
transferred from the original buying entities to the balance sheet of Forpost in 2006, it was 
understood that this was a purely technical transaction that made no difference to the ultimate 
beneficial ownership of those OMZ shares (Belikov, 2007a). This impression is reinforced by 
the fact that the FAS had in May 2007 established that Forpost’s OMZ stake in December 
2006 was 44% (scarcely above the 42% sold by Bendukidze and other OMZ senior managers 
in November 2005) (Malkova, 2007a). In other words, whoever had been behind the original 
buyers from Bendukidze in November 2005 were still the ultimate owners of the OMZ shares 
at the end of 2006, and were most likely still the owners in 2009 (when the sale of OMZ to a 
company owned by Gazfond apparently made no change to OMZ’s ultimate beneficial 
ownership). Gazfond was, therefore, the ultimate controlling owner from November 2005 
onwards. Precisely how it had structured the initial acquisition in November 2005 is not 
known, but it is possible to deduce that when Forpost Management took over the controlling 
stake in OMZ in June 2006, it was Gazfond that was the investor behind Forpost’s parent 
entity, the Citadel equities fund. 
A state or private ownership outcome? Gazfond’s relationship to the state 
Gazfond was a “non-state” (negosudarstvennyi) pension fund. This term referred not to its 
being ultimately owned by a private entity, but rather to the fact that it offered pension 
provision outside of the state pension system. In fact, Gazfond was effectively a state-
controlled entity at the time of the OMZ takeover in November 2005. Founded in 1994 by 
Gazprom and various subsidiaries including Gazprombank, its original goal was to provide 
social protection for retired gas industry employees (“O fonde,” 2014)234.  
As a non-state pension fund, Gazfond was classed as a non-commercial organisation, which 
meant that by law it had no owners (only “founders” [in Russian: uchrediteli]) (“Minfin 
                                                     
234 In 2008 it became an “open” pension fund which could accept contributions from any individual or 
company (Mazunin, 2008). 
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obyazhet negosudarstvennye pensionnye fondy naiti sebe vladel’tsev,” 2013; Zubova, 2013). 
Former deputy Energy Minister Vladimir Milov in 2004 described it as an entity that was 
affiliated with Gazprom without formally being part of the group (Miledin & Reznik, 2004). 
But Milov was mistaken: Gazfond was until 2007 still being listed by Gazprom (by this time a 
majority state-controlled entity) as part of the latter’s group of companies, both in its financial 
reports to international accounting standards (IAS)235 and in its obligatory disclosures to the 
Russian financial regulator236.  
However, Gazfond began to move away from Gazprom’s control soon afterwards. Its 
financial resources had been under trust management by a company named ZAO Lider, which 
was 96%-owned by Gazfond (Rozhkov, Reznik, Baraulina, & Myazina, 2006). But in April 
2006, ZAO Lider was sold to a subsidiary of the St Petersburg-based, privately-owned Bank 
Rossiya, whose owners were reported to be close personal friends of Vladimir Putin (Kozyrev 
& Sokolova, 2008). Gazfond’s charter stated that the trust manager (i.e. Lider) had exclusive 
rights over the disposal of the assets invested in the fund: the pension fund’s founders, i.e. 
Gazprom and its subsidiaries, had no such rights (Kozyrev & Sokolova, 2008). Thus the sale 
of Lider began to cast doubt on whether Gazfond’s resources were really under Gazprom’s 
(and thus the state’s) control.  
In fact there are indications that Bank Rossiya had already gained considerable influence over 
ZAO Lider by the time of the OMZ purchase. At the beginning of 2003, Bank Rossiya’s CEO 
had said that Gazfond was one of its principal clients. Then in the middle of that year, Yury 
Shamalov, the son of one of Bank Rossiya’s main shareholders Nikolai Shamalov, became 
                                                     
235 e.g. Gazprom, Financial Report 2005 (in English), p. 76. Gazfond was here listed as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Gazprom. Arguably this was an error, given that Gazfond had no legal owners. In 2007, 
Gazprom explained why it had to date included Gazfond as a member of the group: this had been done 
“primarily due to the fact that the Group management exhibited control over the financial and 
investment decisions of NPF Gazfund” (Gazprom, Financial Report 2007, p. 86). 
236 e.g. OAO “Gazprom”, List of Affiliated Entities (Spisok affilirivannykh lits) as of 31 December 
2005. Gazfond is listed as an affiliated entity of Gazprom on page 32 of this document, on the basis that 
it “belongs to the Gazprom group of companies”. 
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President of Gazfond  (Rozhkov et al., 2006)237. In 2004, Bank Rossiya bought from Gazprom 
a majority stake in the Sogaz insurance company (Miledin, Myazina, & Kudinov, 2004; 
Miledin, Shcherbakova, & Petrova, 2005; Miledin & Reznik, 2004). Sogaz was the entity 
through which Bank Rossiya gained control of ZAO Lider in April 2006. 
In 2007, Gazfond became as Milov had earlier described: an entity that was de jure no longer 
part of the Gazprom group. On 1 February, the law was changed for Gazfond and other non-
state pension funds, which meant that it was no longer appropriate to include them among the 
affiliated entities of their founders. Gazprom decided accordingly not to include Gazfond in its 
future consolidated accounts to IAS238. 
An extremely vexed question is whether the de jure removal of Gazfond from the Gazprom 
group of companies constituted any real loss of control on Gazprom’s part, and thus whether it 
meant Gazfond and its assets were no longer subject to any formal state control. It has been 
claimed that Gazfond effectively became an extension of the business empire of privately-
owned Bank Rossiya, though it was acknowledged that it was a “weak link” in that empire 
because Bank Rossiya only owned the company which managed Gazfond’s resources under 
contract (Milov, 2012). Gazfond reserved the right in theory to cancel its contract and appoint 
a new trust manager, whereupon Bank Rossiya would lose all access to Gazfond’s assets 
including OMZ. This always looked unlikely to happen in practice, because Gazfond’s 
President was still Yury Shamalov, the son of one of Bank Rossiya’s major shareholders. 
However, an additional indicator that Gazprom would retain controlling influence over 
Gazfond was provided by the appointment of Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller as Chairman of 
Gazfond in May 2007, at the same time that Gazfond’s formal removal from the Gazprom 
group was being announced (Grivach, 2007).  
                                                     
237  Yury Shamalov was also Deputy Chairman of Gazprombank (source: OAO “Gazprombank”, 
quarterly report (Russian) for Q4 2010). 
238 The specific change in legislation was Government Regulation (“Postanovlenie”) no. 63 dated 1 
February 2007. See Gazprom, Financial Report 2007, p. 86. 
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Further indications as to whether it was Bank Rossiya or Gazprom that wielded the main 
controlling influence over Gazfond after 2007 are provided by how its main assets were run 
after that date. One of these assets was Gazprombank itself, which, as mentioned above, 
became majority-owned by Gazfond in April 2007. Prior to this transaction Gazprom signed 
an agreement with Gazprombank which allowed it to continue to have a board majority at the 
bank as if it were still the controlling shareholder (Moiseev et al., 2007). Similarly, Bank 
Rossiya was said to play no role either in the editorial policy or the business affairs of 
Gazprom-Media, which as a subsidiary of Gazprombank might be thought to have been under 
Bank Rossiya’s control239. In his January 2012 pre-election article on economic strategy, 
Vladimir Putin called on Gazprom to end its involvement in non-core businesses, including 
the media (Putin, 2012). Either he was unaware that Gazprom no longer had any formal 
affiliation with Gazprom-Media, or he was acknowledging its continuing de facto control over 
the media business240. 
If (as argued above) Gazfond remained a de facto extension of state-controlled Gazprom 
group after its de jure removal in 2007, then its continuing usefulness to the group thereafter 
can be explained as follows: it was now a convenient place for Gazprom to store non-core 
assets (including Gazprombank and OMZ) without having to include them (and, more 
importantly, their associated liabilities) on the consolidated balance-sheet of Gazprom itself 
(Frumkin, 2009). 
Given the presence of Gazprombank senior managers on the board of OMZ’s parent company 
Forpost-Management, it appears that Gazfond had delegated to Gazprombank the task of 
                                                     
239 Author’s interview with media expert Anna Kachkaeva, Higher School of Economics, May 2012.  
240 As a final example, when Sibur later came to be owned by Gazprombank, a source close to Sibur’s 
board of directors said that Bank Rossiya’s shareholders had never taken an interest in the business. 
Sibur’s CEO said that he had never met Bank Rossiya’s then-Chairman Yury Koval’chuk (Malkova, 
2011). 
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managing its investment in OMZ241. Thus, in the following section aimed at understanding the 
buyers’ motivations behind both the Atomstroieksport and OMZ takeovers, it makes sense to 
treat those buyers as being essentially the same group of individuals in both cases.  
Research question 1: causes of the state-led coercive takeovers 
Having finally reached some conclusions regarding the identity of the buyers in the two 
takeovers and their connection to the state, we now turn to the first central research question, 
i.e. what prompted the Gazprom group to make these acquisitions and how its motivations 
squared with the state’s interest in the takeovers.  
As explained in the previous chapter, Gazprom was already under solid de facto state control 
at the time of the Atomstroieksport takeover, and had become de jure state-controlled by the 
time OMZ was sold in November 2005. But it was also a joint-stock company with a diverse 
base of non-state minority shareholders. Thus, like any state-controlled but ‘commercialised’ 
company, its interest in profit-maximisation was potentially at odds with its susceptibility to 
being used by the state for political purposes. In addition, Tompson (2008) notes that “in 
general, Russian state-owned companies are run for the benefit of corporate insiders and their 
patrons in the state administration.” There are accordingly three possible explanatory factors 
behind Gazprom group’s involvement in the takeovers: either there was some sound 
commercial logic behind it despite these companies being distinctly outside of Gazprom’s 
core business, or the company was acting under political instructions, or the investment 
decision was dictated by the rent-seeking motivations of a group of individuals within 
Gazprom and their political patrons. Quite possibly, the best explanation lies in some 
combination of these three factors. 
                                                     
241 Indeed, there was a precedent for precisely such an arrangement. In September 2004, Gazprom 
announced that Gazprombank had sold a 15.76% stake in Mosenergo to Gazfond (see below). 
Gazprom’s press-secretary said that the stake would continue to be managed by Gazprombank “on the 
basis of agreements with the buyer [i.e. Gazfond]” (Aglamish’yan, 2004a). 
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Atomstroieksport: gifting control to Rosatom 
Gazprombank remained as the controlling shareholder of Atomstroieksport for only a year and 
a half. In May 2006, it sold a 4% stake to the nuclear fuel producer TVEL, thereby bringing 
its own stake below controlling. TVEL was both state-owned and directly subordinate to 
Rosatom. It now held a 6.2% stake, and another 44% was held by another company controlled 
by the state via Rosatom, named Zarubezhpromstroi (Malkova, 2006).  
Gazprombank had described its acquisition of Atomstroieksport as “temporary” in its 
quarterly report for Q4 2005242. This did not prove to be strictly accurate: as will be discussed 
below, it stayed on as a minority shareholder after ceding control to Rosatom. But it does 
seem quite clear that Gazprombank had intended from the outset to hand control of 
Atomstroieksport to Rosatom soon after its acquisition. It later disclosed that it had paid 
around $25m for its 54% stake (Malkova, 2006). The amount it received from TVEL for its 
4% stake was not officially disclosed, but a high-ranking Rosatom source claimed on the eve 
of this sale that the bank would only receive the nominal value of the shares (Malkova & 
Yegorova, 2006)243. If correct, this would mean that the amount paid was just RUB 4,000 
(then worth $142)244. Thus it would appear that its services in handing control to Rosatom 
were effectively pro bono. In this narrow sense at least, there was no commercial logic to 
Gazprombank’s involvement in Atomstroieksport.  
                                                     
242 OAO “Gazprombank”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q4 2005, p. 348. Furthermore, a Gazprombank 
source said in February 2006 that, when the bank had bought the company from OMZ, it had been 
planning from the outset to sell it on (Malkova & Yegorova, 2006). 
243 Gazprombank disclosed in the second half of 2006 that it had sold 23% to “third parties” for 
$11.47m (source: Gazprombank Group, Interim Consolidated Financial Statements (unaudited), six 
months ended 30 June 2006, p. 41). This amount does not distinguish between the amount it received 
from Forpost-Management for its 19.9% stake, and the amount received from TVEL for the 4% stake. 
244 Atomstroieksport’s accounts for 2006 show that its share capital was then worth just RUB 100,000. 
The nominal value of a 4% stake was therefore RUB 4,000. In February 2006, $1 was worth 
approximately RUB 28.2 (source: oanda.com). 
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In July 2006, Gazprombank disclosed that it planned to sell off its remaining 49% stake 
(Malkova, 2006)245. It later emerged that it had already begun this process, having sold a 
19.9% stake in June. The buyer, which intended also to buy the remaining 30% in due course, 
was none other than Forpost-Management (Aliev, 2007; Malkova, 2007a). As discussed 
above, Forpost was effectively an affiliate of Gazprombank, and thus the bank was in essence 
not exiting Atomstroieksport at all, but staying on as a minority shareholder. Its longer-term 
rationale for its involvement in the company was tied up with its strategy for OMZ’s Izhorskie 
Zavody, which is explained below. 
OMZ: commercial rationale stemming from government strategy 
When the OMZ acquisition was first announced, analysts appeared to be in agreement that it 
made no commercial sense. As noted earlier, the company had narrowly avoided defaulting on 
its debts in 2004, and entire business lines had been sold off by Bendukidze in order to 
optimise the planned fit with Silovye Mashiny. The speciality steels produced by 
Uralmashzavod and used by the nuclear industry were seen as the only interesting business 
line that remained (Kudryashov, 2005). There was already speculation that nuclear energy was 
on the verge of an international boom (Koksharov, 2005; Vin’kov, 2004), and while the 
merger with Silovye Mashiny was still on the cards there was optimism that the merged 
company would be able to capitalise on this. But after that deal was unwound, OMZ’s future 
looked bleak. Rumours were circulating that Atomstroieksport and OMZ might be included in 
a new “mega-corporation” under Rosatom (Nikol’skii & Yegorova, 2005), but a source inside 
Russia’s engineering industry dismissed the prospect of OMZ profiting from such a plan, 
noting that “it’s a doomed idea. The nuclear reactor produced by Izhorskie Zavody is obsolete, 
and the new model only exists on paper. And no-one needs our [i.e. Russia’s] nuclear 
engineering” (Yambaeva et al., 2005). 
                                                     
245 The disclosure came in Gazprombank Group’s Independent Auditors’ Report and Consolidated 
Financial Statements, Year Ended 31 December 2005, p. 32. 
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These analysts were clearly not aware of plans that were about to be announced that would 
change the potential profitability of OMZ’s nuclear engineering business (i.e. of Izhorskie 
Zavody). As mentioned earlier, just two months after the takeover of OMZ, in February 2006, 
Rosatom head Sergei Kirienko announced the dramatic scaling up of plans to increase 
Russia’s nuclear energy generation capacity, in which Izhorskie Zavody was set to play a key 
role as the only available supplier of equipment for the new nuclear reactors. Around one 
quarter of spending on a new generating unit goes on the reactor shell, and it was estimated in 
2006 that Izhorskie Zavody could be guaranteed state orders of up to USD 15bn over the next 
25 years (Borisov, 2006). The FTP also emphasized the need to promote Russian construction 
of nuclear power stations abroad, which (if successful) would both add further to Izhorskie 
Zavody’s order book and provide revenue for Atomstroieksport. It seems plausible that 
OMZ’s buyers were party to information that had not yet reached the public domain regarding 
the government’s nuclear expansion plans, and thus saw tremendous potential for profit.  
There were additional reasons why the OMZ investment was of interest to Gazprom group 
specifically, despite its being a long way from Gazprom’s core business. The nuclear 
expansion plan promised to free up gas exports by reducing the dependence on gas-fired 
power stations. At the time, the export price was substantially higher than Gazprom could sell 
its gas for domestically (Henderson, 2011)246. According to figures provided to one newspaper 
by a former deputy minister at Minatom, each new nuclear generating unit built would free up 
for export by Gazprom an additional 3.2bcm of gas per year which would otherwise have to 
be sold to domestic gas-fired power stations. At 2006 prices, this meant it would receive 
$800m in revenue instead of $128m (Derbilova, Nikol’skii, & Yegorova, 2006)247.  
                                                     
246 As Henderson shows, this situation had changed by 2011, because increases in Gazprom’s regulated 
domestic gas price meant it was now possible to sell gas to domestic industry profitably for the first 
time. 
247 The former deputy minister claimed that freeing up gas for exports would also yield a $336m 
increase in annual budget revenues (Derbilova, Nikol’skii, & Yegorova, 2006). 
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This was a compelling argument, which the government reportedly used to persuade Gazprom 
that it ought to become involved in financing the nuclear expansion. But the argument had one 
flaw: as long as the planned nuclear expansion happened, Gazprom would enjoy the predicted 
financial benefit even if it decided to remain as a ‘free-rider’. That Gazprom was nevertheless 
interested in becoming involved stemmed from the decision by its senior management, first 
revealed to the world by CEO Aleksei Miller in April 2004, that the company should become 
a fully diversified energy conglomerate similar to international giants such as E.On 
(Aglamish’yan, 2004b; Ostrovsky & Jack, 2004). This was justified in terms of shielding the 
company from the risks of cyclical world gas prices, but also as a way to profit from 
electricity sector reforms that promised substantial increases in regulated prices for consumers 
in the coming years.  
Accordingly, just one week after Kirienko’s announcement regarding the nuclear expansion 
(and even as they were denying any involvement in the OMZ acquisition), Gazprom’s 
managers discussed with the Kremlin how they might be involved in the construction of the 
new nuclear generating capacity. A plan was being considered at this time to offer Gazprom 
ownership of the newly-built nuclear power stations if it agreed to finance their construction 
(Derbilova et al., 2006). This would have required a change in the law, which stipulated that 
all nuclear power stations must be directly owned by the state. In July 2006, Kirienko 
signalled that the idea had been dropped, by announcing that the construction of new nuclear 
generating units would be financed directly from the budget instead. At the same time, 
however, he said that no budget money would be used to finance the required modernisation 
of Russia’s nuclear engineering capacities (Pushkarskaya & Kornysheva, 2006). This included 
upgrading the “obsolete” nuclear reactor model at OMZ’s Izhorskie Zavody, and left the door 
open for Gazprom group to provide the necessary financing.  
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Implementing government strategy, or holding it to ransom? 
Around the time of Kirienko’s February 2006 announcement, OMZ’s buyers were saying 
publicly that their actions at the company would be coordinated with Rosatom (Kudryashov, 
2006a). The company’s quarterly reports explicitly linked its own strategy to government 
economic programmes including the long-term strategy for Rosatom, Russia’s energy strategy 
through to 2030, and the timetable for nuclear energy expansion. They also stated that its 
strategy would “help to strengthen the technological sovereignty of the Russian Federation in 
the realm of energy- and heavy engineering”248. 
However, a source close to OMZ’s new shareholders, who was quoted in the press in 
February 2006, painted a different picture of their motivations: “the construction of new 
nuclear power stations is an attractive field for which a battle is now underway. And OMZ’s 
majority owners have in their possession a heavy club [tyazhelayoi dubinoi] – their monopoly 
over reactor production. And they are now putting this club into action” (Kornysheva, 
Yambaeva, & Grib, 2006).  
These two contrasting interpretations of the buyers’ plans for OMZ, and how they fit with 
government strategy, go to the heart of a deeper question. Treisman (2007) has suggested that 
since 2000, Russia’s “oligarchy” has given way to a new “silovarchy”: a defining 
characteristic of Putin’s regime being the takeover of corporate boardrooms by “a new 
business elite drawn mostly from the network of security service and law enforcement 
veterans known as the siloviki”. Treisman claims (2007, p. 144) that Gazprom “clearly 
belongs in the silovarch empire”. This is based on the less than compelling evidence that three 
out of 17 members of Gazprom’s management committee are from the security services and 
another an FSB reservist. But there is better evidence available to link OMZ’s buyers to the 
“silovarch empire”. Official disclosures by OMZ-owned companies show that Forpost-
Management’s Chairman since 2007, the Gazprombank deputy CEO Farid Kantserov, 
                                                     
248 e.g. OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q3 2010, p. 39. 
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graduated from the KGB Higher School with the rank of “officer with a higher vocational 
training”249. Media reports indicate that his KGB ties went further: he was the “former head of 
military counterintelligence in the Republic of Belarus” and a career officer of the Soviet 
KGB (“Dmitry Medvedev nagradil Farida Kantserova,” 2010; Kozyrev, 2008)250. Kantserov’s 
superior at Gazprombank, CEO Andrei Akimov, was rumoured to hold the rank of general of 
the active reserve in one of the KGB’s successor organisations (Birman, 2005). Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Ivanov, whose son was also on the Forpost-Management board of directors, 
made no secret of his past in the KGB and in Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (Parfitt, 
2013). 
Treisman (2007, p. 145) suggests that the “silovarchs” “would indignantly reject comparisons 
to the oligarchs they are displacing”. They “see their mission as precisely to fix the problems 
the oligarchs created”, but “the image of the siloviki as selfless crusaders for order, rooting 
out corruption, is getting harder to sell to the Russian public”. The consensus, though, appears 
to be that there is little or no substance to their patriotic rhetoric. Hanson (2007b, p. 33) 
suggests that “different groups in the leadership may be using rhetoric about ‘sovereignty’, 
‘security’ and ‘strategic assets’ to secure their political positions, their personal wealth or 
both”. Murtazaev (2006) claims that such rhetoric only comes into play once powerful people 
have taken a “mercenary” interest in acquiring an asset. They are required to pay lip-service to 
concepts such as sovereignty and security so that the Kremlin will turn a blind eye to their 
predatory acquisitions. 
At first glance, subsequent events at OMZ would favour the view that the buyers’ patriotic 
rhetoric was merely a fig-leaf for self-interest. As will be explained below, OMZ failed to 
cooperate effectively with Rosatom. And given Izhorskie Zavody’s monopoly on reactor 
                                                     
249 OAO “Uralmashzavod” Ezhekvartal’nyi otchet za 2 kv. 2010 g., p. 62.  
250 According to the same media sources, Kantserov was “one of the first high-ranking KGB generals to 
decide not to serve the current Belarusian authorities. After retiring from all posts in Minsk he moved to 
Moscow and began working in the gas industry”. Soon afterwards he was made an advisor to 
Gazprombank’s CEO Andrei Akimov, and deputy CEO of the bank. 
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production, this threatened to undermine the entire government programme for the nuclear 
industry. But the notion that the buyers were effectively holding government strategy to 
ransom (using the “heavy club” of Izhorskie Zavody’s monopoly on reactor production) is at 
odds with the fact that they effectively gifted control of Atomstroieksport back to Rosatom. In 
fact, the evidence shows that the buyers had a single plan for Atomstroieksport and Izhorskie 
Zavody that relied on successful cooperation with Rosatom. 
On 8 February 2006, Rosatom’s head Sergei Kirienko announced that Rosatom planned to 
create a state-controlled holding company that was subordinate to the agency. It would bring 
together the whole chain of production of civilian nuclear energy production, from uranium 
production to dealing with nuclear waste, and including nuclear heavy engineering. The 
holding company would include some firms that were currently privately-owned. Precisely 
how this would work had not yet been clarified, but it was suggested that the private 
companies might only be managed by the state-owned holding, rather than being nationalised 
(Kornysheva et al., 2006). Gazprombank had announced the day before that it was 
representing the  unspecified buyers of OMZ, and at the same time noted that Rosatom’s 
reforms of the nuclear energy industry were “likely to affect the structure of OMZ and its 
nuclear equipment division” (Ermakova, 2006)251. This signalled that OMZ’s buyers were 
both aware of, and on board with, Rosatom’s plans; furthermore, it hinted that OMZ was 
prepared to hand over Izhorskie Zavody to Rosatom’s control. In March, Rosatom’s press 
officer confirmed the agency’s interest in obtaining “guarantees of management and control” 
over Izhorskie Zavody’s reactor production, adding that without these, the fulfilment of the 
nuclear expansion plan would be impossible (Malkova & Simakov, 2006). 
In July 2006, Kirienko announced that Rosatom and Gazprombank had signed a framework 
agreement on strategic cooperation, and a separate agreement on placing Izhorskie Zavody 
                                                     
251  The press-release, dated 7 February 2006, was available via Google’s cached version of 
http://www.omz.ru, accessed 4 February 2014. 
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under the management of a joint venture that would be 51%-owned by Rosatom, and 49% by 
Gazprombank (Pushkarskaya & Kornysheva, 2006). Two days later, Rosatom issued a press-
release stating that the new joint venture would be the owner (rather than merely the manager) 
of Izhorskie Zavody, and that the deal was expected to be closed by the end of the year 
(Gritskova & Kornysheva, 2006).  
By August 2006 it was clear that OMZ’s owners were searching for a very similar 
arrangement for the company’s other key asset, Uralmashzavod. Talks were underway with 
the privately-owned metals company Metalloinvest, whose main owner was the business 
tycoon Alisher Usmanov (Malkova, Fedorinova, Rozhkova, & Yegorova, 2006). This came to 
fruition in February 2007 with the creation of a 50-50 joint venture called ZAO MK 
Uralmash, with management control given to Metalloinvest. MK Uralmash became parent 
company to Uralmashzavod as well as to the Yuzhuralmashzavod enterprise located in Orsk 
(Orenburg region), which was Metalloinvest’s contribution to the joint venture (Lander, 
2007). Thus OMZ’s buyers appear to have been aware that they did not have the professional 
knowledge and experience necessary to manage OMZ’s key enterprises by themselves. A 
source told one newspaper that “Gazprombank’s representatives [at OMZ] are not 
industrialists, and they have a weak conception of what to do with industrial assets” 
(Kudryashov, 2006b)252. 
Unlike the joint venture for Uralmashzavod, the Izhorskie Zavody tie-up ultimately failed to 
come to pass, for reasons that will be examined below. However, towards the end of 2007 
                                                     
252 Indeed, there are indications that OMZ’s buyers initially had no other strategy for the company 
beyond the plan for the two joint ventures. Sergei Lipsky, whom they had inherited as OMZ’s CEO, 
quit in October 2006 apparently in response to a lack of direction from Forpost Management 
(Kudryashov, 2006b). As one press article put it, “If earlier there was one person who took the strategic 
decisions at OMZ [i.e. Bendukidze], now they have to be made collectively – no-one wants to take 
personal responsibility for the development of OMZ.” At the June shareholder’s meeting at which the 
new owners had finally installed a new set of directors, “the new shareholders did not reveal their 
development strategy for OMZ. The company recommends asking the shareholders” (Vin’kov, 2006). 
After the new owners’ arrival “the lives of the managers, who were used to relative independence under 
Bendukidze, became seriously more complicated. To decide any question required multiple approvals. 
And what was worse, sometimes it was completely impossible to obtain any kind of answer” (Kozyrev, 
2008). 
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both sides were still working to achieve it. Kirienko and Atomstroieksport CEO Sergei 
Shmatko visited Izhorskie Zavody on 26 November, accompanied by First Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergei Ivanov and St Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko. After some 
disagreements between Rosatom and Gazprombank, the two sides were now planning to make 
Atomstroieksport (which was still 51%-owned by Rosatom) the parent company of Izhorskie 
Zavody, and Ivanov’s presence at this visit to the factory signalled the government’s support 
for this plan (N. Stepanova, 2007). Atomstroieksport would issue new shares worth RUB 
12bn (then worth approximately $460m) to raise finance for an investment programme. Its 
existing shareholders would buy all the new shares, leaving the ownership structure 
unchanged. Rosatom would provide its share of the $460m investment in cash, while Forpost 
Management’s contribution would be in the form of shares in Izhorskie Zavody (Malkova, 
2007b). 
OMZ’s buyers repeatedly replaced its chief executive in the years after the takeover, and in 
each case the need to improve relations with Rosatom was a significant factor. This provides 
further evidence that they were not seeking to hold the government programme to ransom. 
Sergei Lipsky, whom OMZ’s buyers inherited from Bendukidze as company CEO, resigned in 
October 2006, and it was claimed that the new owners felt the company should be headed by 
someone with sufficiently good contacts to facilitate winning government orders253 . This 
theme continued as OMZ underwent two more changes of chief executive within a short space 
of time: Lipsky’s permanent replacement Valery Chernyshev, who was appointed in June 
2007, was dismissed eight months later over tensions with Rosatom. His replacement, Viktor 
Danilenko, was seen as someone who could improve the relationship (Belikov, 2008a). 
The above provides convincing evidence that OMZ’s owners had in mind a cooperative 
relationship with Rosatom, rather than seizing Izhorskie Zavody’s monopoly status as a way 
to hold Rosatom hostage. If Gazprombank was uncertain of its own abilities to manage 
                                                     
253 Board member Sergei Skatershchikov cited in Yambaeva et al. (2006). 
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industrial assets under its ownership, this begs the question as to why it had believed the 
acquisition made commercial sense. As one might expect from a bank, Gazprombank saw its 
primary role as provider of long-term finance for OMZ. In July 2006, it said that it would be 
responsible for providing the credit for Rosatom’s wider plans to bring a range of nuclear 
industry enterprises under its ownership over the next three years (Yegorova, Medvedeva, & 
Nikol’skii, 2006). It was rumoured in November 2007 to be prepared to invest $1bn in 
modernisation at Izhorskie Zavody (N. Stepanova, 2007). In this light, Gazprom group’s 
equity investment in OMZ can be viewed as secondary to its relationship as lender, and as 
having been aimed primarily at providing additional guarantees for those loans. 
Gazprombank’s credit life-line 
The history of Gazprombank’s lending to the OMZ companies provides compelling evidence 
that Gazprom group was committed to developing OMZ over the long term, even after doubts 
arose regarding its viability as a going concern. This decision made little sense from a purely 
commercial perspective and provides further convincing evidence that the altruistic, patriotic 
rhetoric of the ‘silovarchs’ at the bank was not in this case a mere smokescreen for venal self-
interest.  
OMZ’s quarterly report for the third quarter of 2010 shows that it had been borrowing in 
recent years from Gazprombank, with loans totalling RUB 4.8bn ($150m) at the time. The 
company described itself as highly leveraged, and its financial position as “unstable”254 . 
Eighteen months later, the company was using more measured language to describe its plight. 
However, the company’s negative net working capital 255  (amounting to RUB 1.17bn, or 
approximately $37m) was still noted. The company still owed RUB 4.06bn ($127m) in short-
term debt, with just RUB 89m ($2.8m) in long-term debt256. 
                                                     
254 OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q3 2010, p. 65.  
255 A measure of operating liquidity determined as current assets minus current liabilities. 
256 OAO “OMZ”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q1 2012, p. 76. 
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The credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s (S&P) in 2009 gave OMZ a credit rating of B-
(stable). Granted, this was an increase on its previous rating, but S&P cited among other 
factors behind this increase “the apparent willingness of Gazprombank OJSC, the group’s 
major shareholder, to provide financial support”257. The rating was the same in April 2012, 
when S&P described the company’s liquidity position as “less than adequate” (one step up 
from “weak”) because of its reliance on “short-term credit lines that they have historically 
renewed on a routine basis” (Standard and Poor’s, 2012, p. 9). The implication was that 
Gazprombank as controlling shareholder and main creditor would continue to provide the 
necessary support for OMZ, rather than pulling the plug on its credit lines. However, later in 
the year S&P suspended its OMZ rating due to inadequate information from the company, and 
soon afterwards withdrew the rating altogether at the company’s request (“S&P drops OMZ 
suspended ratings at issuer’s request,” 2012). This suggested that OMZ had for the time being 
abandoned any thought of tapping international credit markets, reinforcing its dependence on 
Gazprombank’s continued support for its survival as a going concern. 
The lion’s share of Gazprombank’s lending was to OMZ’s subsidiary Izhorskie Zavody rather 
than the main company OAO “OMZ”, because the subsidiary had physical assets that could 
be pledged as collateral. Izhorskie Zavody borrowed from a relatively diverse base, including 
state banks Sberbank and VTB. As of 2010, Izhorskie Zavody had borrowed from 
Gazprombank $175m out of total borrowing of $467m; $135m was still outstanding to 
Gazprombank, out of total outstanding debt of $332m258.  
OMZ’s 2011 consolidated financial statements (which show figures for the group as a whole, 
not just for OAO “OMZ”) in fact show relatively modest debt, with short-term loans totalling 
$142.4m and long-term debt of $95.8m. But this reduction had not been achieved by 
improving performance. In August-September 2010, OMZ sold stakes in Izhorskie Zavody 
                                                     
257 http://www.omz.ru/eng/investors/ratings/  
258 Source: OAO “Izhorskie Zavody”, quarterly report (Russian) for Q4 2010, pp. 11-15. 
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and the specialist steels division OMZ Spetsstal’ to Forpost-Management for $152.6m259. This 
deal improved the balance sheet of OMZ, but was effectively a debt-for-equity swap that saw 
Gazprombank (through its subsidiary Forpost) take equity in OMZ’s subsidiaries, in addition 
to its controlling stake in the parent company.  
The fact that OMZ’s working capital was exceeded by its short-term loans, as noted above, 
suggests that some of Gazprombank’s lending was simply keeping the company afloat. 
However, Gazprombank was also making the kinds of investments envisaged by Kirienko 
aimed at modernising OMZ’s engineering capacities. At Izhorskie Zavody, the main focus 
was an arc steel smelting furnace which was launched in early 2009 and was financed by 
Gazprombank to the tune of RUB 5bn (approximately $160m) (“Kto investiruet, tot i 
vyigryvaet,” 2009). 
Why not Rosatom? 
If the buyers in the two state-led coercive takeovers were acting as channels for government 
policy, rather than as opportunists seeking to exploit government strategy for their own 
advantage, then this raises the question as to why Atomstroieksport and OMZ were not 
instead taken over by companies subordinate to Rosatom, the government body charged with 
supervision of the nuclear industry.  
One source at a state-owned company was quoted as saying that Rosatom’s companies had 
been deterred from buying Atomstroieksport by its debts of $200m (Yambaeva, 2004). They 
could in principle have approached a bank to borrow the money required to buy 
Atomstroieksport and service its debt, and if there was sufficient political will, then 
presumably one of the state-owned banks would have obliged. However, in what was a time-
sensitive situation owing to the need to bring the company back under state control as soon as 
                                                     
259 Source: OMZ, “International Financial Reporting Standards Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Independent Auditors’ Report”, 31 December 2011, p. 52. 
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possible, Gazprombank (as a bank itself) was in a better position to quickly raise the funds 
necessary to make the purchase.  
Nevertheless, a source inside Rosatom claimed that it had proposed several options that would 
have seen control of Atomstroieksport transferred to one of its own companies. None of these 
had received approval from the highest levels of government, suggesting that it was ultimately 
a high-level political decision that saw Gazprombank rather than Rosatom take ownership of 
Atomstroieksport260 . The talks leading up to that takeover were reportedly conducted by 
Rosatom deputy head Boris Yurlov, who had joined the agency in March 2004 after a year 
spent working as a Deputy CEO of Gazprom. Prior to his work at Gazprom he had worked for 
two years as deputy (and later first deputy) head of the Department of Presidential Affairs 
(Upravdelami)261 in Putin’s presidential administration (Yambaeva, 2004). 
Yurlov was reportedly an active lobbyist for Gazprom’s interests within Rosatom (Yambaeva, 
2004) and a “competitor” to the agency’s existing head Aleksandr Rumyantsev (Andrianov, 
2008). Sources close to Rosatom claimed that he had “prepared the ground for [Gazprom] to 
gain control of the industrial enterprises [...] that were subordinate to [Rosatom]. He began 
with Atomstroieksport” (Yambaeva, 2004)262. The implication here is that Rosatom was being 
undermined from within by a ‘mole’ working for an acquisitive Gazprom. But the fact that 
Gazprombank subsequently handed Atomstroieksport over to Rosatom, and apparently gained 
nothing from its involvement, does not fit easily with this interpretation. An alternative 
explanation is that Yurlov’s appointment to Rosatom was symptomatic of the political 
decision to bring Gazprom in as a partner for Rosatom’s future plans.  
                                                     
260 A source in Rosatom described the purchase of Atomstroieksport by Gazprombank as “an allocation 
from above” [raznaryadkoi sverkhu], adding that Gazprom was not the best outcome but was still 
“more acceptable than Bendukidze. He had a very bad reputation in the industry” (Yambaeva, 2004).  
261  This division of the Presidential Administration is charged with managing its physical assets, 
financial affairs and business interests. 
262 Yurlov died suddenly in September 2004, weeks before the Atomstroieksport takeover (Yambaeva, 
2004). 
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By contrast to the earlier Atomstroieksport takeover, no Rosatom companies showed any 
serious interest in OMZ. As noted earlier, Gazprombank issued a press release in February 
2006 making clear that OMZ’s buyers were coordinating their activities with Rosatom, and 
that the reform process in the sector was likely to have an impact on OMZ’s structure. Since 
this came so soon after the November 2005 takeover, Rosatom’s lack of interest in purchasing 
OMZ was most likely because it already had agreement in principle that Gazprombank would 
split OMZ and place Izhorskie Zavody into some kind of joint venture with Rosatom. 
Why did the tie-up with Rosatom fail? 
Although the notion has been discounted above that OMZ’s buyers were holding the 
government programme to ransom, it remains puzzling why they failed to reach agreement 
with Rosatom, given the importance of such agreement to the government’s plans for the 
nuclear industry.  
According to one account, the failure of the joint venture plan was down to self-interested 
rivalry between two political factions: the new owners of OMZ and their political backers on 
the one hand, and the bureaucrats of Rosatom on the other (“Kto investiruet, tot i vyigryvaet,” 
2009). These two factions were depicted as competitors for the budget money that would be 
spent on the nuclear expansion programme. But it was shown above that OMZ’s buyers 
apparently sincerely sought a cooperative relationship with Rosatom, and aimed to play a 
constructive part in realising government strategy. This section aims to explain the failure of 
this cooperation, given that both sides were apparently working towards it rather than simply 
fighting over budget money. It also seeks to understand the government’s failure to intervene 
successfully to resolve the dispute between the two sides, despite the threat it posed to 
government strategy. 
OMZ and Rosatom were mutually dependent when it came to the provision of nuclear 
reactors. OMZ had no other buyers for its reactors besides Rosatom and Atomstroieksport. 
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Rosatom was dependent on Izhorskie Zavody for reactor equipment because it was not 
prepared to source that equipment abroad and Izhorskie Zavody was the only Russian factory 
capable of producing them. This is the “lock-in” situation which, as Williamson (1981) 
explains, arises from high asset-specificity, i.e. when investments have been made that are 
“specialized to a particular transaction”. In the present case, the high level of technical 
specialisation (i.e. physical asset-specificity) involved in the production of nuclear reactors 
means that there are always likely to be very few (if any) alternative buyers and suppliers. 
Williamson predicts that under such circumstances, “buyer and seller will make special efforts 
to design an exchange that has good continuity prospects”. In line with this prediction, 
Rosatom and OMZ negotiated in apparent good faith between 2006 and 2008 in the hope of 
settling on the terms of a joint venture.  
Williamson only predicts that both sides will be interested in resolving the problem, either by 
bringing future transactions ‘within the firm’ (so that both sides in the transaction are under 
common ownership) or through some partial move towards this “such as franchising, joint 
ventures, etc.”. However, his reasoning also suggests that the two sides might face problems 
in agreeing on a resolution to the problem: the same transaction costs that would be reduced 
by integration may also create obstacles to an agreement on such integration. The “lock-in” is 
problematic for both sides because, in the absence of alternative buyers and sellers, the market 
mechanism no longer provides any meaningful price signals. There is no independent 
guidance for either side in the transaction on what might be a ‘fair’ price for the product being 
transacted. Both sides are inevitably motivated to a significant extent by their own 
institutional profit-maximising self-interest. They are also operating within ‘bounded 
rationality’, i.e. as well as the uncertainty over price, they do not fully know or understand the 
motivations of the other side. This complicates reaching an agreement on the price of the 
product being transacted. But that price in turn affects the terms of a joint venture deal that in 
this case both sides saw as the resolution of the problem. Izhorskie Zavody’s value for the 
243 
 
purposes of the joint venture was dependent on the price it could expect to receive for its 
reactor equipment.  
The FTP had laid out Rosatom’s expectations for the prices of its equipment purchases, but 
Kirill Komarov, CEO of Rosatom’s company Atomenergoprom, claimed that Izhorskie 
Zavody was in 2007 demanding double the expected prices for its equipment. He argued that 
Rosatom was left with no choice but to search for an alternative supplier. OMZ countered that 
it had proposed a bilateral or trilateral commission to formulate a “market-based price”, and 
had received no response from Rosatom. It also claimed that it could offer lower prices if 
Rosatom were in exchange prepared to offer a guaranteed stream of orders (Vin’kov, 2010). 
The disagreements over price meant that Izhorskie Zavody was effectively idle for most of 
2006 and into early 2007 (Kuzin, 2007). It was reported in August 2007 that Rosatom had 
suspended its contract with Izhorskie Zavody for two reactor shells for the Novovoronezh 
nuclear power station (Belikov, 2007b). This was the only order it had received from Rosatom 
since the approval of the FTP in 2006. By the end of May 2008, there were still no confirmed 
orders from Rosatom263. Gazprombank had decided to go out on a limb and provide interim 
financing for construction of the Novovoronezh reactors while it waited for Rosatom to 
unfreeze the contract (Belikov, 2008b). The contract was eventually unfrozen, and a similar 
order was received from Rosatom for two reactors for the Leningrad-2 nuclear power station, 
helping Izhorskie Zavody to post a profit of RUB 144m (then worth $4.6m) in the first half of 
2009 (Bychina, 2009). But Rosatom had proceeded with this purchase with great reluctance, 
and continued to search for a way to break its dependence on Izhorskie Zavody. 
Meanwhile, signs had emerged as early as January 2008 that the planned joint venture 
agreement was in danger. OMZ held an EGM where two Rosatom representatives were 
running for seats on the board, so that the two sides could better coordinate implementation of 
                                                     
263 Meanwhile, Rosatom was pressing ahead with other aspects of the programme, having reached 
agreement to buy turbines and generators worth $1.7bn from Silovye Mashiny. 
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the joint venture. But neither of Rosatom’s representatives was voted on to the board. 
Gazprombank was now saying that it would subscribe to the new share issue at 
Atomstroieksport in cash, rather than handing over Izhorskie Zavody. A source close to the 
OMZ board commented that the two sides were in disagreement over the value of OMZ’s 
assets (Sikamova, 2008). When Atomstroieksport’s new share issue finally took place at the 
beginning of 2009, Gazprombank declined to participate. Izhorskie Zavody thus remained in 
OMZ’s ownership, and Gazprombank’s stake (now held via Forpost Management) was 
diluted to 10.7% (“Gazprombank ostalsya s Izhoroi, a Rosatom - s Atomstroieksportom,” 
2009; Godlevskaya, 2009). This marked the collapse of the joint venture plan and signalled a 
wider breakdown in relations between OMZ’s owners and Rosatom.  
In April 2009, Rosatom announced that it was embarking on a project to bring reactor 
construction ‘within the firm’. It intended to purchase the Soviet-era Atommash enterprise in 
Volgodonsk, which had been capable of building nuclear reactors until being re-profiled in the 
1990s for different types of production. At the beginning of 2010 it opted instead to buy the 
Petrozavodskmash plant, which had previously been used to make heavy machinery for the 
paper industry, and which Rosatom set about converting to the production of nuclear reactor 
equipment (Belikov, 2011; Vin’kov, 2010). 
Rosatom’s plans were at odds with the signals coming from the top political leadership. A 
visit by Putin to Izhorskie Zavody’s main plant in Kolpino (Leningradskaya region) in June 
2009 suggested that the political leadership had ruled in favour of OMZ. Putin was there to 
inspect the results of Gazprombank’s substantial investments in modernisation at the plant, 
which would enable Izhorskie Zavody to produce higher-spec reactors, as well as helping to 
increase from two to four the number of reactor equipment sets it could produce annually 
(“Putin osmotrel proizvodstvennye moshchnosti ‘Izhorskikh zavodov,’” 2009). According to 
one account, the financial crisis, and the consequent scaling down of the nuclear expansion 
programme, had been instrumental in Putin’s choice, as upgrading Izhorskie Zavody’s 
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existing facilities was more cost-effective than Rosatom’s alternative plans (“Kto investiruet, 
tot i vyigryvaet,” 2009). 
Nevertheless, Rosatom continued its efforts to develop its own production. In late November 
2010 it placed an order for a reactor unit for the Baltic nuclear power station in Kaliningrad 
not from Izhorskie Zavody but from Petrozavodskmash. Rosatom had used retained earnings 
to make $40m of investments so far (out of a planned total of $80m) in re-profiling the plant 
(Kudiyarov, 2011; Vin’kov, 2010). Petrozavodskmash was described in 2012 as pressing 
ahead with what was now described as a $155m investment programme which would allow it 
to deliver its first finished nuclear reactor in 2014 (Prokhorov, 2012). 
The failure of the two sides to cooperate was also a failure on the part of the government, 
which was interested in seeing the nuclear expansion strategy successfully realised. The 
government’s failure can be attributed to a lack of coordination between those state 
institutions and actors who were tasked with overseeing the operations of Rosatom and OMZ. 
When the federal agency Rosatom had taken over responsibility for the nuclear sector from 
Minatom in March 2004, it was initially made subordinate to the Ministry for Industry and 
Energy (then headed by Viktor Khristenko), which also had responsibility for heavy 
engineering. However, just a few months later Rosatom was instead made directly subordinate 
to the office of new Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
ot 20 maya 2004 g. N 649 Voprosy struktury federal’nykh organov ispol’nitel’noi vlasti, 
2004). Khristenko’s responsibility for the energy sector meant that he naturally retained an 
interest in (but no formal supervision over) nuclear energy production (Andrianov, 2008). 
The intention had reportedly been to divide the civilian and military aspects of the nuclear 
industry, giving the civilian operations to Khristenko’s Ministry and the military side to the 
Defence Ministry (“Minatom RF preobrazuyut v federal’noe agentstvo,” 2004). The decision 
instead to leave it directly subordinate to the Prime Minister may have been linked to a 
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realisation that implementing such a split was going to be a major task in itself. When 
Kirienko was appointed as Rosatom’s new head in November 2005 (coinciding with the OMZ 
takeover), it was with President Vladimir Putin’s public blessing. Putin stated that Kirienko’s 
role was to solve organisational problems in the nuclear energy sector, and a former Atomic 
Energy Minister (who claimed to have spoken to Kirienko) stated that what Putin had in mind 
was splitting the civilian and military sides of the industry (Nikol’skii & Yegorova, 2005).  
In the same month, Sergei Ivanov was made Deputy Prime Minister in addition to his existing 
role as Defence Minister. He was given responsibility for overseeing the military-industrial 
complex, a role which entailed some supervision of the military aspects of Rosatom’s 
activities (Nikol’skii, Mazneva, & Petrachkova, 2005). In February 2007, Ivanov was 
promoted to First Deputy Prime Minister and given additional responsibilities for civilian 
industry, including both nuclear energy and heavy engineering (Grozovsky, 2007)264. In May 
2008, Ivanov was demoted back to Deputy Prime Minister, but although oversight of civilian 
industry (including heavy engineering) was transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Igor’ 
Sechin, Ivanov retained his oversight of the nuclear energy sector (Nikolaeva, Sterkin, & 
Kaz’min, 2008). 
In December 2007 the Rosatom federal agency was transformed into a state corporation265 
with the same name, which continued to be headed by Kirienko. The laws underlying the 
creation of Rosatom and other state corporations stated that the chief executive reported to a 
Supervisory Council, whose Chairman was appointed by the Russian President (Volkov, 
2008b, pp. 10–11). It might have made sense to appoint Ivanov to this position at Rosatom, 
given his role as overseer of the nuclear industry. But instead, the Chairmanship was given to 
                                                     
264 Ivanov said in an April 2007 interview: “My main task is the real sector of the economy minus 
energy. I don’t get involved in energy apart from the nuclear sector, because the nuclear industry is a 
scientific sector […] I have been given the brief of looking after everything connected with innovation 
and diversification of sectors of the economy” (Buckley & Belton, 2007).  
265 The state corporation was a specific legal form of Russian company, with a special law passed by 
the President for the creation of each corporation. In each case, the assets contributed by the state to the 
corporation became the property of the corporation itself. See Volkov (2008b). 
247 
 
another political heavyweight, Sergei Sobyanin, who had been head of Putin’s Presidential 
Administration since 2005. After Medvedev became Russia’s President in March 2008 and 
Putin became Prime Minister, Sobyanin was made Deputy Prime Minister (“Sobyanin, Sergei: 
mer Moskvy,” n.d.). Medvedev re-appointed him as Chairman of Rosatom’s Supervisory 
Council in July 2008 (“D. Medvedev naznachil chlenami Nablyudatel’nogo soveta Rosatoma 
A. Dvorkovicha i Yu. Yakovleva,” 2008). 
Thus for most of the period when OMZ and Rosatom were holding talks on the creation of a 
joint-venture, the lines of reporting from the two sides in the talks to their political overseers 
were both complicated and shifting. Writing towards the end of the Yeltsin era, Huskey (1999, 
pp. 98–124) examined in detail the conflicting loyalties that arise when governmental 
institutions in Russia have overlapping responsibilities for particular sectors or policy areas. 
For a few months in 2007, Ivanov had authority over both sides in the negotiations. This was 
at a time when he was being groomed by Putin as a possible successor. It is quite possible that 
Ivanov had a particular loyalty to Gazprombank in its bargaining with Rosatom, not least 
because his son (also named Sergei Ivanov) was one of a handful of senior Gazprombank 
managers who were in charge of strategic management at OMZ. Under these circumstances, 
Kirienko did not have sufficient authority to impose conditions on Gazprombank. Since 
Ivanov had numerous other responsibilities and apparently had his sights set on the 
presidency, it may be that his interest in the outcome of the talks between Rosatom and OMZ 
did not extend beyond supporting the bargaining position of the latter at this time. After 
December 2007, the arrival of Sobyanin at Rosatom must have substantially weakened 
Ivanov’s personal authority. 
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Research question 2: explaining the ownership outcomes 
Turning now to the ownership outcomes of the SLCTs, it is possible to state that 
Atomstroieksport was brought back to “state ownership” through its controlling interest in 
Gazprombank, the new controlling shareholder. State control was also established over OMZ, 
albeit more tentatively via a pension fund which by definition had no owners. In both cases, 
Gazprom group (loosely defined) can be said to have been the buyer. The reasons for its 
interest in these acquisitions, and for the state’s own interest in seeing Gazprom group as the 
buyers, have been explained above.  
Following on from the previous chapter, one question that arises is why Gazprom group was 
now selecting Gazprombank to make its purchases (albeit via Gazfond in the case of OMZ), 
rather than using Gazprominvestholding. As another Gazprom subsidiary, Gazprombank was 
as well-placed as Gazprominvestholding to bypass the need for the government’s directive in 
deal approvals. It had also provided the finance for some of the Gazprominvestholding 
acquisitions made in the previous chapter. But in those earlier acquisitions (which took place 
largely in 2002), the particular value of Gazprominvestholding over Gazprombank was its 
ability to present itself as being ‘on the side of’ the existing asset owners. In the more recent 
takeovers made by Gazprombank, the atmosphere was less acrimonious and Usmanov had no 
historical affinities with the existing owner. 
Another factor is that Gazprominvestholding was tasked with returning assets previously 
owned by Gazprom, or on the brink of being lost. Gazprombank, by contrast, was becoming a 
channel for new non-core investments by Gazprom group (Kozyrev & Sokolova, 2008). It 
began to take on this role following the appointment of Andrei Akimov as its new CEO in 
2002, and by some accounts, acquisitions such as Atomstroieksport and OMZ were his 
initiative (Birman, 2005; Milov, 2012). Meanwhile Gazprominvestholding’s role reportedly 
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shifted towards cracking down on non-payments by Gazprom’s clients (Igumenov & 
Malkova, 2012). 
The remainder of this section deals with the specific ownership outcomes of the two 
takeovers, i.e. the particular ownership structures that were used by the buyers. As described 
in the earlier section assessing the ownership outcomes, both takeovers involved the use of 
multiple affiliated entities, and the buyers refused to confirm the acquisitions until some time 
after the fact. On the face of it, this would seem to fit with the notion that the takeovers were 
aimed at rent-seeking by insiders: the complex and non-transparent nature of the acquisitions 
was, by this interpretation, designed to maximise the opportunities for insiders to extract value 
from the target companies and/or the buying entities. However, close examination of the 
evidence indicates that the specific ownership outcomes were instead (as in the Gazprom 
takeovers examined in the previous chapter) a response to legal restrictions that stipulated the 
need for prior approval of company acquisitions.  
In the previous chapter, this prior approval needed to come from the board of directors of the 
company making the acquisition; if that company was state-owned as in the case of Gazprom, 
then approval from state representatives on the board first required additional approvals from 
relevant government bodies. Gazprom used subsidiaries, and subsidiaries of subsidiaries, in an 
effort to circumvent these restrictions so that it could respond more flexibly in time-sensitive 
situations. In the present chapter, the buyers designed the acquisitions primarily in reference 
to a different restriction, namely the need for prior approval by the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service (FAS).  
By law, this approval was required if a single group of entities (as defined in antitrust 
legislation266) purchased more than 20% of a company. The threshold had been set in Article 
                                                     
266 Since 2006 the legal definition of a group of entities has been found in Article 9 of the Law on the 
Defence of Competition (Zakon “O zashchite konkurentsii”), available in its 2006 edition at 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61763/. Accessed 23 January 2014. 
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18 of the Law “On competition and restricting monopolistic activity on commodity markets”, 
first passed in 1991267. There was an additional qualification aimed at preventing a flood of 
applications for minor transactions: prior approval was only required if the combined asset 
value of the group of companies making the acquisition and the target company exceeded 30 
million “minimum wages”. Below this threshold, post factum notification of an acquisition 
was sufficient. The minimum wage was set by the government at RUB 600 at the time of the 
Atomstroieksport acquisition, and had been raised to RUB 800 by the time of the OMZ 
acquisition268, so the combined asset value threshold was RUB 18bn for the former, and RUB 
24bn for the latter. Given that this applied not just to the acquiring company but to the wider 
group, and Gazprom group’s total assets were valued at the end of 2004 at RUB 2.51 
trillion269 , there was no doubt that Gazprom group companies would require prior FAS 
approval for any new acquisitions. 
Before turning to how this law affected the ownership outcomes at Atomstroieksport and 
OMZ, it is helpful to examine an earlier case in which Gazprom group purchased a 25.1% 
stake in Mosenergo, the Moscow-based electricity company that was then a subsidiary of the 
company United Energy Systems (UES). Gazprombank bought a 15.76% stake in May 2003, 
but no formal acknowledgement was made of this fact until the publication of a Gazprom 
Eurobond prospectus in April 2004 (Reznik & Yegorova, 2004). In July 2004, Gazprombank 
sold the shares to a buyer who was not named in Gazprom’s accounts. Although the sale was 
described as an exit in those accounts, Gazprom’s press-secretary revealed that the buyer was 
Gazfond. There followed a buying frenzy for Mosenergo shares on the open market. Gazprom 
refused to comment on the widespread suspicion that it was the buyer, but then on 19 
November 2004 it revealed in its consolidated accounts that the group now owned a 25.1% 
                                                     
267  Zakon “O konkurentsii i ogranichenii monopolisticheskoi deyatel’nosti na tovarnykh rynkakh”, 
available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_58244/?frame=5. Accessed 23 
January 2014. In 2006, the threshold was raised to 25% by Article 28 of the Law “On the defence of 
competition”. 
268 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_law_15189/. Accessed 23 January 2014.  
269 Gazprom Financial Report for 2004, pp. 7-8. 
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stake, sufficient to block key decisions at the company. Gazprom said that it hoped to 
regularise its purchase with the FAS once the shares, which were distributed among several 
entities, had been transferred to the balance-sheet of a single company (“FAS zainteresovalas’ 
pokupkami ‘Gazproma,’” 2004; Makeev & Siluyanova, 2004). 
In an earlier section it was pointed out that, despite having no legal owners, Gazfond was 
treated as being part of Gazprom group both in Gazprom’s financial reports to international 
accounting standards (IAS) and in its Russian regulatory disclosures. In that sense, it held no 
value to Gazprom in terms of circumventing the need for prior approval for its acquisitions 
from the FAS. The decision to involve Gazfond in Gazprom’s acquisition of Mosenergo has a 
different explanation: crucially, the founders of a non-state pension fund were not obliged to 
include details of the pension fund’s assets and liabilities in its consolidated accounts. 
Furthermore, there were no obligations on the pension fund itself to disclose its own finances 
in any detail (Grivach, 2005)270. Transferring assets to Gazfond therefore kept those assets 
within Gazprom group271 but concealed them from any form of outside scrutiny, including 
regulatory oversight. 
The attraction of this option in the Mosenergo purchase stemmed from the fact that that 
company’s shares were publicly traded. If Gazprom had bought shares directly272, it would 
have been expected to apply for prior approval from the FAS before bringing its stake above 
20%. If instead it planned to delay this application until after the fact, then it could not have 
kept what it was doing hidden: its disclosure requirements would have obliged it to reveal the 
true size of its stake. Either way, its actions would have entered the public domain, signalling 
                                                     
270 Further background on this issue came to light in 2013, when the government proposed turning non-
state pension funds into joint-stock companies in order to increase transparency and regulatory 
supervision (Biyanova & Papchenkova, 2013). 
271 As Gazprom’s press-secretary put it, “Gazfond is a pension fund and when shares are transferred to 
it, this is not reflected in the accounts [of Gazprom]. But Gazprom retains its interest in gas-powered 
electricity generation [gazovoi generatsii]. Mosenergo’s shares have changed owner in a formal sense, 
but in essence, they have remained inside the group” (Grib, 2004). 
272  Or through Gazprominvestholding, which unlike the parent company held a licence to buy 
exchange-traded shares (see Chapter 3). 
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to potential speculative investors that Gazprom was intent on a buying spree at Mosenergo. 
The cost to Gazprom of building up its desired stake would have been substantially higher as a 
result.  
There was also a financial advantage in using Gazfond as a buyer of new assets. Hanson 
(2009, p. 21) has pointed to finite financial resources as a potentially significant factor which 
limits Russia’s appetite for expanded state ownership: “as long as policymakers stop well 
short of isolating Russia from the international business community by acts of outright 
expropriation, the acquisition of assets by state companies has to be paid for, and Rosneft and 
Gazprom cannot increase their borrowing indefinitely to finance a rapid rate of acquisition”. 
Gazfond gave Gazprom access to additional funds in the form of pension reserves, which 
could prove useful if the Gazprom group was experiencing problems relating to liquidity or 
indebtedness. This money could be spent without affecting the financial position of the group 
itself273. It was also suggested that selling shares to Gazfond (rather than leaving them on its 
own balance sheet) enabled Gazprombank to remain within the capital adequacy requirements 
set by the Russian Central Bank (Grib, 2004)274. 
Atomstroieksport 
As at Mosenergo, Gazprom group most likely made use of Gazfond in its acquisition of 
Atomstroieksport, and for similar reasons. Once again, the way in which the acquisition was 
structured was clearly influenced by the requirement to gain prior approval from the FAS.  
As noted earlier, when the Atomstroieksport takeover was first reported on 8 October 2004, 
the buyers were described as “Gazprombank and several of its subsidiaries” (Yambaeva, 
2004). Gazprombank refused to confirm the transaction even after it had been announced by a 
                                                     
273 Though it is not clear how much Gazprom group paid to accumulate the Mosenergo stake, some idea 
of the cost can be gleaned from the fact that Gazfond paid RUB 11.7bn (then worth $400m) to 
Gazprombank for the 15.76% stake in September 2004 (Grib, 2004). 
274 Although these were relatively liquid assets because they were listed shares, they would have added 
to the bank’s total risk-weighted assets, against which it was obliged to make sufficient capital 
provision. 
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government official on 15 October (“Gazprombank poluchil kontrol’ nad ZAO 
‘Atomstroieksport,’” 2004). The first formal confirmation came at the end of November 2004, 
when Gazprom revealed in a consolidated financial report that the group now controlled 
53.85% of the company (“FAS zainteresovalas’ pokupkami ‘Gazproma,’” 2004). It did not 
apply to the FAS for permission for this purchase until December. The applicant was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Gazprombank named OOO Finkom, which was now the owner of 
the entire 53.85% stake. In other words, in the weeks after the 7 October transaction, the 
original buying entities had transferred their Atomstroieksport shares to Finkom. 
This use of multiple entities to buy the controlling stake in Atomstroieksport was almost 
certainly a repeat of the methods used in the Mosenergo case. Again, it was done in order to 
delay the moment when application was made to the FAS. It is likely that the buyers again 
included Gazfond or affiliates thereof, which for the reasons outlined above would have 
helped conceal the real size of the Gazprom group stake. Unlike Mosenergo, Atomstroieksport 
was not a listed entity, so the motive here was not to deter speculative investors. Instead, it 
was most likely the time-sensitive nature of the deal that prompted Gazprombank to use these 
methods again. To recap, the government headed by Mikhail Kas’yanov had an agreement 
with OMZ-Silovye Mashiny on restoring Atomstroieksport to state control. Then in March 
2004, a new government headed by Mikhail Fradkov was put in place, and OMZ-Silovye 
Mashiny was obliged to wait and see whether the new government would honour the existing 
agreement. Shortly afterwards, the OMZ-Silovye Mashiny merger unwound and Bendukidze 
(who resumed control of Atomstroieksport as a result) joined the government of a foreign 
country. Although technically this meant placing his shares in OMZ (through which he 
controlled Atomstroieksport) in blind trust, the new Russian government no doubt resolved at 
this point that Atomstroieksport needed to be restored to state control as quickly as possible. 
Under the circumstances, Gazprombank presumably judged that it was worth cutting corners 
on the FAS approval for the sake of expediting the takeover.  
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When the bank subsequently sold a 4% stake in Atomstroieksport to TVEL, it then sought to 
sell its remaining 49% to Forpost-Management, and once again the FAS regulations shaped 
how this was done. It first sold Forpost a 19.9% stake (i.e. just below the threshold requiring 
FAS approval) in June 2006, and then in the same month it applied to increase this stake to 
49%. Thus the aim was to sell as many shares as possible before having to wait for FAS 
permission. Presumably, this was motivated by Gazprombank’s capital adequacy 
requirements, i.e. its wish to offload as much of this relatively illiquid asset as possible 
without having to wait for approval from the FAS. 
OMZ 
In the earlier section which assessed OMZ’s ownership outcome, it was determined that 
Gazfond must have been the company’s hidden controlling beneficiary from November 2005 
onwards. Using Gazfond as the buyer helped Gazprom to deny its involvement in the same 
way as it had for a time at Mosenergo. Initially, OMZ’s buyers faced a similar predicament: 
like Mosenergo, OMZ was a listed company, and the application to FAS would signal to 
speculative investors that Forpost intended to build up a substantial stake275.  
In terms of secrecy, however, the OMZ takeover in November 2005 was a more extreme 
version of the earlier Mosenergo and Atomstroieksport cases. In those earlier acquisitions, 
Gazprom group had been prepared to admit its involvement once it had obtained the desired 
number of shares in the target company. But at OMZ, the identity of the ultimate controlling 
beneficiaries between November 2005 and February 2009 was never revealed. Something 
made Gazprom want to keep its involvement secret long after it had gained control over the 
asset. 
                                                     
275 In February 2006, when Gazprombank announced that it was representing OMZ’s buyers, who had 
gained a 75% stake, it also said it was considering de-listing the company and changing its legal form 
from open to closed joint-stock company. This may have been the intention at the time, but the delisting 
and change in legal form never happened, and there was speculation that the announcement was 
designed at least in part to dampen investor appetite for OMZ shares (“Povestka dnya: OMZ stanet 
ZAO,” 2006). 
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Vedomosti newspaper cited a source close to the negotiations leading up to the OMZ takeover, 
who said that it became clear during the talks that Gazprom and its affiliates would not be able 
to buy the company. This was because it included two engineering companies in the Czech 
Republic named Skoda JS and Skoda Steel, and this meant prior approval would need to be 
sought from the “European antitrust body”, i.e. the European Commission  (Yegorova & 
Malkova, 2005). These Czech companies had been acquired by OMZ-Silovye Mashiny in 
April 2004 (Lemeshko, 2004a; “‘OMZ-Silovye Mashiny’ prishli v Chekhiyu,” 2004). The 
source noted that relations between Gazprom and the European Commission were not good, 
implying that permission for the deal was not expected to be forthcoming (Yegorova & 
Malkova, 2005)276.  
Clearly, a simpler way for Gazprom to avoid problems with the European Commission would 
have been to cut these Czech assets out of the OMZ purchase. But there are indications that 
the buyers saw them as an important part of the OMZ business. Sergei Lipsky, who took over 
as OMZ’s CEO after the company bought the Czech assets (and who therefore might have 
had reason to point to his predecessor’s mistakes), said in a December 2004 interview that 
those new assets were “a logical addition to OMZ’s existing businesses. Thanks to these 
assets the company has gained access to European markets […] We would have needed at 
least five years to gain access to those markets ourselves.” He also noted that there would be 
considerable technology transfer from the Czech plants to OMZ’s existing Russian plants 
(Lemeshko, 2004c). 
The European Commission hypothesis comes from just this one source cited in a single (albeit 
highly reputable) Russian newspaper. Efforts to find corroborating evidence elsewhere proved 
fruitless. It is, however, consistent with the fact that the mystery surrounding OMZ’s 
controlling beneficiaries ended in February 2009, when Gazprombank acquired OMZ’s parent 
                                                     
276 It is indeed the case that there have historically been tensions between Gazprom and the European 
Commission, albeit the main focus of those tensions has been Gazprom’s allegedly anti-competitive 
practices in its European gas sales (Riley, 2012). 
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company Forpost-Management (“Gazprombank stal sobstvennikom 85% aktsii ZAO 
‘Forpost-Menedzhment’, kontroliruyushchego OMZ,” 2009). As explained earlier, 
Gazprombank had ceased legally to be part of Gazprom group in 2007. Therefore the 
European Commission no longer had any legal grounds to cite difficulties with Gazprom as an 
objection to Gazprombank’s ownership of OMZ277. 
Using Gazfond as buyer did not in itself pre-empt possible objections from the European 
Commission, since (as explained above) the pension fund was at the time still being treated by 
Gazprom as a member of its group of companies. But because neither Gazprom nor Gazfond 
needed to disclose details of the assets held by the pension company, channelling ownership 
through Gazfond was crucial in maintaining the secrecy surrounding OMZ’s controlling 
beneficiaries. It allowed Gazprom and Gazprombank to deny publicly that they had any 
affiliation to OMZ’s buyers, secure in the knowledge that this could not be proved otherwise. 
However, the OMZ acquisition was again structured in a complex way, rather than simply 
involving Gazfond as the buyer. When it was first announced in November 2005, the 
investment bank UFG, which acted as settlor and organiser, claimed that the buyers were 
several entities who were not affiliated with each other, and that accordingly the deal did not 
require antitrust approval (Yambaeva et al., 2005). The fact that UFG felt the need to make 
the latter point explicit indicates that the deal may well have been deliberately structured in 
order to bypass the need to seek prior approval from the FAS. As at Mosenergo and 
Atomstroieksport, the multiple entities which made the initial acquisition then transferred their 
shares to a single company (in this case, Forpost-Management). Once again, this single 
company duly applied to the FAS for permission at a time that the buyers deemed most 
appropriate for them. In June 2006, Forpost applied to the FAS both to increase its 
                                                     
277 At the time of Gazprombank’s purchase of Forpost-Management in February 2009, OMZ still had 
its Czech assets. It subsequently sold one of these assets in July 2010, but was still in possession of 
Skoda JS at the time of writing. 
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Atomstroieksport stake from 19.9% to 49%, and to increase its OMZ stake (which it claimed 
was 19.93%) to 95% (Aliev, 2007; Malkova & Mazneva, 2007; Malkova, 2007a). 
Once again, Gazfond (whose pension reserves stood at RUB 244.8bn ($8.6bn) as of the end of 
2005 (“Pensionnye rezervy,” n.d.)) provided a useful alternative source of funds at a time 
when Gazprom group’s financial situation was strained. In the two months preceding 
Gazfond’s acquisition of OMZ, Gazprom had acquired a 75.68% stake in oil company 
Sibneft’ (Gazprom, 2006, p. 7). This was financed via a $13bn bridging loan from a 
consortium of Western banks (Ostrovsky, 2005), and left Gazprom highly leveraged, with net 
debt of just under $30bn as of the end of 2005 (“Fitch upgrades Gazprom,” 2006). Granted, 
the OMZ purchase price (believed to have been between $50m and $70m) was trivial to a 
company of Gazprom’s scale. However, in making the acquisition Gazprom was also 
assuming OMZ’s debt, which stood at $221m at the end of 2005 (“Finansovye rezul’taty za 
2005 god po MSFO svidetel’stvuyut ob uspekhakh programmy optimizatsii kommercheskikh 
i administrativnykh zatrat,” 2006)278. 
Response of the FAS to Gazprom’s actions 
The interactions described above between Gazprom group and the FAS provide a mixed 
picture of partial compliance with the relevant law and some direct contraventions. In this 
respect, the picture differs from the account in the previous chapter of Gazprom’s relationship 
to constraints relating to corporate governance. In that previous chapter, Gazprom was seen to 
be frequently distorting the spirit of the relevant laws and regulations, but no evidence was 
found of any direct contraventions. Gazprom’s more cavalier attitude can doubtless be 
explained to a significant extent by the fact it could rely on only a limited response from the 
FAS, and the following account shows that Gazprom did indeed largely escape sanction for its 
violations.  
                                                     
278 By structuring the acquisition via the pension fund, Gazprom was only assuming OMZ’s debt in the 
loosest sense. It was not required to reflect OMZ’s liabilities in its own consolidated accounts, because 
it had no legal ownership over OMZ. 
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The FAS reacted to the official acknowledgement that Gazprombank had gained control of 
Atomstroieksport by writing to Gazprom in December 2004 requesting information regarding 
the acquisition, something Gazprom was required by law to provide in a timely fashion (“FAS 
zainteresovalas’ pokupkami ‘Gazproma,’” 2004). In January 2005 the FAS said that the 
information had not been provided within the required time-frame, and that it would soon be 
deciding on what action to take in response to this administrative violation (Grivach, 2005). 
But in March the FAS granted post-factum permission for the Atomstroieksport acquisition, 
saying that it had found no violations “either from the point of view of market dominance or 
from the point of view of the legal requirements to apply in advance of concluding the deal” 
(“FAS odobrila pokupku ‘Gazpromom’ kontrol’nogo paketa ‘Atomstroieksporta,’” 2005).  
The main action taken by the FAS with respect to the two acquisitions followed the June 2006 
application by Forpost-Management to increase its stake in Atomstroieksport to 49%, and its 
stake in OMZ to 95%. At the time, Forpost held a 19.9% stake (just below the threshold 
requiring approval) in both companies. The FAS delayed its decision on this application until 
May 2007. Unusually, its decision was to deny approval279 . Contemporary press reports 
suggested that this decision reflected the FAS’s hostility towards Gazprom. But the FAS cited 
two apparently objective reasons for its rejection: firstly, Forpost had failed to provide the 
information requested on the identity of its ultimate beneficiaries, making it impossible to 
determine the impact the deals would have on competitiveness in the heavy engineering 
sector; secondly, Forpost had by the end of 2006 increased its stake in OMZ without waiting 
for a decision from the FAS. This second point meant that the information in Forpost’s 
application, on which the FAS was being asked to opine, was no longer accurate (Aliev, 2007; 
Belikov, 2007a; Malkova & Mazneva, 2007; Malkova, 2007a). For a year, Gazprombank 
abided by this ruling and held on to the 30% Atomstroieksport stake it had intended to sell to 
Forpost. But in June 2008, it went ahead and sold the stake in direct contravention of the FAS 
                                                     
279 In 2006, the FAS declined only 2.2% of the 6000 applications it received (Belikov, 2007a).  
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ruling, and notified the FAS of this after the fact. The FAS said that it was studying this 
notification to determine whether the transaction had been legal (Denisova, 2008). There is no 
record of the FAS having taken any legal action against Forpost280.  
The FAS said that it intended to fine Forpost for its failure to gain prior approval to increase 
its OMZ stake, but the amount of the fine was a mere RUB 500,000 (approximately $1,600). 
The antitrust body refused to be drawn on whether it intended to challenge the transaction in 
court (Belikov, 2007a). The evidence suggests that it elected not do so281. Forpost retained its 
OMZ stake at approximately the same level, rather than proceed as it had done at 
Atomstroieksport by increasing its stake despite the FAS ruling282. 
Growing – but limited – authority of the FAS 
The above account shows that Gazprom’s partial compliance with the law requiring prior FAS 
approval for deals was matched by an only partial willingness on the part of the FAS to 
sanction non-compliance. Although growing in independent authority, the regulatory body 
was still relatively powerless against the might of Gazprom and in any case had only limited 
sanctioning powers available. 
Created in March 2004 as the successor to the Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy, the FAS 
was headed by Igor’ Artem’yev, under whose leadership it “began to fight anti-competitive 
practices much more actively than in the previous 10 years” (Panov, 2005). This helps to 
explain why the FAS had played a less significant role in determining ownership outcomes in 
the 2002 takeovers of the previous chapter. Much of the work of the FAS focused on other 
anti-competitive practices (such as price-fixing or cartelisation) for which it was authorised to 
apply relatively severe penalties. Against companies that failed to comply with the law 
                                                     
280 Based on searches of press archives and the centralised database of arbitrazh court cases, which is  
maintained by the Supreme Arbitrazh Court and available at http://kad.arbitr.ru   
281 See fn. 280. 
282 As of the end of 2011, Forpost’s stake in OMZ was 46.31%. This was down from 49.9% the year 
before, but was still enough to exercise voting control. Source: OMZ Consolidated Financial 
Statements, 31 December 2011, p. 28. 
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requiring prior approval for transactions, its powers were meagre. It could unilaterally impose 
a fine on such companies, but this was a token amount not exceeding RUB 500,000 (around 
$1600) (Grivach, 2005; Malkova, 2008; Medvedeva, 2007c). In principle, it could apply to an 
arbitrazh court to have the transaction annulled. But in order to be successful, it needed to 
prove that the acquisition had been anti-competitive (Malkova & Mazneva, 2007). In a 
February 2007 interview, Artem’yev claimed that the agency was successful in 80% of the 
cases it brought to court (Corcoran, 2007). But the vast majority of these cases related to other 
types of anti-competitive activity. 
In the same interview, Artem’yev made clear that the agency had a negative attitude to 
Gazprom’s “growing monopolism”. The two sides had just emerged from a bitter legal battle, 
which had begun two months before the OMZ acquisition, in September 2005. The FAS had 
approved Gazprom’s acquisition of the gas producing company Nortgaz, but had imposed a 
highly significant condition on this approval: Gazprom group would not be permitted to buy 
any further controlling stakes in gas-producing companies in Russia. If it did so, the FAS 
would go to court to invalidate the transaction (“FAS razreshila vernut’ ‘Nortgaz’ pod 
kontrol’ ‘Gazproma,’” 2005). Gazprom successfully challenged this condition in court, and by 
January 2007 the FAS had dropped its condition (Surzhenko, 2007). Artem’yev noted in the 
aforementioned interview that the FAS was successful against Gazprom in only 30% of cases 
(as opposed to an 80% overall success rate). But although he implied that the courts were 
biased in Gazprom’s favour, he also claimed that “we normally launch about 20 suits against 
Gazprom a year and there have never been any complaints from the government or the 
Kremlin”. 
It appears that the FAS rarely exercised its right to take companies to court specifically for 
having failed to gain prior approval for a deal. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there have been 
occasions when Gazprom and Gazprombank have chosen to proceed without prior approval, if 
time was pressing. In the later acquisition of Sibneftegaz by Gazprombank, a source at the 
261 
 
bank made the calculation explicit by saying that, because the FAS fine was so small, “it will 
be easier to pay the fine now, rather than get together all the necessary documents and wait for 
the FAS decision on approval. All this bureaucracy takes a long time, which on this occasion 
we didn’t have” (Podobedova, 2007). 
The FAS found two ways to make the most of the limited powers available to it. The 
conditional approval, as with the Nortgaz acquisition, was one tactic: failure to comply with 
the conditions imposed by the FAS gave the latter a sounder basis for challenging the original 
deal in court (Medvedeva, 2007c). The second tactic was to delay reaching a decision on an 
application, thus creating an aura of legal risk around the acquired asset because of the 
theoretical possibility that the transaction might be annulled in court. Delaying tactics were 
used when the independent gas producer Novatek announced in September 2004 that it would 
sell a blocking stake to French company Total. The FAS made it clear there would be no 
decision on approval until Novatek had carried out a planned IPO. Novatek’s owners then 
“got the message”, doing “virtually everything in their power to squirm out of the deal with 
Total without losing face” (Heinrich & Kusznir, 2005, p. 24). On that occasion, Novatek no 
doubt understood that the stance taken by the FAS reflected a wider political opposition to the 
deal, which was in turn based on concern over a Western company taking a major stake in 
Russia’s second largest gas producer. Where that wider political opposition was absent, 
delaying tactics from the FAS were less likely to deter a state-backed company such as 
Gazprom. In his 2007 interview, Artemyev said that the FAS had ultimately succeeded only in 
delaying Gazprom’s acquisitions of Nortgaz and Mosenergo283, implying that to him such an 
outcome was better than nothing when the FAS had objections to a deal but did not have the 
power to block it. 
                                                     
283  In 2007, Gazprom sought FAS approval to bring its stake in Mosenergo up to controlling 
(Medvedeva, 2007b).  
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Conclusion 
The evidence from the cases offers little support for the notion that the SLCTs had predatory 
motives. The decision to bring Atomstroieksport back into state hands was motivated by 
international pressure from its clients, who otherwise questioned the value of the Russian state 
guarantees underlying their orders, and by the belief that only a state-owned company would 
refrain from abusing its monopoly position as the gateway for exports of equipment for 
nuclear power stations. The state may, as Pappe and Galukhina (2009, p. 174) suggest, have 
been prompted by Bendukidze’s takeover of Atomstroieksport to push out private capital at all 
nuclear-related enterprises including OMZ. But the particular importance of Izhorskie Zavody 
to the government’s strategy for the nuclear industry, and concerns over Bendukidze’s having 
joined the Georgian government, probably best explain why the state was demanding OMZ’s 
return to state control.  
There is also sufficient evidence to state with some confidence that the buyers’ decision to 
become involved in these takeovers was not motivated only by naked self-interest. Granted, 
Gazprom’s decision to buy OMZ was almost certainly influenced by the prospect of 
considerable profits from the supply of government orders for new reactors as part of the 
nuclear expansion programme. The successful realisation of this programme also promised 
additional revenues for Gazprom (and for the government) because it would free up more gas 
for export. Thus commercial incentives dovetailed with the wish to help implement 
government strategy. This is not the same as saying that they were simply opportunists 
battling with Rosatom for a share of the spoils from the nuclear expansion programme. They 
duly transferred Atomstroieksport to Rosatom’s control, and apparently received no 
meaningful compensation for providing this service. At OMZ they backed up their talk of the 
need to preserve Russia’s “technological sovereignty” with genuine efforts to revive this 
important part of the heavy engineering industry. Rather than being deliberately obstructive in 
order to maximise their profits from sales of reactors to Rosatom, they went through a number 
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of changes of senior management, in search of people who could mend fences with the 
government agency. Crucially, they also decided to keep OMZ alive with new credits after the 
hoped-for flood of orders from Rosatom failed to materialise and doubts arose as to whether it 
could otherwise survive as a going concern. This decision makes little sense from a purely 
commercial perspective and provides convincing evidence that the altruistic, patriotic rhetoric 
of the ‘silovarchs’ at Forpost and Gazprombank was not in this case a mere smokescreen for 
venal self-interest, as we would expect based on the remarks made by Murtazaev (2006) and 
Hanson (2007b, p. 33).  
Nevertheless, the institutional self-interest of the buyers is an important part of the explanation 
for their subsequent failure to cooperate effectively with Rosatom, thereby endangering the 
same government programme they claimed to be intent on helping to fulfil. Williamson 
(1981) proved helpful in explaining why two sets of institutions which seem to have been 
genuinely interested in helping the government realise its strategy ended up undermining it. 
As a result, the distinctly mixed results of Gazprom group’s involvement in Russia’s nuclear 
engineering industry are explained in a way that is more nuanced and convincing than typical 
accounts based on rivalry between two sets of interest-maximising bureaucratic factions. From 
the state’s perspective, the failure to bring about the cooperation between the two sides can be 
attributed to a lack of coordination between the various state actors and institutions that had 
oversight of the nuclear and heavy engineering industries, and to overlapping responsibilities 
between them. This recalls the emphasis placed by Johnson (1982, p. 319) on the importance 
of a “pilot organisation” in successful state-led development. Indeed, the story of Rosatom’s 
and OMZ’s failure to cooperate provides an illustration of just how state-led developmental 
projects can founder in ways that do not require any of the state agents involved to be 
harbouring corrupt or predatory motives.  
The examination of the way the Atomstroieksport and OMZ acquisitions were executed, and 
the precise way in which ownership was structured, has highlighted the extent to which these 
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were shaped by both domestic and international institutional constraints on the buyers. The 
use of multiple entities including Gazfond helped the buyers to delay the moment when they 
turned to the antitrust regulator for approval for the deals, so that they could expedite the deals 
in time-sensitive circumstances and avoid signalling their intentions to speculative investors 
who would drive up the price of the takeover. The peculiar legal status of Gazfond enabled the 
buyers to keep their identity secret and avoid problems with the European Union’s antitrust 
body. Gazfond also provided a fresh source of ‘off-the-books’ funds for a group that was 
reaching the limits of its indebtedness.  
That Gazprom’s actions were shaped by institutional constraints at all is significant in itself, 
because in an ideal-typical kleptocracy one would expect a state-owned company to operate 
without regard to such constraints, especially when it is engaging in a takeover that has the 
government’s full support. But in these two SLCTs, the state-backed buyers did not simply 
respond with meek compliance to the institutional constraints stemming from the FAS. 
Instead, their response was a mixture of compliance, “gaming of the rules”, and direct breach, 
as follows:  
1) using multiple entities including Gazfond, they delayed the moment when application was 
made for prior FAS approval for the acquisitions. They maximised the stakes that could be 
built up without the need for such approval (compliance, but with some ‘gaming of the rules’ 
and possible breach through concealment of the amount of shares held by Gazfond);  
2) they duly applied for FAS approval (compliance), but at OMZ did not wait for this 
approval before building up the stake further (breach); 
3) after the FAS declined the application, they halted the planned sale of the remaining 30% 
stake in Atomstroieksport to Forpost-Management, and abandoned the idea of increasing 
further Forpost’s stake in OMZ (compliance); 
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4) but after a year, they proceeded with the Atomstroieksport sale in direct contravention of 
the FAS ruling (breach). 
How to explain this particular mixture? North (1990, p. 4) writes that “an essential part of the 
functioning of institutions is the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of 
punishment”. The extent to which Gazprom’s actions were shaped by institutional constraints 
can no doubt largely be explained in terms of the possibility and severity of sanctions for non-
compliance. As discussed above, the FAS was gaining real independent authority under its 
new leadership, and had begun taking companies including Gazprom to the arbitrazh courts. 
The FAS had a significantly below-average success rate in court cases it brought against 
Gazprom, and limited powers available to it without recourse to the courts. It may be that it 
chose not to pursue court action against the buyers of Atomstroiekport and OMZ (even when 
they directly contravened a FAS ruling) because it did not believe in the possibility of a fair 
trial against this powerful state-owned and state-backed company. But it is also possible that it 
decided that it could not prove either acquisition was anti-competitive, the only legal basis on 
which it could secure a court ruling to annul a transaction. The FAS may have realised that 
legal action would only prompt OMZ buyers’ to take defensive action by selling OMZ shares 
on to offshore companies and making it all but impossible to prove that those companies were 
part of a single group284.  
Significantly, in these and other cases involving Gazprom, the FAS made substantial use of 
the powers available to it without going to court (delaying approval and/or making it subject 
to certain conditions). Its head, Igor’ Artem’yev, appeared to view successfully delaying deals 
of which the FAS did not approve as a worthy goal when blocking them was not practically 
possible. Thus, even when considerable doubts remain regarding the independence of the 
                                                     
284 This possibility was suggested by a lawyer cited in Belikov (2007a). 
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courts from the executive, institutions can still cause difficulties for state-backed companies, 
raising the costs of non-compliance with existing legislation285.  
The buyers were apparently confident enough of their privileged position vis-à-vis the courts 
to ultimately go against a direct ruling from the FAS – and their confidence proved well-
founded. But it is also significant that their behaviour showed an interest in complying with 
the relevant legislation: they did apply for FAS approval, even if this was after the fact; if the 
20% threshold demanding prior FAS approval was an irrelevance to them, they would not 
have built up their stakes in Atomstroieksport and OMZ to 19.9% before applying for that 
approval; and the FAS ruling against the sale of the remaining 30% stake in Atomstroieksport 
made them pause for a year before proceeding nevertheless with the transaction. This limited 
interest in compliance might be explicable solely in terms of the distinctly inadequate (but 
greater than zero) capacity of the FAS to sanction non-compliance. But Gans-Morse (2011) 
may be right to suggest that another force was at work in moving Russian companies away 
from “force” to “law”: because of its exposure to external creditors and shareholders, 
Gazprom group was on balance interested in avoiding controversy and complying with the 
legislation. This limited effect was, however, only sufficient to constrain Gazprom’s actions 
when there was no overriding priority to expedite its takeovers. 
  
                                                     
285 Gazprombank’s sale of its remaining 30% stake in Atomstroieksport to Forpost-Management was 
aimed at helping the bank meet its capital adequacy requirements. By ruling against the transaction, the 
FAS at least delayed this sale for a few months, and thereby imposed a material penalty of sorts on the 
bank. 
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Chapter 5. State-led coercive takeovers, 
kleptocracy and the “developmental state” 
Since Vladimir Putin first became Russia’s President in 2000, the state has played an 
increasingly active and interventionist role in the economy, and one important manifestation 
of this trend has been its involvement in a large number of coercive takeovers of privately-
owned businesses. The best known case is the Yukos affair which began in 2003, but there 
have been many other, less prominent takeovers. It is no exaggeration to say that threats to 
property rights are an everyday concern for Russia’s private business actors, and that the state 
is now perceived as the greatest source of such threats (Gans-Morse, 2012; Rochlitz, 2013; 
Volkov, 2004).  
Because coercive takeovers involving the state have become such a prominent feature of the 
political economy of modern Russia, it is important that they be correctly understood. While 
many analyses of the Yukos affair specifically have emphasized its political motivations, it is 
also explained as having been essentially an illegal act of predatory takeover by corrupt state 
officials who were motivated by the desire to enrich themselves or increase their power. 
Studies of the wider phenomenon of coercive takeovers involving the state, including the 
works cited above, have emphasized the latter interpretation by seeing them as cases of 
reiderstvo (defining features of which are the illegality of the takeover and the venal motives 
of those involved in bringing it about). Such analysis contributes to the perception that Russia 
under Putin is essentially a kleptocracy, with the state (or individual state actors) given free 
rein to engage in economically-destructive attacks on property rights. 
This thesis is a study of a number of cases of state-led coercive takeover, including the Yukos 
affair. As the venn diagram in Figure 1 (Chapter 1) illustrated, it proceeds from a belief that 
some cases (perhaps a small fraction of the overall set, but including some takeovers of 
disproportionate political significance, including the Yukos affair) may be motivated by 
268 
 
considerations other than material gain. The cases were chosen for study in part because they 
appeared not to be explicable as examples of reiderstvo. The first central research question of 
the thesis therefore asked precisely what was motivating the state actors who were involved in 
instigating these takeovers.  
The Yukos affair saw the company broken up and its assets effectively nationalised: the 
government sold them off at auction and controlled the process in a way that ensured that 
almost all of the assets were bought by state-owned Rosneft’. Yukos’s fate has understandably 
been seen as part of (or as the beginning of) a broader trend of significant expansion of state 
ownership in Putin’s Russia, not only in the oil sector, but in the economy as a whole. Various 
explanations have been offered for this trend, which generally fall under the same categories 
as those offered for the Yukos affair specifically: it has been seen as driven by the rent-
seeking appetites of state officials, or as a response to their fear of the political threat posed by 
the ‘oligarchs’, or as an attempt at a state-led solution to developmental challenges. However, 
there is a puzzling feature to the state-led coercive takeovers studied in this thesis: some of 
them (i.e. the cases of Russneft’ and Bashneft’) resulted in the asset being sold to new private 
owners rather than being nationalised.  
These differing “ownership outcomes” present a problem when attempting to explain the 
motivations behind the takeovers: if companies are forcibly nationalised so that venal state 
officials can enrich themselves, then what explains those coercive takeovers that do not result 
in nationalisation? If there were other good reasons for wanting to increase the amount of state 
ownership (as part of a state-led developmental push, or as a way to counter the growing 
political power of the ‘oligarchs’), then why did the state not take the opportunity to 
nationalise all the targets of its coercive takeovers? The solution to this problem started with a 
recognition that state-led coercive takeover and expanding state ownership are two distinct 
phenomena from an analytical perspective: not only did some of the takeovers fail to have a 
nationalising outcome, but a significant proportion of the expansion of state ownership has 
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been the result of ‘voluntary’ acquisitions by state-owned companies rather than coercive 
takeover. The factors driving the expansion of state ownership might well be part of the 
explanation for the phenomenon of state-led coercive takeover, but they cannot account for 
the different forms of ownership that resulted, ranging from “state” to “private”. In order to 
gain an adequate understanding of state-led coercive takeovers, it was therefore necessary to 
address the latter point as a second central research question: what are the causal factors 
which determine the varying “ownership outcomes” of state-led coercive takeover? 
Causes of the takeovers: sovereign development 
To reiterate, this thesis does not set out to challenge the established notion that state-led 
coercive takeovers in Russia can be a form of reiderstvo, i.e. can be the work of state actors 
who are motivated by self-enrichment or self-aggrandisement. Instead it argues that this 
explanation does not hold for certain cases, including some that are highly significant. The 
same techniques that are used successfully by predatory state actors can be, and have been, 
used by the state to achieve political objectives. 
The thesis has coined the term “sovereign development” in an attempt to encapsulate the 
sometimes conflicting political objectives that underlie the takeovers studied here. Contrary to 
the notion that Putin’s Russia is a kleptocracy, it has followed Barnes (2006a, 2006b) and 
Wengle (2012) in arguing that the regime pursued economic development and subscribed to 
the view that the state needed to play an activist role in achieving it.  
However, economic development as a strategic goal occasionally conflicted with higher 
priorities. For reasons stemming from the way post-Soviet Russia had come into being in 
1991, and the way market-based institutions including privatisation were introduced in the 
1990s, Putin began his first presidency in 2000 facing threats to the supremacy of central state 
power. In other words, the concentrated political and economic power of certain ‘oligarchs’ 
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and the refusal of certain regional leaders to accept the Kremlin’s authority on their territory 
challenged what Krasner (1999) terms “domestic sovereignty”. While economic development 
was in many ways helpful in consolidating state power, it also threatened to strengthen further 
the political power of the forces that were believed to be posing a threat to sovereignty. Thus 
“sovereign development” involves two vectors (the pursuit of development and the pursuit of 
increased sovereignty) which in Putin’s Russia sometimes pointed in the same direction, but 
sometimes opposed each other. When they opposed each other, the perceived need to counter 
threats to sovereignty took precedence. 
The oil industry takeovers examined in Chapter 2 are best understood as cases where concerns 
over sovereignty trumped developmental considerations. The existing owners of all three 
targeted companies were involved in political activity that the government identified as a 
threat. The political leadership undertook to neutralise that threat through forcing the business 
owners to give up their assets. Aside from the possibility that the takeover of Bashneft’ was in 
part driven by the wish to see its petrochemicals assets opened up to the national and global 
economy, these were primarily politically-motivated takeovers that were undertaken despite 
the significant short-term economic damage they caused as demonstrative attacks on property 
rights. The primary objective in all three cases appears to have been to deprive the existing 
owners of their key assets as a way to neutralise them politically: precisely what form of 
ownership resulted and what happened to the assets subsequently was of secondary 
importance. 
At the same time, it would be wrong to suggest that the owners of the targeted businesses 
posed a credible danger to the incumbency of the Putin regime: only Khodorkovsky could be 
viewed as having had any ambitions to overthrow the government, and his chances of success 
in such an undertaking have been vastly exaggerated. The political danger that Putin and his 
allies identified in these business owners lay instead exclusively in their perceived 
undermining of the state’s sovereignty: Yukos and its owners were seen as exercising undue 
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influence over the workings of parliament and becoming involved in matters of foreign policy 
that were the government’s prerogative; the owners of Russneft’ and Bashneft’ were blamed 
for the Kremlin’s inability to exercise its authority over the Russian regions of Ingushetia and 
Bashkortostan, respectively.  
In Chapters 3 and 4 the takeovers had different motivations. Underlying them was a decision 
that the assets involved should be taken into state ownership: the lost assets of de facto state-
owned Gazprom should be returned to it; Atomstroieksport belonged in state hands because of 
the state guarantees to foreign buyers that formed the basis of its operations; OMZ’s Izhorskie 
Zavody in particular needed to be re-nationalised so that it did not hold the nuclear expansion 
programme to ransom by exploiting its monopoly on Russian reactor production. In each case, 
developmental considerations loomed larger than in Chapter 2. State control of Gazprom was 
to be consolidated and the company itself built up as a tool of domestic and foreign policy. 
Restoring ownership of some of these lost assets was intended to solve economic problems 
such as supporting the petrochemicals industry which was seen as one step up the value chain 
from mere natural gas production (Sibur), or keeping alive an ailing infrastructure services 
company that for social reasons could not be allowed to fail (Zapsibgazprom). As Russia’s 
last surviving enterprise that was capable of producing nuclear reactors, Izhorskie Zavody was 
particularly important to the ambitious developmental programme to expand the share of 
nuclear power in the country’s overall energy mix.  
However, in Chapters 3 and 4 there were related concerns over sovereignty and national 
security. The political leadership was undoubtedly concerned that it had only tentative control 
over Gazprom, its most strategically-important company, and that the company might fall into 
the hands of foreign or domestic ‘enemies’. Even if state control could be consolidated by 
obtaining direct control over a majority of the company’s voting shares, the fear remained that 
important Gazprom-owned assets might continue to go astray, thereby eroding the company’s 
strategic value. There was similar alarm at the prospect of other strategic companies such as 
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Atomstroieksport (the sole gateway for construction of nuclear power plants abroad) and 
OMZ’s Izhorskie Zavody becoming controlled not just by potentially uncooperative private 
business, but by hostile foreign powers. When OMZ’s owner Kakha Bendukidze joined the 
government of Georgia, it looked as though these fears were being realised. 
Causes of the takeovers: rival “rent-seeking” explanations 
How do alternative explanations based on rent-seeking fare as rivals to the above “sovereign 
development” hypothesis? If in fact these takeovers were motivated by rent-seeking, then all 
the talk of sovereignty, national security and development was a mere fig-leaf aimed at 
justifying what was essentially predatory reiderstvo. The oil industry cases in Chapter 2 
provide the most fertile ground for such an interpretation: they were lucrative takeover targets 
and (unlike in Chapters 3 and 4) there was no compelling or relatively self-evident reason for 
the state to want them to change ownership. The main challenge to the rent-seeking 
explanation for these cases lies in the contingent nature of their ownership outcomes. 
Rosneft’s political patrons (who are widely held to be responsible for instigating the Yukos 
takeover) cannot have known from the outset that ‘their’ company would emerge as the owner 
of the majority of Yukos’s assets, because, as Gustafson (2012, p. 314) puts it, that outcome 
was effectively a “fluke”. If they had embarked on the takeover in the hope of enriching 
themselves as the new owners of Yukos, they were therefore taking a surpringly large risk that 
they might lose out to another set of state officials altogether (i.e. the patrons of whichever 
other company might have emerged instead as the new owner). Similarly, the private 
businessmen who took ownership of Russneft’ and Bashneft’ do not appear to have been 
involved in instigating the takeovers: rather, they were chosen by the existing owners as 
people who could protect them from attack. If the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ takeovers had been 
instigated by state officials with rent-seeking motives, then they were botched attempts at 
reiderstvo. It is possible to construct elaborate theories involving rent-seeking ties between the 
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buyers of these companies and whoever was behind the original takeovers. Alternatively, it 
can be argued that eventually those buyers will sell the companies on to their intended owners, 
at which point everything will fall into place. But years have passed and (as of this writing) 
the Russneft’ takeover has been fully aborted with full ownership restored to its original 
owner. Meanwhile, Bashneft’ has still not been sold to Rosneft’ or Gazprom. As a result, 
attempts to explain these takeovers and their ownership outcomes through elaborate theories 
involving rent-seeking state officials have become increasingly difficult to sustain. By 
contrast, if the three oil industry takeovers were primarily aimed at neutralising the existing 
owners as a political threat by depriving them of their key assets, then it is no longer puzzling 
that their ownership outcomes were largely a matter of historical ‘accident’. 
In Gazprom’s campaign to re-gather its ‘lost’ assets, which was the subject of Chapter 3, there 
were questions around how the existing owners came to control the assets. Accordingly it is 
not so easy to claim that they were the innocent parties attempting to defend their property 
rights from reiderstvo staged by venal state officials. There is undoubtedly widespread 
corruption at Gazprom, and therefore any attempt by the company to increase the size of its 
assets can be seen as increasing the theoretical potential for rent-seeking. However, the way 
that the company managed its newly-regained assets is particularly difficult to square with the 
claim that it took them back so that certain state officials could enrich themselves further. For 
example, the decision to take ownership of Stroitransgaz seems to have been a genuine 
attempt to control the inflated costs of its relationship with that supplier (and it is precisely the 
inflated costs of such relationships that are the most fertile ground for rent-seeking). The 
attempt to save Zapsibgazprom from collapse might not have been commercially prudent, but 
it is not the behaviour one would expect from rent-seekers faced with an unprofitable 
business.  
In Chapter 4, the timing of the OMZ takeover shortly before the announcement of the 
government’s nuclear expansion programme certainly gave rise to a suspicion that this was a 
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rent-seeking acquisition by people acting on insider information. There looked to be 
significant potential for OMZ’s new owners to extract rents from Izhorskie Zavody’s 
monopoly on reactor production. Additionally, the failure of cooperation between Izhorskie 
Zavody and Rosatom was explained in the Russian press as the result of a factional struggle 
over the windfall of state budget money that was to be spent on financing the nuclear 
expansion. However, close examination of the way OMZ was managed under its new owners 
found evidence that was difficult to square with the idea that they were essentially rent-
seeking opportunists. Rather than using Izhorskie Zavody’s monopoly to hold Rosatom to 
ransom, they repeatedly sacked the chief executives of OMZ as they searched for someone 
who could improve relations with Rosatom. And as the company got into increasing financial 
difficulty (not least because of its dispute with Rosatom), they continued to lend it money to 
keep it afloat, apparently far beyond the point where this was commercially prudent. This 
practice of throwing good money after bad (as at Zapsibgazprom) is more commonly 
associated with state-owned companies operating under political pressure. It is not the 
expected behaviour of opportunistic rent-seekers, who when faced with such a situation would 
normally engage instead in predatory asset-stripping.  
In summary, the hypothesis that these state-led coercive takeovers were driven by the political 
leadership’s pursuit of “sovereign development” provides a significantly better fit for the case 
evidence than do rival explanations based on rent-seeking. Even if the patriotic declarations of 
state actors regarding sovereignty and national security are dismissed as mere cover for their 
true, venal, motives, rent-seeking explanations still founder on the evidence from Chapters 3 
and 4 regarding how the assets were subsequently managed by their new owners, and on the 
contingent nature of the ownership outcomes of Chapter 2.  
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Explaining the varying ownership outcomes 
In cases of reiderstvo involving state officials, one expects the targeted business to be 
acquired by whichever company (state-owned or private) acts as the vehicle for rent-seeking 
by the state officials responsible. But if, as argued above, the state-led coercive takeovers 
studied in this thesis were undertaken in pursuit of “sovereign development” rather than rent-
seeking, then the ownership outcomes of those takeovers are likely to have been determined 
by other factors.  
Pappe and Galukhina (2009, pp. 161–5) and Radygin and Mal’ginov (2006) have provided a 
set of factors that might determine whether or not a particular takeover results in 
nationalisation. These can be summarised by saying that nationalisation can be the result for 
political reasons: as part of a plan to increase state ownership in the sector, or in order to save 
the company (and/or a wider set of companies on which it depends) from collapse. But it can 
also be the outcome when, for exclusively commercial reasons, a state-owned company 
happens to be best positioned among potential buyers, i.e. it has both the resources available 
to buy the targeted business and a compelling business case for doing so. 
The above framework was intended to be applied when understanding the ownership outcome 
of any takeover. The evidence from the cases has indicated that for state-led coercive 
takeovers that are not cases of reiderstvo, the path to the ownership outcomes is altered 
substantially by the use of state coercion. Firstly, each takeover involved a two-way 
bargaining game between state and existing owner. In each case, the state applied a measure 
of coercion before presenting to the existing owner a “carrot-and-stick” offer, which, if 
accepted, would see the situation resolved peacefully. The evidence from the cases suggested 
that the offer typically entailed agreeing to sell the targeted business, but also undertaking to 
refrain from the activities that the state considered to be a threat. In some of the cases it also 
involved agreeing to leave the country. The owner could take some comfort from the fact that 
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he could expect to receive a substantial sum of money in exchange for the business – perhaps 
even approaching its market value.  
Despite the use of coercion, the evidence from the cases indicated that the state prefers a 
“negotiated” outcome to the takeover, where the owner accepts the “carrot-and-stick” offer. 
Such was the “bargaining outcome” of all but one of the cases studied, the exception being the 
Yukos affair. The reason for the state’s preference—what prevented it from simply pursuing 
forcible seizure of the assets in every case—was that the latter was expensive in terms of the 
administrative resources required to undertake it effectively. Furthermore, there were 
defensive tactics available to the existing owners that could help increase this expense – for 
example, by structuring ownership offshore and otherwise ‘internationalising’ the business.   
Chapter 1 noted that the process-tracing method adopted in this thesis should aim to provide 
causal explanations that are simple enough to be represented in an arrow-diagram – if this is 
not possible, then it is likely that the explanation itself is too “muddy” (Van Evera, 1997). 
Figure 10 builds on the game tree provided in Figure 2 (Chapter 1), by summarising how the 
“bargaining outcomes” of the takeovers (either the “negotiated” outcome involving the 
owner’s acceptance of the state’s “carrot-and-stick” offer, or “full-scale asset seizure” by the 
state) translate into their ownership outcomes. 
  
Figure 10. From bargaining outcomes to ownership outcomes
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nationalise the company, and what kind of company (state-owned or private) is best-placed 
from a commercial perspective to emerge as the buyer? However, the evidence from the cases 
has indicated that the use of state coercion increases the odds in favour of this “negotiated” 
bargaining outcome resulting in a private or quasi-state ownership outcome. This is because 
the state frequently uses an intermediary who promises to facilitate the negotiated outcome it 
prefers. In order to qualify as intermediary, the buyer needs to be at some remove from the 
forces identified by the existing owner as responsible for the coercion being used against him. 
The private business owners who emerged as buyers in the Russneft’ and Bashneft’ cases 
(Chapter 2) played such a role: they were not foisted by the state on the existing owners, but 
were approached and/or chosen by those owners as people who promised to be able to call off 
the Kremlin’s pressure. Similarly, in the Gazprom cases of Chapter Three, Usmanov was 
valuable to Gazprom as an intermediary because of his past dealings with its former 
management, with whom the existing owners had good relations, and because he was a private 
businessman in his own right as well as the hired manager of a de facto state-owned company 
(Gazprominvestholding). Remarks made by both the successful intermediaries (Usmanov and 
Yevtushenkov) and by some of the existing owners confirmed how resistant the latter were to 
the idea of being forced to sell to the same people who were responsible for the coercion 
being used against them. That these intermediaries would be involved in the ownership 
outcome as well as the negotiations is not entirely self-evident but also not surprising. It seems 
likely that Yevtushenkov helped Gutseriev on the condition (or at least on the understanding) 
that he would subsequently receive a 49% stake in Russneft’. Usmanov’s role as negotiator 
did not automatically translate into the selection of ‘his’ company Gazprominvestholding as 
the buyer, but it did favour that selection, because it increased his credibility as a negotiator 
independent from Gazprom and presumably gave him greater freedom to negotiate terms. 
As the arrow-diagram indicates, once the decision has been made to take a company into state 
ownership, a final choice is made between a direct purchase by a state-owned company and an 
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indirect purchase via one of its subsidiaries or affiliates. The Gazprom cases suggest that this 
decision can be driven in part by whether or not the indirect route promises to facilitate a 
negotiated outcome. But what became abundantly clear from Chapters 3 and 4 was that 
Gazprom also faced institutional constraints on its taking direct ownership of new 
acquisitions. These constraints largely consisted of controls aimed at ensuring that the 
management of a state-owned company cannot make decisions on the buying and selling of 
major assets without appropriate sign-off from the state, and that any large company obtain 
prior approval from the antitrust regulator before making acquisitions that had the potential to 
undermine competition in the market. The problem was less that the relevant approvals might 
not be forthcoming (though Gazprom was driven to conceal its involvement in the OMZ 
acquisition because of fears it would be blocked by a European body, and its quasi-affiliate 
Forpost-Management had its application to the Federal Antimonopoly Service turned down), 
and more that they took time to obtain, thereby reducing the ability of the state-owned 
company to respond in a flexible and agile manner in time-sensitive situations. The coercive 
takeovers were particularly time-sensitive: either the existing owners were strategizing to 
place their assets offshore or otherwise hamper the state’s ability to seize them, or (in the case 
of Atomstroieksport and OMZ) the same sovereignty-related reasons why the companies 
needed to be taken over also dictated that this be done as quickly as possible. Under the 
circumstances, the buyers felt they could not afford to wait for months for the appropriate 
sign-off from government and regulator. They discovered that by structuring the acquisitions 
via subsidiaries and other affiliates (or more specifically, via a pension fund whose legal 
status as an affiliate was usefully ambiguous), they were able to bypass these institutional 
constraints. 
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Kleptocracy and “coercion-constraining institutions” 
The two key arguments summarised above, which form the answers to the project’s central 
research questions, present a challenge to the notion that Russia is a kleptocracy. The term 
implies (in the words of the Bill Browder epigraph to the thesis) a ruling elite that is interested 
only in “stealing money” rather than “the execution of public service”. The evidence from the 
cases indicates that the state actors involved did in fact have a significant interest in “public 
service”, though that service was arguably more to the state (as they conceived it) than to the 
public. But kleptocracy also requires an environment that offers no meaningful constraints on 
the thieving ways of the ruling elite. Granted, all of the cases involved the use of state 
coercion in ways that would not be possible in a country where property rights are adequately 
protected from attack by the state. Indeed, if they did not involve such coercion, they would 
not have qualified as cases. But constraints on this coercion were important in shaping the 
takeovers in a number of key ways: 
• they meant that a negotiated outcome was favoured over full-scale asset seizure, 
therefore favouring private or quasi-state buyers and increasing the chances that the 
existing owner would walk away with substantial compensation for his assets;  
• they gave the existing owners real options in terms of tactics they could use to 
improve their bargaining position or rescue some of their assets from seizure; 
• they prompted state-owned companies to find indirect forms of ownership when 
acting as buyers in time-sensitive takeovers.  
In an ideal-type kleptocracy, the takeovers would have proceeded quite differently. There 
would have been no bargaining, no chance for the owners to salvage any of their assets, and 
no need for innovative new ownership structures. 
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The cases have shed some light on the question of precisely what institutions act as constraints 
on the state’s use of coercion to attack property rights. As noted in Chapter 1, Frye (2004) 
wrote that our understanding of this question was limited, but suggested that the key to 
tackling the “commitment problem” is a legal system and judiciary that is independent of the 
executive. Meanwhile, some scholars have argued that Russia’s legal system is best 
characterised by “telephone justice”, i.e. the ability of the executive to interfere arbitrarily in 
the workings of the courts, including by dictating verdicts (Ledeneva, 2008, 2011; Varese, 
2005). “Telephone justice” is the antithesis of what Frye suggests is crucial to constraining 
state coercion. Since the state’s actions are nevertheless being constrained somehow, we can 
conclude that either “telephone justice” does not extend to the whole of Russia’s legal system, 
or that the constraints come from outside that system. 
One constraint on state coercion that does indeed come from outside Russia’s legal system 
stems from the fact that the Russian state and Russian business do not exist in isolation from 
the rest of the world. International exposure means occasionally being subject to legal 
constraints from outside Russia’s jurisdiction. An excellent example is the US legal action 
brought by Yukos which forced Gazprom to abandon its plans to buy Yuganskneftegaz at 
auction. Rosneft’, whose international exposure at the time was minimal, was able to step into 
the breach. Similarly, Russia encountered difficulties securing the extradition of Yukos 
associates who had fled the country and were the subject of criminal cases286, and persuading 
Western courts to freeze Yukos assets earmarked for the Russian bankruptcy proceedings. In 
other cases, Gazprom was reportedly reluctant to pursue full-scale asset seizure against Sibur 
because this would entail a large-scale legal campaign in various countries, thanks to the 
complex offshore ownership structure Goldovsky had put in place. Gazprom was apparently 
                                                     
286 Here “telephone justice” at home worked actively against Russia’s purposes. Judges in Western 
countries turned down extradition requests on the grounds that there was no guarantee the individuals 
would receive a fair trial in Russia. 
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compelled to hide its beneficial ownership of OMZ because of fears the European 
Commission would not allow it to control OMZ’s Czech assets.  
However, it is also clear that the state and state-owned companies faced additional constraints 
that had no international dimension. For example, in Chapter 3 the existing owners of 
Gazprom’s ‘lost’ assets used share dilutions to weaken Gazprom’s ownership claims. At 
Zapsibgazprom, Gazprom was eventually able to have the share dilution annulled through the 
courts, but in the intervening period Zapsibgazprom had lost control of the South Russkoe oil 
field (the main asset of interest to Gazprom) through further share dilutions. At Sibur and 
Zapsibgazprom, Gazprom regretted its decision to begin bankruptcy proceedings because of a 
real danger that the assets could be lost to rival creditors. For all its access to “administrative 
resources”, it was not able to ensure the bankruptcy proceedings went exactly as it wanted. 
The existence of meaningful domestic constraints on state coercion, even in cases which had a 
clear political significance, lends weight to Hendley’s (2006, 2009) view that “telephone 
justice” is only part of the story in Russia’s legal system. In her view, it is better seen as 
“dualistic” and as an “equilibrium that somehow balances ‘rule by law’ and ‘rule of law’”. 
She sees the commercial arbitrazh courts as an area where particular progress has been made 
towards professionalism in recent years (Hendley, 2007). These courts are tasked with 
handling all economic disputes involving legal entities, and would have been the forum for 
legal action brought against the state-backed companies in chapters 3 and 4 if they had failed 
to comply with the antitrust and corporate governance laws. It is significant in this context that 
there has been a marked increase in firms’ willingness to take their disputes with state 
authorities to the arbitrazh courts (Gans-Morse, 2011, p. 40; Hendley, 2006, p. 367). 
However, as Hendley (2006, p. 361, 2007, p. 248 fn. 8) has pointed out, the arbitrazh courts 
have themselves been susceptible at times to “telephone justice”. They were complicit in the 
legal travesty of the Yukos affair: the grossly inflated claims for back taxes, which formed the 
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basis for the seizure of Yukos’s assets under the guise of bankruptcy, were given legal force 
by rulings from arbitrazh judges. Hendley’s conclusion is that “telephone justice” interferes in 
the normal workings of the arbitrazh courts when the Kremlin takes a particular interest in the 
outcome of certain cases, while routine cases are resolved in accordance with the law. 
It might be possible to conclude from this that the limited domestic institutional constraints on 
state coercion that we have observed in the case studies stem from the fact that “rule of law” 
operates outside of particular court cases in which the Kremlin takes a close interest. 
However, the Kremlin did take a close interest in all of the takeovers examined as case studies 
in the preceding chapters. Why did this interest not translate into complete freedom from 
domestic institutional constraints?  
The answer lies in the fact that each state-led coercive takeover involved a great deal more 
than a single court verdict. It could involve multiple court cases brought by state and existing 
owner, as well as claims by third parties such as rival creditors. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, 
constraints could also come from regulatory institutions (in this case, the FAS) that had 
limited powers to sanction companies or hinder their actions without having to turn to the 
courts, for example by delaying approval for deals or imposing certain conditions on that 
approval287.  
The number and complexity of interactions with the law and regulatory institutions is 
significant if the scope of “telephone justice” is limited by the Kremlin’s lack of 
administrative resources to micro-manage outcomes on a wider scale. As Hendley (2009, p. 
248 fn. 8) says, “it strains credulity to imagine that Kremlin officials are involved in resolving 
the hundreds of thousands of cases that are heard by the arbitrazh courts every year […]”. But 
at the same time, Hendley (2009) and Ledeneva (2008, p. 326 fn. 6) both suggest that judges 
                                                     
287 The FAS’s record of success in challenging Gazprom both in and out of court was patchy at best, but 
it was certainly enough to make Gazprom interested in complying with the relevant laws when there 
was no overriding imperative to get deals done quickly. 
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operate to some extent under a form of “self-censorship”: without the need for a telephone call 
from the Kremlin, they understand which way a court case should go when (for example) one 
side is a state-owned company and the other a private business. Other institutions which enjoy 
no real autonomy from the executive are presumably similarly able to understand instinctively 
how they should behave vis-à-vis state-owned or state-backed companies. If this “self-
censorship” were functioning perfectly, then the Kremlin’s attempt to micro-manage complex 
state-led coercive takeovers should not run up against any administrative constraints: all the 
judges and regulators involved should know how to behave without any direct guidance 
required. That is clearly not what was happening in the cases: in addition to the struggles of 
the FAS against Gazprom in Chapter 4, a good example is the way Alfa Group fought 
successfully against Gazprom to defend its interests as a Sibur creditor in Chapter 3.  
In some instances, the apparent willingness of courts and regulators to take a stand against a 
company as powerful as Gazprom might be down to corrupt influence, or the fact that 
Gazprom’s rivals had an equally powerful source of patronage inside the Kremlin. However, 
it seems unlikely that this can explain all the moments where Gazprom felt the force of purely 
domestic institutional constraints. The evidence points instead to partial progress having been 
made towards the establishment of viable, independent market institutions. But this progress 
towards “rule of law” is at least as vulnerable as the pursuit of economic development to being 
trumped by higher priorities288.  
Russia as flawed “developmental state” 
In arguing that the state actors involved in the coercive takeovers were motivated in part by 
developmental motives, this thesis has subscribed to the view that Russia was during this 
period not just some distance from being an ideal-type kleptocracy, but was in fact a form of 
                                                     
288 At the time of writing, there appears to be a serious risk that the partial progress in this area (and 
many others) will be undone by Russia’s incursions into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  
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“developmental state”. When they were not aimed solely at countering perceived threats to 
sovereignty, the coercive takeovers were part of a wider set of dirigiste policies that had 
economic development as their goal.  
However, the Russian variant of the “developmental state” was flawed in significant and 
instructive ways. The “developmental state” literature (e.g. Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; 
Leftwich, 1995) has pointed to the presence of an external security threat (e.g. the threat of 
invasion by a foreign power) as a factor that focuses the minds of state actors on the need to 
make a serious commitment to a state-led developmental push. The above discussion of 
“sovereign development” suggests that insecurity within a country’s borders (when state 
power has not been fully consolidated) can have the opposite effect of distracting state actors 
from developmental objectives289. In the Russian case this may have been enough to doom the 
state-led developmental project to partial success at best. The political elite’s apparently 
exaggerated, ideology-based sensitivity to threats to state security only compounded the 
difficulty. 
However, even in those cases where the state was not distracted by sovereignty concerns from 
pursuing developmental objectives (such as the attempt to integrate Izhorskie Zavody’s 
reactor production effectively into the overall nuclear industry development programme) the 
results were still patchy at best. That particular case was one of poor implementation, and not 
because of predatory behaviour on the part of state officials. In the absence of any meaningful 
market signals to help them agree on appropriate prices for reactors supplied by Izhorskie 
Zavody, the apparently development-minded state actors at Forpost-Management and at 
Rosatom were unable to cooperate effectively across the institutional lines that divided them. 
This underlines the importance of getting the right institutional design inside government. The 
“developmental state” literature already offers a potential solution to this problem in the form 
                                                     
289  Similarly, Leftwich (1995) observes that successful developmental states typically start from a 
position where state power and autonomy vis-à-vis national and foreign capital have already been 
consolidated. 
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of the “pilot organisation”: a single institution within government that enjoys some autonomy 
from the rest of the bureaucracy, and that is tasked with devising developmental policies and 
coordinating their implementation across state agencies (Johnson, 1982). A pilot organisation 
would have been of considerable value for cooperation between Izhorskie Zavody and 
Rosatom through its simply ensuring that a single government body had both the power and 
the motivation to make two subordinate government agencies work together effectively.  
The pilot organisation might also provide a solution to the drawbacks of the ‘directive’ system 
which is a central feature in the governance of Russia’s state-owned companies. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, this system requires sign-off from multiple state agencies before state 
representatives can vote at shareholder and board meetings. As Tompson (2008, p. 12) notes, 
this makes Russian state-owned companies inherently inefficient even when leaving aside 
their particular vulnerability (as he sees it) to corruption. It does so not solely because it is a 
piece of cumbersome ‘red tape’: it also exacerbates the historical problem noted by Vernon 
(1984) of state-owned companies being subject to poorly coordinated government control, and 
pursuing a multitude of sometimes conflicting political objectives. One solution to this 
problem, based on Hertog (2010), would be to allow state-owned companies to pursue profit-
maximisation with a minimum of government interference. However, this is not viable in 
situations where an important part of the raison d'être of the state-owned company is to 
pursue political objectives besides profit-maximisation. Replacing the ‘directive’ with a single 
sign-off from a pilot organisation would maintain the channel of government influence and 
control, but make it possible to exercise this control according to a single, coordinated 
strategy. The varying agendas of interested government agencies would have to be taken into 
account when the pilot organisation was formulating its strategy, but this process would be 
separated from the issue of obtaining government sign-off for particular votes at the board and 
shareholder meetings of state-owned companies. It would therefore allow the government to 
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use state-owned companies for ‘political’ purposes besides profit-maximisation, without them 
becoming subject to ‘mission creep’ and bureaucratic paralysis290. 
However, state-owned companies can be pulled in different directions by their masters in 
government not only because of flaws in their governance processes, but because the 
government has failed to devise an appropriate strategy for development. The Putin regime 
can perhaps be credited for having recognised the dangers of continuing to impose a 
neoliberal economic agenda, and for experimenting with forms of state intervention. In 
common with much of the rest of the world, Russia is feeling its way forward in terms of how 
best to bring the state back into economic strategy. But Putin’s policies have often been too ad 
hoc and impulsive to merit description as coherent strategy291.  
If the “developmental state” literature is correct, the economic challenge facing Russia 
requires a far more ambitious and coordinated response. The state will be required to settle on 
a few sectors that hold the potential to break the dependence on hydrocarbons and other 
primary natural resources, because it will not have sufficient administrative resources to 
spread its developmental efforts any wider. It will then need to devise and implement 
sophisticated policies aimed at fostering the growth of those sectors into serious contenders on 
the world market. As the apparent failure of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s 
nanotechnologies project indicates, these policies require long-term and institutional 
commitment rather than being associated too closely with the changing whims and fortunes of 
a particular politician or politicians.  
                                                     
290 Vernon notes that historically, various countries (including India) have attempted to solve the same 
problems through the creation of a special “ministry for state-owned enterprises, which was expected to 
act as both a buffer and an advocate for such enterprises within the ministerial structure”. The proposal 
made here is somewhat different, mainly because it places responsibility for strategic management of 
state-owned companies within the remit of a development-focused pilot organisation. This would 
eliminate the danger that a separate “ministry for state-owned enterprises” might begin pursuing its own 
self-interest (and that of the state-owned enterprises) at the expense of the wider developmental agenda. 
291 Granted, it may be that devising such a coherent strategy requires the creation and empowerment of 
a “pilot organisation” staffed with the best and brightest minds, sufficiently protected from political 
interference to prevent policy capture by vested interests, yet sufficiently “embedded” in society to 
ensure adequate policy implementation and feedback regarding successes and failures (Evans, 1995). 
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Making the decision to target only a small number of sectors for state support is bound to 
entail a more coherent strategy for dealing with the unprofitable sections of the Soviet 
industrial legacy. Autarchy is clearly a high priority for Russia’s security-minded political 
elite, and it has its place in any country’s economic strategy, but one suspects that Russia’s 
development is being hindered by an excessive emphasis on maintaining domestic production 
capabilities in many areas of the economy, including some where the national security 
imperative is limited. There may be other good reasons (both in terms of the social impact and 
the knock-on effect for other areas of the economy) for not letting much of Russia’s ailing 
industrial legacy go the way of creative destruction. But half-hearted and ad hoc attempts to 
keep alive failing enterprises such as Zapsibgazprom are surely not the answer. 
The world is full of examples where states have been unsuccessful in their attempts to make 
economic interventions, and a cynic might question the value of adding new case studies to 
the pile. But in an era of growing realisation that states are integral to all economies, it is more 
important than ever to learn the correct lessons from failed interventions as well as seeking to 
explain the rare successes. This thesis has argued that states’ economic interactions are too 
often explained away in terms of corruption and rent-seeking. The author hopes that it has 
made a small contribution towards correcting this imbalance, by providing an alternative 
account that allows for the possibility of state actors pursuing political objectives besides their 
own venal interest-maximising, and that focuses on institutional constraints on their efforts at 
economic intervention. 
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